In re Paul ( 2023 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 22-BG-457
IN RE DANA A. PAUL, RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar
of the District of Columbia
(Bar Registration No. 490142)
On Report and Recommendation
of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(Disciplinary Docket No. 2019-D199)
(Board Docket No. 19-BD-63)
(Submitted January 24, 2023 Decided April 20, 2023)
Dana A. Paul, pro se.
Hamilton P. Fox and Myles V. Lynk were on the brief for the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel.
Before HOWARD and ALIKHAN, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior Judge.
ALIKHAN, Associate Judge: After respondent Dana A. Paul disclosed client
confidences in a disciplinary complaint that he filed against his former client, N.E.,
the District of Columbia Office of Disciplinary Counsel investigated him for
violating multiple District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board
on Professional Responsibility concluded that he had violated D.C. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.6(a) and recommended that we impose a 90-day suspension. Before this
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court, Mr. Paul argues that D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) immunizes him from disciplinary
action stemming from his complaint, that his disclosures do not fall under Rule 1.6’s
protections and were necessary to defend himself against an earlier disciplinary
action that N.E. had filed against him, and that the Board’s recommended 90-day
suspension was unwarranted. We disagree that he is immune from discipline,
conclude that he violated Rule 1.6(a), and order a 30-day suspension.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Factual Background
The Hearing Committee and the Board made the following findings of fact,
most of which are undisputed. In 2014 and 2015, Mr. Paul, a member of the D.C.
Bar, represented N.E. and her husband in a matter in a Maryland court. He
represented them again in 2017 when they sued their realtor and others, also in a
Maryland court, alleging a “botched” real estate deal.
Mr. Paul and his clients began to disagree about the case, and, a few months
later, he resigned. In April 2018, N.E. and her husband reported Mr. Paul to the
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland and the District of Columbia Office
of Disciplinary Counsel. They alleged that he had improperly retained an expert
witness, had failed to communicate with N.E. and her husband, had not prepared
them for depositions, and had entered unauthorized stipulations on their behalf.
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In May 2018, Mr. Paul responded to both complaints. In his response to
N.E.’s complaint in the District and at Disciplinary Counsel’s request, Mr. Paul
submitted his entire client file for N.E. Three months later, while Disciplinary
Counsel was investigating N.E.’s complaint against Mr. Paul, he filed a disciplinary
complaint against N.E., who is also a member of the D.C. Bar. Mr. Paul included
the case number of the matter against him in his disciplinary complaint, and he
disclosed information that N.E. had shared with him when he was her attorney. The
Office of Disciplinary Counsel eventually dismissed N.E.’s complaint against
Mr. Paul and requested that N.E. respond to Mr. Paul’s complaint against her. After
N.E. responded, Mr. Paul replied, noting: “I am only filing this grievance because
of the grievance [N.E.] filed against me.” In his reply, Mr. Paul included additional
information that he had learned during his 2017 representation of N.E. and her
husband.
B. Procedural History
In June 2022, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel instituted disciplinary
proceedings against Mr. Paul, alleging that he had violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6
and 8.4(d). First, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel alleged that in his response to
N.E.’s grievance, his disciplinary complaint against N.E., and his reply to N.E.’s
response, Mr. Paul had disclosed client confidences or secrets, which had been
unnecessary to establish a defense to the disciplinary charge against him and
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therefore violated Rule 1.6. Second, it alleged that Mr. Paul’s retaliatory disciplinary
complaint against N.E. seriously interfered with the administration of justice in
violation of Rule 8.4(d).
After a hearing in March 2020, an Ad Hoc Hearing Committee concluded that
Mr. Paul had violated both rules and recommended that he receive a 90-day
suspension. As to Rule 1.6, the Hearing Committee determined that Mr. Paul had
knowingly revealed N.E.’s confidences when he intentionally gave private
information about her—information he only knew because he had represented her—
to Disciplinary Counsel. It reached this conclusion only with respect to Mr. Paul’s
disciplinary complaint against N.E. and his subsequent reply in that matter, finding
that those disclosures were offensive (rather than defensive) in nature and not
reasonably necessary for Mr. Paul to defend himself against N.E.’s accusations. The
Hearing Committee did not find a Rule 1.6 violation with regard to the disclosures
that Mr. Paul had made in response to N.E.’s complaint against him, concluding that
those were necessary for him to defend himself. See D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(e)(3)
(allowing reasonable disclosures to defend against a disciplinary action).
As to Rule 8.4(d), the Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Paul’s retaliatory
complaint seriously interfered with the administration of justice because it was
improper, bore directly on the judicial process, and affected the process “in more
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than a de minimis way.” In re Hopkins, 677 A.2d 55, 61 (D.C. 1996). The Hearing
Committee recommended a 90-day suspension after considering (1) the seriousness
of Mr. Paul’s conduct; (2) prejudice to the client; (3) whether the conduct involved
dishonesty; (4) violation of other disciplinary rules; (5) Mr. Paul’s disciplinary
history; (6) whether Mr. Paul had acknowledged his wrongful conduct; and
(7) mitigating circumstances. See In re Daniel, 11 A.3d 291, 300 (D.C. 2011).
Mr. Paul filed exceptions to each of these conclusions. In June 2022, the
Board issued its report and recommendation. The Board agreed with the Hearing
Committee’s conclusion that Mr. Paul had violated Rule 1.6 when he disclosed
N.E.’s confidences in his complaint against N.E. and his subsequent reply in that
matter. The Board also determined that D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 19(a) did not provide Mr.
Paul absolute immunity from attorney discipline—as opposed to civil liability—for
complaints submitted to Disciplinary Counsel, because such immunity was not
consistent with the plain text of the rule, and because a contrary reading would
conflict with other D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct. Finally, the Board
concluded that Mr. Paul had not violated Rule 8.4(d) because his conduct did not
impact the judicial system “in more than a de minimis way.” In re Hopkins, 677
A.2d at 61.
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Despite finding fewer violations than the Hearing Committee, the Board
adopted the Hearing Committee’s recommendation of a 90-day suspension. In so
doing, it explained that Mr. Paul’s disciplinary complaint against N.E. was retaliatory
and egregious and thus warranted a 90-day suspension even without a finding that
Mr. Paul had violated Rule 8.4(d).
Mr. Paul took exception to several of the Board’s conclusions and its
recommended sanction, and he filed a brief in this court. The Office of Disciplinary
Counsel did not file exceptions, but it filed a brief supporting the Board’s report and
recommendation.
II. Discussion
We “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and [we] adopt the recommended
disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent
dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar
R. XI, § 9(h)(1). We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo. In re Samad,
51 A.3d 486, 495 (D.C. 2012) (per curiam).
Before this court, Mr. Paul argues that (1) D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) immunizes
him from disciplinary action stemming from the complaint he filed against N.E.;
(2) he did not disclose information protected by Rule 1.6 and, even if he did, such
7
disclosure was necessary to defend himself against the earlier disciplinary action
N.E. had filed against him; and (3) a 90-day suspension was unwarranted. We take
each in turn.
A. Immunity Conferred by D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a)
In the District of Columbia, an individual may submit allegations of an
attorney’s misconduct to the Board or to the D.C. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 6(a)(2), 8(a). 1 These allegations may come through formal
complaints or other sources, id. § 6(a)(2), and they may come from other lawyers,
see D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3.
All complaints submitted to Disciplinary Counsel or the Board are “absolutely
privileged, and no claim or action predicated thereon may be instituted or
maintained.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a). Additionally, “[m]embers of the Board, its
employees,” and other similarly situated individuals are “immune from disciplinary
1
This court has disciplinary jurisdiction over, among others, “members of the
District of Columbia Bar, all persons appearing or participating pro hac vice in any
proceeding . . . , and all persons who have been suspended or disbarred.” D.C. Bar
R. XI, § 1(a).
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complaint . . . and from civil suit for any conduct in the course of their official
duties.” Id. 2
Mr. Paul argues that Section 19(a)’s proviso that disciplinary complaints are
“absolutely privileged, and [that] no claim or action predicated thereon may be
instituted or maintained” means that an attorney who submits a disciplinary
complaint is immune from both litigation and disciplinary action related to the
complaint. In contrast, the Board concluded, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
argues, that this language immunizes attorneys who file complaints only from suit
but not from disciplinary action. This is so, they reason, because the next sentence
of Section 19(a) provides immunity from both civil suit and disciplinary action, but
only to a select group of people: “[m]embers of the Board, its employees,” and other
2
In full, D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) reads:
Immunity. Complaints submitted to the Board or
Disciplinary Counsel shall be absolutely privileged, and
no claim or action predicated thereon may be instituted or
maintained. Members of the Board, its employees,
members of Hearing Committees, Disciplinary Counsel,
and all assistants and employees of Disciplinary Counsel,
all persons engaged in counseling, evaluating or
monitoring other attorneys pursuant to a Board or Court
order or a diversion agreement, and all assistants or
employees of persons engaged in such counseling,
evaluating or monitoring shall be immune from
disciplinary complaint under this rule and from civil suit
for any conduct in the course of their official duties.
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similarly situated individuals. Thus, in their view, an attorney who commits
misconduct in pursuing a disciplinary complaint against another attorney may not
be sued, but he could face disciplinary action for his misdeeds.
We conclude that the Board has the better argument. We begin with the text
of the provision: “Complaints submitted to the Board or Disciplinary Counsel shall
be absolutely privileged, and no claim or action predicated thereon may be instituted
or maintained.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) (emphases added). “In interpreting a statute
or rule, we are mindful of the maxim that we must look first to its language; if the
words are clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to its plain meaning.” In re
Greenspan, 910 A.2d 324, 335 (D.C. 2006) (brackets omitted) (quoting McPherson
v. United States, 692 A.2d 1342, 1344 (D.C. 1997)). “Like the rule for statutory
construction, ‘words of a [rule] should be construed according to their ordinary sense
and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Washington v. United States, 884 A.2d 1080, 1096 (D.C. 2005)).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “absolute privilege” as “[a] privilege that
immunizes an actor from suit, no matter how wrongful the action might be, and even
though it is done with an improper motive.” Absolute Privilege, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); see In re Spikes, 881 A.2d 1118, 1124
(D.C. 2005) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary to interpret “absolute[] privilege[]”
10
in Section 19(a)). The ordinary meaning of “absolutely privileged,” then, is an
immunity from litigation—from “suit”—not from consequences outside the
courtroom. This is consistent with how we have construed this term previously. See
In re Nace, 490 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1985) (explaining that immunity under D.C.
Bar R. XI, § 19(a) meant that an individual “could not maintain any action against
[a would-be defendant] on a claimed right under District of Columbia law in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia”). It is also consistent with how our sister
jurisdictions treat “absolute privilege” in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Att’y
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Frost, 85 A.3d 264, 278 n.14 (Md. 2014) (“Absolute
privilege is a broad defense to tort claims, including tort claims related to statements
made in connection to pending [disciplinary] actions . . . ; however, we confirm that
it is not a defense to claims of unprofessional conduct.” (citation omitted)). 3
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See also, e.g., Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 889 A.2d
426, 438 (N.J. 2006) (“The litigation privilege does not immunize an attorney from
disciplinary sanctions . . . .”); Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895, 901 n.1 (Utah 2001)
(“We note here that although an attorney is normally absolutely immune from civil
liability for defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, the
privilege does not prevent professional discipline against the attorney for such
conduct in deserving circumstances.”); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950
(Okla. 1990) (explaining that the absolute privilege for statements made in the
course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings “would not protect an attorney from
suffering professional discipline because of unethical conduct”); Selby v. Burgess,
712 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Ark. 1986) (noting that although absolute privilege
“prohibit[s] an attorney from being subject to litigation” based on defamatory
communications made during judicial proceedings, “it will not make him immune
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The rule’s context confirms the natural reading of its text. See Util. Air Regul.
Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (“[R]easonable statutory interpretation must
account for both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the broader
context of the statute as a whole.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)); Webb v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 204
A.3d 843, 849 (D.C. 2019) (“Statutory construction generally demands reading a
statute in its entirety, and a ‘statute should be interpreted as a harmonious whole.’”
(quoting Stevens v. D.C. Dep’t of Health, 150 A.3d 307, 316 (D.C. 2016))).
Specifically, the second sentence of Section 19(a) confers a broader immunity than
the first, directing that Board members and similarly situated individuals “shall be
immune from disciplinary complaint under this rule and from civil suit for any
conduct in the course of their official duties.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) (emphasis
added). The inclusion of immunity from disciplinary complaint, in addition to
immunity from civil suit, for this set of individuals in Section 19(a)’s second
sentence is strong evidence that the first sentence does not provide a similar
immunity to attorney-complainants like Mr. Paul. That is because, “[w]here
[drafters] include[] particular language in one section of a statute but omit[] it in
from professional discipline . . . when it is appropriate” (citation omitted)); Theiss v.
Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1968) (implying that an attorney could be
“subject to disciplinary action by the court and by his bar association” for statements
he made during a judicial proceeding despite “[t]he rule of absolute privilege”).
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another . . . , it is generally presumed that [they] act[] intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C. v. Joint Rev.
Comm. on Educ. in Radiologic Tech., 114 A.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. 2015) (fifth
alteration in original) (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208
(1993)); see Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1058 (2019) (“Congress
generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another.” (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574
U.S. 383, 391 (2015))). This presumption operates with as much force in
interpreting a rule as it does in interpreting a statute. See In re R.F.H., 354 A.2d 844,
845 n.2 (D.C. 1976) (“Regulations generally are construed by the same rules of
statutory construction as are statutes.”).
Other strong contextual indicators are found in the D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct, several provisions of which specifically contemplate that attorneys may be
disciplined for actions they take before the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or the
Board. For example, Rule 8.3 allows a lawyer to report another lawyer’s misconduct,
but not if doing so requires disclosing information that is otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6 (like the information at issue here). D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3(c). An
attorney also violates the rules if he “[s]eek[s] . . . disciplinary charges solely to
obtain an advantage in a civil matter.” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(g). To provide a
third example, Rule 1.6 provides attorneys with a limited right to disclose a client’s
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confidences or secrets if necessary to defend himself against accusations of
wrongdoing. D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(e)(3). But a lawyer violates that rule if the
disclosure is “greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate
[his] innocence.” Id., cmt. 25. If the first sentence of Section 19(a) conferred
immunity from disciplinary action, it would render these rules nugatory. Cf. Thomas
v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 547 A.2d 1034, 1037 (D.C. 1988) (“A basic principle
is that each provision of the statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of
the statute’s provisions, not rendering any provision superfluous.”).
Given the clarity of the text and context, we need not resort to additional tools
of statutory interpretation. See In re Greenspan, 910 A.2d at 335-36. We do,
however, pause to respond to Mr. Paul’s arguments. First, Mr. Paul argues that
“absolute[] privilege means the same thing as absolute immunity.” That is true as
far as it goes, but it does not answer the question: absolute immunity from what?
For the reasons above, we conclude that it is absolute immunity from suit, not from
disciplinary action. To the extent Mr. Paul is arguing that the absolute immunity
conferred in the first sentence of Section 19(a) operates like the absolute immunity
afforded to judicial officers or prosecutors, we note that such immunity similarly is
an immunity from civil suit and not from attorney discipline. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) (explaining that “the immunity of
prosecutors from liability in suits under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983 does not leave the public
14
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs,” including through
“professional discipline by an association of his peers”); see also, e.g., Beck v.
Phillips, 685 N.W.2d 637, 643 n.2 (Iowa 2004) (“Prosecutors are not completely
beyond reproach even when absolute immunity attaches. The doctrine does not
foreclose professional discipline or criminal punishment.”); Chicopee Lions Club v.
Dist. Att’y for Hampden Dist., 485 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Mass. 1985) (“[A]bsolute
immunity from civil suit does not render the public entirely powerless to deter
prosecutorial misconduct: elections and bar discipline proceedings are available
mechanisms which may serve to check an overzealous district attorney.”).
Next, Mr. Paul contends that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel “has never
charged an attorney for filing a grievance against another attorney” and claims this
is evidence that Section 19(a) confers immunity from disciplinary action for
attorney-complainants. Even if this were true (Mr. Paul’s citation does not support
his claim), this court—which has the final word on attorney discipline—has certainly
suggested that it is possible. In re Howard, 940 A.2d 130, 131 n.1 (D.C. 2007) (per
curiam) (issuing reciprocal discipline and noting that a respondent’s improper threats
to report opposing counsel to disciplinary authorities would have violated
Rule 8.4(g) if they had occurred in the District). That this situation may be rare does
not mean that Section 19(a) forecloses it.
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Finally, Mr. Paul argues that without immunity from disciplinary action,
attorneys will not “report ethical misconduct [for] fear that the [Office of
Disciplinary Counsel] will charge them for filing a grievance in the future.” This
overstates the issue. Attorneys are encouraged to report professional misconduct
where they “know[] that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3(a).
But the rule “does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6 or other law.” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3(c). And, more generally, such a
report cannot be “solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.” D.C. R. Prof.
Conduct 8.4(g). As the comments to Rule 8.3 explain, “[a] measure of judgment
is . . . required in complying with the [rule].” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3, cmt. 3. We
trust that attorneys will exercise that judgment by not violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct in the course of filing a disciplinary complaint against another
attorney. And if the attorney does violate the rules, we see no policy justification
for relieving him of the consequences of his actions.
Accordingly, we hold that Section 19(a) does not immunize an attorney-
complainant from professional discipline if he violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct in the course of filing or pursuing his disciplinary complaint against another
attorney.
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B. Protection Under D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(e)(3)
Mr. Paul next argues that he did not violate Rule 1.6 because the information
he disclosed was not N.E.’s confidence or secret, D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a), (b),
and because his disclosures were “reasonably necessary to establish a defense to
a . . . disciplinary charge . . . against [him],” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(e)(3). We
disagree. Rule 1.6 explicitly prohibits the disclosure of a client’s “secret,” which is
defined as information, “the disclosure of which would be embarrassing” or
“detrimental” to the client. D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(b). Mr. Paul shared
information that he alleged illustrated N.E.’s criminal and civil liability—something
that would certainly be detrimental to her and therefore fall squarely within
Rule 1.6’s definition of a “secret.”
In considering his second argument, the Hearing Committee and the Board
differentiated between the disclosures Mr. Paul had made in the course of responding
to N.E.’s complaint about him and those in the course of pursuing his own complaint
against N.E., concluding that the former were protected by Rule 1.6(e)(3) but the
latter were not.
We agree with that differentiation. Mr. Paul’s disciplinary complaint against
N.E. and his reply to N.E.’s response to his complaint were part of an offensive
action against N.E. and not necessary to defending against the complaint she had
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filed against him. Indeed, by the time Mr. Paul submitted these materials, he had
already responded to the allegations in N.E.’s complaint. In his disciplinary
complaint, however, he went on to argue that N.E. “[wa]s not mentally competent
to be a member” of the D.C. Bar and “should [not] be allowed to practice law.”
Mr. Paul attached to his complaint documents that N.E. had sent him when he
represented her, which he alleged proved her criminal conduct and provided a civil
cause of action against her. He also stated that he “filed the grievance against her,”
because she “is dishonest.” His complaint is plainly read as one that is offensive in
nature and not necessary to or connected with his own defense. Accordingly, his
disclosures related to his disciplinary complaint against N.E. are not protected by
Rule 1.6(e)(3).
C. Sanction
The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee’s recommendation that
Mr. Paul receive a 90-day suspension. While the Board’s recommended sanction
comes to us with a “strong presumption in favor of its imposition,” In re Hallmark,
831 A.2d 366, 371 (D.C. 2003), the ultimate responsibility of “imposing sanctions
rests with this court in the first instance,” In re Godette, 919 A.2d 1157, 1164
(D.C. 2007) (quoting In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C. 1993)). In so doing,
we must ensure that we do not “foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions
18
for comparable conduct” and that the sanction is not “otherwise . . . unwarranted.”
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1).
We conclude that a 90-day suspension is outside the range of discipline for
conduct comparable to that of Mr. Paul’s. In prior cases where attorneys violated
Rule 1.6, we have imposed public censures or informal admonitions. In re Ponds,
876 A.2d 636, 637 (D.C. 2005) (imposing a public censure for improperly disclosing
confidential information in a motion to withdraw as counsel); In re Gonzalez, 773
A.2d 1026, 1027, 1032 (D.C. 2001) (imposing an informal admonition when the
respondent revealed secret information about a client in his motion to withdraw and
did not take steps to minimize the possibility of harm); In re Tun, 286 A.3d 538, 540
(D.C. 2022) (noting that the respondent had received an informal admonition for
improperly disclosing a client’s confidences in an earlier disciplinary proceeding);
In re Osemene, 277 A.3d 1271, 1271-72 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (publicly censuring
the respondent for violating Rules 1.5(b) and 1.6(a)).
A 90-day suspension is significantly more serious, and the cases cited by the
Hearing Committee—In re Koeck, 178 A.3d 463 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam), and In
re Rosen, 470 A.2d 292 (D.C. 1983)—do not persuade us that it is appropriate here.
In In re Koeck, the respondent received a 60-day suspension with a fitness
requirement. 178 A.3d at 464. The respondent had committed “four separate rule
violations” and disseminated private information to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for
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the Northern District of Illinois, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the government of Brazil. Id. at 463. In In re Rosen, we issued a six-month
suspension after considering the respondent’s violation of Rule 1.6 along with other
serious violations including an intentional failure to carry out client objectives. 470
A.2d at 301-02. In both of those cases, the conduct at issue was more egregious than
that at issue here.
We do agree, however, with the Board’s determination that the retaliatory
nature of Mr. Paul’s complaint is particularly problematic and therefore warrants a
suspension of some length. 4 See In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053 (D.C. 2013)
(considering “(1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client,
(3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary
rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has
acknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances” as
non-exhaustive factors in determining the appropriate sanction for attorney
misconduct). Mr. Paul wrote to Disciplinary Counsel that he “only fil[ed] this
Grievance because of the Grievance [N.E. had] filed against” him. He now denies
that his complaint was retaliatory and maintains that he filed it only because N.E. is
We also note that Mr. Paul has a disciplinary history in Maryland. Att’y
4
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Paul, 31 A.3d 512 (Md. 2011); Att’y Grievance
Comm’n of Md. v. Paul, 187 A.3d 625 (Md. 2018).
20
a “menace to the legal profession.” But the language of his complaint and its
timing—only three months after N.E.’s complaint against him—suggest to us that
the greatest impetus for Mr. Paul’s complaint was his frustration with N.E. for filing
a complaint against him. We adopt the Board’s finding on this point, consider the
complaint to be retaliatory and serious conduct, and conclude that a 30-day
suspension is appropriate.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Paul is suspended from the practice of law in
the District of Columbia for 30 days. For purposes of reinstatement, his suspension
will not begin to run until he files an affidavit that fully complies with the
requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).
So ordered.