Raleigh Bynum, II ( 2018 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 18-BG-341
IN RE RALEIGH BYNUM II, RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 503380)
On Report and Recommendation
Of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN 378-14)
(Decided December 13, 2018)
Before BECKWITH and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FARRELL, Senior
Judge.
PER CURIAM: In this case, the Board on Professional Responsibility has
adopted the Hearing Committee’s factual findings that Mr. Bynum violated
multiple rules of professional conduct in connection with his representation in
South Carolina of (1) three clients (a son and his parents) in two medical
malpractice actions and an estate action, and (2) the son in a life insurance matter.
The Board disagrees, however, with the Committee’s recommended sanction of a
three-year suspension with proof of fitness for reinstatement to the Bar. Based on
its determination that Mr. Bynum engaged in flagrant dishonesty, the Board
2
recommends that Mr. Bynum be disbarred. We review and adopt the Board’s
recommendation.
After a hearing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that Mr. Bynum, who is not a
member of the South Carolina bar, agreed to represent in two medical malpractice
suits an individual whose wife had died after giving birth to their daughter, and his
parents, who were personal representatives of their son’s wife’s estate. Previous
counsel had withdrawn his appearance because he determined that representation
of all three clients presented a conflict of interest and had moved to take two
previously filed cases off the South Carolina court docket, with the possibility of
reinstatement within one year. Mr. Bynum failed to notify the parties either of his
unlicensed status or of the conflict of interest. He subsequently failed to ensure
that local counsel entered Mr. Bynum’s appearance pro hac vice, to verify that
appropriate motions to restore the claims to the docket were filed or, once one
complaint was restored, to conduct discovery, to identify experts, or to respond to
court orders, with the result that both medical malpractice suits were dismissed.
Mr. Bynum was intentionally dishonest when he misrepresented (a) to all three
clients and the South Carolina Probate Court that the one restored lawsuit was
proceeding and intentionally omitted the fact that the other law suit was never
restored, and (b) to the son that he had contacted the life insurance company and
3
then failed to timely return the son’s copy of decedent’s life insurance policy.
Finally, Mr. Bynum repeatedly provided false testimony to the Committee
concerning his communication with his clients and the agreement he undertook
with local counsel to pursue the medical malpractice cases; and, also before the
Committee, falsely blamed local counsel for the dismissal of the complaints and
asserted his inaction was due to health problems, when the evidence showed he
had litigated a number of other matters during the same time period.
Based on these findings the Ad Hoc Committee and the Board in turn
concluded that Mr. Bynum had violated numerous disciplinary rules. 1 The
Committee, however, recommended only a three-year suspension with a fitness
requirement, whereas the Board has recommended disbarment. The Board
specifically takes issue with the Committee’s assessment that Mr. Bynum’s
misconduct did not amount to “flagrant dishonesty” because his “falsehoods do not
involve schemes to obtain client or public funds directly or a crime, a feature of
many disbarment cases.” The Board disagrees that “dishonesty is ‘flagrant’ only
where some sort of financial embezzlement or fraudulent pecuniary gain has
1
The Board found that respondent had violated D.C. R. 1.3 (a), 1.3 (b)(1),
1.3 (c), 1.4 (a) and 1.4 (b) as well as numerous professional rules in South
Carolina, including an equivalent 8.4 (d) (dishonesty) violation.
4
occurred,” and cites this court’s decisions defining “flagrant dishonesty” as
“reflect[ing] a continuing and pervasive indifference to the obligations of honesty
in the judicial system” 2 and including dishonesty that is “aggravated or
prolonged.”3 The Board notes that Mr. Bynum’s dishonest conduct spanned five
years, from the outset of his representation of his clients, through the disciplinary
hearing in this case, and argues that his dishonesty is exacerbated by his lack of
remorse and effort to shift the blame to others, which the Board deems additional
hallmarks of flagrant dishonesty. 4
Neither Mr. Bynum nor Disciplinary Counsel has filed any exceptions to the
Board’s Report and Recommendation.5 Under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(2), “if no
exceptions are filed to the Board’s report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing
the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted
2
In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135, 141 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
3
In re Omwenga, 49 A.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also In re Howes, 39 A.3d 1, 16–18 (D.C. 2018)
(concluding respondent engaged in flagrant dishonesty where he engaged in a
“long and calculated course” of dishonest conduct).
4
Cf. In re Vohra, 68 A.3d 766, 773 (D.C. 2013) (determining that
respondent had not engaged in “flagrant dishonesty” where he, inter alia, had taken
“full responsibility” for his misconduct.)
5
Mr. Bynum likewise did not file any exceptions to the Committee Report.
5
for filing exceptions.” See also In re Viehe, 762 A.2d 542, 543 (D.C. 2000)
(“When . . . there are no exceptions to the Board’s report and recommendation, our
deferential standard of review becomes even more deferential.”). On the
undisputed facts, we discern no reason to depart from the Board’s recommendation
of disbarment, which appears to flow directly from our precedent. 6
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that respondent Raleigh Bynum II is hereby disbarred. For
purposes of reinstatement, the period of respondent’s disbarment will not begin to
run until such time as he files a D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g) affidavit.
So ordered.
6
See notes 4–6 supra (citing flagrant dishonesty cases where respondent
was disbarred); see also In re McClure, 144 A.3d 570, 572 (D.C. 2016) (accepting
recommendation that disbarment was warranted based on flagrant dishonesty); In
re Pelkey, 962 A.2d 268, 281 (D.C. 2008) (acknowledging flagrant dishonesty
supports disbarment).