Williams v. United States ( 2022 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 17-CF-944
CARRINGTON WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
V.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia
(CF3-14625-15)
(Hon. Zoe Bush, Trial Judge)
(Argued June 23, 2020 Decided February 10, 2022)
Fleming Terrell, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam and
Jaclyn Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant.
Daniel Lenerz, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu,
United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, John
P. Mannarino and David P. Saybolt, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on
the brief for appellee.
Before THOMPSON, * Associate Judge, and WASHINGTON and FISHER, **
Senior Judges.
*
Judge Thompson was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of
argument. Although her term expired on September 4, 2021, she will continue to
serve as an Associate Judge until her successor is appointed and qualifies. See
D.C. Code § 11-1502 (2012 Repl.) She was appointed on October 4, 2021, to
perform judicial duties as a Senior Judge. See D.C. Code § 11-1504(b)(3) (2012
(continued…)
2
WASHINGTON, Senior Judge: Appellant, Carrington Williams, was indicted
on eight counts stemming from incidents that took place at his former girlfriend’s
apartment on the evening of September 26 and into the morning of September 27,
2015. The case first went to trial on November 15, 2016, but before the jury was
sworn, one of the complainants in this case, Derrick Brown, was arrested on
charges of “domestic violence” against one of the other complainants, Tonica
Belton. As a result, the trial was postponed. In March 2017, appellant was
convicted after a jury trial of first-degree burglary, first-degree burglary while
armed, two counts of destruction of property, assault with significant bodily injury,
and two counts of simple assault. In this appeal, appellant argues that the trial
court erred by concluding that he could be convicted of two counts of first-degree
burglary, first for entering an apartment and again for entering a bedroom within
the apartment, both belonging to the same complainant; and by curtailing the
defense’s impeachment of Mr. Brown. 1 Concluding that the burglary statute does
(…continued)
Repl.). She will begin her service as a Senior Judge on a date to be determined
after her successor is appointed and qualifies.
**
Judge Fisher was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument.
His status changed to Senior Judge on August 23, 2020.
1
Appellant appeals his convictions for one of the two counts of simple
assault and for assault with significant bodily injury of Ms. Belton, arguing that the
(continued…)
3
not ordinarily permit multiple convictions for breaches of different portions of the
same dwelling, we reverse in part. We hold that the trial court did not err in
curtailing the impeachment of Mr. Brown, and thus affirm appellant’s remaining
convictions.
I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
Tonica Belton testified that she is appellant’s former girlfriend and the
mother of appellant’s children. At the time of the incidents at issue here, Ms.
Belton was in a relationship with Derrick Brown, who was at her apartment. Ms.
Belton lived at the apartment with her children, and was the leaseholder. No other
adults lived in the apartment. On September 26, 2015, appellant and Ms. Belton
became involved in a dispute via a text message exchange. Appellant then arrived
at Ms. Belton’s apartment and the two of them argued in person outside of her
apartment complex. Ms. Belton returned to her apartment and locked her front
door. Appellant texted Ms. Belton to meet him outside, but she refused to meet
(…continued)
convictions must merge since they both arise from the same assault inside her
bedroom. The government concedes appellant’s argument. Accordingly, we hold
that appellant’s simple assault and assault with significant bodily injury
convictions merge, with the conviction for assault with significant bodily injury
surviving.
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him. Soon after, appellant began kicking her apartment door and forcibly opened
it; he grabbed and pushed Ms. Belton before Mr. Brown became involved in the
altercation. While the men were fighting in the kitchen, appellant grabbed a knife
and ran after Mr. Brown, who exited the apartment. Ms. Belton ran into her
bedroom, where her daughter was sleeping, locked the door, and “got on the floor.”
She put her “back up against the corner of the bottom of the bed and used [her] feet
to keep the door closed.” Appellant did not follow Mr. Brown, but instead broke
Ms. Belton’s bedroom door, cut her shoulder with the knife he was carrying,
grabbed her hair, and repeatedly punched her. At one point, appellant stopped and
walked out of the bedroom, but then entered again and resumed hitting Ms. Belton.
During the trial, Mr. Brown testified that he had been drinking in Ms.
Belton’s bedroom since the morning of September 26, 2015. He stated that he had
been drinking because he was unable to see his newborn child and consequently
was depressed. Mr. Brown added that he had observed appellant choking Ms.
Belton before appellant attacked him. He testified that when he was fighting with
appellant in the kitchen, appellant had grabbed a knife and swung it at him, cutting
his shirt but not wounding him. During cross-examination, Mr. Brown admitted to
bragging about his fight with appellant on social media. Mr. Brown also
confirmed that when he testified before the grand jury in this case, he had a
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pending misdemeanor assault case for an incident arising in September 2015, and
he eventually pled guilty to the charge. He testified that the charge carried up to
six months in jail. Mr. Brown was impeached with his grand jury testimony in
which he stated that he had started drinking in the afternoon, and that in fact he had
seen his newborn child the night before. During further cross-examination, he
stated that he was “upset” and “depressed” but again asserted that it was because
he “couldn’t see [his] child.” Mr. Brown denied being angry with appellant or
attacking him with a knife. Mr. Brown was also impeached with his November
2016 charge for destroying Ms. Belton’s property, and testified that the
government had dropped those charges against him. He confirmed that the day
before he destroyed Ms. Belton’s property, Ms. Belton informed him that she had
talked to the defense team in this case, but he denied threatening Ms. Belton or
calling her a “snitch.”
During the trial, the defense sought to introduce specific facts of Mr.
Brown’s September 2015 assault (which resulted in a conviction), arguing that the
facts of the assault were necessary for the jury to assess “whether . . . the witness
[Brown] might be biased[.]” The defense counsel conveyed to the trial court that
the September 2015 assault charge resulted from Mr. Brown slapping his
girlfriend, Lauren Hickson (“Hickson assault”), who had just given birth to their
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newborn child. The defense theory was that Mr. Brown had “an independent self-
interest in avoiding prosecution . . . [and] a motive to curry favor with the
[g]overnment . . . [as well as] a separate . . . area of bias.” It was also asserted that
“Mr. Brown [was] the person who assaulted Ms. Belton, not [appellant].” As to
the bias issue, the defense argued that when Mr. Brown testified before the grand
jury, “he was . . . wrapped up in a possible domestic violence love triangle kind of
case having his own pending DV case.”
The trial court ruled that the defense could inquire about Mr. Brown’s
probation resulting from his guilty plea, and about how he could face 60 days of
incarceration if he were to violate the probation. The court also permitted the
defense to ask questions related to Mr. Brown’s potential belief that “he should
curry favor with the government in the event that he did violate his probation[.]”
The court found, however, that introducing specific facts underlying the Hickson
assault or other matters of domestic violence would be more prejudicial than
probative.
The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts after the
government rested its case. According to the defense, the government could not
charge appellant with two counts of first-degree burglary for the entry into Ms.
7
Belton’s apartment and again for the entry into her bedroom because the bedroom
did not qualify as a separate dwelling or a room used as a sleeping apartment under
the statute, and the charges were duplicitous.
II. DISCUSSION
Burglary Convictions
We address the issue of the two burglary convictions first. The crime of
burglary is defined in relevant part as:
Whoever shall . . . break and enter, or enter without
breaking, any dwelling, or room used as a sleeping
apartment in any building, with intent to . . . commit any
criminal offense, shall, if any person is in any part of
such dwelling or sleeping apartment at the time of such
breaking and entering, or entering without breaking, be
guilty of burglary in the first degree.
D.C. Code § 22-801(a) (2012 Repl. & 2021 Supp.). At issue in this case is the
proper unit of prosecution for burglary—specifically, whether a defendant may be
convicted of burglary twice for first entering a dwelling, and then a locked
bedroom within that larger dwelling that is occupied by the same individual.
Appellant argues that his conviction for first-degree armed burglary of Ms.
Belton’s bedroom must be vacated because the phrase “room used as a sleeping
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apartment” refers to rooms that can be burgled separately from the larger structure,
such as a hotel room or a dormitory room. The government recommends an
expansive interpretation of § 22-801(a) in which any locked bedroom inside a
dwelling qualifies as a room used as a sleeping apartment. We reject the
government’s broad interpretation. See Swinson v. United States, 483 A.2d 1160,
1162 (D.C. 1984) (“The common law offense of burglary . . . has been replaced by
a statutory crime. . . . The much broader definition of burglary found in [the D.C.
Code] is in derogation of the common law, and the statute is therefore to be
construed strictly.”); United States v. Evans, 30 App. D.C. 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1907)
(“Ordinarily, penal statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed.”).
This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo, including
questions regarding the proper unit of prosecution. Whylie v. United States, 98
A.3d 156, 162 (D.C. 2014) (citing Hammond v. United States, 77 A.3d 964, 967
(D.C. 2013)). “When it becomes necessary to determine [w]hat [the legislature]
has made the allowable unit of prosecution . . . under a statute which does not
explicitly give the answer[,] doubt will be resolved against turning a single
transaction into multiple offenses[.]” Whylie, 98 A.3d at 162 (internal quotation
9
marks omitted). In this case, the evidence was sufficient to support both
convictions for burglary, but that does not mean that both convictions can stand.
We find the recent opinion in People v. Garcia, 365 P.3d 928 (Cal. 2016),
informative in determining when multiple convictions for burglary are permitted.
In Garcia, the Supreme Court of California analyzed whether a defendant could be
convicted of a second burglary for entering into a store bathroom after breaching
the security of the store upon his initial entry. The court explained that:
a burglary does not result from every felonious entry into
a room preceded by a burglary of an enclosing structure.
Rather, the subsequent entry will constitute a burglary
only when the invaded room provides an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy and security, distinct
from that the enclosing structure itself provides, which
makes the room similar in nature to [a] stand-alone
structure[]. . . .
Id. at 932. The Garcia court concluded that a “‘room’ may be ‘subsumed’ into a
larger structure when it is not different in nature from the enclosing structure—that
is, when it provides no incremental security, privacy, or possessory right, as
compared to the enclosing building.” Id. at 932-33.
The particular facts of this case are such that Ms. Belton’s bedroom was
“subsumed” into the larger structure of her apartment, as the spaces were “not
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different in nature”; that is, the bedroom was part of her “dwelling.” Ms. Belton
was the only adult leasing the apartment. There was no distinct possessory interest
between her bedroom and the rest of the apartment; the entire space was her own,
occupied by only herself and her children. Appellant violated Ms. Belton’s
possessory interest when he first entered her apartment with intent to commit an
assault. When he entered her bedroom, he did not violate a separate possessory
interest which could support a second conviction. 2
We readily agree with numerous other jurisdictions that have likewise
sustained multiple burglary convictions only where multiple possessory interests
were violated. See Bedard v. Nevada, 48 P.3d 46, 48-49 (Nev. 2002) (upholding
multiple counts of burglary for entering separate office suites within a single
structure when each suite was rented by a different tenant); Minnesota v. Hodges,
386 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1986) (“[T]he burglarious entry of one dwelling
should justify only one burglary conviction. Under this approach, the commission
of other crimes . . . against the occupants of the dwelling after entry is made may
be additionally punished with convictions and sentences . . . per victim of the other
2
The government does not argue that two burglary convictions can stand
because appellant had reached a fork in the road before breaking into Ms. Belton’s
bedroom or acted under a fresh impulse in doing so.
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crimes, but only one burglary conviction would be allowed.”); Oregon v. White,
147 P.3d 313, 322 (Or. 2006) (holding that the defendant did not commit
“‘separately punishable’ burglaries” when he unlawfully entered “into the victim’s
apartment with the intent to commit two different crimes.”).
That is not to say that the burglary statute did not protect Ms. Belton’s
bedroom; it was, as we have said, a part of her dwelling. If appellant had lawfully
been inside her apartment, and then unlawfully entered her bedroom with intent to
assault her, he would have breached her possessory interest and committed a
burglary. The issue here is not that there was no breach when he entered her
bedroom, but rather, that there was no breach of a possessory interest distinct from
that which he breached upon his initial entry into her apartment. Our conclusion
does not exclude, for example, the possibility of a first-degree burglary charge for
an individual who has an invitation to enter the larger structure but then enters a
locked room within the same structure without the owner’s or the occupant’s
permission with the intent to commit a crime once therein. This conclusion is also
in line with the decisions of other jurisdictions. See Sandefer v. Mississippi, 952
So. 2d 281, 287 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] burglary is committed . . . by one who
has permission to enter the dwelling (the outer or entrance door) of another but
once inside, breaks and enters, without permission, an inner door of a room of that
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dwelling with the intent to commit some crime therein.”); Wisconsin v. Curtis, 424
N.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding burglary conviction where
defendant lawfully resided in the house but did not have consent to enter victim’s
bedroom); People v. Sparks, 47 P.3d 289, 299 (Cal. 2002) (upholding burglary
conviction where defendant was allowed into house before entering bedroom, and
victim was a young adult living with her family and “reasonably could expect
significant additional privacy and security” in her bedroom).
In sum, Ms. Belton’s bedroom did not provide an objective expectation of
privacy and security that was distinct from that associated with the rest of her
apartment. It was part of her dwelling, not a separate room used as a sleeping
apartment. Therefore, appellant’s second conviction of first-degree burglary while
armed must be vacated.
Curtailment of Cross-examination
Appellant argues that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause when it foreclosed all inquiry into the facts underlying
13
witness Brown’s assault upon Ms. Hickson. 3 He contends that those facts were
“essential to enable jurors to evaluate the strength of Mr. Brown’s motives both to
curry favor with the same prosecution that was investigating and prosecuting him
for a near-contemporaneous domestic violence assault, and to shift the blame for
the second such assault in which he was involved . . . onto appellant.” The
government counters that the court allowed ample inquiry into Mr. Brown’s
3
Alternatively, appellant argues under Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1(D.C. 1996) (en banc), the facts of the Hickson assault were admissible to show
that it was Mr. Brown who had attacked appellant and Ms. Belton on September
26, 2015. We reject appellant’s Winfield argument because no witness identified
Mr. Brown as the assailant; Ms. Belton freely testified about Mr. Brown’s
aggression towards her after the incident at issue here, so appellant’s argument that
Ms. Belton identified appellant as the assailant to the police out of fear is
unpersuasive; and Mr. Brown’s mere presence and ease of access to the knife does
not indicate that appellant did not commit the assault. See Bruce v. United States,
820 A.2d 540, 546 (D.C. 2003) (rejecting the appellant’s Winfield argument where
the “proffered facts individually [were] clearly speculative and [did] not satisfy
Winfield” and, when facts were examined collectively, they were only “marginally
relevant”). Appellant also contends that Mr. Brown opened the door to the facts of
the Hickson assault when he testified about the issue on direct examination. We
are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument. Based on the record, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the extent of cross-
examination when it permitted introduction of Mr. Brown’s prior inconsistent
statement — concerning the Hickson assault — to the grand jury. See (Latasha)
Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) (“This court will set
aside an exercise of trial court discretion ‘only upon a showing of grave abuse.’”)
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995)). Lastly,
appellant claims that defense counsel should have been able to cross-examine Mr.
Brown about the Hickson assault because he provided false testimony on the topic.
Appellant’s argument is unavailing. The defense was allowed to inquire
specifically about Mr. Brown’s false testimony on the issue of whether he was able
to see his newborn child.
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motives to curry favor with the government, and any further details of Mr. Brown’s
history of domestic violence would have inflamed the jury. Therefore, it submits,
the trial court properly curtailed Mr. Brown’s cross-examination.
Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has a
right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Coles v. United States, 808 A.2d
485, 489 (D.C. 2002). The trial court, however, has a wide latitude to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination without violating the Confrontation Clause.
Id. The trial judge may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination “‘based on
concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’”
Id. (quoting Grayton v. United States, 745 A.2d 274, 280-81 (D.C. 2000)). “The
Sixth Amendment ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense may wish.’” Lewis v. United States, 10 A.3d 646, 653 (D.C. 2010)
(quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
To clarify the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination, this
court recently focused on the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). Under the Van Arsdall
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formulation, “a violation of the Sixth Amendment is shown if ‘[a] reasonable jury
might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness’s]
credibility had [defense] counsel been permitted to pursue [the] proposed line of
cross-examination.’” In re J.W., 258 A.3d 195, 202 (D.C. 2021) (quoting Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680).
Here, the defense was precluded from inquiring about facts underlying the
Hickson assault, an effort which it claimed would show: 1) that Mr. Brown gave
misleading testimony about what had occurred at the hospital; 2) that the temporal
proximity between his grand jury testimony in this case and the government’s
prosecution of him for the Hickson assault gave him a motive to curry favor with
the government when testifying; and 3) his possible motive to shift blame for the
assault of Ms. Belton onto appellant. However, the defense was able to elicit other
impeachment evidence about Mr. Brown such as his drinking habits and his anger
when drinking, his attacks on Ms. Belton and destruction of her property, and
social media posts boasting of his fight with appellant. Defense counsel was also
allowed to inquire into Mr. Brown’s motivation to curry favor with the government
– establishing that his simple assault prosecution was pending when he testified
before the grand jury in this case and the possible punishment he faced for that
charge. Although defense counsel was precluded from asking any questions about
16
the facts underpinning that charge, counsel was “permitted to present the nature
and extent of the [possible] bias” by bringing to light the fact that there was a
charge pending against Mr. Brown, the nature of that crime, and the potential
penalty. Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 851 (D.C. 2012). In contrast,
“violations are found primarily where defendants have been given no realistic
opportunity to ferret out a potential source of bias[.]” United States v. Graham, 83
F.3d 1466, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (Sixth Amendment
violation where counsel was permitted to ask witness whether he was biased, but
not to demonstrate why he might be); Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 532
(D.C. 1992) (Sixth Amendment violation where “the exact nature of the crime”
was not disclosed, meaning the jury “was without knowledge if the crime
committed carried a significant sentence which might induce [the witness] to shade
his trial testimony to curry the government’s favor in the future”).
The jury also learned that Mr. Brown was on probation at the time of trial
and faced sixty days in jail if he were found to have violated his probation. As
conditions of probation, he was “ordered to complete an alcohol evaluation and get
treatment as directed” and to “enroll in and complete [a] domestic violence
intervention program.” Mr. Brown acknowledged that destroying Ms. Belton’s
17
property constituted a violation of that probation, but the government “decided to
drop that violation of probation.” Moreover, the government had dismissed the
charges against him for destroying Ms. Belton’s property. Defense counsel asked
rhetorically, “the government has done pretty well by you, right[?]”; Mr. Brown
responded, “[b]een blessed.”
Given defense counsel’s ability to impeach Mr. Brown with his prior
inconsistent stories; his tumultuous history with Ms. Belton; his anger and
drinking; his assault charge and the potential sentence for such; the fact that he was
on probation at the time of trial; that, although the destruction of Ms. Belton’s
property constituted a violation of his probation, his probation was not revoked;
and that the government dismissed the destruction of property charges shortly
before trial, we do not find that the jury would have formed a “significantly
different impression” of Mr. Brown with the additional, precluded details, and so
there was no Sixth Amendment violation.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions except his first-
degree burglary while armed conviction and his conviction for simple assault,
which we remand for the trial court to vacate.
So ordered.