Antonin M. Washington v. United States , 206 A.3d 864 ( 2019 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 17-CO-1056
ANTONIN WASHINGTON, APPELLANT,
V.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CMD-13858-83)
(Hon. Steven Wellner, Trial Judge)
(Argued April 4, 2019 Decided April 25, 2019)
Adrian Madsen for appellant.
Elizabeth Aloi, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu,
United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Nicholas P. Coleman, T. Anthony
Quinn, and Jillian D. Willis, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief,
for appellee.
Before GLICKMAN and THOMPSON, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON,
Senior Judge.
THOMPSON, Associate Judge: Through legislation enacted in 2014, the
Council of the District of Columbia (the “Council”) “decriminalized the possession
2
of . . . marijuana for personal use.” 1 In 2015, the Council enacted legislation
entitled “Record Sealing for Decriminalized and Legalized Offenses Act of 2014,”
codified as D.C. Code § 16-803.02 (2017).
In 1983, appellant, Antonin Washington, was charged with two counts of
possession of marijuana and two counts of possession of phencyclidine (PCP). Mr.
Washington pled guilty to one count of possession of PCP; Superior Court records
indicate that the disposition of the marijuana counts and one of the PCP counts was
nolle prosequi. On May 4, 2017, relying on § 16-803.02, Mr. Washington filed a
motion to seal the publicly available records of his “arrests and related court
proceedings” in the 1983 matter (as well as records in matters from other years not
involved in this appeal). In an August 29, 2017, order, the Superior Court denied
the motion, stating that “[p]ossession of PCP is not a decriminalized or legalized
1
McRae v. United States, 148 A.3d 269, 274 (D.C. 2016). See D.C. Act
20-305, “Marijuana Possession Decriminalization Amendment Act of 2014”, 61
D.C. Reg. 3482 (Apr. 4, 2014); D.C. Code § 48-1201 (a)-(b) (2017) (providing that
“[n]otwithstanding any other District law, the possession or transfer without
remuneration of marijuana weighing one ounce or less shall constitute a civil
violation . . . . [and] shall not constitute a criminal offense or a delinquent act
. . . .”); D.C. Act 20-565, “Legalization of Possession of Minimal Amounts of
Marijuana for Personal Use Initiative of 2014,” 62 D.C. Reg. 880 (Jan. 23, 2015);
D.C. Code § 48-904.01(a)(1) (2017) (providing inter alia that “it shall be lawful . . .
for any person 21 years of age or older to . . . [p]ossess, use, purchase, or transport
marijuana weighing 2 ounces or less; . . . [and to] [t]ransfer to another person 21
years of age or older, without remuneration, marijuana weighing one ounce or
less”).
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offense” and therefore that Mr. Washington could not “avail himself of relief under
. . . § 16-803.02 . . . .” The court did not address whether to grant Mr. Washington
a part of the relief he sought by sealing the records of his accompanying
marijuana-possession charges.
This appeal followed. We affirm the Superior Court’s ruling insofar as it
denied sealing of the records of Mr. Washington’s PCP arrest, charges, and
conviction. However, we remand for the Superior Court to consider whether to
seal the records relating to Mr. Washington’s accompanying arrest and charges for
marijuana possession.
I.
Section 16-803.02 (2017) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) A person arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a
criminal offense pursuant to the District of Columbia
Official Code or the District of Columbia Municipal
Regulations that was decriminalized or legalized after the
date of the arrest, charge, or conviction may file a motion
to seal the record of the arrest, charge, conviction, and
related Superior Court proceedings at any time.
(1)
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(A) The Superior Court shall grant a motion
to seal if:
(i) The arrest was not made in
connection with or did not result in any
other District of Columbia Official Code or
District of Columbia Municipal Regulations
charges or convictions against the person;
and
(ii) The arrest was not made in
connection with or did not result in any
other federal charges or convictions in the
United States District Court for the District
of Columbia against the person.
(B) In a motion filed under subparagraph
(A) of this section, the burden shall be on the
prosecutor to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the record is not eligible for sealing
pursuant to this section because the conduct was
not decriminalized or legalized.
(2)
(A) In cases that do not meet the
requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection,
the Superior Court may grant a motion to seal if it
is in the interest of justice to do so. In making this
determination, the Court shall weigh:
(i) The interests of the movant in
sealing the publicly available records of his
or her arrest, charge, conviction, and related
Superior Court proceedings;
(ii) The community’s interest in
retaining access to those records;
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(iii) The community’s interest in
furthering the movant’s rehabilitation and
enhancing the movant’s employability; and
(iv) Any other information it
considers relevant.
D.C. Code § 16-803.02(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
Mr. Washington does not dispute that the records of his 1983 case are
ineligible for sealing under § 16-803.02(a)(1) because the case involved an arrest
and charges for marijuana possession “in connection with” and “result[ing] in” an
arrest, charges, and conviction for possession of PCP, an offense which has not
been decriminalized or legalized. § 16-803.02(a)(1)(A)(i). He contends, however,
that the Superior Court had discretion (but erred in failing to recognize that it had
discretion) to seal all the records of the 1983 case, pursuant to § 16-803.02(a)(2).
He relies on the following language: “In cases that do not meet the requirements of
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Superior Court may grant a motion to seal if it
is in the interest of justice to do so.” § 16-803.02(a)(2)(A). Mr. Washington
appears to read that language to mean that “[i]n cases that do not meet the
requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection [in that the cases involve both
now-decriminalized or legalized conduct as well as offenses that have not been
decriminalized or legalized], the Superior Court may grant a motion to seal [the
record of the entire case] if it is in the interest of justice to do so.” He also reads
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the reference in § 16-803.02(a)(2) to “related Superior Court proceedings” (“A
person arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense . . . that was
[afterwards] decriminalized or legalized . . . may file a motion to seal the record of
the arrest, charge, conviction, and related Superior Court proceedings at any
time,” (emphasis added)) to mean that sealing is available under § 16-803.02 with
respect to the records of any arrest, charge, or conviction for a still-criminal or
still-illegal offense that was related to the arrest, charge, or conviction for now-
decriminalized or legalized conduct.
Because Mr. Washington’s argument presents an issue of statutory
construction, our review is de novo. 2
II.
Standing by itself, the language of §§ 16-803.02(a) and (a)(2) perhaps is
susceptible of the meanings Mr. Washington imputes to those provisions. But
“interpreting a statute or a regulation is a holistic endeavor,”3 and a provision in
2
Peterson v. United States, 997 A.2d 682, 683 (D.C. 2010).
3
W.H. v. D.W., 78 A.3d 327, 337 (D.C. 2013) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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isolation “is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because
only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
compatible with the rest of the law . . . .”4 Further, “[t]he literal words of a statute
. . . are not the sole index to legislative intent, but rather, are to be read in the light
of the statute taken as a whole, and are to be given a sensible construction . . . .” 5
Our task “is to search for an interpretation that makes sense of the statute and
related laws as a whole[,]” and we may “turn to legislative history to ensure that
our interpretation is consistent with legislative intent.”6 Further, “if divers statutes
relate to the same thing, they ought to be taken into consideration in construing any
one of them . . . .” 7
The foregoing principles lead us to reject Mr. Washington’s interpretation.
To begin with, we disagree with Mr. Washington’s assertion that his interpretation
4
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988) (citations omitted).
5
Carlson Constr. Co. v. Dupont W. Condo., Inc., 932 A.2d 1132, 1134
(D.C. 2007) (quoting District of Columbia v. Bender, 906 A.2d 277, 281-82 (D.C.
2006)).
6
Aboye v. United States, 121 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
7
Abadie v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 843 A.2d 738, 742
(D.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
is the only one that keeps § 16-803.02(a)(2) from being surplusage. An alternative
interpretation is that § 16-803.02(a)(2) gives the Superior Court discretion to seal
the portion of a record that relates to an offense that was subsequently
decriminalized or legalized even if — contrary to § 16-803.02(a)(1) — the offense
was “in connection with” another still-criminal or still-illegal charge, or “result[ed]
in” conviction of a still-criminal or still-illegal offense. This alternative
interpretation is in accord with the statutory purpose as reflected in the title of the
record-sealing legislation (Bill 20-467), as reported by the Council Committee on
the Judiciary and Public Safety in its September 17, 2014, Report, the “Record
Sealing for Decriminalized and Legalized Offenses Act of 2014.” 8 The alternative
interpretation also is in harmony with the statutory language indicating that
portions of a record may be sealed. See § 16-803.02(b)(3)(A) (“In a case involving
co-defendants in which the [c]ourt orders the movant’s records sealed, the [c]ourt
8
The title of § 16-803.02 as added by the codifiers — “Sealing of public
records for decriminalized or legalized offenses” — also supports the alternative
interpretation. But see, e.g., United States v. Castro, 837 F.2d 441, 442 n.1 (11th
Cir. 1988) (title that “was added subsequent to enactment by those responsible for
codification of the legislation . . . cannot . . . properly be of aid in determining the
intent of [the legislature] . . . . Where headings of chapters, articles, or sections are
mere arbitrary designations inserted for convenience of reference by clerks or other
persons who have no legislative authority, such head[ing]s are held not to be
proper matters for consideration in the interpretation of the statute.”) (citations,
parentheses, and internal quotation marks omitted).
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may order that only those records, or portions thereof, relating solely to the movant
be redacted.”).
In addition, the legislative history of § 16-803.02 supports our alternative
interpretation. The Committee Report on Bill 20-467 states as follows:
While Bill 20-467 makes further amendments to the
record sealing laws in the District, the bill does not
require the same balancing underlying the 2006 and 2012
Acts, as Bill 20-467 only addresses criminal records
relating to offenses that have been decriminalized or
legalized after the date of the arrest or conviction.
Committee Report on Bill 20-467 at 4 (emphasis added). As can be seen, the
language from the Committee Report quoted above refers to other District of
Columbia record-sealing provisions, which also support our alternative
interpretation of § 16-803.02. D.C. Code §16-803 sets out procedures that may
enable individuals arrested, charged with, or convicted of eligible misdemeanors or
felonies to obtain sealing of their records after prescribed waiting periods and upon
satisfaction of other requirements (and, in the case of a conviction, upon the
movant’s showing by “clear and convincing evidence” that sealing is in the
interests of justice, § 16-803(i)(3)). We discern no sensible reason why the
Council would have intended — through § 16-803.02 — to allow the Superior
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Court to seal the records of any still-criminal or still-illegal offenses that were in
connection with marijuana-possession or other decriminalized or legalized
offenses, and to do so upon a showing by a mere “preponderance of the evidence”
that sealing is in the interest of justice (§ 16-803.02(a)(2)(B)), when the records
relating to those still-criminal or still-illegal offenses would not (or would not yet)
be eligible for record-sealing if an arrest, charge or conviction for now-
decriminalized or legalized conduct had not accompanied them.
Finally, the Superior Court could reasonably find that it is in the interest of
justice to seal the records of a marijuana-possession arrest, charge, or conviction
(or the records of some other now-decriminalized or legalized conduct) even while
leaving to stand the records of an accompanying charge or conviction for a still-
criminal or still-illegal offense. For example, the court might reasonably find that
a movant has a strong “interest[] . . . in sealing the publicly available records of his
. . . conviction” for marijuana possession, and that sealing the record of his or her
marijuana-possession conviction would “enhanc[e] the movant’s employability,”
§§ 16-803.02(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iii), even if the record of an accompanying still-
criminal offense that did not result in conviction were left to stand. Or, as another
example, the court might reasonably find that sealing the record of a marijuana-
possession conviction would “enhanc[e] the movant’s employability,” id., even if
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the record of a more serious, accompanying charge or conviction was, at least
temporarily, left to stand, if the waiting period for obtaining sealing of the records
of that accompanying charge or conviction had run (or would soon have run),
making discretionary sealing available under § 16-803. Thus, our alternative
interpretation that discretionary sealing is available only for the records of a no-
longer-criminal offense is not undermined by the considerations mandated by § 16-
803.02(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that § 16-803.02(a)(2) gives the Superior
Court discretion, in the interest of justice, to seal the portions of a case record
pertaining to now-decriminalized or legalized conduct, but does not authorize the
court to seal the portions of a case record pertaining to an accompanying, still-
criminal or still-illegal offense. We affirm the trial court’s order as it pertains to
sealing of the records of Mr. Washington’s PCP conviction and dismissed PCP
charge, but we remand for the court to consider whether to seal the records of Mr.
Washington’s accompanying marijuana-possession arrest and charges.
So ordered.