In re Micah Jared Smith , 197 A.3d 507 ( 2018 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 17-BG-881
IN RE MICAH JARED SMITH, RESPONDENT.
A Suspended Member of the Bar
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 1002861)
On Report and Recommendation
of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(DDN 201-17)
(Decided December 6, 2018)
Before FISHER and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and Nebeker, Senior Judge.
PER CURIAM: In this case, the Board on Professional Responsibility has
recommended that respondent Micah Jared Smith be disbarred from the practice of
law after he was convicted in the state of Delaware of one count of Continuous
Abuse of a Child,1 one count of Sex Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of
Trust,2 and three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, 3 urging
1
Del. Code § 11-776.
2
Del. Code § 11-778A.
3
Del. Code § 11-769.
2
that at least one of these convictions is a crime of moral turpitude per se. Neither
respondent nor Disciplinary Counsel filed any exceptions to the Board’s report.
However, in response to a previously imposed suspension pursuant to D.C. Bar R.
XI, § 10 (c), respondent filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g) affidavit on November
17, 2017.4
Under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(2), “if no exceptions are filed to the Board’s
report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing the discipline recommended by the
Board upon the expiration of the time permitted for filing exceptions.” See also
In re Viehe, 762 A.2d 542, 543 (D.C. 2000) (“When . . . there are no exceptions to
the Board’s report and recommendation, our deferential standard of review
becomes even more deferential.”). While we have never decided whether
violations of these specific statutes are crimes of moral turpitude per se, we have
held that convictions under other child sex abuse statutes, especially where the
respondent exercised authority or a trust relationship, are crimes of moral turpitude
per se. See In re Sharp, 647 A.2d 899 (D.C. 1996) (finding a conviction of child
molestation under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-370.1 (1950) was a crime involving moral
turpitude per se); In re Wortzel, 698 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1997) (relying on In re Sharp
4
This matter was stayed while respondent appealed his convictions. His
convictions were affirmed on May 29, 2018.
3
held a conviction for child abuse under Md. Code Ann. art. 27 § 35C constituted a
crime involving moral turpitude per se). In this case, respondent’s convictions on
one count of Continuous Abuse of a Child and one count of Sex Abuse of a Child
by a Person in a Position of Trust were based on his instances of sex abuse of a
relative who was a minor and over whom respondent exerted control and authority;
therefore, these convictions, at a minimum, constitute crimes involving moral
turpitude per se. Therefore, having found respondent committed crimes of moral
turpitude per se, the required sanction is to disbar him from the practice of law.
See In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1165 (D.C. 1979) (en banc); D.C. Code § 11-
2503 (2012 Repl.).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Micah Jared Smith is hereby disbarred from the practice of
law, nunc pro tunc to November 17, 2017.
So ordered.