D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Services ( 2024 )

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic
and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of
any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go
to press.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 21-AA-0772
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT, PETITIONERS,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT,
and
DAVID FANT, INTERVENOR.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
Compensation Review Board
(2021-CRB-000062)
(Argued October 24, 2023 Decided December 27, 2023 *)
Alex Fumelli, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor
General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J.
Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for petitioners.
Harold L. Levi for intervenor.
Before EASTERLY, MCLEESE, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
*
The decision in this case was originally issued as an unpublished
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. It is now being published upon the court’s
grant of petitioners’ motion to publish.
2
MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Petitioners District of Columbia Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) and District of Columbia Office of Risk Management
(“ORM”) challenge an order reinstating intervenor David Fant’s workers’
compensation benefits. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The pertinent facts appear to be undisputed for present purposes. Mr. Fant
began working at DOC in 1976. In 1989, Mr. Fant injured his back while working.
He subsequently received temporary total disability benefits and related medical
benefits pursuant to the workers’ compensation program for District of Columbia
employees injured during the course of employment. D.C. Code § 1-601.1 et seq.
In 1992, Mr. Fant applied for federal disability retirement benefits. He was eligible
for a federal retirement annuity because the federal government operated DOC when
Mr. Fant began working for DOC. Although he was approved for a federal disability
retirement annuity in 1993, Mr. Fant elected at that time to receive D.C. workers’
compensation benefits in lieu of federal benefits.
Mr. Fant continued to receive D.C. workers’ compensation benefits until
2007. When he accepted a position as a security guard, however, ORM terminated
Mr. Fant’s D.C. workers’ compensation benefits. Mr. Fant then activated his federal
retirement annuity, effective August 2007.
3
Mr. Fant soon left the position as a security guard, due to pain that made it
difficult to perform his job duties. He then challenged the termination of his D.C.
workers’ compensation benefits. In August 2008, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) determined that the security-guard position exceeded Mr. Fant’s physical
capabilities and ordered the reinstatement of Mr. Fant’s D.C. workers’ compensation
benefits.
Mr. Fant received both a federal retirement annuity and D.C. workers’
compensation benefits until 2017, when ORM terminated his D.C. workers’
compensation benefits on the ground that Mr. Fant’s receipt of federal disability
benefits rendered Mr. Fant ineligible to receive D.C. workers’ compensation
benefits.
Mr. Fant challenged ORM’s decision in two ways. First, as directed in the
decision, he appealed to ORM’s Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”). Second, Mr. Fant
requested an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ with the Office of Administrative
Hearings (“OAH”).
The CRO affirmed ORM’s decision, concluding that, under D.C. Code
§ 1-623.16(a), Mr. Fant could not receive “salary, pay, or remuneration” from the
District while simultaneously receiving workers’ compensation benefits. The CRO
concluded that this “prohibition extends to the receipt of retirement benefits,
4
including Federal retirement benefits, payable as a result of District government
employment.”
Mr. Fant challenged the CRO’s decision in Superior Court. The Superior
Court initially upheld the CRO’s interpretation of Section 1-623.16(a). On
reconsideration, however, the Superior Court agreed with Mr. Fant that OAH had
exclusive jurisdiction to review ORM’s decision, and the Superior Court therefore
dismissed the case before it.
Although DOC and ORM took the position in Superior Court that the
authority to review ORM’s decision lay with the CRO and the Superior Court, rather
than the ALJ and the Compensation Review Board (“CRB”), DOC and ORM did
not appeal the Superior Court’s order dismissing the case.
In the proceeding before OAH, the ALJ reinstated Mr. Fant’s D.C. workers’
compensation benefits. The ALJ acknowledged that D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a-1),
which was added in 2010, seemingly barred Mr. Fant from receiving D.C. workers’
compensation benefits because Mr. Fant was employed by the District of Columbia
before October l, 1987, and was currently receiving disability retirement benefits
from the federal government. The ALJ reasoned, however, that before
Section 1-623.16(a-1)’s adoption, the public-sector workers’ compensation statute
“did not specifically prohibit a District of Columbia employee from receiving [D.C.
workers’ compensation] benefits at the same time he or she was receiving retirement
5
disability pay under the federal government civil service disability retirement
system.” Therefore, the ALJ ruled that Mr. Fant was eligible to receive both federal
disability benefits and D.C. workers’ compensation benefits under the pre-2010
version of the statute. The ALJ also ruled that applying the current version of the
workers’ compensation statute to Mr. Fant’s D.C. workers’ compensation benefits—
first awarded in 1989 and then reinstated in 2008—would be an impermissible
retroactive application of the statute.
The CRB affirmed the ALJ’s order. First, the CRB noted that although ORM
and DOC had argued in the Superior Court case that the Superior Court, rather than
OAH and the CRB, had jurisdiction to review ORM’s decision, ORM and DOC had
not raised that jurisdictional challenge before the CRB. The CRB therefore did not
address the jurisdictional issue. Second, the CRB upheld the ALJ’s analysis that the
pre-2010 version of the public-sector workers’ compensation statute did not forbid
simultaneous receipt of federal disability retirement benefits and D.C. workers’
compensation benefits. Third, the CRB agreed with the ALJ that application of the
current version of the public-sector workers’ compensation statute to post-2010
payments would give the statute impermissible retroactive effect.
II. Analysis
We review a decision of the CRB to determine whether the decision is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
6
law.” Reyes v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 48 A.3d 159, 164 (D.C. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We have often given deference to the CRB’s reasonable
interpretation of workers’ compensation statutes. E.g., Howard Univ. Hosp. v. D.C.
Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 267 A.3d 1068, 1071 (D.C. 2022). Recent decisions of this
court, however, have raised questions about the extent to which the CRB is entitled
to deference in its interpretation of workers’ compensation statutes. See Lecea v.
D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 301 A.3d 734, 739-40 (D.C. 2023). ORM and DOC
argue that this court should defer to ORM rather than the CRB. We need not address
that issue, however, because the conclusions we reach in this case do not depend on
our standard of review.
A. Jurisdiction
As previously noted, DOC and ORM unsuccessfully argued in the Superior
Court that jurisdiction to review ORM’s decision was vested in the Superior Court
rather than in the ALJ and the CRB. DOC and ORM did not raise that issue before
the CRB, however, and they have not raised that issue in this court. Nevertheless,
we have an independent obligation to confirm our own jurisdiction before ruling on
the merits of a case. E.g., Nunnally v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 80 A.3d 1004, 1006
n.4 (D.C. 2013). We conclude that we do have jurisdiction. The CRB has frequently
decided public-sector workers’ compensation cases, and this court has frequently
reviewed such decisions. E.g., Perry v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 288 A.3d 300,
7
300-06 (D.C. 2023). Even if the CRB lacked the authority to review the particular
ORM decision at issue in this case, this court ordinarily need not consider alleged
jurisdictional defects in an agency’s authority that were not properly presented to the
agency. D.C. Hous. Auth. v. D.C. Off. of Hum. Rts., 881 A.2d 600, 613 (D.C. 2005)
(“[T]he general rule is that even jurisdictional questions must be put to agencies
before they are brought to the reviewing court.”) (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted). There is a “narrow” discretionary exception to this doctrine,
applicable to challenges to the agency’s “inherent capacity to act, or where the
challenged action is plausibly claimed to be patently in excess of the agency’s
authority.” Id. at 612, 613 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). No party
has invoked that discretionary exception in this court, and we see no reason to raise
the exception sua sponte. We therefore proceed to decide the case on the merits,
without expressing a view as to whether the claim at issue in this case ought to have
come to this court by way of the ALJ and the CRB or instead by way of Superior
Court.
B. Post-2010 D.C. Workers’ Compensation Benefit Payments to Mr. Fant
D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a-1), which was enacted in 2010, provides that a
District “employee shall not be eligible for [District public-sector workers’
compensation benefits] if he or she was employed by the District of Columbia or the
federal government before October 1, 1987, and is receiving disability benefits from
8
the federal government for the same injury.” It is undisputed that Mr. Fant was
employed by the District of Columbia before October 1, 1987, and that his D.C.
workers’ compensation benefits and his federal disability benefits arose from the
same injury. Thus, once it went into effect in 2010, Section 1-623.16(a-1) by its
plain terms appears to bar payments of D.C. workers’ compensation benefits to
Mr. Fant during the period when he was receiving federal retirement disability
benefits.
Mr. Fant argues, however, that applying Section 1-623.16(a-1) to him would
be to give that provision a retroactive effect, because doing so would attach new
legal consequences to his 1989 work-related injury. We assume without deciding
that Mr. Fant is correct on that point.
There is a presumption against giving statutes retroactive effect, but that
presumption will yield in the face of sufficiently clear legislative intent. Metro.
Police Dep’t v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 301 A.3d 714, 721 (D.C. 2023); see Apartment
& Off. Bldg. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 129 A.3d 925, 932 (D.C. 2016) (statute
need not explicitly state that it applies retroactively; “it will suffice if the legislature
has made its intent clear”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nixon v. D.C. Dep’t
of Emp. Servs., 954 A.2d 1016, 1023 (D.C. 2008) (“[L]egislation must be considered
as addressed to the future, not to the past[,] unless such be the unequivocal and
inflexible import of the statutory terms.”) (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation
9
marks omitted). We hold that the text of Section 1-623.16(a-1) itself demonstrates
the legislature’s unequivocal intent to bar post-2010 D.C. workers’ compensation
payments to claimants, like Mr. Fant, whose injuries had occurred pre-enactment.
Section 1-623.16(a-1) explicitly reaches well back into the past, applying to
employees who were working for the District government or the federal government
over twenty years before the provision’s enactment. Nothing in the provision’s text
suggests that the legislature was focused only on post-enactment injuries, and many
of the employees whom the provision explicitly covers might no longer even have
been working for the District government or the federal government when the
provision was enacted. We therefore hold that, once it went into effect in 2010,
Section 1-623.16(a-1) barred payments of D.C. workers’ compensation benefits to
Mr. Fant during the period when he was receiving federal retirement disability
benefits.
Even where the legislature’s intent is clear, there are constitutional limits on
the legislature’s ability to enact retroactive legislation. E.g., Metro. Police Dep’t,
301 A.3d at 721. Nevertheless, “constitutional restrictions on retroactivity are of
limited scope, and . . . absent a violation of those specific provisions, . . . potential
unfairness is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended
scope.” Id. (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
721-22 (assuming without deciding that court could disregard legislative intent if
10
retroactive application of statute would cause “manifest injustice”). Mr. Fant does
not argue in this court that there are grounds on which this court could override the
legislature’s intent. We therefore need not decide that issue. We do observe,
however, that we see no obvious basis upon which the court in this case could
permissibly override the legislature’s intent.
C. Pre-2010 D.C. Workers’ Compensation Benefit Payments to Mr. Fant
The parties dispute whether, even before the enactment of
Section 1-623.16(a-1) in 2010, D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a) already barred Mr. Fant
from simultaneously receiving D.C. workers’ compensation benefits and federal
disability benefits. We have no occasion to decide that issue. The ORM decision at
issue in this case halted future payments to Mr. Fant of D.C. workers’ compensation
benefits as of 2017. For the reasons we have explained, that ORM decision was
lawful in light of the 2010 enactment of Section 1-623.16(a-1). We therefore reverse
the judgment of the CRB and remand for entry of an order affirming ORM’s
decision.
Up to this point in the present case, ORM has not sought repayment from
Mr. Fant of any D.C. workers’ compensation benefits already paid to Mr. Fant. We
express no view as to whether the District would be entitled to obtain such repayment
if it were sought. See generally D.C. Code § 1-623.29 (establishing procedures and
11
standards governing recovery of overpayments of public-sector workers’
compensation benefits); 7 D.C.M.R. § 133 (same).
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the CRB and remand for
entry of an order upholding ORM’s 2017 order terminating payment of future D.C.
workers’ compensation benefits to Mr. Fant.
So ordered.