State v. Daniels ( 2024 )

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PATRICIA DANIELS
(AC 46053)
Cradle, Suarez and Clark, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court following her
conviction of, inter alia, manslaughter in the first degree. She claimed that
the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of intentional man-
slaughter and that the trial court committed error in its jury instruction
concerning the element of intent. Held:
The state presented evidence from which the jury reasonably could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant collided with the vic-
tim’s vehicle intending to cause serious physical injury to another person.
The defendant, having implicitly waived any objection to the trial court’s
instruction to the jury on the element of intent, was unable to demonstrate
that a constitutional violation occurred that deprived her of a fair trial, and
she failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to relief under the plain
error doctrine.
Argued May 23—officially released October 1, 2024
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of manslaughter in the first
degree, and with one count each of the crimes of mis-
conduct with a motor vehicle, risk of injury to a child,
and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor
vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Kava-
newsky, J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court
vacated the conviction as to one count of manslaughter
in the first degree, and rendered judgment of guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree, misconduct with a
motor vehicle, risk of injury to a child, and evasion of
responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, from
which the defendant appealed to this court, Lavine,
Bright and Bear, Js., which reversed in part the trial
court’s judgment; subsequently, the state, on the grant-
ing of certification, appealed to the Supreme Court,
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State v. Daniels
which reversed in part the judgment of this court and
remanded the case to this court with direction to
remand the case to the trial court with direction to
reinstate the defendant’s intentional manslaughter con-
viction, to sentence the defendant on that count, and
to resentence the defendant on the remaining counts
of conviction; thereafter, the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Laila M.G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender,
with whom, on the brief, was Ruth Burke, certified legal
intern, for the appellant (defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,
state’s attorney, and Marc R. Durso, senior assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Patricia Daniels, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial,
of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) (intentional manslaughter).
The defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the conviction and (2) the court com-
mitted instructional error in its jury instruction concern-
ing the essential element of intent. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
In connection with a prior appeal, this court pre-
viously summarized the facts, as reasonably could have
been found by the jury, as follows: ‘‘The victim, Evelyn
Agyei, left her Bridgeport home at approximately 6 a.m.
on December 4, 2014. Her eleven year old son accompa-
nied her. Agyei and her son got into her Subaru Outback
(Subaru), Agyei driving and her son in the back seat
on the passenger’s side. After traversing some back
roads, they took Bond Street and arrived at the intersec-
tion of Bond Street and Boston Avenue. Agyei stopped
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at the red light and then proceeded to make a right turn
onto Boston Avenue, staying in the right lane. As she
was making the right turn, her son looked to the left
and saw a white BMW sport utility vehicle (BMW)
approximately two streets down, traveling at a high rate
of speed in the left lane.
‘‘After Agyei [turned] onto Boston Avenue, the driver
of the BMW pulled alongside Agyei’s vehicle. Agyei’s
son saw the BMW logo on the hood; however, he could
not see the driver or the license plate. The driver of
the BMW then moved into the right lane, hitting Agyei’s
Subaru once on the driver’s side and causing her to
begin to lose control of the vehicle. The driver of the
BMW then moved behind the Subaru and ran into it
from behind, causing the vehicle to cross the median,
proceed under a fence, and hit a tree. Tragically, Agyei
died from her injuries, and her son, who also was
injured, continues to have vision problems as a result
of the injuries he sustained. After an investigation . . .
the police, having concluded that the defendant was
the driver of the BMW that hit the Subaru [and] caus[ed]
Agyei’s death and the injuries to Agyei’s son, arrested
the defendant.’’ State v. Daniels, 191 Conn. App. 33,
36–37, 213 A.3d 517 (2019), rev’d in part, 342 Conn. 538,
271 A.3d 617 (2022).
In a long form information, the defendant was
charged with intentional manslaughter, manslaughter in
the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (3) (reckless
manslaughter), misconduct with a motor vehicle in vio-
lation of General Statutes § 53a-57 (a) (criminally negli-
gent operation), risk of injury to a child in violation of
General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), and evasion of responsi-
bility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation
of General Statutes § 14-224 (a). The jury found the
defendant guilty of all of these charged offenses, and
the court accepted the jury’s verdict. At the time of
the defendant’s sentencing, the trial court vacated the
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State v. Daniels
intentional manslaughter conviction at the state’s
request so as to avoid double jeopardy implications
pursuant to State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 61 A.3d
1084 (2013). See id., 245 (‘‘when a defendant has been
convicted of greater and lesser included offenses, the
trial court must vacate the conviction for the lesser
offense rather than merging the convictions’’). With
respect to the remaining charged offenses, the court
imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years of
incarceration, execution suspended after sixteen years,
followed by five years of probation.
In a prior appeal to this court, the defendant claimed,
in part, that the trial court had erred in accepting the
jury’s guilty verdicts on the intentional manslaughter,
reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent opera-
tion charges because they were legally inconsistent
insofar as each offense required a mutually exclusive
mental state. See State v. Daniels, supra, 191 Conn.
App. 36. This court concluded that the convictions of
reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent opera-
tion were legally inconsistent but that neither convic-
tion was legally inconsistent with the conviction of
intentional manslaughter. Id., 49, 51, 53. This court
reversed the judgment of conviction with respect to the
counts of reckless manslaughter and criminally negli-
gent operation and remanded the case to the trial court
for a new trial as to those charges as well as the charge
of intentional manslaughter. Id., 62–63.
Thereafter, our Supreme Court granted the state’s
petition for certification to appeal with respect to the
following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly
order a new trial rather than reinstate the defendant’s
conviction of intentional manslaughter in the first
degree, which was vacated for sentencing purposes
under State v. Polanco, [supra, 308 Conn. 242]?’’ State
v. Daniels, 333 Conn. 918, 216 A.3d 651 (2019). In State
v. Daniels, 342 Conn. 538, 271 A.3d 617 (2022), our
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Supreme Court agreed with the state that this court
had improperly ordered a new trial on the charges of
intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and
criminally negligent operation, rather than reinstating
the intentional manslaughter conviction. Id., 547. Rely-
ing on State v. Wright, 320 Conn. 781, 135 A.3d 1 (2016),
State v. Miranda, 317 Conn. 741, 120 A.3d 490 (2015),
and State v. Polanco, supra, 308 Conn. 242, our Supreme
Court concluded that the legal inconsistency in the ver-
dict as to the reckless manslaughter and criminally neg-
ligent operation charges did not taint the intentional
manslaughter conviction and that the reinstatement of
the latter conviction was the proper remedy. See State
v. Daniels, supra, 342 Conn. 554. Accordingly, our
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court
solely with respect to the remedy afforded the defen-
dant in her direct appeal to this court. See id., 562–63.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to this court
‘‘with direction to remand the case to the trial court
with direction to reinstate the defendant’s intentional
manslaughter conviction, to sentence the defendant on
that count, and to resentence the defendant on the
remaining counts of conviction . . . .’’ Id. Following
our remand to the trial court, the trial court imposed
a total effective sentence of seventeen years of incarcer-
ation, execution suspended after thirteen years, fol-
lowed by five years of probation for the crimes of which
the defendant presently stands convicted, namely,
intentional manslaughter, risk of injury to a child, and
evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor
vehicle. This appeal followed.1 In light of the claims
raised on appeal, the defendant asks this court to
reverse the intentional manslaughter conviction and
order either a directed verdict of not guilty on that
1
In this appeal, the defendant does not challenge the judgment of convic-
tion as to the crimes of risk of injury to a child or evasion of responsibility
in the operation of a motor vehicle.
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State v. Daniels
charge or a new trial on that charge. Additional facts
will be set forth as necessary.
I
First, the defendant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction of intentional
manslaughter. Specifically, the defendant argues that
the jury could not reasonably have found that she acted
with the requisite mental state necessary for the com-
mission of intentional manslaughter, the specific intent
to cause serious physical injury. The defendant argues
that, on the basis of the evidence before the jury, ‘‘it is
impossible to ascertain whether [she] changed lanes to
hit [Agyei’s] car or whether she simply did not see
[Agyei’s] car. None of her actions before or after evi-
dences any intent to run [Agyei’s] car off the road.
Second, even if the evidence is sufficient to show that
the incident was intentional, it is not sufficient to show
that [the defendant] intended to cause serious physi-
cal injury.’’
We begin by setting forth the principles that govern
our consideration of the claim. ‘‘[A] defendant who
asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an
arduous burden. . . . [F]or the purposes of sufficiency
review . . . we review the sufficiency of the evidence
as the case was tried . . . . [A] claim of insufficiency
of the evidence must be tested by reviewing no less
than, and no more than, the evidence introduced at
trial. . . . In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence
claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts
so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded
that the cumulative force of the evidence established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . This court can-
not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if
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there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s ver-
dict. . . .
‘‘[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty
of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and
inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is
reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a
basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted
to consider the fact proven and may consider it in com-
bination with other proven facts in determining whether
the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the
defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Moreover, it does not
diminish the probative force of the evidence that it
consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circum-
stantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact . . .
but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which
establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circum-
stantial evidence. . . . In evaluating evidence, the
[jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those
inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s inno-
cence. . . . The [jury] may draw whatever inferences
from the evidence or facts established by the evidence
[that] it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .
‘‘[O]n appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reason-
able view of the evidence that would support a reason-
able hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether
there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports
the jury’s verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Raynor, 175 Conn. App. 409, 424–26,
167 A.3d 1076 (2017), aff’d, 334 Conn. 264, 221 A.3d
401 (2019).
‘‘It is well established that the question of intent is
purely a question of fact. . . . The state of mind of one
accused of a crime is often the most significant and, at
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State v. Daniels
the same time, the most elusive element of the crime
charged. . . . Because it is practically impossible to
know what someone is thinking or intending at any
given moment, absent an outright declaration of intent,
a person’s state of mind is usually proven by circumstan-
tial evidence . . . . Intent may be and usually is
inferred from [conduct. . . . Whether] such an infer-
ence should be drawn is properly a question for the
jury to decide. . . . [I]ntent may be inferred from the
events leading up to, and immediately following, the
conduct in question . . . the accused’s physical acts
and the general surrounding circumstances.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Thompson, 146 Conn. App. 249, 277–78, 76 A.3d 273,
cert. denied, 310 Conn. 956, 81 A.3d 1182 (2013). ‘‘[T]he
determination of [intent] should stand unless the con-
clusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one. . . .
[T]he [trier of fact is] not bound to accept as true the
defendant’s claim of lack of intent or his explanation
of why he lacked intent. . . . Furthermore, it is a per-
missible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference
that a defendant intended the natural consequences
of his voluntary conduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Leuders, 225 Conn. App. 612, 625, 317
A.3d 69 (2024).
We now turn to the essential element of the offense
at issue in the present claim. Section 53a-55 (a) provides
in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious
physical injury to another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person . . . .’’ Intentional
manslaughter is a specific intent offense; the state bore
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury
to another person. Our legislature defines ‘‘[s]erious
physical injury’’ as ‘‘physical injury which creates a
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substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfig-
urement, serious impairment of health or serious loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily organ
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).
The state presented evidence from which the jury
reasonably could have found the following facts about
the automobile collision that led to Agyei’s death.2 The
collision occurred on a portion of Boston Avenue that
consists of a four lane road that is divided by a land-
scaped median. Two lanes of travel proceed eastbound
and two lanes of travel proceed westbound. The auto-
mobile operated by the defendant approached Agyei’s
automobile at a high rate of speed as Agyei made a
right turn from Bond Street onto Boston Avenue. The
defendant, who was in the left lane, pulled alongside
Agyei’s vehicle, which was in the right lane. At this
point in time, Agyei’s eleven year old son noticed the
defendant approach in what he would later describe to
be a white BMW SUV. As both automobiles moved in the
same direction, the front of the defendant’s automobile
struck the rear driver’s side of Agyei’s automobile. Agyei
began to lose control of her automobile. Seconds later,
the defendant moved into the right lane, behind Agyei,
and the front of her automobile struck the rear of Agy-
ei’s automobile a second time. As a result of the impact,
Agyei lost control of her automobile and it crossed the
median, proceeded under a fence, and struck a tree.
The state also presented evidence about the defen-
dant’s conduct following the collision. There was no
2
This version of events is consistent with the trial testimony of Agyei’s
son as well as images of the collision that were recorded by surveillance
cameras at a nearby school. The defendant does not dispute that the evidence
permitted the jury to find these facts about how the collision occurred but
argues that the jury could not reasonably have concluded that she acted with
the requisite mental state for the commission of intentional manslaughter.
Instead, she argues that ‘‘[t]he video shows [her automobile] striking [Agyei’s
automobile], both cars losing control, and [her automobile] striking [Agyei’s
automobile] again. The video shows that this was a terrible accident. It does
not show specific intent to harm the Agyeis.’’
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State v. Daniels
dispute that the operator of the automobile that collided
with Agyei fled the scene on December 4, 2014. The
police, relying on the description of the automobile
involved in the collision provided by Agyei’s son, began
contacting registered owners of BMW SUVs. Ultimately,
they questioned the defendant at her home in Bridge-
port on December 16, 2014. The defendant permitted
the police to inspect her white BMW SUV in the drive-
way. The police immediately noticed that the front
bumper of the automobile was damaged in a manner
consistent with it having been involved in the collision
that led to Agyei’s death. This led to the police
impounding the automobile.3
When officers spoke with the defendant at her home
on December 16, 2014, she told them that she first
noticed the damage to her automobile on December 8,
2014, after she had been released from a four day stay
in a hospital for psychiatric treatment.4 With respect to
her whereabouts on December 4, 2014, the date of the
collision, she stated that she had been having ‘‘some
psychological issues’’ and that she left her home ‘‘at
around 6 or 6:30 that morning and drove herself to St.
Vincent’s Hospital and checked herself in to the psych
3
The state presented evidence of the results of a forensic analysis of both
the defendant’s automobile and Agyei’s automobile. The results of such
analysis, including an analysis of paint samples taken from both automobiles,
supported a conclusion that the defendant’s automobile had struck Agyei’s
automobile.
4
The defendant presented evidence that she had been admitted voluntarily
to St. Vincent’s Medical Center on December 4, 2014. Brunoi Germain, a
psychiatrist employed by the hospital who treated the defendant, determined
that she was not stable enough to be released until December 8, 2014, in
part because she had made comments reflecting that she could have posed
a danger to her granddaughter in that she had expressed thoughts of kidnap-
ping her. Germain diagnosed the defendant as having an unspecified mood
disorder and she received mood stabilizer and antipsychotic medications
during her hospital stay.
We note that, although the jury was presented with evidence about the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the events at issue, the defendant
did not assert a defense of diminished capacity.
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unit.’’ She stated that her route to the hospital included
driving westbound on Boston Avenue in Bridgeport.
The defendant described some of the ‘‘issues’’ she had
been experiencing on December 4, 2014, which included
her relationship with her fiancé, whom she identified
as David Adkins. The defendant showed the officers
wedding rings she had purchased. The defendant told
the police that she was speaking with Adkins while
driving herself to the hospital and that she met Adkins
at the hospital before she decided ‘‘to check herself in.’’
The defendant also told the police that she was under
the belief that her granddaughter was being sexually
molested and that she was so upset that she was unable
to breathe and had not slept in several days.
The state presented evidence that the defendant vol-
untarily provided the police with sworn, recorded state-
ments on December 17 and 18, 2014. In her statement
of December 17, 2014, the defendant reiterated many
of the representations that she had made to the police
the day before. She also told the police that, earlier in
the year, she had been involved in an automobile acci-
dent in Waterbury in which she collided with a parked
automobile. She also explained that she drove to St.
Vincent’s Medical Center on December 4, 2014, rather
than Bridgeport Hospital, which was considerably
closer in distance to her residence, because she had
received psychiatric treatment at St. Vincent’s Medical
Center in 2003, and she did not believe that Bridgeport
Hospital had a psychiatric unit. In her much shorter
statement on December 18, 2014, the defendant
expressed her displeasure with the police for having
publicly identified her as a suspect in the crimes that
occurred on December 4, 2014.
The state presented evidence from which the jury
reasonably could have found that some of the defen-
dant’s representations to the police were false. For
example, the state presented testimony from Adkins
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State v. Daniels
that he was the pastor of a church in New Haven that
the defendant had attended over the course of many
years. Adkins testified that he had never been engaged
to the defendant, given the defendant an engagement
ring, or been in a romantic or sexual relationship with
her. Moreover, Adkins testified that he did not speak
with the defendant on December 4, 2014, nor was he
in Bridgeport that day. Cell phone records presented
by the state corroborated portions of his testimony.
There was undisputed evidence that the defendant
had, in fact, used her cell phone near 6:29 a.m., when
the collision occurred. The parties stipulated that the
defendant called 911 from her cell phone at 6:24 a.m.
The 911 dispatcher called her back immediately there-
after. The defendant called 911 again at 6:25 a.m. The
state presented evidence that the defendant sought
police assistance for what she described as a violent
incident involving several armed men, a woman, and a
baby at the intersection of Coleman Street and Vine
Street in Bridgeport. She stated that she was observing
this incident from a beige Nissan Maxima. When police
officers responded to the location described by the
defendant, they did not find any evidence of the armed
disturbance that she had described.
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury reason-
ably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant collided with Agyei intending to cause
serious physical injury to another person. First, there
was evidence of the defendant’s mental state generally
in the moments leading up to the collision. There was
evidence that the defendant made the decision to check
herself into a hospital for what she described as mental
issues, that she was upset about her relationship with
Adkins, and that she was so distraught about the situa-
tion that she perceived involving her granddaughter
that she was unable to breathe and had not slept in
several days. The jury, thus, reasonably could infer that
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the defendant was agitated, not calm, as she drove
herself to the hospital seeking treatment for what was
later diagnosed as a mood disorder.
Second, the jury reasonably could have drawn infer-
ences about the defendant’s mental state from the man-
ner in which she operated her automobile, an instru-
mentality that is capable of causing serious physical
injury. In her agitated state, she approached Agyei while
traveling at a high rate of speed. She initially struck the
rear driver’s side of Agyei’s automobile while she was
steering into the right lane. Seconds later, she moved
into the right lane directly behind Agyei’s automobile
and struck the rear of it with sufficient force to cause
it to spin out of control. The fact that the defendant
did not bring her automobile to a stop or otherwise
take steps to avoid striking Agyei following the initial
collision, but instead struck Agyei a second time, caus-
ing Agyei to lose control, cross the median, and, ulti-
mately, strike a tree, supported a finding that the defen-
dant intended to cause serious physical injury. The jury
also was presented with photographs of Agyei’s auto-
mobile following the collision as well as the surveillance
footage taken of the collision. The jury reasonably could
have inferred that, at the time of the collision, Agyei’s
automobile should have been visible to other drivers,
including the defendant, and the fact that the defendant
struck Agyei’s automobile twice, viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, reflected an intent to cause serious
physical injury.
Third, the jury reasonably could have found that, in
the aftermath of the collision, the defendant engaged in
conduct that demonstrated her intent to cause serious
physical injury and her consciousness of guilt.5 ‘‘Evi-
dence that an accused has taken some kind of evasive
action to avoid detection for a crime, such as flight,
5
The court delivered a consciousness of guilt jury instruction in this case.
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State v. Daniels
concealment of evidence, or a false statement, is ordi-
narily the basis for a [jury] charge on the inference
of consciousness of guilt.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Vasquez, 133 Conn. App. 785, 800, 36
A.3d 739, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 921, 41 A.3d 661 (2012).
The evidence demonstrated that the defendant fled the
scene of the collision rather than stopping to help the
occupants of Agyei’s automobile or summon first
responders to the scene. The jury could reasonably have
inferred that the defendant’s failure to summon aid
immediately following the collision supported a finding
that she, in fact, intended to cause serious physical
injury by striking Agyei’s automobile. Moreover, when
the police located the defendant and questioned her
concerning the events of December 4, 2014, she pro-
vided false information that tended to exculpate herself
from her criminal conduct. Specifically, the defendant
told the police that she was engaged to Adkins, that
she was speaking on her cell phone with Adkins at the
time of the collision, and that Adkins met her at the
hospital that morning. The jury reasonably could have
found that all of these statements were false and that the
defendant had made these false statements knowingly
because she knew that she had intentionally caused the
collision that led to Agyei’s death.
The defendant urges us to conclude that the evidence
of intent was insufficient because, here, ‘‘there is simply
no indicia that [she] intended to hit [Agyei’s automobile]
or even knew it was there.’’ She also argues that, here,
‘‘[she] did not display any sort of intent to seriously
physically injure. There was no prior indication that
she arbitrarily felt like running total strangers off the
road to hurt them. Nor did the evidence ever show any
relationship at all with the Agyei family, much less an
acrimonious one.’’ The defendant urges us to conclude
that the state failed to prove the requisite intent because
‘‘the surrounding circumstances’’ do not suggest that
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she intended to harm the victims in this case and the
manner in which the collision occurred reflects ‘‘that
this was a terrible accident.’’
The defendant’s arguments invite this court to con-
strue the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defense. As we explained previously, our role in evaluat-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence is to evaluate the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict. To the extent that the defendant argues that, in
contrast with other cases, the evidence was insufficient
because the circumstances surrounding the collision
did not readily explain her motive to cause serious
physical injury to the particular victims of her criminal
conduct, her argument puts a higher burden on the
state than is required.6 The state was not required to
prove that an acrimonious relationship existed between
6
The defendant relies on State v. Goldberger, 118 Conn. 444, 173 A. 216(1934) (affirming conviction of murder in second degree); State v. Santiago,
206 Conn. App. 390, 260 A.3d 585 (affirming conviction of attempt to commit
assault in first degree and attempt to commit assault of peace officer), cert.
denied, 339 Conn. 918, 262 A.3d 138 (2021); and State v. Andrews, 114 Conn.
App. 738, 971 A.2d 63 (affirming conviction of attempt to commit assault
in first degree and attempt to commit assault of peace officer), cert. denied,
293 Conn. 901, 975 A.2d 1277 (2009). First, these cases are factually distin-
guishable, and they do not require as a matter of law that intent be proven
by means of any specific type of evidence. They reflect that the issue of
intent is inherently fact bound and must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. Second, even if we assume, arguendo, that the state’s evidence of
intent was stronger in these cases than in the present case, it in no way
undermines the inquiry before us based on the evidence in the present case.
Although these cases may be instructive, they are not dispositive. We must
construe the evidence in the present case in the light most favorable to the
state and to determine whether, in light of the evidence so construed, the
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
with the requisite intent.
The defendant also relies on out of state cases, including State v. Chalmers,
100 Ariz. 70, 411 P.2d 448 (1966); Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 Pa. 527,
716 A.2d 593 (1998); and Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d
616 (1995). These cases, which are factually distinguishable from the present
case, do not affect our evaluation of whether the evidence presented in the
present case supported the jury’s finding that the defendant acted with the
specific intent to cause serious physical injury.
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State v. Daniels
the defendant and one or more occupants of Agyei’s
automobile or that the defendant stood to gain by caus-
ing one or more occupants serious physical injury.
Although evidence of such facts would have been rele-
vant to the issue of the defendant’s intent, our inquiry
is to evaluate the evidence that was before the jury.
Here, for the reasons we have explained, the evidence
of the defendant’s operation of her automobile, the evi-
dence of her agitated state prior to the events at issue,
and her conduct following the collision afforded the
jury a basis upon which to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that she intended to inflict serious physical injury.
II
Next, the defendant claims that the court committed
instructional error in its jury instruction concerning the
essential element of intent. Specifically, the defendant
challenges the portion of the court’s intent instruction
in which it stated that an inference that there was intent
to cause serious physical injury could be drawn from
her use of an automobile during the events at issue.
Primarily, the defendant argues that the court’s instruc-
tion violated her due process right to a fair trial. Alterna-
tively, the defendant argues that the instruction consti-
tutes plain error. We conclude that the defendant
waived her constitutional challenge at trial and that she
has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to relief
under the plain error doctrine.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. On December 7, 2016, after the parties rested
their cases, the court dismissed the jury for the day
and the following colloquy with counsel occurred:
‘‘The Court: [H]ow much time, if any, do the attorneys
need before they see me on the charge conference?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Judge, have we seen a copy of
the charge yet? I’ve not.
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‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I haven’t—
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I don’t need any. I’m prepared
to . . . attend now if there’s nothing to review. I’m
prepared.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Yeah, we can . . . discuss it now.
‘‘The Court: No, I don’t have a written copy—
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Oh.
‘‘The Court: —printed out, but I will give you one
. . . once I do it, but I don’t.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I’m prepared now.
‘‘The Court: Okay. State ready, too?
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Okay, then this [is] what we’ll do. I’m
going to adjourn in a moment. I’ll . . . see the attorneys
in back for a charge conference. We’ll put the results
of the charge conference on the record tomorrow, as
is required before argument, and then the attorneys will
be prepared to argue the case.’’
The next morning, the court began the proceeding,
outside of the presence of the jury, by stating that it
was providing ‘‘replacement pages’’ to the attorneys for
the portion of its charge in which it discussed the
offense of evasion of responsibility. The following collo-
quy between the court, the prosecutor, and defense
counsel followed:
‘‘The Court: I want to summarize the charge confer-
ence we had briefly yesterday and into today.
‘‘I did send a copy of the substantive offenses to
counsel by email last night . . . 8 p.m., 8:30 there-
abouts. The only change I made to that, I think, relates
to the evasion of responsibility count that we just talked
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State v. Daniels
about. Then earlier this morning, I sent the entirety of
the charge.
‘‘In terms of the way I do intend to charge and the
charge conference we had, I’m going to go over what
I’ll just call, very briefly, the headnotes.
‘‘I’m going to charge on the function of the court and
jury, the presumption of innocence, burden of proof,
reasonable doubt, evidence, circumstantial and direct
evidence, inferences, credibility of witnesses, evaluat-
ing credibility of witnesses.
‘‘I’m also doing an instruction on evidence admitted
for a limited purpose. We’ve gone over that, and I’ve
given you a copy of that, relating to the use of certain
evidence by way of what the defendant may have said
to others, expert testimony, the testimony of police
officers.
‘‘I am giving an instruction on evidence of conscious-
ness of guilt as requested by the state. I know there’s
a defense objection to that. But it will relate primarily
to issues of flight, if in fact they deem she was involved
in an incident and did, in fact, flee, and that was unex-
plained. And also relating to purported statements she
made [concerning] [Adkins].
‘‘The state put on evidence that would appear to
contradict those. It’s for the jury to determine whether
or not the defendant’s statements that were made and
were false or not. But if they choose to believe she
made them and they are false, they can use that as
evidence of consciousness of guilt. That’s all in my
instructions.
‘‘I am giving an instruction on the defendant’s election
not to testify, the nature of the information and then
I’m going to instruct on manslaughter first in count one,
intentional manslaughter first recklessness indifference
in count two.
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‘‘I am giving a lesser included offense on count two
of manslaughter second. I’m going to instruct count
three, misconduct with a motor vehicle, and I am going
to give a lesser offense there that was requested by
both sides, negligent homicide with motor vehicle. I’m
going to give a count four, risk of injury to a minor,
situation risk.
‘‘Count five, evading responsibility—we’ve talked
about that, and then the concluding remarks; notetak-
ing, how they’re to render their verdicts, the irrelevance
of any punishment, the duties upon retiring and how
they’re to communicate with the court.
‘‘Now, just in terms of the charge conference, is there
anything the state wants to add or correct concern-
ing that?
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: No, I don’t believe so, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: The defense?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: No, sir.
‘‘The Court: Okay. Then will the attorneys be ready
when the jury comes out to argue?
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Judge. I—I heard the court
say that it noted our objection to the consciousness of
guilt charge. I just want to say the word so that it’s not
waived. We . . . object to giving that charge.
‘‘The Court: Okay.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I just want to make sure nobody
claims waiver, you know.
‘‘The Court: No. It’s clear you’re objecting, okay.’’
Thereafter, the prosecutor and defense counsel made
closing arguments to the jury. The court then delivered
its jury charge. The court provided the following
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State v. Daniels
instruction concerning the requisite intent for inten-
tional manslaughter: ‘‘For you to find the defendant
guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The first element
is that the defendant specifically intended to cause seri-
ous, physical injury to another person. Intent relates to
condition of mind of the person who commits the act;
her purpose in doing it. Specific intent is the intent to
achieve a specific result. It is a conscious objective to
cause such result. The specific intent for the crime
of intentional manslaughter in the first degree is the
intention to cause serious, physical injury to another
person; here, [Agyei]. There is no particular length of
time necessary for a defendant to have formed the spe-
cific intent to cause such injury.
‘‘What the defendant intended is a question of fact
for you to determine. You should consider all of the
evidence as it pertains to the defendant’s intent. What
a person’s intention was is usually a matter to be deter-
mined by inference. No person is able to testify that he
looked into another’s mind and saw therein a certain
knowledge or a certain purpose or intention to do harm
to another. Because direct evidence of the defendant’s
state of mind is rarely available, intent is generally
proved by circumstantial evidence. The only way a jury
can ordinarily determine what a person’s intention was
at any given time, is by determining what the person’s
conduct was and what the circumstances were sur-
rounding that conduct, any words spoken by the defen-
dant and any statements she made. To draw an infer-
ence concerning someone’s intent from this
circumstantial evidence is the proper function of a jury,
provided of course that the inference drawn complies
with the standards for inferences as explained in con-
nection with my instruction on circumstantial evidence.
The inference is not a necessary one. You’re not
required to infer a particular intent from such evidence,
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but it is an inference that you may draw if you find it
is reasonable and logical.
‘‘You may also consider the nature of the injuries
inflicted upon the decedent, as well as the instrumental-
ity, the motor vehicle, as evidence [of] intent, and from
such evidence an inference may be drawn that there
was intent to cause serious, physical injury. Any infer-
ence that may be drawn from the nature of the instru-
mentality used and the manner of its use is then an
inference of fact to be drawn by you upon consideration
of these and other circumstances in the case in accor-
dance with my previous instructions. Remember that
the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt
is on the state.’’
After it delivered its charge, the court, outside of the
presence of the jury, separately asked the prosecutor
and defense counsel whether there were any exceptions
to the charge. The state raised an issue with respect to
the court’s instruction concerning expert testimony that
did not ultimately lead to a corrected instruction.
Defense counsel, renewing his earlier objection, stated
that he took exception ‘‘[o]nly with respect to con-
sciousness of guilt, sir, nothing else.’’
We first address the defendant’s argument that the
portion of the court’s instruction concerning intent in
which it permitted the jury to consider her use of an
automobile violated her right to due process. The defen-
dant acknowledges before this court that she did not
preserve this claim for review, but she seeks review
pursuant to the bypass rule set forth in State v. Golding,
213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188(2015). ‘‘Pursuant to Golding, a [defendant] can prevail
on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial
only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
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State v. Daniels
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the [defendant] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harm-
less error analysis, the [state] has failed to demonstrate
harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two steps in
the Golding analysis address the reviewability of the
claim, [whereas] the last two steps involve the merits
of the claim.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Gabriella M., 221 Conn. App. 827,
836, 303 A.3d 319, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 925, 304 A.3d
443 (2023).
The state argues that the defendant implicitly waived
the unpreserved claim of a constitutionally defective
jury instruction under State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447,
10 A.3d 942 (2011), and that she is therefore unable to
prevail under Golding. In Kitchens, our Supreme Court
reasoned that ‘‘when the trial court provides counsel
with a copy of the proposed jury instructions, allows
a meaningful opportunity for their review, solicits com-
ments from counsel regarding changes or modifications
and counsel affirmatively accepts the instructions pro-
posed or given, the defendant may be deemed to have
knowledge of any potential flaws therein and to have
waived implicitly the constitutional right to challenge
the instructions on direct appeal.’’ Id., 482–83.
In the present case, the record reflects, and the par-
ties do not dispute, that the court provided the parties
with a written copy of its proposed jury instructions
by email at approximately 8:30 p.m. on December 7,
2016. The proposed instructions contained the instruc-
tion that is the subject of the present claim. We are
persuaded that, because counsel had the instructions
overnight, the court afforded counsel a meaningful
opportunity to review the proposed instructions prior
to the court proceeding on the following day. See, e.g.,
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State v. Davis, 311 Conn. 468, 480–81, 88 A.3d 445 (2014)
(opportunity to review proposed jury instructions over-
night amounts to meaningful review); State v. Leach,
165 Conn. App. 28, 33–34, 138 A.3d 445 (same), cert.
denied, 323 Conn. 948, 169 A.3d 792 (2016).
The defendant argues that this court should narrowly
define what satisfies an opportunity to review jury
instructions ‘‘overnight.’’ Specifically, the defendant
argues that ‘‘ ‘[o]vernight’ should mean that the court
must provide the advanced copy by 5 p.m., and it must
be delivered in person and on the record. By 8 p.m.,
time is getting very short. This court should consider
that the attorneys may have family or other obligations
in the evenings. Moreover, if the copy is delivered by
email, the attorney may not see it for a few more hours,
if at all. There is no guarantee that it will even show
up in the attorneys’ inboxes.’’ The defendant’s argument
in this regard is not persuasive. As the record reflects,
on December 8, 2016, when the court asked counsel
about the proposed jury instructions that it had emailed
to counsel the night prior, defense counsel in no way
indicated that he did not have a meaningful opportunity
to review the instructions. In line with his basic duty
to review the instructions on behalf of the defendant,
it was reasonable for the court to expect that defense
counsel had an affirmative obligation to inform the
court if he was not prepared to proceed or needed more
time to prepare to discuss the proposed jury charge.
No such requests were made by defense counsel even
though the court did not in any way suggest that it
would not afford counsel more time, if requested, to
review the proposed charge. Contrary to the arguments
being raised presently, defense counsel did not state
that other obligations prevented him from reviewing
the instructions overnight, that he did not timely notice
the proposed instructions in his email, or that he simply
never received them in his email. Instead, all of defense
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State v. Daniels
counsel’s responses to the court’s inquiries unequivo-
cally indicated that he was ready to address the sub-
stance of the court’s draft jury charge and proceed to
closing arguments.
This court does not apply the implicit waiver doctrine
set forth in Kitchens in a rigid or mechanistic fashion.
We are ever mindful that an evaluation of waiver must
be made on a case-by-case basis and that, ‘‘in most
instances, a combination of facts and circumstances
rather than any single fact will support a finding of
waiver.’’ State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 411, 147 A.3d
655 (2016). We decline to resolve the waiver issue in
the present case on hypothetical facts that are foreign
to the record before us. Neither our Kitchens case law
nor the unique facts of the present case support the
defendant’s argument that defense counsel’s ability to
review the emailed proposed jury instructions overnight
did not amount to a meaningful opportunity for review.
The following morning, when the court solicited com-
ments from counsel regarding changes or modifica-
tions, defense counsel affirmatively accepted the
instructions proposed by the court. The court specifi-
cally referred to its instruction on ‘‘manslaughter first
in count one’’ and thereafter asked defense counsel if
there was anything ‘‘to add or correct’’ in its proposed
charge. Defense counsel replied, ‘‘No, sir.’’ Following
the charge, defense counsel did not take an exception
to the charge based on the intent instruction at issue
in the present claim.
Because, under Kitchens, the defendant implicitly
waived any objection to the court’s intent instruction,
she is unable to demonstrate under Golding’s third
prong that a constitutional violation occurred that
deprived her of a fair trial.
We now turn to the defendant’s argument that the
portion of the court’s instruction concerning intent in
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26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1State v. Daniels
which it permitted the jury to consider her use of an
automobile constitutes plain error. See Practice Book
§ 60-5.7 It is well settled that a conclusion that an implicit
waiver under Kitchens has occurred does not necessar-
ily preclude appellate relief under the plain error doc-
trine with respect to that same claim. See State v.
McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 808, 155 A.3d 209 (2017).
‘‘[I]f a claim is unpreserved . . . an appellate court
may in the interests of justice notice plain error not
brought to the attention of the trial court. . . . Applica-
tion of the plain error doctrine is nevertheless reserved
for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the exis-
tence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness
and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
proceedings. . . . [Thus, a] defendant cannot prevail
under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demon-
strates that the claimed error is both so clear and so
harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would
result in manifest injustice. . . .
‘‘There is a two step framework for evaluating claims
under the plain error doctrine. First, we must determine
whether the trial court in fact committed an error and,
if it did, whether that error was indeed plain in the
sense that it is patent [or] readily discernable on the
face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . .
obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . [T]his
inquiry entails a relatively high standard, under which
it is not enough for the defendant simply to demonstrate
that his position is correct. Rather, the party seeking
plain error review must demonstrate that the claimed
impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as
to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
7
Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The court shall not be
bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose
subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain
error not brought to the attention of the trial court. . . .’’
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State v. Daniels
v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 315–16, 280 A.3d 601,
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022).
The defendant argues: ‘‘The facts of this case do not
support the deadly weapon instruction [delivered by
the court].8 First, the inference tends to arise only in a
very narrow subset of cases where it is almost incontro-
vertible. The instruction usually applies when the
weapon [used] has the sole purpose of inflicting serious
physical injury on someone, such as a firearm. . . . In
Connecticut, it is supposed to apply when it is used on
the vital part of another. . . .
‘‘Neither of these situations exist[s] in the present
case. Although a car is a deadly weapon; see General
Statutes § 53a-3 (7); its existence is not premised on its
ability to fatally injure someone. Context is critical
when a motor vehicle is involved. Here, although the
accident was fatal, the facts do not support the inevita-
ble conclusion that [the defendant] was using the car
to badly hurt someone. There was no evidence that she
chased [Agyei’s automobile] down, that she was waging
a vendetta against [Agyei] and her son, or even that she
was exhibiting road rage, as the state argued.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks
8
The defendant describes the portion of the court’s intent instruction at
issue, concerning her use of an automobile, as a ‘‘deadly weapon’’ instruction.
The court, however, did not refer to the defendant’s automobile, let alone
any other evidence before the jury in this case, as a deadly weapon.
We note that a ‘‘deadly weapon’’ ‘‘means any weapon, whether loaded or
unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged, or a switchblade knife,
gravity knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, or metal knuckles. . . .’’ General
Statutes § 53a-3 (6). An automobile, nevertheless, may be deemed to be a
‘‘dangerous instrument,’’ which ‘‘means any instrument, article or substance
which, under the circumstances in which it is used or attempted or threat-
ened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury, and
includes a ‘vehicle’ as that term is defined in this section and includes a
dog that has been commanded to attack, except a dog owned by a law
enforcement agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof or of
the federal government when such dog is in the performance of its duties
under the direct supervision, care and control of an assigned law enforce-
ment officer . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (7).
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28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1State v. Daniels
omitted.) The defendant argues that the instruction was
improper because it ‘‘gave the jury permission to find
that [she] intended to cause serious physical injury
based solely on the facts that [Agyei] died and that [the
defendant] was driving a car.’’
The defendant argues that the error was clear, obvi-
ous, and indisputable and that ‘‘[e]xpanding the deadly
weapon doctrine to an accident such as this one put
[her] at a huge disadvantage. It will also affect public
confidence in our justice system, as our citizens are all
at risk [of] being convicted of manslaughter when such
accidents occur.’’
First, we observe that the defendant focuses on iso-
lated portions of the court’s intent instructions, specifi-
cally, the portions concerning the defendant’s use of
an automobile in connection with Agyei’s death. She
fails to properly view those portions of the instruction
in the context of the entire charge. See, e.g., State v.
Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 308, 221 A.3d 798 (2019) (‘‘indi-
vidual instructions are not to be judged in artificial
isolation from the overall charge’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Here, as we set forth previously, the
court instructed the jury to consider ‘‘all of the evidence
as it pertains to the defendant’s intent.’’ (Emphasis
added.) It also stated that the issue of intent was gener-
ally resolved on the basis of circumstantial evidence
and ‘‘by determining what the person’s conduct was
and what the circumstances were surrounding that
conduct, any words spoken by the defendant, and any
statements she made.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court
cautioned the jury that it ‘‘may’’ infer a particular intent
on the part of the defendant if it finds that it is reason-
able and logical. The court then stated, ‘‘[y]ou may also
consider the nature of the injuries inflicted upon the
decedent, as well as the instrumentality, the motor vehi-
cle, as evidence of intent, and from such evidence an
inference may be drawn that there was intent to cause
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State v. Daniels
serious, physical injury. Any inference that may be
drawn from the nature of the instrumentality used and
the manner of its use is then an inference of fact to be
drawn by you upon consideration of these and other
circumstances in the case in accordance with my pre-
vious instructions.’’
A review of the court’s instructions readily reflects
that the court did not instruct the jury that it was permis-
sible for it to find that the defendant intended to cause
serious physical injury to another based solely on the
fact that Agyei died and that her death was caused by
the defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle. Such an
interpretation of the charge is unreasonable. Instead,
the court’s instructions, read broadly and realistically,
permitted the jury, in its evaluation of all of the evi-
dence, to consider ‘‘the nature of the instrumentality
used and the manner of its use’’ in its evaluation of
intent.
Second, the defendant’s claim is premised on her
erroneous belief that the charge was inapplicable
because the evidence was insufficient to support a find-
ing that she intended to cause serious physical injury.
This is reflected in her arguments that the collision that
caused Agyei’s death was ‘‘an accident’’ and that the
facts do not support a finding that she was operating her
automobile ‘‘to badly hurt someone.’’ We have rejected
materially similar arguments of this nature in part I of
this opinion. The defendant does not appear to cast
doubt on the basic principle that, depending on the
circumstances of its use, an automobile can be a danger-
ous instrument that is capable of causing serious physi-
cal injury. In light of the evidence presented by the
state, the court properly invited the jury to consider
the surrounding circumstances of her use of her auto-
mobile in the present case to determine whether she
intended to cause serious physical injury.
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Third, even if we were to conclude that the court’s
charge was improper, we nevertheless would conclude
that the alleged error was neither patent nor readily
discernable on the face of the record. The defendant
does not argue that the instruction is legally flawed but
that it was unwarranted in light of the evidence before
the jury. Despite the defendant’s characterization of the
nature of the claimed error, she has not satisfied the
high standard of demonstrating an error that was so
clear, obvious and indisputable that it warrants the
extraordinary remedy of reversal. In light of the forego-
ing, we are not persuaded that plain error exists.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.