In re Wendell Robinson ( 2020 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 18-BG-340
IN RE WENDELL ROBINSON, RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 377091)
On Report and Recommendation of the
Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN-293-12)
(Argued February 27, 2019 Decided February 20, 2020)
(Amended May 14, 2020)*
Abraham C. Blitzer for respondent.
Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Jennifer P. Lyman,
Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and FISHER and BECKWITH,
Associate Judges.
*
We granted respondent’s April 21, 2020, motion to amend the opinion to
reflect that respondent has since served his suspension and been reinstated. On
February 20, 2020, this court had suspended respondent from the practice of law
on May 30, 2018, and lifted that suspension on October 24, 2019.
2
BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge: Disciplinary Counsel charged
respondent Wendell Robinson with violating Rule 1.15(d) of the D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct for failing to hold disputed funds in trust during the
pendency of a dispute with co-counsel. Though Disciplinary Counsel only charged
respondent with violating Rule 1.15(d), the Hearing Committee, sua sponte,
considered whether respondent also violated Rules 1.15(a) and (c) by intentionally
misappropriating funds. The Hearing Committee found that respondent violated
Rules 1.15(a), (c), and (d), and recommended that respondent be disbarred. The
Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) agreed that respondent violated
Rule 1.15(d), but concluded that the Hearing Committee erred in considering the
misappropriation charge under Rules 1.15(a) and (c). The Board rejected the
proposed sanction of disbarment, and instead recommended that respondent be
suspended for one year. We accept the Board’s findings and recommended
sanction. 1
1
Before the issuance of this opinion, respondent served his suspension and
was reinstated to practice law. On May 30, 2018, this court suspended respondent
pending the final disposition of the underlying proceeding. On July 25, 2019,
respondent moved to lift the suspension. In an October 24, 2019, order, we lifted
respondent’s interim suspension, and ordered respondent to file with this court a
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g) affidavit, which we would consider submitted on July 16,
2018 (when he filed the same with the Board). Respondent filed the affidavit with
this court on October 25, 2019.
3
I.
In September 2009, respondent and three others, D.C. attorneys Leonard L.
Long and W. Thomas Stovall, II, and Virginia attorney William Thompson,
associated to represent Tonyette Bables in a medical malpractice suit in Virginia.
On February 2, 2010, Ms. Bables signed a retainer agreement naming all four as
her attorneys. The agreement outlined a contingency-fee arrangement between
attorney and client, but did not specify how the attorneys were to divide their fee
among themselves. Respondent conducted the litigation largely on his own and
eventually negotiated a settlement. Before the case settled, the lawyers disagreed
on how to divide the attorneys’ fees. Respondent assumed that, after paying Mr.
Thompson a certain amount for his role as local counsel, the remaining fees would
be distributed based on the work each attorney performed. That understanding was
based, at least in part, on respondent’s conversation with an Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel, who referred him to D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e). 2
2
Under Rule 1.5(e) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct:
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if:
(1) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation.
(continued . . .)
4
Respondent testified that Mr. Long admitted respondent did all the work in the
case, which respondent understood to be a concession that respondent was entitled
to all of the attorneys’ fees. Mr. Long and Mr. Stovall, however, testified that they
orally agreed with respondent to pay Mr. Thompson an unspecified amount for his
services, and then divide the remaining fee equally among the three attorneys. In a
letter dated May 16, 2011, Mr. Long rejected respondent’s proposal to split the
fees based on the division of labor and suggested submitting the issue to
arbitration.
In June 2011, Ms. Bables’s case settled for $600,000, entitling the attorneys
to collect $240,000 (i.e., forty percent of the settlement) in accordance with the
retainer agreement. Respondent, however, initially told Ms. Bables that the
attorneys would collect only $200,000 (i.e., one-third of the settlement). After co-
counsel told respondent that the lawyers were actually entitled to $240,000,
respondent informed Ms. Bables, who became upset. Respondent testified that he
offered to pay Ms. Bables one-third of the $40,000 difference between the two
(. . . continued)
(2) The client is advised, in writing, of the identity of the lawyers who
will participate in the representation, of the contemplated division of
responsibility, and of the effect of the association of lawyers outside
the firm on the fee to be charged;
(3) The client gives informed consent to the arrangement; and
(4) The total fee is reasonable.
5
amounts. The settlement proceeds were credited to respondent’s trust account on
June 20, 2011, and ten days later, respondent paid Ms. Bables $360,000, and paid
Mr. Thompson $15,000, leaving $225,000 to be disbursed among respondent, Mr.
Long, and Mr. Stovall. By August 11, 2011, despite the fact that the three
attorneys had not resolved the attorneys’ fees issue, respondent had paid himself
$193,350 and paid Mr. Long and Mr. Stovall each $15,700.
Mr. Long and Mr. Stovall filed a complaint with Disciplinary Counsel, and,
on May 20, 2015, Disciplinary Counsel charged respondent with violating Rule
1.15(d) for failing to keep the disputed funds in his escrow account. 3 Respondent
conceded, and the Hearing Committee found, that respondent violated Rule
1.15(d). The Hearing Committee credited testimony by Mr. Long and Mr. Stovall
that the attorneys had agreed to split the attorneys’ fees in equal parts. The
3
Rule 1.15(d) states, in relevant part:
When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which interests are claimed by
the lawyer and another person, or by two or more persons
to each of whom the lawyer may have an obligation, the
property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there
is an accounting and severance of interests in property. If
a dispute arises concerning the respective interests among
persons claiming an interest in such property, the
undisputed portion shall be distributed and the portion in
dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the
dispute is resolved.
6
Hearing Committee found that respondent “[r]epeatedly testified falsely” during
the hearing when he stated that Mr. Long agreed that respondent was entitled to all
or most of the settlement fees. The Hearing Committee also found that respondent
committed misappropriation, which was not included in the Specification of
Charges, in violation of Rules 1.15(a) and (c). Concluding that respondent violated
Rules 1.15(a), (c), and (d), the Hearing Committee recommended that respondent
be disbarred.
The Board agreed that respondent violated Rule 1.15(d), but concluded that
the Hearing Committee erred when it considered the misappropriation charge.
Based solely on the Rule 1.15(d) violation, the Board recommended that
respondent be suspended for one year. Neither Disciplinary Counsel nor
respondent disputes the Rule 1.15(d) violation or the Board’s rejection of the
misappropriation charge. Both Disciplinary Counsel and respondent, however,
have filed exceptions to the Board’s recommended sanction. Respondent seeks a
thirty-day suspension, whereas Disciplinary Counsel urges this court to impose
disbarment.
II.
7
“The scope of our review of the Board’s Report and Recommendation is
limited.” In re Bailey, 883 A.2d 106, 115 (D.C. 2005) (quoting In re Berryman,
764 A.2d 760, 766 (D.C. 2000)). We will accept the Board’s findings of fact,
“unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record,” but will review
the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. In re Lee, 95 A.3d 66, 72 (D.C. 2014)
(quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1)). With respect to the Board’s recommended
sanction, we defer to the Board’s recommendation unless doing so “would foster a
tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would
otherwise be unwarranted.” In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d 775, 785 (D.C.
2019) (quoting In re Tun, 195 A.3d 65, 74 (D.C. 2018)).
A. Rule 1.15(d) Violation
Respondent concedes that he violated Rule 1.15(d) by failing to keep the
disputed fees in a trust account pending resolution of the dispute between him and
co-counsel. Respondent’s concession is also supported by the record. The
Hearing Committee credited Mr. Long’s and Mr. Stovall’s testimony that they,
along with respondent, agreed to equally divide the attorneys’ fees. Their
testimony is supported by respondent’s offer to return one-third of the difference
between what Ms. Bables thought she was going to receive in the settlement and
8
what she actually received, reflecting respondent’s understanding that each
attorney was entitled to one-third of the fee. Given that shared understanding,
respondent was required to place the disputed portion of the attorneys’ fees in a
trust account pending resolution of the dispute. Because he did not, respondent
violated Rule 1.15(d).
We also adopt the Board’s conclusion that the Hearing Committee erred
when it added, sua sponte, a misappropriation charge to the case. Disciplinary
Counsel is empowered to “dismiss a complaint, institute formal charges, or
informally admonish an attorney,” In re Kitchings, 779 A.2d 926, 932 (D.C. 2001)
(citing D.C. Bar R. XI, § 8(b)), subject to prior approval by a Contact Member, an
attorney member of the Hearing Committee who may “review and approve or
suggest modifications of” Disciplinary Counsel’s recommendations. D.C. Bar R.
XI, § 4(e)(5). If the Contact Member disagrees with Disciplinary Counsel’s
recommendation, the case is submitted to the Chair of the Hearing Committee to
make the final decision. Board Prof. Resp. R. 2.13. But there is no authority for
the Hearing Committee, acting alone, to add charges that were not sought by
Disciplinary Counsel or approved by a Contact Member. See D.C. Bar R. XI,
§§ 5(c) (outlining powers and duties of the Hearing Committee), 6(a) (outlining
powers and duties of Disciplinary Counsel).
9
In concluding that it was acting within the scope of its authority in “tak[ing]
the admittedly extraordinary step of considering charges not levied by Disciplinary
Counsel,” the Hearing Committee relied on In re Harris-Lindsey, 19 A.3d 784
(D.C. 2011), a case in which we adopted the Board’s rejection of a petition for
negotiated discipline in favor of a contested proceeding. But Harris-Lindsey does
not stand for the proposition that the Hearing Committee is authorized to
unilaterally add charges not sought by Disciplinary Counsel. Instead, Harris-
Lindsey simply highlights this court’s authority to approve (or, in Harris-Lindsey,
reject) a petition for negotiated disposition “in accordance with [the court’s]
procedures for the imposition of uncontested discipline.” D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 12.1(d). While the Hearing Committee correctly recognizes the seriousness with
which this court views misappropriation, see, e.g., In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190,
196 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (holding disbarment as the presumptive discipline for
all but negligent misappropriation), it overstepped its authority in considering the
misappropriation charge here.
B. Sanction
10
Having concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.15(d), we now determine
the appropriate sanction. We apply a strong presumption in favor of adopting the
Board’s sanction recommendation as long as it “falls within the wide range of
acceptable outcomes.” In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053 (D.C. 2013) (quoting In
re Elgin, 918 A.2d 362, 376 (D.C. 2007)). But “the responsibility for imposing
sanctions rests with this court in the first instance.” In re Chapman, 962 A.2d 922,
924 (D.C. 2009). We base our determination of sanctions on multiple factors,
including “(1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client, (3)
whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary rules,
(5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has acknowledged
his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances.” In re Martin, 67
A.3d at 1053. To foster consistent dispositions, “we necessarily compare the
instant case with prior cases in terms of the misconduct at issue, the attorney’s
disciplinary history, and any legitimate mitigating or aggravating circumstances.”
In re Edwards, 870 A.2d 90, 94 (D.C. 2005). The Board recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. We adopt that
recommendation.
We agree with the Board that respondent’s violation of Rule 1.15(d) was
serious. Mr. Long and Mr. Stovall communicated to respondent on multiple
11
occasions that they disputed respondent’s proposed division of attorneys’ fees. Yet
despite his awareness of the dispute, respondent made multiple payments to
himself out of the disputed funds, all without telling Mr. Long or Mr. Stovall.
With respect to the prejudice factor, the Board noted that respondent’s failure to
pay co-counsel potentially subjected Ms. Bables to a payment demand from Mr.
Long or Mr. Stovall. However, no such demand was made and there is no
evidence that Ms. Bables was otherwise prejudiced by respondent’s misconduct.
The Hearing Committee did not find that respondent’s misconduct involved
dishonesty, but it did find that respondent testified falsely, which warrants a greater
sanction. In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 798; In re Martin, 67 A.3d at 1054
(“Engaging in dishonest conduct to cover up other misconduct is absolutely
intolerable and warrants a greater sanction.” (cleaned up)). As discussed, because
the Hearing Committee erred in considering the misappropriation charge, the Rule
1.15(d) violation is the only charge considered here. As to respondent’s
disciplinary history, respondent’s previous disbarment for misappropriation favors
a greater sanction here. See In re Robinson, 583 A.2d 691 (D.C. 1990).
Respondent, however, has acknowledged his latest misconduct and concedes his
Rule 1.15(d) violation here.
12
Respondent seeks a thirty-day suspension, claiming that his good-faith
reliance on Rule 1.5 is a substantial mitigating factor, and that his conduct did not
involve dishonesty or misrepresentation. Even if we were to find that respondent
relied on his reading of Rule 1.5 in good faith, we must still account for other
serious aggravating factors, such as his prior disbarment for misappropriation and
his false testimony to the Hearing Committee. See In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892
A.2d 396, 413 (D.C. 2006) (considering false testimony a significant aggravating
factor). Further, we decline respondent’s invitation to disturb the findings of the
Hearing Committee and Board that respondent testified falsely, Mr. Long agreed
that respondent was entitled to most or all of the fees, and Mr. Long was merely
seeking from respondent a gift from the fees. The Hearing Committee found that
respondent’s testimony was contradicted by the written record, including
respondent’s own letters in which he referred to the lawyers’ dispute. See In re
Lee, 95 A.3d at 72.
In determining an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the
Board relied on our decision in Martin, a non-misappropriation case involving an
attorney’s failure to hold disputed funds in trust. 67 A.3d at 1044. There we found
13
that Martin violated Rules 1.15(a) and (d) 4 when he transferred from his trust
account to his operating account an amount he believed to be his proper fee, even
though he knew the client disputed his entitlement to that fee and the client
instructed him not to distribute the bulk of the settlement funds. In re Martin, 67
A.3d at 1043–44. We also found that Martin testified falsely regarding advice he
received from the D.C. Bar Ethics Hotline about the disputed funds, and made two
false statements on his Virginia Bar application concerning the dispute. Id. at
1054. We explained that “honesty is basic to the practice of law,” and although
“we have generally imposed relatively short periods of suspension for isolated
instances of dishonesty, . . . we have imposed relatively longer suspensions where
dishonesty is accompanied by other serious violations or is protracted.” Id. at 1053
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that an eighteen-
month suspension was warranted as Martin’s dishonesty “was both protracted and
intended to conceal or excuse earlier misconduct.” Id. at 1054.
In the Board’s view, respondent’s misconduct here was not as serious as the
misconduct in Martin, and thus, the imposition of an eighteen-month suspension
was not warranted: Respondent’s misconduct arose out of a dispute with co-
4
At the time of the violation in Martin, Rule 1.15(d) was codified as Rule
1.15(c). See In re Martin, 67 A.3d at 1043 n.13.
14
counsel, not a client; respondent’s client was not prejudiced by his misconduct;
there was no allegation that he mishandled the underlying case; and the respondent
in Martin engaged in meritless litigation in order to delay payment of the funds,
going so far as to condition payment on the client’s withdrawal of its disciplinary
complaint. See In re Martin, 67 A.3d at 1053–54. The Board, however, found that
respondent’s false testimony and prior disbarment for misappropriation were
troubling aggravating factors in this case, and thereby recommended a one-year
suspension. We agree.
While we recognize that respondent has had issues with money
management, we find no support in our case law to disbar respondent absent a
finding of misappropriation for the instant Rule 1.15(d) violation. Additionally,
considering that the client in this case was not prejudiced by respondent’s
misconduct, and that respondent has accepted responsibility for this violation,
disbarment would be too severe a sanction. We thus adopt the Board’s
recommendation of a one-year suspension because it falls within the wide range of
acceptable outcomes, is supported by our case law, and is warranted under the
circumstances. See In re Daniel, 11 A.3d 291, 301 (D.C. 2011) (imposing a three-
year suspension in a non-misappropriation case in which respondent violated
multiple rules and provided false statements in a sworn affidavit); In re Martin, 67
15
A.3d at 1053–54 (imposing an eighteen-month suspension in a non-
misappropriation case involving serious dishonesty and interference with the
administration of justice).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we accept the Board’s decision and recommendation that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a
period of one year, with reinstatement conditioned upon compliance with D.C. Bar
Rule XI, § 16(c). As noted, supra note 1, respondent served his suspension,
beginning on July 16, 2018, and has since been reinstated.
So ordered.