In re Edward T. Smith Bruce E. Gardner ( 2014 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Nos. 12-PR-436 and 12-PR-1582
IN RE EDWARD T. SMITH;
BRUCE E. GARDNER, APPELLANT.
Appeals from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CON-101-58)
(Hon. Peter H. Wolf, Trial Judge)
(Hon. Ronald P. Wertheim, Trial Judge)
(Submitted June 4, 2013 Decided September 18, 2014)
Bruce E. Gardner, pro se.
Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim,
Solicitor General, Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, and Stacy L.
Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief for the District of
Columbia.
Before FISHER and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FARRELL, Senior
Judge.
FISHER, Associate Judge: Appellant Bruce E. Gardner challenges the denial
of his requests for compensation, claiming that because he was appointed as
“conservator” of Edward T. Smith after D.C. Code § 21-1501 had been repealed
and because he performed the duties of a guardian and conservator as described in
2
D.C. Code §§ 21-2047 and 21-2070 (the Guardianship Act), he is eligible to
receive compensation from the Guardianship Fund. We conclude that Mr. Gardner
is not eligible to receive compensation from the Guardianship Fund for services
rendered under his original appointment in 1998, but he is eligible to receive
compensation from the Fund in connection with his 2010 appointment as
conservator of the person.
I. Background
The underlying case has a long and confusing procedural history which
began in 1958; Mr. Smith died in 2013. During the intervening years, the
governing statutes were repealed and superseded, and it is fair to say that the
transition to the new law did not occur seamlessly. At times, it appears, titles
given to the fiduciary were not used with precision. Nevertheless, the various trial
judges and Mr. Gardner acted in good faith to provide the services Mr. Smith
needed.
A. Mr. Smith’s Civil Commitment in 1958
3
In January 1958 a petition for the civil commitment of Mr. Smith was filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. After holding a
hearing and considering affidavits from persons familiar with Mr. Smith, and
taking into account the recommendations of physicians and the Commission on
Mental Health, the court found that Mr. Smith was of “unsound mind and in need
of treatment in a hospital for his mental condition.” See D.C. Code §§ 21-301 to -
333 (1951) (repealed); see also United States v. Snyder, 689 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (“Under the statutory scheme existing at the time, a decree of „unsound
mind‟ was synonymous with a determination of insanity.”). The court ordered that
Mr. Smith be committed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital “until he may be safely
discharged therefrom, or transferred to a veterans facility.” Hoping to recover
some of the costs of care and treatment from Mr. Smith‟s estate, the District of
4
Columbia petitioned for the appointment of a “committee.”1 The court appointed
John B. Perna as “committee of the person and estate of Edward T. Smith.”2
In 1962 Mr. Smith was transferred to a veterans‟ hospital in New Jersey, but
Mr. Perna continued to serve as committee. In 1972, following court
reorganization, the case was transferred from the District Court to the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia. The same year, Mr. Smith absconded from the
veterans‟ hospital in New Jersey. He was located at the Promenade Hotel for
Adults in New York three years later. Shortly thereafter, he was moved to Pilgrim
Psychiatric Center, a New York State mental hospital, and was eventually
relocated to an extended care facility in New York. The record makes clear that
1
In this context, a “committee” is the “person or persons who are invested,
by order of the proper court, with the guardianship of the person and estate of one
who has been adjudged a lunatic.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 342 (4th ed. 1968).
The statute in effect at that time provided that the court had “full power and
authority to superintend and direct the affairs of persons non compos mentis . . .
and to make such orders and decrees for the care of their persons . . . as to the court
may seem proper.” D.C. Code § 21-301 (1951) (repealed). The court also had the
authority to appoint a committee to “account for all profit and increase of the estate
of such person and the annual value thereof.” Id.
2
Mr. Perna was not, and apparently could not have been, appointed as
Mr. Smith‟s guardian or conservator under the statutes as then written. Guardians
were generally only available to infants and minors, and conservators were only
available to those with “mental weakness (not amounting to unsoundness of
mind).” D.C. Code §§ 21-101 to -130 (1951), -501 (1958 Supp.).
5
Mr. Perna made arrangements for Mr. Smith‟s welfare, and did much more than
simply account for the receipts and expenses of his estate.
Mr. Perna continued to serve until 1997, when he was “hospitalized and . . .
unable to perform his duties as committee.” As a result, the Superior Court
appointed Cheryl Mout Taylor as “[c]onservator of the person and estate of
Edward T. Smith” on October 27, 1997. The court did not cite the statutory
authority for the appointment. In 1964, the law which authorized Mr. Perna‟s
appointment as committee had been repealed by the District of Columbia
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, Pub. L. No. 88-597, 78 Stat. 944 (1964)
(popularly known as “the Ervin Act”), and a few years later, the new statute was
amended. However, each of these legislative actions included a savings clause
which will be discussed in more detail below.
When Congress repealed the statute which authorized the appointment of a
committee, it also amended the conservatorship statutes. See D.C. Code §§ 21-
1501 to -1507 (1967). But these new conservatorship statutes in Chapter 15 only
applied to those with “mental weakness not amounting to unsoundness of mind.”
D.C. Code § 21-1501. In 1981, the Code was again amended, but the laws
governing committees, conservators, and guardians remained essentially
6
unaffected; rather, the relevant changes reflected the reorganization of the courts.
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 21-564 (b) (1981) (changing supervision from the District
Court to the Superior Court). Then, in 1987, the Guardianship Act was enacted,
repealing the statutes in Chapter 15 which governed conservatorships. D.C. Code
§§ 21-2001 to -2085. Its purpose was to “establish a comprehensive system of
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings to deal with a wide range of legal
problems which arise from varying degrees of adult physical and mental
incapacity.” Report of the Council, Committee on the Judiciary, on Bill 6-7, at 2
(June 18, 1986). Among other things, the Guardianship Act “separates the
concepts of property and personal management and establishes a range of
alternatives for each.” Id. at 3.
B. Mr. Gardner’s 1998 Appointment
In April 1998 Ms. Taylor‟s appointment was vacated because she failed to
post the required surety, and on May 4, 1998, Judge Haywood appointed Bruce E.
Gardner as “conservator of Edward T. Smith, adult ward.” This order was issued
by handwriting “Bruce E. Gardner, Esq.” and “conservator” into blanks provided
on a preprinted form, but it did not identify the source of the court‟s authority to
make the appointment. The corresponding Certificate of Appointment, issued by
7
the Register of Wills, indicates that Mr. Gardner was appointed “successor
conservator pursuant to the provisions of the D.C. Code 21-1501 et seq. (1981
[ed.]) of the estate of Edward T. Smith,” notwithstanding that this statute had
already been repealed by the time of Mr. Gardner‟s appointment and that this
statute only applied to a person who was “unable, by reason of . . . mental
weakness not amounting to unsoundness of mind, properly to care for his
property.” D.C. Code § 21-1501 (1981). Mr. Smith, of course, had been found to
be “of unsound mind.”3
On January 16, 2001, Mr. Gardner petitioned the court to terminate the
conservatorship, representing that there were no additional assets to recover,
Mr. Smith‟s VA benefits were being sent directly to the psychiatric facility in New
York, and Mr. Gardner had been inactive since recovering certain assets for the
estate. Ultimately, the court denied this request. It was not until April 7, 2009,
that a hearing was held to “explore options to be taken by the conservator towards
3
D.C. Code § 21-564 (b) provided that a person who had been hospitalized
by “judicial decree” prior to September 15, 1964, “shall, upon the expiration of the
one-year period immediately following September 15, 1964, be deemed to have
been restored to legal capacity unless, within the one-year period, affirmative
action is commenced to have the person adjudicated mentally incompetent by a
court of competent jurisdiction.” There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Superior Court took notice of this provision or considered Mr. Smith no longer to
be of “unsound mind.” Nor does the record reflect that any “affirmative action”
was taken to have Mr. Smith once again “adjudicated mentally incompetent.”
8
the possible termination or closure and potential transfer of this former law
conservatorship proceeding to an Intervention (INT) or Supplemental Needs Trust
(SNT) case type proceeding, including whether a guardian should be appointed for
the ward.” About a month later, another hearing was held, and Mr. Gardner was
ordered to file a petition for intervention. On May 22, 2009, Mr. Gardner filed the
petition with the Register of Wills and, according to Mr. Gardner, the petition was
mailed to the ward at the nursing home in New York. Nevertheless, on July 30,
2009, the petition was dismissed because Mr. Smith had not been personally
served. See D.C. Code § 21-2042.
C. Mr. Gardner’s New Appointment
On June 7, 2010, the court held a hearing to determine whether the
conservatorship should be terminated. During this hearing, an Assistant Deputy
Register of Wills explained that there was no evidence in the record “that there was
ever a conservator for the person of the ward,” and it was necessary to appoint a
conservator of the person to make medical decisions on behalf of Mr. Smith.
However, because personal service could not be obtained, a new intervention
proceeding could not be initiated. This created a “conundrum.” To ensure that the
ward had a fiduciary to make medical decisions on his behalf, the deputy suggested
9
that the court issue “an order specifically appointing a conservator of the person”
with the power to make full medical decisions on the ward‟s behalf.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Kaye Christian explained that she
would issue an order “appointing Mr. Gardner as the conservator of the person of
Edward T. Smith” to make “decisions with respect to his daily care, medical
decisions, and other decisions that are required for him to be made by a court-
appointed fiduciary.” On June 11, Judge Christian issued an order appointing Mr.
Gardner “conservator of the person of Edward T. Smith, ward, with full legal
powers to make medical decisions on the ward‟s behalf.” The Certificate of
Appointment issued on August 11, 2010, stated that this appointment had been
made “pursuant to the provisions of D.C. Code, section 21-1506 et seq. (1967
ed.),” granting him “full legal powers to make medical decisions on behalf of the
ward.”
In January 2011 Judge Wertheim ordered that the conservatorship of the
estate be terminated but “that the conservatorship of the person shall continue.”
That conservatorship of the person was effectively terminated when Mr. Smith
died in 2013.
10
D. Compensation
Under the 1951 law, a committee was entitled to receive “a reasonable
compensation for services rendered by the committee not exceeding a commission
of 5 per centum of the amounts collected if and when disbursed.” D.C. Code § 21-
301 (1951). This measure of compensation was not much different for
conservators appointed under the 1967 and 1981 laws. See D.C. Code § 21-1503
(1967); Mitchell v. Ensor, 412 F.2d 155, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (a five percent
commission is permissible in determining reasonable compensation). Superior
Court Probate Rule 225 states that “[c]ompensation to a conservator . . . for
ordinary services shall be by commission which shall not exceed 5% of amounts
disbursed from the estate.”4 When the Guardianship Act was enacted in 1987, it
not only eliminated the percentage commission, but also established a fund for
compensation. D.C. Code § 21-2060 provides:
(a) As approved by order of the court, any visitor,
attorney, examiner, conservator, special conservator,
guardian ad litem, or guardian is entitled to compensation
4
Subsections (c) and (e)(1) of Probate Rule 225 also permit additional
compensation for “extraordinary services” by fiduciaries and for attorney fees,
which may include “reasonable attorney‟s fees for preparing pleadings filed with
the Court and for other necessary legal services rendered to the fiduciary in the
administration of the estate.”
11
for services rendered either in a guardianship proceeding,
protective proceeding, or in connection with a
guardianship or protective arrangement. . . .
Compensation shall be paid from the estate of the ward
or person or, if the estate of the ward or person will be
depleted by payouts made under this subsection, from a
fund established by the District.
(b) There is established within the General Fund of the
District of Columbia a separate account to be known as
the Guardianship Fund” (“Fund”) and to be administered
by the court. There is authorized to be appropriated
funds necessary for the administration of this section.
Shortly after his appointment in 1998, Mr. Gardner recovered approximately
seven thousand dollars which belonged to the ward‟s estate. Thereafter,
Mr. Gardner filed a series of petitions for compensation. Two of these petitions
were approved for the entire amounts requested and were paid from the ward‟s
estate. However, when ruling on one such request, the court limited Mr. Gardner‟s
compensation to a five percent commission on the disbursements that he made
from the estate, plus related costs, an amount also paid from the ward‟s estate. See
Super. Ct. Prob. R. 225 (a).
On August 11, 2011, Mr. Gardner petitioned the court for compensation for
legal services rendered from June 7, 2010, through August 11, 2011. Because the
ward no longer had any assets, Mr. Gardner requested that the compensation be
12
paid from the Guardianship Fund. See D.C. Code § 21-2060. Judge Wolf, relying
on Sullivan v. District of Columbia, 829 A.2d 221 (D.C. 2003), and In re Estate of
Bryant, 738 A.2d 283 (D.C. 1999), concluded that Mr. Gardner “may not be paid
from the Guardianship Fund in an „old law‟ case” and denied the petition without
prejudice “to leave open to counsel to apply further if he can come up with a way
to be lawfully paid.” Judge Wolf noted that “[t]he court has attempted to convert
old law cases to new law cases partly to prevent the apparent injustice to counsel
evident here,” but “[t]hat was not done successfully in this case, at least not yet.”
Mr. Gardner filed two subsequent petitions requesting compensation, both of
which were denied. In denying Mr. Gardner‟s amended petition for compensation
for the period from April 7, 2009, through August 8, 2011, Judge Wolf stated that
“[w]hile the court agrees with counsel‟s interpretation of Estate of Bryant, it cannot
agree with counsel‟s other arguments to overcome Sullivan v. D.C.” (citations
omitted).5 Judge Wertheim denied Mr. Gardner‟s petition for compensation for the
period from August 9, 2011, through June 22, 2012, “for the [same] reasons set
forth in Judge Wolf‟s Orders entered Nov[ember] 17, 2011 and March 14, 2012.”
Mr. Gardner appeals from the denial of those two petitions, emphasizing that he
5
In Bryant, we specifically pointed out that we were not deciding whether
the Guardianship Act applied to “old law” cases. 738 A.2d at 284 n.2.
13
was appointed after § 21-1501 had been repealed. Therefore, he argues, he was
appointed pursuant to the “new law” and was eligible to receive compensation
from the Guardianship Fund.6
II. Analysis
The introductory language of the Guardianship Act instructs that “[t]his
chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies.” D.C. Code § 21-2001 (a). However, “[n]othing in this chapter shall
affect any guardian or conservator appointed by the court upon a petition filed
prior to the effective date of this chapter.” D.C. Code § 21-2002 (c). This latter
provision does not necessarily apply to Mr. Gardner‟s appointment because, as we
explain below, he was properly regarded as a successor committee, not a guardian
or conservator. Moreover, the crucial appointment in this case, occurring in 2010,
did not occur “prior to the effective date of this chapter.”
A. Mr. Gardner’s 1998 Appointment as Conservator of the Estate
6
A third appeal (13-PR-1034) has been held in abeyance pending the
outcome of these consolidated appeals.
14
Despite the language used by the Superior Court in naming Mr. Gardner
conservator of the ward‟s estate in 1998, he might have been more aptly described
as a successor committee. Mr. Perna had been appointed as a committee pursuant
to § 21-301 of the 1951 law. In 1964, Congress repealed the statutes which
authorized committeeships, but it provided a savings clause that stated “[n]othing
in this subsection shall be construed to affect any action taken prior to the date of
the enactment of this Act pursuant to any of the aforementioned subsections
repealed by this subsection.” 78 Stat. at 953-54. Thus, it left Mr. Perna‟s
committeeship intact. When the law was amended in 1965 and again in 1981,
§ 21-564 (b) provided that in “cases in which a committee has heretofore been
appointed and the committeeship has not been terminated by court action, such
committee shall continue to act under the supervision of the [court] under its equity
powers.” Mr. Perna‟s committeeship was preserved notwithstanding the enactment
of the 1981 laws.
When Ms. Taylor was appointed to replace Mr. Perna, she was effectively
appointed as successor committee. She would have served under the same
authority as Mr. Perna; no steps had been taken to have her appointed conservator
(of the person or estate) under a different set of statutes. After Ms. Taylor‟s
appointment was vacated for failure to post a surety bond, Mr. Gardner was
15
appointed to replace her, thereby becoming successor committee of the ward‟s
estate. As a successor committee, Mr. Gardner would be ineligible to receive
compensation from the Guardianship Fund; rather, according to the statutes in
place at the time of Mr. Perna‟s appointment, Mr. Gardner would only be eligible
to receive a five percent commission from the funds available in the ward‟s estate.
D.C. Code § 21-301 (1951).
Probate Rule 225 is sometimes cited as an additional restriction on
compensation in “old law” cases. The commentary warns that “[n]o compensation
shall be awarded for supervision of a ward‟s person.” It goes on to say that
“[c]onservators and guardians serve as officers of the Court. There can be no
assurance in any given case that a fiduciary will receive compensation or
commission which the fiduciary considers adequate.” For reasons explained
below, we do not think this rule precludes compensation for services performed
after the 2010 appointment.
Superior Court Probate Rule 1 (d) states that Rules “201 through 212 shall
govern all proceedings instituted in the Probate Division of the Court involving
guardians of minors‟ estates or custodians of minors, conservators appointed in
proceedings filed before September 30, 1989, committees, and trustees.” The
16
referenced rules are procedural in nature, and Rule 1 does not mention Rule 225,
which applies to the compensation of guardians of minors and conservators
appointed before 1989. Moreover, Rule 225 itself does not mention the
compensation of committees. Nevertheless, the “spirit” of the rule may preclude
compensation from the Guardianship Fund for services performed as a successor
committee.
B. Mr. Gardner’s 2010 Appointment as Conservator of the Person
Although our decision in Sullivan is instructive, it does not clearly preclude
an award of compensation from the Guardianship Fund for the services
Mr. Gardner rendered as conservator of the person after his 2010 appointment.
The issue in Sullivan was whether the services rendered by the guardian ad litem,
who was appointed pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 17 (c) but after the enactment of
the “new law,” were of the type compensable from the Guardianship Fund.
Sullivan, 829 A.2d at 224. We concluded that counsel‟s service as guardian
ad litem to “ascertain information concerning [plaintiff‟s] mental condition” and
provide legal services to the plaintiff in two civil lawsuits was not compensable
from the Guardianship Fund because only a qualified examiner could have
assessed plaintiff‟s mental condition and the civil suits were not among the types
17
of proceedings for which a guardian ad litem could be appointed and compensated
under the Guardianship Act. Id. at 226. The case thus is factually distinguishable.
However, in Sullivan we did endorse two principles that must guide our
analysis of the instant case. In order to receive compensation from the
Guardianship Fund, the appointment must have been made pursuant to the
Guardianship Act, and the appointee must have performed duties consistent with
his or her role as specified by the Act. Id. In other words, the appointment and
compensation is limited to only “specific types of proceedings.” Id.
It is not clear that the court assigned Mr. Gardner the proper title because the
Guardianship Act does not provide for a “conservator of the person,” and
conservators appointed under that Act manage the estate of a protected individual.
See D.C. Code §§ 21-2051 to -2077. Nevertheless, at least some of the duties
performed by Mr. Gardner after the 2010 appointment appear to be those of a
guardian. The Guardianship Act provides that a “guardian of an incapacitated
individual is responsible for care, custody, and control of the ward.” D.C. Code
§ 21-2047. Examples of such duties include:
(1) Becom[ing] or remain[ing] personally acquainted
with the ward and maintain[ing] sufficient contact with
18
the ward to know of the ward‟s capacities, limitations,
needs, opportunities, and physical and mental
health; . . . (5) Report[ing] in writing the condition of the
ward and of the ward‟s estate that has been subject to the
guardian‟s possession or control, as ordered by the court
on petition of any person interested in the ward‟s welfare
or on any order of the court, but at least semiannually;
(6) Mak[ing] decisions on behalf of the ward by
conforming as closely as possible to a standard of
substituted judgment or, if the ward‟s wishes are
unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts to
discern them, make the decision on the basis of the
ward‟s best interests.
D.C. Code § 21-2047 (a).
After the court appointed Mr. Gardner conservator of the person, his records
reflect that he made seven trips to New York to visit Mr. Smith from
November 2010 to August 2011 to determine Mr. Smith‟s needs and medical
condition in order to make informed medical decisions on the ward‟s behalf. This
is consistent with the duties of a guardian. In addition, he continued to prepare and
file reports and accountings and corresponded with the social worker overseeing
Mr. Smith‟s care. Therefore, at least some of the duties Mr. Gardner performed
fall into the category of those defined in the Guardianship Act, satisfying the
second principle identified in Sullivan.
19
Turning to the first principle described in Sullivan, it is less clear that
Mr. Gardner‟s appointment was made under the authority of the Guardianship Act.
The court did not identify its legal basis for making the appointment. The
Certificate of Appointment stated that the appointment had been made pursuant to
§ 21-1506 (1967), a law which was no longer in effect and apparently was
inapplicable because it only applied to persons “with mental weakness not
amounting to unsoundness of mind.”7 Previous statutes were also inapplicable to
this appointment because the old guardianship statutes generally did not apply to
adults, and the old conservatorship statutes, in addition to being inappropriate for
managing those of “unsound mind,” were primarily reserved for the maintenance
of the estate, not of the person. D.C. Code §§ 21-101 to -182, -1501, -1503.
The only apparent authority available in 2010 for appointing a “conservator
of the person” (more aptly, a guardian) for Mr. Smith was the Guardianship Act.
Both the trial court and the Assistant Deputy Register of Wills seemed to believe
that Mr. Gardner needed to have additional authority. Perhaps this appointment
7
It is uncontested that Mr. Smith was civilly committed in 1958 because he
had been diagnosed with chronic schizophrenia (undifferentiated type), which led
to the decree that he was of “unsound mind.” Mr. Gardner‟s reports indicate that
Mr. Smith continued to “suffer[] from NSC schizophrenia” in 2013.
20
was not legally pristine because the intervention petition had been dismissed. 8
However, Mr. Smith was already a ward of the court, and the Assistant Deputy
Register of Wills had orally requested the appointment of a conservator of the
person with authority to make medical decisions. Thereafter, Mr. Gardner acted in
good faith under the directives of the court to carry out his duties as, in effect,
Mr. Smith‟s guardian.
Technical flaws in an appointment of this type are addressed by our decision
in Orshansky, where this court said that “whether a fiduciary appointed by the
probate court is due compensation from the subject‟s estate under the Guardianship
Act does not depend on whether the probate court‟s appointment was in error.
Service in good faith pursuant to court order is compensable, regardless of whether
the probate court erred in making the appointment.” In re Orshansky, 952 A.2d
199, 210 (D.C. 2008). If the payout for the services rendered would deplete the
estate, “payment is made from the Guardianship Fund.” Id.
We therefore conclude that Mr. Gardner‟s 2010 appointment as conservator
of the person is properly construed to have been made pursuant to the
8
In addition, one might reasonably ask whether such an appointment should
have been sought in New York, where Mr. Smith had resided for some time. See
D.C. Code § 21-2021 (territorial application of Guardianship Act).
21
Guardianship Act. Thus, if there are no longer funds available in the ward‟s estate
to compensate Mr. Gardner, he is eligible to receive compensation from the
Guardianship Fund for services rendered after his appointment in 2010 as
conservator of the person. Such payment would be entirely consistent with the
purposes for which the Guardianship Fund was established. That of course does
not mean that Mr. Gardner is entitled to compensation from the Fund in the
amounts requested, but this is a question for the trial court to answer. See District
of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t v. Stanley, 951 A.2d 65, 67 (D.C. 2008) (“[F]ee
petitions raise factual questions . . . [and] should presumptively be addressed first
at the trial court level.”).
Our study of this record raises many questions about whether the mental
status of Mr. Smith should have been reexamined over the years and whether the
new appointment of Mr. Gardner was accomplished without regard to many
procedural requirements of the Guardianship Act. See notes 3 and 8, supra.
However, no one has questioned whether Mr. Smith‟s rights were honored, and
any such issues have been mooted by his death. Therefore, we have addressed
only the question presented to us.
22
III. Conclusion
The judgments on appeal are hereby reversed, and these cases are remanded
to the Superior Court with instructions to consider the petitions for compensation
anew and determine whether Mr. Gardner is entitled to payment from the
Guardianship Fund for the various services he provided following his appointment
as conservator of the person in 2010.
It is so ordered.