In re Johnson ( 2023 )


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    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 20-BG-600
    IN RE ANITHA W. JOHNSON, RESPONDENT.
    A Suspended Member of the Bar
    of the District of Columbia
    (Bar 
    Registration No. 495672
    )
    On Report and Recommendation
    of the Board on Professional Responsibility
    (Disciplinary Docket Nos. 2010-D551 et al.)
    (Board Docket No. 18-BD-058)
    (Argued March 16, 2022                                             Decided July 27, 2023)
    John O. Iweanoge, II, for respondent.
    Myles V. Lynk, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton
    P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary
    Counsel.
    Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, SHANKER, * Associate Judge, and
    THOMPSON, Senior Judge.
    SHANKER, Associate Judge: In this bar disciplinary matter, the District of
    Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) concluded in a Report
    *
    On June 2, 2023, Associate Judge Shanker was substituted for Associate
    Judge Beckwith. See Administrative Order 3-23.
    2
    and Recommendation, following review of a Report and Recommendation by an Ad
    Hoc Hearing Committee (“Committee”), that Respondent Anitha W. Johnson
    violated over 20 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct in connection
    with five separate client matters over the course of seven years and recommended
    that she be disbarred for “flagrant dishonesty and indifference to her clients.” Ms.
    Johnson filed exceptions to the Board Report and Recommendation in this court.
    After Ms. Johnson filed her exceptions, and after considering Ms. Johnson’s
    response to an order to show cause, this court suspended Ms. Johnson from the
    practice of law in the District of Columbia pending final disposition of this
    proceeding. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g).
    Ms. Johnson argues that the consideration of expert testimony at her
    Committee hearing deprived her of the right to a fair hearing, challenges the Board’s
    findings of fact and conclusions of law, and contests the Board’s recommended
    sanction of disbarment. We conclude that Ms. Johnson was not deprived of her right
    to a fair hearing; that the facts found by the Committee and upheld by the Board are
    supported by substantial evidence of record; that Ms. Johnson committed the
    charged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct; and that the recommended
    sanction is warranted based on Ms. Johnson’s flagrant dishonesty. We therefore
    order that Ms. Johnson is disbarred from the practice of law in this jurisdiction.
    3
    I.     Factual Background and Procedural History
    A.     Factual Background
    Ms. Johnson was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 2006 and has no
    prior record of professional discipline. This case arose out of her conduct in five
    separate client matters and her financial record-keeping and commingling. The
    Committee heard evidence on the alleged rule violations and made the following
    factual findings under a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. 1
    1.     Count 1: Police Misconduct Case Filed on Behalf of the
    Rudders, Ms. Goss, and Their Children
    In June 2008, Roger and Rosena Rudder, their five-year-old daughter, Mr.
    Rudder’s sister Noverlene Giselle Goss, and Ms. Goss’s 15-year-old daughter (“the
    Rudders”) attended an annual parade celebrating the culture of Trinidad. Following
    1
    The Board concurred with the factual findings as supported by substantial
    evidence in the record. Ms. Johnson takes exception to many of the findings. We
    address those exceptions in the Discussion; because we conclude that the findings
    are supported by substantial evidence of record, see infra, we accept them for
    purposes of this recitation.
    4
    an altercation with the District of Columbia police, all three adults and Ms. Goss’s
    daughter were arrested. The adults accepted diversions in their criminal cases.
    The Rudders claimed that they were subjected to excessive force by the police,
    including the striking and mishandling of the minor children, and in October 2008
    they met with Ms. Johnson about filing a civil action against the police. Ms. Johnson
    falsely told the Rudders that she had successfully handled several police misconduct
    matters; in fact, she had not previously litigated an excessive force case. Thinking
    that Ms. Johnson “[knew] what she [was] doing,” the Rudders signed a contingency
    fee agreement with Ms. Johnson.
    The Rudder family had two potential causes of action: District of Columbia
    common-law claims against the individual police officers and federal civil rights
    claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . The common-law claims were generally easier to
    establish, but they had a one-year statute of limitations, although that was tolled for
    minors until they reached the age of 18. 
    D.C. Code §§ 12-301
    , 13-302. The Section
    1983 claims had a three-year statute of limitations but imposed heightened pleading
    standards and provided a qualified immunity defense for individual defendants and
    a defense for the governmental entity that the officers acted contrary to policy or
    custom. Ms. Johnson was not aware of these principles.
    5
    The Rudder family provided Ms. Johnson with the names of witnesses and
    leads to obtain possible video of the incident. Ms. Johnson, however, “kind of blew
    it off a little,” telling the Rudders that that was “something for later.” She failed to
    take steps to secure eyewitness testimony or video footage. Later, Ms. Johnson told
    the Rudders and Ms. Goss to contact the witnesses themselves. An expert in police
    misconduct cases opined that Ms. Johnson’s failure to investigate the case was a
    “fatal, fatal mistake.”
    In November 2009—more than a year after being retained and 17 months after
    the incident—Ms. Johnson filed a complaint in federal court on behalf of the
    Rudders against the District of Columbia and two named police officers. Ms.
    Johnson testified at the Committee hearing that in drafting the complaint she
    “combined a complaint where [she] saw various causes of actions, and [she] just put
    them in there.” She later told Disciplinary Counsel that the “main count” was the
    Section 1983 claim and that “[a]ll other [common-law] claims was [sic] just added
    to the complaint.” The common-law claims for the adults were barred because they
    were filed outside the statute of limitations. The minors’ common-law claims,
    however, were tolled, so they were still viable. Ms. Johnson did not have the statute
    of limitations “on [her] mind” when she filed the complaint.
    6
    The defendants moved to dismiss the adults’ common-law claims on statute-
    of-limitations grounds and the Section 1983 and some of the constitutional claims
    for failure to plead sufficient facts. The defendants explicitly acknowledged that the
    minors’ common-law claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Ms.
    Johnson, however, expressly conceded the lack of viability of the entire common-
    law case and filed a proposed order providing for the dismissal of all of the common-
    law claims. The D.C. Circuit later called this move “inexplicabl[e].” Rudder v.
    Williams, 
    666 F.3d 790
    , 793 (D.C. Cir. 2012). And even after the defendants pointed
    out the error in their reply brief, Ms. Johnson did not correct her erroneous
    concession. Accordingly, the district court dismissed with prejudice all of the
    common-law claims, including the minors’ claims, and it subsequently dismissed
    the entire case on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to
    withstand a motion to dismiss the federal civil rights and constitutional claims.
    Later, during an unsuccessful mediation, the defendants’ lawyers told the Rudders
    that they had “no leverage” because they had “given up [their] rights.”
    Ms. Johnson did not inform her clients when the government filed its motion
    to dismiss or when the court granted the motion. She did not advise them about the
    statute-of-limitations issues, nor did she consult with them before conceding to
    7
    dismissal of all of the common-law claims. Without informing them of what had
    happened, she moved for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended complaint.
    The evidence shows that Rosena Rudder emailed Ms. Johnson asking if the
    defendant’s motion to dismiss had been denied—over a month after the district court
    had granted the motion. Ms. Johnson replied, claiming that the defendants were “not
    interested in settlement while the issue of dismissal is pending”; Ms. Johnson did
    not say in this email that dismissal had in fact been granted a month earlier.
    After Ms. Johnson filed the motion to reconsider, the Rudders discovered on
    their own that their case had been dismissed and confronted Ms. Johnson. Only then
    did she tell them about the dismissal and that she was taking steps to reverse it. Ms.
    Johnson, however, understated the seriousness of the dismissal. As she testified, “I
    assured them everything is still on track; don’t worry . . . .” Ms. Johnson falsely
    represented that the “case was not dismissed due to [her] error”; rather, she told the
    Rudders, the court “just dismissed the case on its own initiate [sic] which was clearly
    an error and was inappropriate.”
    The district court denied the motion for reconsideration. Ms. Johnson then
    filed an appeal, again without consulting with or informing her clients. While the
    appeal was pending, Mr. Rudder sent a letter to Ms. Johnson to terminate the
    8
    attorney-client relationship. He also sent a letter to the D.C. Circuit seeking a
    continuance to obtain new counsel, asserting that Ms. Johnson had performed
    incompetently. In November 2010, Mr. Rudder filed a complaint with Disciplinary
    Counsel.
    Ms. Johnson responded by warning the Rudders that if they continued to claim
    the case was dismissed due to her error, they “will not be successful on appeal.” The
    Rudders kept Ms. Johnson as their attorney, and she filed an appellate brief on their
    behalf, again without sharing a draft or consulting with them.
    During the appeal, the Rudders fired Ms. Johnson and proceeded with another
    attorney. In January 2012, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court in part and
    reinstated the minors’ common-law claims and the constitutional claims against the
    individual officers. The adults’ common-law claims remained dismissed as time-
    barred. Ultimately, the parties settled the case.
    To Disciplinary Counsel and before the Committee, Ms. Johnson made false
    or misleading statements and tried to minimize her responsibility for the dismissal
    or blame her clients. For example, she claimed in correspondence with Disciplinary
    Counsel that she had filed a “similar case for excessive force,” based, she later
    9
    acknowledged, on her involvement in a police misconduct case as a paralegal. She
    falsely told Disciplinary Counsel that she had not missed any deadlines,
    notwithstanding the statute-of-limitations issues.      She claimed that she had
    “previously informed the Rudders of the issue of the dismissal,” but the evidence
    established that she did so only after the district court denied her motion to
    reconsider, seven months after the defendants had moved to dismiss. And she
    characterized the disciplinary complaint as a misunderstanding, asserting that “Mr.
    Rudder is not an attorney and does not realize . . .” or “does not understand” what
    happened.
    2.     Count 2: Representation of Donnell Lewis in a Divorce
    Matter
    In July 2007, Donnell Lewis signed a retainer agreement with Ms. Johnson
    for representation in a divorce matter that was pending in D.C. Superior Court. Ms.
    Johnson entered her appearance and the court scheduled a status hearing without
    consulting Ms. Johnson about her availability. Ms. Johnson had a conflict on the
    date set by the court but did not move for a continuance or find substitute counsel,
    although she did arrange to participate by telephone.
    10
    Approximately one month before the hearing, Ms. Johnson informed Mr.
    Lewis that she intended to withdraw as his attorney because he had not paid her.
    Because the matter was pending before a court, however, she was required to move
    for the court’s consent to withdraw. She did not do so.
    On the day of the status hearing, Ms. Johnson did not appear in person; and,
    although she had obtained approval to appear by telephone, the court clerk was
    unable to reach her because she was in another courtroom at the time. The court was
    unhappy that Ms. Johnson was not present because the case had “been continued
    numerous times” and expressed its “frustrat[ion] that [Ms. Johnson] has just chosen
    not to be here today.” The court asked Mr. Lewis why his counsel was not present.
    In response, Mr. Lewis disclosed confidential information about his relationship
    with Ms. Johnson.
    Ms. Johnson thereafter filed a motion to withdraw in which she revealed in
    greater detail confidential information about Mr. Lewis’s situation. Ms. Johnson did
    not file the motion to withdraw in camera or ex parte because she was not aware
    that she could do so. Mr. Lewis had not given Ms. Johnson permission to disclose
    the basis of her motion to withdraw.
    11
    3.     Count 3: Representation of Glenn Strawder in a Medical
    Malpractice Matter
    In 2004, Glenn Strawder suffered a retinal tear in his left eye and lost all vision
    in that eye. Mr. Strawder believed the tear was the result of medical malpractice and
    sought legal representation. In April 2007, he found Ms. Johnson, who agreed to
    take his case on a contingent fee basis (with Mr. Strawder paying costs and
    expenses), even though she had no experience handling a complex medical
    malpractice case.
    Ms. Johnson testified that she planned to file suit to preserve the cause of
    action before the statute of limitations expired and then hand the case off to a more
    experienced lawyer. She did not do so. Ms. Johnson drafted a complaint using a
    model form she had obtained at a seminar. The complaint sought damages for pain
    and suffering, medical expenses, and lost earnings.
    Ms. Johnson had difficulty finding a qualified expert witness who would
    testify that the defendants had violated the applicable standard of care. Two experts
    opined that they could not support a claim of breach of the standard of care.
    Nonetheless, Ms. Johnson arranged for Mr. Strawder to take out loans against the
    value of his cases from a litigation financing company. Ms. Johnson told Mr.
    12
    Strawder that she believed in the strength of his case and encouraged him to apply
    for the litigation loans, which she submitted on his behalf.           She did so
    notwithstanding the views of the experts she had contacted and her failure to try to
    value the case. Ms. Johnson told the litigation finance company that the case was
    valued at $5 million, but she testified at the hearing that she “didn’t know whether
    [Mr. Strawder’s] case had value” and she had “no idea” how that number was arrived
    at. She also told the finance company that Mr. Strawder understood the terms of the
    loan when, in fact, he did not. After exhausting his own funds, Mr. Strawder
    borrowed more than $17,000.
    Ms. Johnson did not explain to Mr. Strawder “the implications of borrowing
    the funds, including the high interest rate” he would be charged if he received any
    recovery.   Moreover, despite requests from Mr. Strawder, Ms. Johnson never
    provided him with accounts of how she used the loan funds or with records or
    receipts accounting for the funds Mr. Strawder paid her.
    Ms. Johnson was ultimately able to secure a medical expert, but he was not a
    retinal specialist. Ms. Johnson failed to obtain and provide the expert with Mr.
    Strawder’s complete medical records before he was deposed, a fact that came out at
    the deposition. During an unsuccessful mediation, Ms. Johnson persuaded Mr.
    13
    Strawder to dismiss the individual doctor from the case without getting anything in
    return, because she believed it made the case easier to settle. According to a medical
    malpractice expert, this was a “serious” mistake. Ms. Johnson told the Committee
    that Mr. Strawder made the decision to dismiss the doctor, but the Committee found
    this assertion intentionally false.
    Ms. Johnson withdrew from the case in February 2009. The court later denied
    Mr. Strawder’s new counsel’s request to re-open discovery, and Mr. Strawder
    accepted what he believed was a nuisance-value settlement.
    4.     Count 4: Representation of Katina Wilson in Separate Child
    Custody and Personal Injury Matters
    a.     In July 2012, Katina Wilson retained Ms. Johnson to represent her on
    an hourly fee basis in seeking sole custody of her daughter. Ms. Wilson paid $1,000
    as an advance fee, which Ms. Johnson deposited into her Interest on Lawyer Trust
    Accounts (IOLTA) account. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Johnson entered her appearance
    on Ms. Wilson’s behalf in D.C. Superior Court. Trial was scheduled for July 2013.
    Ms. Johnson represented Ms. Wilson through discovery and pre-trial matters.
    Ms. Wilson requested that Ms. Johnson’s office provide her regular invoices. Ms.
    14
    Johnson sent invoices for the first few months, but then stopped, and she did not
    maintain detailed time records. Ms. Wilson continued to make monthly payments
    (sometimes twice a month), often in thousand-dollar amounts, despite not knowing
    what services she was paying for. She paid Ms. Johnson $16,000 in total.
    Ms. Johnson failed to prepare Ms. Wilson’s case for trial. She failed to
    prepare any fact witnesses whom Ms. Wilson had identified (including a witness
    about domestic abuse, which was an issue in the case), despite telling Ms. Wilson
    that she would. She also provided Ms. Wilson incomplete information about what
    was happening with her case. In addition, Ms. Johnson mishandled discovery issues,
    which led to various disputes and ultimately to the imposition of sanctions on Ms.
    Wilson at trial.
    Ms. Johnson frequently failed to comply with discovery rules and scheduling
    orders. Opposing counsel unsuccessfully tried to get complete discovery responses
    from Ms. Johnson. She did not provide this information even though Ms. Wilson
    had provided her with the requested information. Eventually, Ms. Johnson provided
    some discovery responses after being compelled by court order, but some of the
    responses were evasive and nonresponsive.
    15
    About one week before the trial, Ms. Johnson told Ms. Wilson that she was
    going to withdraw as her attorney because she had received an opportunity to teach
    a course overseas that conflicted with the scheduled trial. Ms. Johnson described
    the course to opposing counsel as a “great career opportunity” for her. Ms. Johnson
    told Ms. Wilson that she had arranged for another attorney to stand in for her at trial.
    She misled Ms. Wilson about the potential ramifications of changing counsel and
    she falsely told Ms. Wilson that the stand-in attorney was “of counsel” in her law
    firm. Ms. Johnson also told Ms. Wilson that “[i]t will not take a rocket scientist to
    represent someone in a custody case.”
    Ms. Wilson was initially amenable to having the other attorney handle her
    case. She believed that the new counsel was prepared and would bill at the same
    hourly rate as Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson did not explain that the successor counsel
    was expecting fees up to $20,000, in addition to the $16,000 Ms. Wilson had already
    paid. After she found out about the new counsel’s fees, Ms. Wilson decided that she
    could not afford to pay and that her only option was to proceed to trial pro se.
    Ms. Johnson did not explain to Ms. Wilson that there were unresolved
    discovery disputes and pending sanction motions to be addressed at trial, let alone
    how to handle these issues. Ms. Wilson did not learn of the most recent sanction
    16
    motion until Ms. Johnson uploaded it to a shared file system, and she was unaware
    that she could be held personally liable for the discovery disputes that had arisen
    during Ms. Johnson’s handling of the case.
    Ms. Johnson left the country without having filed or been granted a motion to
    withdraw, without having informed the presiding judge, and without having
    arranged for successor counsel. She also did not turn over the case file to Ms. Wilson
    or prepare her for the trial, including how to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
    While Ms. Johnson had subpoenaed witnesses to testify for Ms. Wilson, she had not
    prepared them for trial. The same day Ms. Johnson left the country, Ms. Wilson
    emailed all the parties to tell them she would proceed pro se.
    Two days before trial and three days after she had left the country, Ms.
    Johnson filed a motion to withdraw. The same day, opposing counsel filed a fourth
    motion to compel discovery and for sanctions based on Ms. Johnson’s failure to
    submit complete responses. Ms. Johnson did not file an opposition, nor did she
    explain to Ms. Wilson why opposing counsel had filed the motion or how she should
    respond.
    17
    Ms. Wilson appeared alone for the trial. Pursuant to a court order, Ms.
    Johnson appeared by telephone to address why Ms. Wilson was appearing without
    counsel. The court then granted Ms. Johnson’s withdrawal motion. Ms. Wilson
    represented herself, including presenting witnesses and addressing the outstanding
    discovery and sanctions motions. Ms. Wilson relied on her recollection of scenes
    from the television program “Law and Order” to raise objections. She also “Googled
    what to ask” to assist her in examining witnesses.
    Ms. Wilson learned from opposing counsel that she was entitled to submit
    documentary exhibits and have access to a trial notebook. Thus, after the first two
    days of trial, Ms. Wilson went to Ms. Johnson’s office to obtain exhibits and a trial
    notebook from Ms. Johnson’s paralegal. The court permitted her to late-file the
    exhibits but did not permit her to submit anything “new.”
    Despite Ms. Johnson’s conduct and eleventh-hour withdrawal, Ms. Wilson
    was able to prevail and obtain full custody of her daughter. Even though she
    prevailed, the court sanctioned Ms. Wilson $1,089 in attorney’s fees and costs for
    discovery failures for which Ms. Johnson was responsible. Ms. Johnson did not
    reimburse Ms. Wilson for those sanctions or for any of the $16,000 Ms. Wilson had
    paid in fees. After Ms. Johnson stopped handling the case, Ms. Wilson requested a
    18
    final bill from her. Ms. Johnson never provided one. In response to Disciplinary
    Counsel’s investigation, however, Ms. Johnson created two different versions of
    billing invoices, each of which she termed a “comprehensive bill” and “itemized
    accounting of all of the time that [she] spent in her representing Ms. Wilson.”
    b.     In August 2012, several months after she retained Ms. Johnson in the
    child custody matter, Ms. Wilson was struck by a cab while walking in a crosswalk.
    Ms. Johnson agreed to handle the matter for Ms. Wilson on a contingency fee basis.
    Although Ms. Johnson drafted a fee agreement for a 33 percent contingency fee, Ms.
    Wilson never signed the agreement, and Ms. Johnson did not provide anything else
    in writing about the basis or rate of the fee.
    Ms. Johnson’s office sent Ms. Wilson to the Maryland Injury Center to receive
    treatment for her injuries. Ms. Johnson also sent a letter to the cab driver’s insurance
    company demanding $30,000, and the insurer responded with an offer to settle. Ms.
    Johnson never shared this offer with Ms. Wilson. Ms. Johnson settled with the
    insurer for $4,500 without discussing the offer with Ms. Wilson and without her
    approval. Later, without being informed about the total amount offered in settlement
    or given the chance to approve the offer, Ms. Wilson was told that she would receive
    $1,500 as her portion of the settlement. Ms. Wilson asked that her share of the
    19
    settlement funds be applied to Ms. Johnson’s bill for her legal fees in the child
    custody matter. Ms. Johnson, however, never accounted to Ms. Wilson how the
    settlement funds were used or applied to the bill for the child custody case.
    Ms. Johnson deposited the $4,500 settlement check into her trust account. She
    later obtained a $2,960 reduction of the Maryland Injury Center’s fee for medical
    services to $1,500 by falsely representing that her firm would reduce its 33 percent
    fee. In fact, Ms. Johnson took $1,500, which was her full one-third of the settlement
    amount. Six months after placing the settlement funds into her trust account, Ms.
    Johnson sent a $1,500 check to the Maryland Injury Center.
    5.    Financial Record-Keeping and Commingling
    Due to the accounting irregularities in the Wilson matters, Disciplinary
    Counsel, with the assistance of a forensic investigator, sought to analyze Ms.
    Johnson’s accounting more generally. Ms. Johnson failed over the course of almost
    a year to provide requested accounting and supporting documents. Eventually, with
    respect to the Wilson matters, Ms. Johnson submitted to Disciplinary Counsel two
    different invoices bearing the same number and date. The Hearing Committee did
    not conclude that either invoice was intentionally false, but it determined that Ms.
    20
    Johnson’s record-keeping in the Wilson matters was unreliable and that neither
    invoice had been submitted to Ms. Wilson.
    This prompted Disciplinary Counsel to focus its attention on one of Ms.
    Johnson’s IOLTA accounts. As with the Wilson invoices, Ms. Johnson provided
    Disciplinary Counsel with two different versions of client account ledgers covering
    the same time period. The forensic investigator tried to compare the second,
    purportedly “updated” ledger against relevant bank records but found that it was
    impossible for him to match up the transactions. The investigator nonetheless
    concluded that Ms. Johnson’s IOLTA account was short at least $3,000 from what
    should have been in the account according to the ledger.
    In digging deeper, the forensic investigator determined that accounts for
    certain randomly selected clients were short when compared with bank records,
    including the account of Fuad and Marenikeji Aregbe, which was $350 short, and
    the account of Dionne Hart, which was $786 short. And, although checks for a
    settlement in Ms. Hart’s matter were deposited in the IOLTA account, Ms. Johnson
    wrote a check from a different account to pay a health care center on behalf of Ms.
    Hart.
    21
    Ultimately, the Committee found that Ms. Johnson negligently (but not
    recklessly or intentionally) misappropriated Ms. Hart’s entrusted funds, commingled
    funds by leaving earned fees in her IOLTA account, failed to keep reliable and
    complete records of client funds, failed to respond to Disciplinary Counsel’s
    inquiries and subpoenas in a truthful and expeditious manner, and provided
    conflicting and contradictory versions of requested documents.
    B.    The Disciplinary Process
    In June 2018, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel instituted disciplinary
    proceedings against Ms. Johnson, alleging in a five-count Specification of Charges
    that she had committed multiple rule violations in connection with the client matters
    and record-keeping addressed above and also an additional non-client matter. The
    Committee held a four-day hearing in March 2019, at which Disciplinary Counsel
    presented the testimony of 11 witnesses, including three experts. Ms. Johnson
    testified but did not present any other witnesses.
    In October 2019, the Committee issued its Report and Recommendation,
    finding clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Johnson violated Rules of
    Professional Conduct 1.1(a) and (b), 1.2(a), 1.3(a), 1.3(b)(1) and (2), 1.3(c), 1.4(a)
    22
    and (b), 1.4(c), 1.5(a)-(c), 1.6(a)(1), 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.4(c), and
    8.4(d). The Committee found that several of the Rule violations occurred more than
    once, as they were repeated among multiple counts, and also that Ms. Johnson
    intentionally testified falsely at the hearing. The Committee recommended the
    sanction of disbarment after considering (1) the seriousness of Ms. Johnson’s
    conduct; (2) prejudice to the clients; (3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty;
    (4) violation of other disciplinary rules; (5) Ms. Johnson’s disciplinary history;
    (6) whether Ms. Johnson had acknowledged her wrongful conduct; and
    (7) mitigating circumstances. See In re Martin, 
    67 A.3d 1032
    , 1053 (D.C. 2013).
    Ms.     Johnson    filed   exceptions   to   the   Committee’s    Report    and
    Recommendation. In an October 2020 Report and Recommendation, the Board
    found that four alleged Rule violations (Rule 1.5(b), Rule 3.4(c), and two violations
    of Rule 8.4(d)) had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence but otherwise
    upheld the Committee’s Report and Recommendation, resulting in a determination
    that Ms. Johnson had committed over 20 rule violations and testified falsely in
    several respects at the hearing. 2        The Board adopted the Committee’s
    2
    The Board concluded that Ms. Johnson violated the following Rules:
    • Rule 1.1(a) and (b) (competence) (three counts);
    23
    recommendation of disbarment. In so doing, it cited the seven-year span of Ms.
    Johnson’s misconduct, Ms. Johnson’s false testimony at the Committee hearing, and
    her lack of remorse, and it explained that Ms. Johnson’s “repeated, persistent, and
    pervasive dishonesty constituted flagrant dishonesty such that . . . [she] should be
    barred from the continued practice of law.”
    • Rule 1.2(a) (consulting with client and abiding by client’s decisions)
    (one count);
    • Rule 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal) (two counts);
    • Rule 1.3(b)(1) and (2) (seek client’s lawful objectives and not prejudice
    or damage client) (three counts);
    • Rule 1.3(c) (reasonable promptness) (three counts);
    • Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (communication) (three counts);
    • Rule 1.4(c) (informing client of settlement offer) (one count);
    • Rule 1.5(a) and (c) (reasonableness of fee and communication of
    contingent fee arrangement) (one count);
    • Rule 1.6(a)(1) (client confidentiality) (one count);
    • Rule 1.15(a) (safekeeping of records) (one count);
    • Rule 1.15(a) (negligent misappropriation, commingling, and record-
    keeping) (one count);
    • Rule 1.15(c) (accounting of client funds) (one count);
    • Rule 1.16(d) (terminating representation) (one count);
    • Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) (three
    counts);
    • Rule 8.4(d) (serious interference with administration of justice) (one
    count).
    24
    Ms. Johnson filed a brief in this court, taking exception to most of the Board’s
    findings of fact and conclusions of law and its recommended sanction. The Office
    of Disciplinary Counsel did not file exceptions, but it filed a brief supporting the
    Board’s Report and Recommendation.
    II.    Discussion
    We “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are
    unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and [we] adopt the recommended
    disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent
    dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar
    R. XI, § 9(h)(1). “Substantial evidence means enough evidence for a reasonable
    mind to find sufficient to support the conclusion reached.” In re Evans, 
    902 A.2d 56
    , 70 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the
    Board’s legal determinations de novo. In re Samad, 
    51 A.3d 486
    , 495 (D.C. 2012)
    (per curiam).
    Before this court, Ms. Johnson argues that (1) the consideration of expert
    testimony by the Committee deprived her of her right to a fair hearing; (2) the
    Committee’s and Board’s factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence;
    25
    (3) the Board’s legal conclusions regarding her Rule violations are erroneous; and
    (4) disbarment is unwarranted. We take each claim in turn.
    A.    Consideration of Expert Testimony
    At a pre-hearing conference seven months before the hearing, Disciplinary
    Counsel disclosed to Ms. Johnson that it might call expert witnesses. In accordance
    with the Committee’s pre-trial order, Disciplinary Counsel disclosed its expert
    witnesses’ identities, subject areas, and contact information before the hearing. The
    three identified witnesses had expertise in the standards of care for police
    misconduct cases, personal injury law, and domestic relations cases.
    One week before the hearing, Ms. Johnson moved to exclude the experts’
    testimony on the ground that Disciplinary Counsel failed to provide sufficient
    information on the witnesses’ areas of expertise, the subject matter of the testimony,
    or the substance of the experts’ opinions. The Committee denied the motion,
    qualified the witnesses as experts, and heard their testimony on direct and cross-
    examination.
    26
    The Board rejected Ms. Johnson’s claim that the Committee erred in
    considering the testimony. The Board stated that pre-hearing discovery of expert
    reports or expert opinion testimony is not required by the Board Rules and that Ms.
    Johnson was able to cross-examine the witnesses concerning their qualifications and
    expertise.
    In this court, Ms. Johnson renews her claim about insufficient disclosures and
    also argues that the experts improperly testified about an ultimate issue, namely, the
    existence of rule violations. We discern no error. Whether evidence—including
    expert testimony—is relevant and admissible under Board Rule 11.3 is “within the
    ambit of the Hearing Committee’s discretion,” In re Speights, 
    173 A.3d 96
    , 102
    (D.C. 2017) (per curiam), and is not governed by “the rules of evidence applicable
    in other proceedings,” 
    id.
     Expert testimony regarding standards of care is not
    uncommon in disciplinary hearings. See, e.g., 
    id. at 100-02
    ; In re Outlaw, 
    917 A.2d 684
    , 686 (D.C. 2007) (per curiam); In re Fair, 
    780 A.2d 1106
    , 1111-12 (D.C. 2001).
    The record reflects that the experts here provided opinion testimony about the
    applicable standards of care, not conclusions about Ms. Johnson’s violations of
    Rules of Professional Conduct.
    27
    In addition, as Ms. Johnson concedes, the Board Rules impose no
    requirements regarding expert disclosures, and, in any event, Disciplinary Counsel
    disclosed its expert witnesses’ identities, subject areas, and contact information
    before the hearing. Ms. Johnson suffered no prejudice, as she was permitted to
    question the experts regarding their qualifications and expertise on cross-
    examination.
    B.   The Committee’s and Board’s Factual Findings
    Ms. Johnson lodges 82 exceptions to the Committee’s and Board’s factual
    findings. The Committee heard testimony by all of the adult clients involved in the
    matters at issue and three expert witnesses and considered over 100 exhibits. We
    have carefully reviewed the record and Ms. Johnson’s exceptions, and we conclude
    that the findings are supported by substantial—if not overwhelming—evidence of
    record, including testimony that the Committee found credible or, in the case of Ms.
    Johnson, not credible.   We are required to “place great weight on credibility
    determinations made by the Board and the Hearing Committee because of the
    Hearing Committee’s unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their
    demeanor.” In re Klayman, 
    282 A.3d 584
    , 593 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see In re Godette, 
    919 A.2d 1157
    , 1164 (D.C. 2007) (“An
    28
    appellate body’s duty to defer to the findings of the trier of fact is obviously at its
    zenith where that trier of fact had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe
    the demeanor of the witness.”).
    Ms. Johnson’s exceptions are largely conclusory or circular, 3 or they focus on
    the weight given to evidence 4 or on inconsequential alleged discrepancies. 5 But “the
    weight, value and effect of the evidence” “fall primarily within the sphere
    customarily left to the factfinder,” In re Temple, 
    629 A.2d 1203
    , 1208 (D.C. 1993),
    3
    For example, Ms. Johnson states, without explaining why the evidence was
    insufficient, that she “excepts to the finding of fact . . . that she did not discuss with
    her clients the motions to reconsider after the dismissal of the complaint”; that “the
    Hearing Committee’s finding that Mr. Lewis found it stressful to appear at the status
    hearing is contradicted by the fact that Mr. Lewis represented himself in the case and
    appeared in Court without counsel for two years”; and that successor counsel for Ms.
    Wilson “was provided with adequate information and documents relating to the
    case” and “two hours spending going over the facts of the case and documents was
    sufficient for her to prepare for the case.”
    4
    For example, Ms. Johnson claims that the Hearing Committee did not read
    certain evidence “in context”; that the finding that the Rudders hired her due to her
    purported experience in police brutality cases is “unfounded” because she herself
    did not testify at the hearing that she made such a representation to the Rudders; and
    that “the Hearing Committee appears to be naive to the fact that [a] discovery dispute
    as to the adequacy of a response is distinct from failing to respond to discovery.”
    5
    For example, Ms. Johnson asserts that the adults in the Rudder matter did
    not accept “judgment[s]” that included diversion, as found by the Hearing
    Committee, but rather “entered into” a diversion program to resolve their criminal
    charges; and that the Hearing Committee’s finding that Ms. Johnson’s intern
    attempted to contact witnesses in the Rudder matter “later” did not establish that the
    attempt did not occur in 2008 (the year of the incident).
    29
    and “[t]his court must accept a finding that is supported by substantial evidence in
    the record as a whole, even though there may also be substantial evidence in the
    record to support a contrary finding,” Godette, 
    919 A.2d at 1163
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Accordingly, we will not disturb the Hearing Committee’s and
    Board’s factual findings.
    C.    The Board’s Conclusions of Law
    Many of Ms. Johnson’s challenges to the findings of specific rule violations
    rest on her version of the facts. As we have explained, however, we must accept the
    factual findings of the Committee and the Board if those findings are “supported by
    substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Godette, 
    919 A.2d at 1163
    . That is
    true even if “there might also be substantial evidence to support a contrary finding.”
    
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the record, we conclude
    that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Johnson violated
    the rules at issue.
    Because the reports and recommendations below are
    voluminous and meticulously detailed, we will not cite to
    every factual example, exhibit, excerpt of the transcript,
    and so forth. Rather, we conclude that substantial
    evidence of each charged violation is supported by a
    30
    handful of notable examples upon which we will focus our
    review.
    In re (Johnnie) Johnson, 
    275 A.3d 268
    , 276 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam).
    1.    Rule 1.1(a) and (b) (competence) (Rudders, Lewis, and
    Strawder)
    Rule 1.1(a) requires lawyers to provide competent representation, defined as
    “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
    the representation.” Rule 1.1(b) requires lawyers to serve their clients with “skill
    and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in
    similar matters.” Competent representation requires the “legal knowledge, skill,
    thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” In re
    Drew, 
    693 A.2d 1127
    , 1130, 1132 (D.C. 1997) (per curiam). Rule 1.1(b) is “better
    tailored [than Rule 1.1(a)] to address the situation in which a lawyer capable to
    handle a representation walks away from it for reasons unrelated to his competence
    in that area of practice.” In re Lewis, 
    689 A.2d 561
    , 564 (D.C. 1997) (per curiam).
    “[T]the same failings that constitute . . . 1.1(a) violations [can] constitute 1.1(b)
    violations.” Evans, 
    902 A.2d at 72
    .
    31
    We find ample evidence of record to support the conclusion that Ms. Johnson
    violated Rules 1.1(a) and (b) in the Rudder, Lewis, and Strawder matters. Among
    other things, Ms. Johnson failed to adequately investigate the Rudder case, was
    unaware of basic principles in police misconduct cases, and allowed the statute of
    limitations to run on the adult Rudders’ common-law claims and then explicitly—
    and “inexplicably,” Rudder v. Williams, 
    666 F.3d 790
    , 793 (D.C. Cir. 2012)—
    conceded that the children’s claims should be dismissed too. What’s more, she failed
    to correct her error after being made aware of it. See In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d 775
    , 787 (D.C. 2019) (per curiam) (attorney “failed to correct her errors after
    being made aware of them”). In the Lewis matter, Ms. Johnson arranged to
    participate in the hearing by telephone but then could not be reached, and she failed
    to file her motion to withdraw, which revealed client confidences, in camera or ex
    parte because she did not know she could. And with respect to Mr. Strawder, Ms.
    Johnson did not know how to value a medical malpractice claim and had no idea
    where the $5 million valuation for Mr. Strawder’s case came from, allowed the
    expert witness to be deposed without sufficient preparation, and dismissed the
    individual doctor from the case without obtaining anything in return. In all three
    matters, Ms. Johnson demonstrated a “‘fail[ure] to engage in the thoroughness and
    preparation reasonably necessary’ for the case[ ] that clearly prejudiced her client.”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Evans, 
    902 A.2d at 69-70
    ).
    32
    We therefore accept the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Johnson violated Rules
    1.1(a) and 1.1(b) multiple times.
    2.     Rule 1.2(a) (consulting with client and abiding by client’s
    decisions) (Wilson)
    Rule 1.2(a) obligates a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
    objectives of the representation . . . and [to] consult with the client as to the means
    by which they are to be pursued.” The Board credited Ms. Wilson’s testimony that
    Ms. Johnson did not present her with the insurer’s offer to settle her personal injury
    claim. We have no basis to disturb that factual finding, and it supports a conclusion
    that Ms. Johnson violated Rule 1.2(a). See In re Elgin, 
    918 A.2d 362
    , 375 (D.C.
    2007); In re Hager, 
    812 A.2d 904
    , 919 (D.C. 2002).
    3.     Rule 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal) (Rudders and Strawder)
    Rule 1.3(a) states that an attorney “shall represent a client zealously and
    diligently within the bounds of the law.” The same facts supporting the Rule 1.1(a)
    and (b) violations support Rule 1.3(a) violations in the Rudder and Strawder
    representations. See In re Cater, 
    887 A.2d 1
    , 16 & n.14 (D.C. 2005) (same evidence
    33
    can support multiple charges of rule violations). Ms. Johnson’s “conduct not only
    fell short of her obligation to provide zealous and diligent representation—it also
    demonstrated a pattern of neglect, which we have defined as ‘indifference and a
    consistent failure to carry out the obligations that the lawyer has assumed to the
    client.’” Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d at 778
     (quoting In re Wright, , 1255 (D.C.
    1997) (per curiam)).
    4.     Rule 1.3(b)(1) and (2) (seek client’s lawful objectives and not
    prejudice or damage client) (Rudders, Strawder, and
    Wilson)
    Rule 1.3(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) [f]ail to seek
    the lawful objectives of a client through reasonably available means permitted by
    law and the disciplinary rules; or (2) [p]rejudice or damage a client during the course
    of the professional relationship.” “Rule 1.3(b) does not ‘require proof of intent in
    the usual sense of the word.’” In re Dickens, 
    174 A.3d 283
    , 300 (D.C. 2017)
    (quoting In re Ukwu, 
    926 A.2d 1106
    , 1116 (D.C. 2007)). “Rather, neglect ripens
    into an intentional violation when the lawyer is aware of her neglect of the client
    matter; or put differently, when a lawyer’s inaction coexists with an awareness of
    her obligations to her client.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up). Intent can also be found where “the
    neglect is so pervasive that the lawyer must be aware of it.” Lewis, 
    689 A.2d at 564
    .
    34
    Again, the evidence relating to the Rudder, Strawder, and Wilson matters—
    including Ms. Johnson’s failure to correct her erroneous concession about dismissal
    of the Rudder children’s claims, her dismissal of the individual doctor in Mr.
    Strawder’s case, and her abandonment of Ms. Wilson on the eve of trial—establishes
    pervasive neglect that prejudiced clients. See Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d at 788
    (attorney’s “failure to correct those deficiencies in the amended complaint ripened
    into an intentional violation because she was undoubtedly aware of the problems by
    that point”) (cleaned up); In re Vohra, 
    68 A.3d 766
    , 781 (D.C. 2013) (finding
    violations of Rules 1.3(b)(1) and (2) where attorney was made aware of the need to
    cure deficiencies in client’s visa applications and failed to do so, seriously
    prejudicing client’s pursuit of permanent resident status); Ukwu, 
    926 A.2d at 1116
    (“Knowing abandonment of a client is the classic case of a Rule 1.3(b)(1) violation.”)
    (cleaned up).
    5.    Rule 1.3(c) (reasonable promptness) (Rudders, Strawder,
    and Wilson)
    Rule 1.3(c) provides that an attorney “shall act with reasonable promptness in
    representing a client.” Ms. Johnson clearly failed to act with reasonable promptness
    in investigating, filing a complaint, and correcting her error in the Rudder case. In
    35
    the Strawder matter, she failed to order medical records to prepare the expert before
    his deposition.    Regarding Ms. Wilson, she repeatedly failed to comply with
    discovery requests and orders and to prepare witnesses for trial, and, of course, she
    withdrew at the eleventh hour without acting earlier to ensure that Ms. Wilson was
    not left to proceed on her own. We have little difficulty finding multiple Rule 1.3(c)
    violations.
    6.    Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (communication) (Rudders, Strawder,
    and Wilson)
    Rule 1.4(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
    about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
    information.” Similarly, Rule 1.4(b) states than an attorney “shall explain a matter
    to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
    regarding the representation.” The Rule places the burden on the attorney to “initiate
    and maintain the consultative and decision-making process if the client does not do
    so and [to] ensure that the ongoing process is thorough and complete.” D.C. R. Prof.
    Conduct 1.4, cmt. [2].
    “While [a]n attorney need not communicate with a client as often as the client
    would like, the attorney’s communication with the client must be reasonable under
    36
    the circumstances.” Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d at 789
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). “Accordingly, the ‘guiding principle’ for evaluating conduct under Rule
    1.4 is whether the lawyer fulfilled ‘reasonable client expectations for information’
    consistent with the lawyer’s ‘duty to act in the client’s best interests’ and the client’s
    overall objectives.” 
    Id.
     (quoting D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4, Cmt. [3]). “To meet
    that expectation, a lawyer not only must respond to client inquiries but also must
    initiate communications to provide information when needed.”                
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted). “[A] lawyer may not withhold information to serve the
    lawyer’s own interest or convenience.” In re Mitrano, 
    952 A.2d 901
    , 927 (D.C.
    2008) (quoting D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4, Cmt. [5]).
    The record is replete with examples of Ms. Johnson failing to keep her clients
    informed, and, in some cases, withholding information to serve her own interests,
    such as her interest in avoiding discovery of her statute-of-limitations error. See,
    e.g., Klayman, 282 A.3d at 596 (upholding finding of Rule 1.4(b) violation where
    attorney “did not consult with [client] before taking important steps in the
    litigation”); Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d at 789
     (violations of Rules 1.4(a) and (b)
    where attorney “repeatedly failed to inform [client] of the developments in her case
    in a timely manner” and client “testified that she had to inquire several times over a
    period of two or three weeks before [attorney] told her that the trial court had
    37
    dismissed her original complaint”); In re Starnes, 
    829 A.2d 488
    , 506 (D.C. 2003)
    (per curiam) (finding Rule 1.4(a) violation where lawyer “routinely failed to keep
    his clients informed of developments in their respective cases”). We recognize that
    Ms. Johnson disputes these factual findings and testified to the contrary regarding a
    number of these occurrences. But we cannot agree that the Committee’s findings
    were not supported by substantial record evidence. The Committee chose to credit
    the testimony of the clients over that of Ms. Johnson, as it was entitled to do in its
    role as factfinder. See Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d at 790
    ; Klayman, 282 A.3d at
    593; In re Bradley, 
    70 A.3d 1189
    , 1193 (D.C. 2013) (per curiam); Godette, 
    919 A.2d at 1164
    . We generally will not second guess such a credibility determination,
    Klayman, 282 A.3d at 593, and we particularly decline to do so where, as in at least
    one instance here, there is documentary evidence—the emails between Rosena
    Rudder and Ms. Johnson indicating that the Rudders did not know that dismissal had
    been granted over a month earlier—corroborating the credited witness’s account.
    See Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d at 790
    .
    7.    Rule 1.4(c) (informing client of settlement offer) (Wilson)
    Rule 1.4(c) provides that “[a] lawyer who receives an offer of settlement in a
    civil case . . . shall inform the client promptly of the substance of the
    communication.” Ms. Johnson’s failure to inform Ms. Wilson of the insurer’s
    38
    settlement offer violates this rule as well. See Elgin, 
    918 A.2d at 375
    ; In re Thyden,
    
    877 A.2d 129
    , 143-44 (D.C. 2005).
    8.    Rule 1.5(a) and (c) (reasonableness of fee and communication
    of contingent fee arrangement) (Wilson)
    Rule 1.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.” We agree
    with the Board that, while Ms. Johnson’s hourly fee in the Wilson custody case
    might not have been unreasonable, the fees Ms. Wilson ultimately paid were
    unreasonable in light of the substantial evidence that Ms. Johnson did not prepare
    witnesses, left Ms. Wilson to proceed pro se, and did not refund the amount of the
    discovery sanction imposed on Ms. Wilson based on Ms. Johnson’s failures.
    Rule 1.5(c) states in part that “[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in writing
    and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined . . . .” Before the
    Board, Ms. Johnson conceded a violation of Rule 1.5(c) for not putting in writing
    the Wilson personal injury case contingency fee agreement.
    39
    9.    Rule 1.6(a)(1) (client confidentiality) (Lewis)
    Rule 1.6(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a client’s
    confidence or secret. Rule 1.6(b) defines a “confidence” as “information protected
    by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law” and a “secret” as “other
    information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
    held inviolate, or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing, or would be likely
    to be detrimental, to the client.” The evidence shows that Ms. Johnson publicly filed
    a motion to withdraw in which she revealed circumstances about Mr. Lewis that led
    her to inform him that she could no longer represent him. We agree with the Board
    that the information Ms. Johnson revealed was “secret” and that Mr. Lewis’s
    statements to the court—after he had been forced to appear alone and explain why
    his attorney was absent—neither constituted revelation of the same information nor
    served to impliedly authorize Ms. Johnson’s disclosures under Rule 1.6(e)(4).
    10.   Rule 1.15(a) (safekeeping of records) (Strawder)
    As relevant here, Rule 1.15(a) provides that a lawyer shall keep complete
    records of client funds.   The evidence shows that, despite requests from Mr.
    Strawder, Ms. Johnson never provided him with accounts of how she used the loan
    40
    funds or with records or receipts accounting for the funds Mr. Strawder paid her.
    We agree that this constitutes a violation of Rule 1.15(a).
    11.    Rules 1.15(a) (negligent misappropriation, commingling, and
    record-keeping) and 1.15(c) (accounting of client funds)
    (Wilson)
    Rule 1.15(a) provides, as relevant here, that “[a] lawyer shall hold property of
    clients or third persons that is in the lawyer’s possession in connection with a
    representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.” Rule 1.15(c) adds that “a
    lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property
    that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
    third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
    Before the Board, Ms. Johnson conceded violations of these rules with respect
    to Ms. Wilson, based on her commingling of personal and client funds and her failure
    to make a prompt payment to the Maryland Injury Center. We also agree with the
    Board that substantial evidence establishes that Ms. Johnson committed negligent
    misappropriation and commingling with respect to Ms. Hart. See Ekekwe-Kauffman,
    
    210 A.3d at 792
     (“Misappropriation is defined as any unauthorized use of client’s
    funds entrusted to a lawyer, including not only stealing but also unauthorized
    41
    temporary use for the lawyer’s own purpose, whether or not she derives any personal
    gain or benefit therefrom.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
    id.
     (“To guard
    against the loss of clients’ money, Rule 1.15(a) also requires a lawyer to hold client
    funds in a separate trust account and to avoid commingling her clients’ funds with
    her own property.”).
    12.    Rule 1.16(d) (terminating representation) (Wilson)
    Rule 1.16(d) states that, in connection with the termination of representation,
    “a lawyer shall take timely steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
    client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
    employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client
    is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been
    earned or incurred.” We have little difficulty concluding that Ms. Johnson violated
    this rule when she decided, a week before trial, to travel abroad to teach, failed to
    give reasonable notice to Ms. Wilson, failed to ensure that Ms. Wilson had new
    counsel she could afford, and failed to provide Ms. Wilson with the trial notebook
    and adequate instruction prior to trial.
    42
    13.    Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation)
    (Rudders, Strawder, and Wilson)
    Rule 8.4(c) prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct involving
    dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” “Rule 8.4(c) is not to be accorded
    a hyper-technical or unduly restrictive construction,” Ukwu, 
    926 A.2d at 1113
    , and
    it “encompasses conduct evincing a lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
    principle[;] a lack of fairness and straightforwardness[;] failure to provide
    information where there is duty to do so[; or] reckless disregard of the truth,” 
    id.
    We agree with the Board that at least the following acts by Ms. Johnson
    constitute dishonesty under the standards described above: (1) her claim to the
    Rudders that she had handled previous police misconduct cases; (2) her assertion to
    the Rudders that their case was “still on track”; (3) her claim that the dismissal of
    the Rudders’ complaint was “not due to [her] error”; (4) her representation to the
    litigation financing company in the Strawder matter that she had explained the terms
    of the financing arrangement to Mr. Strawder and that he understood those terms;
    and (5) her statement to the Maryland Injury Center that she would take a five
    percent reduction in her fees in order to convince the center to reduce its bill for
    services rendered to Ms. Wilson.
    43
    We also concur that Ms. Johnson was dishonest before Disciplinary Counsel
    and the Committee. For example, in response to an inquiry from the Office of
    Disciplinary Counsel regarding the Rudder case, Ms. Johnson described filing a
    “similar case for excessive force,” when in fact she had never “filed” such a case as
    an attorney; even if Ms. Johnson had worked on a similar case as a paralegal, the
    clear implication of her claim was that she had experience as an attorney in police
    misconduct cases.      See Ukwu, 
    926 A.2d at 1113
     (“lack of fairness and
    straightforwardness” constitutes dishonesty) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Ms. Johnson also told Disciplinary Counsel that she immediately advised the
    Rudders of the dismissal of their complaint, when the evidence shows (and she later
    admitted) that she did not do so until after the district court denied her motion for
    reconsideration.
    14.    Rule 8.4(d) (serious interference with administration of
    justice) (Wilson)
    Rule 8.4(d) prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct that seriously
    interferes with the administration of justice.” “To establish a violation of Rule
    8.4(d), [Disciplinary] Counsel must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
    (1) the attorney either took improper action or failed to take action when he or she
    should have acted; (2) the conduct involved bears directly on a case in the judicial
    44
    process with respect to an identifiable case or tribunal; and (3) the conduct taints the
    judicial process in more than a de minimis way, meaning that it must at least
    potentially impact upon the process to a serious and adverse degree.” (Johnnie)
    Johnson, 275 A.3d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up). We agree
    with the Board that Ms. Johnson violated this rule in the Wilson child custody case
    by withdrawing just before trial, forcing the court to choose between delaying a child
    custody matter and allowing a party to handle a trial without counsel.
    D.     Sanction
    The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee’s recommendation that Ms.
    Johnson be disbarred. The Board’s recommended sanction comes to us with a
    “strong presumption in favor of its imposition,” In re Hallmark, 
    831 A.2d 366
    , 371
    (D.C. 2003), and “[i]f the Board’s recommended sanction falls within a wide range
    of acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed,” In re McClure, 
    144 A.3d 570
    , 572 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate
    responsibility of imposing sanctions, however, “rests with this court in the first
    instance.” Godette, 
    919 A.2d at 1164
     (internal quotation marks omitted). In
    imposing the sanction, we must ensure that we do not “foster a tendency toward
    inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct” and that the sanction is not
    45
    “otherwise . . . unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1). “Where this court takes a
    significantly different view of the seriousness of an attorney’s conduct, the court
    thus has not hesitated to reach its own conclusion as to the appropriate sanction.” In
    re Baber, 
    106 A.3d 1072
    , 1076 (D.C. 2015) (per curiam).
    In imposing professional discipline, we aim “not only to maintain the integrity
    of the profession and to protect the public and the courts, but also to deter other
    attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.” In re Martin, 
    67 A.3d 1032
    , 1053
    (D.C. 2013).     “[T]he purpose of imposing a sanction is not to punish the
    attorney . . . .” In re Avery, 
    189 A.3d 715
    , 720 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). When determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction,
    we evaluate “(1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client,
    (3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary
    rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has
    acknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances” as
    non-exhaustive factors. Martin, 
    67 A.3d at 1053
    .
    Disbarment is “our harshest sanction.” In re Tun, 
    286 A.3d 538
    , 547 (D.C.
    2022). It is, however, an appropriate sanction for “flagrant dishonesty.” In re White,
    
    11 A.3d 1226
    , 1233 (D.C. 2011) (per curiam) (“Where this court has concluded that
    46
    the attorney’s conduct falls into a category of dishonesty of a flagrant kind it has
    held disbarment to be the appropriate sanction.”); see also In re Mazingo-Mayronne,
    
    276 A.3d 19
    , 21 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (“a continuing and pervasive indifference
    to the obligations of honesty in the judicial system can warrant disbarment”)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Flagrant dishonesty is either dishonesty accompanied by aggravating factors
    or continued and pervasive dishonesty. See In re O’Neill, 
    276 A.3d 492
    , 503 (D.C.
    2022) (“demonstrated and persistent indifference to the truth” over six years justified
    disbarment); Mazingo-Mayronne, 276 A.3d at 22 (“disbarment can be warranted for
    a prolonged pattern of repeated dishonesty, even in the absence of the aggravating
    circumstances” such as criminal conduct or the improper taking of funds for personal
    gain); In re Howes, 
    52 A.3d 1
    , 15 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]here such dishonesty is
    aggravated and prolonged, disbarment is the appropriate sanction.”).
    We conclude that disbarment is warranted here based on Ms. Johnson’s
    repeated and pervasive dishonesty over seven years, both in the representation of
    clients and before Disciplinary Counsel and the Committee. See Baber, 
    106 A.3d at 1077
     (“The repeated and protracted nature of Mr. Baber’s dishonesty weighs
    significantly in favor of disbarment.”).       In the Rudder matter, Ms. Johnson
    47
    misrepresented to the Rudders her experience handling police brutality cases, to their
    detriment; falsely represented that everything was “still on track” with their case;
    and falsely denied fault for the dismissal of claims in the case, seemingly to avoid
    revelation of her statute-of-limitations errors. During the investigation or before the
    Committee, she again claimed that she had filed a police brutality case and asserted,
    contrary to the clear record, that she had not missed any deadlines in the case and
    had kept her clients informed. In the Strawder matter, Ms. Johnson dishonestly made
    up a valuation of the lawsuit for the litigation financer when she did not even know
    how to value a medical malpractice claim and misrepresented to the lender that she
    had explained the terms of the financing arrangement to Mr. Strawder and that he
    understood those terms. And in the Wilson personal injury matter, Ms. Johnson
    falsely stated to Ms. Wilson’s health care provider that she would take a five percent
    reduction in her fees in order to convince the health care provider to reduce its bill
    for services rendered to Ms. Wilson, when in fact Ms. Johnson did not reduce her
    fees to Ms. Wilson.
    Moreover, Ms. Johnson’s repeated dishonesty was accompanied by an
    appalling level of indifference to her clients, consistent incompetence that prejudiced
    her clients, a revelation of client confidences, financial mismanagement, and a lack
    of remorse and acknowledgement of responsibility. See (Johnnie) Johnson, 275
    48
    A.3d at 282 (disbarment warranted, even in the absence of prior disciplinary record,
    where behavior involved dishonesty, case handling prejudiced client’s claim,
    attorney committed numerous rule violations, and attorney showed no remorse); In
    re Moawad, 
    268 A.3d 820
    , 821-22 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (“we look to the totality
    of the misconduct in determining whether the dishonesty was flagrant and have
    considered whether the intentional dishonesty was an attempt to hide other
    misconduct and blame others for his misconduct”); 
    id.
     (“[w]e have also considered
    whether during the disciplinary proceedings respondent acknowledged his
    misconduct, showed remorse, or showed any willingness to pay restitution or return
    his client’s unearned fees”); Baber, 
    106 A.3d at 1077-78
     (disbarment warranted,
    even in the absence of prior disciplinary record, where dishonesty came at the
    expense of clients’ interests, was compounded by conduct that betrayed client
    confidences, and prejudiced clients and attorney showed no remorse).
    To be sure, taken in isolation, some of Ms. Johnson’s false statements can be
    characterized as puffery, deflection, or an extension of her lack of competence.
    Considered together, though, we agree with the Committee and the Board that Ms.
    Johnson has exhibited a consistent lack of forthrightness, a willingness to shade the
    truth for her own benefit, and a disregard for the obligation for honesty and candor
    that comes with the privilege of membership in our jurisdiction’s Bar. See Baber,
    49
    
    106 A.3d at 1077
     (“honesty is basic to the practice of law, and . . . lawyers have a
    greater duty than ordinary citizens to be scrupulously honest at all times”) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); In re Williams, 
    513 A.2d 793
    , 796 (D.C. 1986) (per
    curiam) (“We grant the license to practice law as a privilege, not as a right, and we
    do so only on the strict condition that the attorney aspire to the highest standards of
    ethical conduct.”).
    Finally, while recognizing that “[p]erfect consistency is not achievable in this
    area,” In re Silva, 
    29 A.3d 924
    , 927 (D.C. 2011), because the “imposition of
    sanctions in bar discipline . . . is not an exact science but may depend on the facts
    and circumstances of each particular proceeding,” In re Goffe, 
    641 A.2d 458
    , 463
    (D.C. 1994) (per curiam), we are satisfied that disbarment here is consistent with the
    sanction imposed in comparable cases. See, e.g., (Johnnie) Johnson, 275 A.3d at
    282; In re Bynum, 
    197 A.3d 1072
    , 1074 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam) (disbarment
    warranted where attorney’s “dishonest conduct spanned five years, from the outset
    of his representation of his clients, through the disciplinary hearing in this case, and
    [the] dishonesty [was] exacerbated by his lack of remorse and effort to shift the
    blame to others”); Baber, 
    106 A.3d at 1077-78
    ; 
    id.
     at 1078-79 (citing cases).
    50
    Accordingly, “[c]onsidering the circumstances of this case as a whole,”
    Baber, 
    106 A.3d at 1078
    , we conclude that disbarment falls within the range of
    acceptable outcomes, is consistent with dispositions for comparable conduct, and is
    not otherwise unwarranted.
    III.   Conclusion
    Because the Committee’s and Board’s factual findings are supported by
    substantial evidence, we are required to adopt them. Reviewing the Board’s legal
    conclusions de novo, we conclude that they are consistent with our precedent.
    Because disbarment for flagrant dishonesty is consistent with our prior decisions,
    and because it is warranted in Ms. Johnson’s case in light of the number and
    seriousness of her rule violations, we adopt the Board’s recommendation.
    Accordingly, it is ordered that Ms. Johnson is disbarred from the practice of law in
    the District of Columbia. For purposes of reinstatement, the effective date of Ms.
    Johnson’s disbarment will not begin to run until she files an affidavit that complies
    with D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).
    So ordered.