JAMES DAVID SPELLMAN v. JOSEPH BOLAND, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL JOSEPH KELLY ( 2016 )

District of Columbia
Court of Appeals
No. 15-FM-429
JUL - 7 2016
JAMES DAVID SPELLMAN,
Appellant,
v. DRB-2765-13
JOSEPH BOLAND, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL JOSEPH KELLY,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
BEFORE: BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE; Associate Judges.
JUDGMENT
This case came to be heard on the transcript of record and the briefs filed,
and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, and for the reasons set forth in
the opinion filed this date, it is now hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the Superior Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
For the Court:
Dated: July 7, 2016.
Opinion by Associate Judge Roy W. McLeese.
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
volumes go to press.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 15-FM-429 7/7/16
JAMES DAVID SPELLMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH BOLAND, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL JOSEPH
KELLY, APPELLEE.
On Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(DRB-2765-13)
(Hon. Judith A. Smith, Trial Judge)
(Argued May 5, 2016 Decided July 7, 2016)
Ugo Colella for appellant.
Darryl A. Feldman, with whom Rebecca C. Shankman was on the brief, for
appellee.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.
MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellant James David Spellman filed a
petition in Superior Court seeking a declaration affirming the existence of a
common-law marriage between Mr. Spellman and his late partner, Michael Joseph
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Kelly. Mr. Spellman appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing the petition for
lack of personal jurisdiction over appellee Joseph Boland, in his capacity as
personal representative of Mr. Kelly’s estate. We conclude that the Superior Court
has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Boland. We therefore reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
Although there are factual disputes between the parties as to Mr. Kelly’s
connections to the District of Columbia, the trial court found the following facts
that appear to be undisputed in this court. In the fall of 1993, Mr. Spellman and
Mr. Kelly, who both lived in the District, met and began dating. In 1998, the two
decided to live together and to hold themselves out as partners. Although Mr.
Spellman and Mr. Kelly primarily resided at Mr. Spellman’s residence in the
District, Mr. Kelly also owned a home in Delaware, where he and Mr. Spellman
stayed on the weekends and during the summer. Mr. Kelly worked in the District
until 2006, when he retired and began spending more of his time at his Delaware
home. After 2006, Mr. Kelly did some consulting work in the District for several
years, and he continued to travel to the District and to spend time there with Mr.
Spellman. Throughout the period from 1998 to 2013, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Spellman
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co-hosted social events in the District, sent joint holiday cards from Mr.
Spellman’s address in the District, and attended book clubs, the opera, and the
theater together in the District. Mr. Kelly was diagnosed with cancer in December
2012 and passed away two months later.
Mr. Boland, Mr. Kelly’s brother-in-law, filed a petition in Delaware to
probate Mr. Kelly’s estate. Mr. Boland was appointed personal representative of
the estate. Once the probate matter was opened, Mr. Spellman filed a claim for a
spousal allowance. Mr. Boland rejected Mr. Spellman’s claim on the ground that
there was no documentation of a marriage between Mr. Spellman and Mr. Kelly
that would be recognized under Delaware law. Mr. Spellman filed a petition in the
District seeking a declaration that he and Mr. Kelly had entered into a
common-law marriage. Mr. Boland filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. In opposition, Mr. Spellman argued that the trial court had personal
jurisdiction under a number of provisions, including D.C. Code § 13-423 (a)(7)(E)
(2012 Repl.), which gives the Superior Court personal jurisdiction with respect to
claims for relief arising from a person’s “marital . . . relationship in the District of
Columbia,” as long as “there is any basis consistent with the United States
Constitution for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” The trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on the motion. At the hearing, somewhat conflicting evidence
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was presented about Mr. Kelly’s ties to the District and to Delaware. The trial
court granted Mr. Boland’s motion to dismiss, rejecting several of Mr. Spellman’s
jurisdictional arguments but without addressing whether the trial court had
personal jurisdiction under section 13-423 (a)(7)(E).
II.
Mr. Spellman argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked
personal jurisdiction. We review de novo whether, on the undisputed facts, the
trial court had personal jurisdiction. See generally, e.g., Holder v. Haarmann &
Reimer Corp., 779 A.2d 264, 269 (D.C. 2001). We conclude that the trial court did
have personal jurisdiction.
Although Mr. Boland is named as the defendant in his capacity as personal
representative of Mr. Kelly’s estate, the parties correctly agree that the relevant
inquiry is whether the Superior Court could properly have exercised personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Kelly himself. See D.C. Code § 13-421 (2012 Repl.) (for
purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, “person” includes “an individual, his
executor, administrator, or other personal representative”); see also, e.g., Willis v.
Willis, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 103, 105, 655 F.2d 1333, 1335 (1981) (executor “was
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subject to the court’s jurisdiction to the same extent that [decedent] would have
been”) (citing D.C. Code § 13-421 (1973)).
Mr. Spellman claims that a marital relationship arose in the District between
Mr. Spellman and Mr. Kelly. Mr. Spellman argues, and Mr. Boland does not
dispute, that under section 13-423 (a)(7)(E) the Superior Court would have had
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kelly to determine that claim as long as the exercise
of such jurisdiction would be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. Mr. Boland argues only that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Kelly would be inconsistent with the Constitution. We
conclude to the contrary and therefore rule as a matter of law that the Superior
Court has personal jurisdiction in this case.
In determining whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kelly
would be permissible under the Due Process Clause, we consider whether Mr.
Kelly had sufficient “minimum contacts” with the District, so that exercising
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kelly “would not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Daley v. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc., 26 A.3d
723, 727 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he critical issue is
whether the individual’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that
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he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Family Fed’n for
World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 242 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also, e.g., Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d
320, 329 (D.C. 2000) (en banc) (jurisdictional inquiry focuses on “the relationship
among the defendant, the forum[,] and the litigation”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The undisputed facts show that Mr. Kelly maintained substantial contacts
with the District. Mr. Kelly owned a home in the District until 1998, when he
moved in with Mr. Spellman at Mr. Spellman’s home in the District. From 1998 to
2006, Mr. Spellman and Mr. Kelly shared a residence in the District and held
themselves out as partners. Mr. Kelly lived and worked in the District until 2006,
when he retired. Although Mr. Kelly began spending more of his time in Delaware
after his retirement, Mr. Kelly’s contacts with the District continued up to his death
in 2013. During the period from 2006 to 2012, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Spellman
continued to co-host social events in the District, send joint holiday cards from Mr.
Spellman’s address in the District, and attend events together in the District.
We conclude that, given Mr. Kelly’s extensive contacts with the District, he
would have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” in the District,
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Family Fed’n for World Peace, 129 A.3d at 242, with respect to a claim that those
same contacts gave rise to a common-law marriage in the District. Cf., e.g., In re
Estate of Rodriguez, 160 P.3d 679, 684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (trial court had
personal jurisdiction over non-resident husband where parties married in state and
validity of marriage was central issue); In re Marriage of Adams, 21 P.3d 171,
173-76 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (in divorce and custody action, trial court had personal
jurisdiction over non-resident husband who had “prolonged, continuous[,] and
frequent contacts with Oregon”); Jessie v. Jessie, 920 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1996) (affirming personal jurisdiction over non-resident husband in divorce
action where parties married in state; husband owned property in state, had
checking account in state, and registered car in state; and husband regularly stayed
with wife in state).
We also conclude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would
not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Daley, 26 A.3d
at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In large part, the concept of fair play
and substantial justice is informed by the connection between the forum and the
underlying dispute -- in other words, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute.” Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 98
A.3d 998, 1005 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is a
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clear connection between the contacts giving rise to jurisdiction in the
District -- many of which concern Mr. Kelly’s relationship with Mr.
Spellman -- and the question whether Mr. Spellman and Mr. Kelly entered into a
common-law marriage in the District. Cf. In re Marriage of Adams, 21 P.3d at 178
(where non-resident husband had extensive contacts with Oregon, exercise of
personal jurisdiction over non-resident husband in divorce and custody action
“comported with recognized notions of fair play and substantial justice”). Indeed,
it seems both fair and just that the question whether a marriage arose in and under
the laws of the District, based on the parties’ course of conduct while living
together in the District, should be adjudicated in the District. Cf. generally, e.g.,
Bansda v. Wheeler, 995 A.2d 189, 198 (D.C. 2010) (“The validity of a marriage is
to be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage occurred.”).
Mr. Boland argues, however, that exercising personal jurisdiction over him
with respect to this action would be inconsistent with the Constitution.
Specifically, Mr. Boland contends that Mr. Kelly could not reasonably have
anticipated being haled into court in the District over a claim that Mr. Kelly’s
contacts with the District gave rise to a common-law marriage, because same-sex
marriage was not statutorily recognized in the District until 2010, by which time
Mr. Kelly lived and was domiciled in Delaware. See D.C. Code § 46-401 (2012
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Repl.). Even assuming that Mr. Kelly was domiciled in Delaware in 2010, the
District nevertheless can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr.
Kelly in this case. Mr. Spellman claims that, as a result of Mr. Kelly’s substantial
and extended conduct in the District, a common-law marriage arose in the District.
Mr. Spellman further claims that that common-law marriage should now be
recognized as having existed since 1998. The merits of that claim are distinct from
the conclusion we reach today: that the Constitution would permit the Superior
Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kelly because Mr. Kelly had
minimum contacts with the District that sufficiently relate to the underlying
dispute.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court had personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Boland under D.C. Code § 13-423 (a)(7)(E). We therefore do not reach
Mr. Spellman’s alternate asserted bases for personal jurisdiction. See D.C. Code
§§ 13-422 (personal jurisdiction exists when defendant is domiciled in the
District), -423 (a)(1), (2), (5), (7)(A)-(C) (2012 Repl.).
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
So ordered.