IN RE VICTOR MBA-JONAS ( 2015 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 14-BG-607
IN RE VICTOR MBA-JONAS, PETITIONER.
A Suspended Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 452042)
On Report and Recommendation of the
Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN-19-11)
(Argued April 14, 2015 Decided July 2, 2015)
Victor Mba-Jonas, pro se.
William R. Ross, Assistant Bar Counsel, with whom Wallace E. Shipp, Jr.,
Bar Counsel, Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel, and Jelani Lowery,
Senior Staff Attorney, were on the brief, for Bar Counsel.
Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, BECKWITH, Associate Judge, and REID,
Senior Judge.
PER CURIAM: Having found by clear and convincing evidence that
petitioner, Victor Mba-Jonas, failed to satisfy any of the criteria for reinstatement
outlined in In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985), the Ad Hoc
Hearing Committee (“Hearing Committee”) recommended that Mr. Mba-Jonas’
petition for reinstatement be denied. The Board on Professional Responsibility
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took no exception to the Hearing Committee’s recommendation. We accept the
Hearing Committee’s recommendation.
I.
The Maryland Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended Mr. Mba-Jonas from
the practice of law in Maryland with the right to petition for reinstatement after
ninety days. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 919 A.2d 669 (Md.
2007) (“Mba-Jonas I”). Thereafter, Bar Counsel initiated reciprocal disciplinary
proceedings. While that reciprocal proceeding was pending, the Maryland Court
of Appeals again suspended Mr. Mba-Jonas indefinitely for additional misconduct,
imposing a right to petition for reinstatement after six months. See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 936 A.2d 839 (Md. 2007) (“Mba-Jonas II”).
This court consolidated the matters and ultimately imposed identical discipline in
both matters, suspending Mr. Mba-Jonas for ninety days with a fitness
requirement, as in Mba-Jonas I, and six months with a fitness requirement, as in
Mba-Jonas II.1
1
In Mba-Jonas I and Mba-Jonas II, Mr. Mba-Jonas was disciplined for
mismanaging client trust accounts over a substantial period of time and failing to
disclose a material fact regarding his past representation of a client to a Maryland
(continued . . .)
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II.
“In a disciplinary case, this court accepts the [Hearing Committee’s]
findings of fact unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record.” In
re Samad, 51 A.3d 486, 495 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(1). Furthermore, “[a]lthough we place ‘great weight’
on the recommendations of the Board and Hearing Committee, this court has the
ultimate authority to decide whether to grant a petition for reinstatement.” In re
Sabo, 49 A.3d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 2012) (quoting In re Bettis, 644 A.2d 1023, 1027
(D.C. 1994)). However, this court defers to the Hearing Committee’s findings of
fact because the Hearing Committee is “the only decision-maker which had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their demeanor.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A petitioner seeking reinstatement has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the petitioner “has the moral qualifications, competency,
and learning in law required for admission,” and that resumption of the practice of
(. . . continued)
Bar investigator who was investigating an overdraft of one of Mr. Mba-Jonas’
client trust accounts.
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law “will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the
administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.” D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 16 (d). In determining whether a petitioner has carried its burden, this court
considers:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the
attorney was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the
seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the attorney’s conduct since
discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past
wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present character;
and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to
practice law.
Roundtree, 503 A.2d at 1217.
Here, the Hearing Committee’s findings were substantially supported by the
evidence provided and the Hearing Committee properly applied the Roundtree
factors in determining whether Mr. Mba-Jonas should be reinstated. Furthermore,
Mr. Mba-Jonas’ contention that the Hearing Committee improperly considered his
handling of his personal financial accounts is without merit given that this behavior
reflects the very conduct that led to his indefinite suspension. See In re Robinson,
705 A.2d 687, 688-89 (D.C. 1988) (recognizing that “in reinstatement cases[,]
primary emphasis should be given to matters bearing most closely on the reasons
why the attorney was suspended or disbarred in the first place” and declining to
disregard petitioner’s mismanagement of personal finances because it was
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“behavior reminiscent of actions that led to his disbarment”). The fact that the
petitioner in Robinson was found to have intentionally misappropriated client
funds while Mr. Mba-Jonas was found to have been negligent in his misconduct is
not dispositive here because, like in Robinson, examining Mr. Mba-Jonas’
handling of his personal financial affairs was the only means of evaluating whether
he could once again be entrusted with client funds. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Victor Mba-Jonas’ petition for reinstatement is denied.
However, pursuant to the Hearing Committee’s recommendation, Mr. Mba-Jonas
is permitted to submit a new petition for reinstatement immediately after the date
of issuance of this opinion.
So ordered.