Lynch v. Ghaida ( 2024 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 22-CV-0556
SHANA LYNCH, APPELLANT,
V.
GHASSAN GHAIDA, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2018-LTB-025721)
(Hon. Todd E. Edelman, Trial Judge)
(Submitted October 26, 2023 Decided August 8, 2024)
Joshua C. Toll, Matthew J. Washnock, and Kassandra L. Ashford were on the
brief for appellant.
Ghassan Ghaida, pro se.
Before EASTERLY and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior Judge.
FISHER, Senior Judge: This appeal arises from a dispute between a landlord
and his tenant. Appellee Ghassan Ghaida, the landlord, filed a complaint seeking to
evict appellant Shana Lynch from his property and to collect unpaid rent. Ms. Lynch
counterclaimed, asserting that the property had severe housing code violations and
that she was entitled to either full or partial abatement of rent. After a bench trial,
2
the Superior Court held that Ms. Lynch was entitled to a 40 percent abatement, but
that she still owed Mr. Ghaida $5,589 for unpaid rent. On appeal, Ms. Lynch
challenges the court’s calculation of the rent abatement and the judgment awarded
against her. We remand for further consideration as explained below.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On June 20, 2018, the parties signed a one-year lease for a single-family home.
Ms. Lynch was eager to move in although she knew that some repairs were still
being made. Disputes soon arose over the condition of the property and Ms. Lynch’s
failure to pay rent, and on October 31, 2018, Mr. Ghaida filed his complaint seeking
to evict Ms. Lynch. Ms. Lynch counterclaimed, as noted above. Before trial,
Ms. Lynch relinquished the property to Mr. Ghaida, leaving money damages as the
sole issue.
After evaluating the condition of the property, the trial court found several
violations of the housing code. Nevertheless, it determined that the evidence
presented by Ms. Lynch was insufficient to support the “findings necessary to void
the lease in its entirety.” We will provide more details in the legal analysis that
follows.
3
Next, evaluating whether the landlord had breached the implied warranty of
habitability, the trial court found that several housing code violations affected
Ms. Lynch’s use and enjoyment of the dwelling. First, the refrigerator was not
cooling adequately and the oven did not work. Second, there was a lack of heat in
the entire home as of November 2018. Third, there was damage to the ceiling and
walls, including “significant, not merely cosmetic” holes and water damage. The
trial court also found that, although there was evidence of a mouse infestation, there
was no evidence of a problem with mice before Ms. Lynch’s tenancy began, and she
did not complain of mice until she had been living in the house for two months.
Therefore, the court concluded that the infestation could not be attributed to
Mr. Ghaida.
The trial court made additional findings regarding notice of the housing code
violations and Mr. Ghaida’s response. First, Ms. Lynch reported to Mr. Ghaida in
August 2018 that the refrigerator and stove were not working, but he did not attempt
to replace them until October 2018. When Mr. Ghaida attempted to deliver
replacements, Ms. Lynch did not let Mr. Ghaida’s agent into the house, and the agent
left the appliances outside on the property. Second, Mr. Ghaida had “some notice”
of heating issues from a 2016 order to vacate the same property issued by the
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”) to a previous tenant,
and Ms. Lynch had notified Mr. Ghaida that the heat was not working in November
4
2018, but Mr. Ghaida did not repair the problem in a reasonable time and in a
workmanlike manner. Third, Mr. Ghaida had notice of the holes and water damage
at the time he rented the property, but he did not make repairs in a reasonable time
and a workmanlike manner.
To determine the appropriate amount of rent abatement, the trial court
evaluated how the housing code violations diminished the value of the property. The
court found that the three violations were “fairly significant”: kitchen appliances that
did not work; large holes, cracks, and water damage in the walls and ceiling; and no
heat during the winter months. The court then evaluated how long the violations
were present. First, it noted that the kitchen appliances did not work for two months
before the landlord attempted to deliver replacements. Second, it explained that the
lack of heat has no effect on the value of the property in the summer months, but
makes the property “unlivable” during the winter months. Considering these
violations together with the damage to the walls and ceiling, the court determined
that 40 percent abatement was appropriate.
The trial court then concluded that, because the rent established by the lease
was $1,970 per month and Ms. Lynch occupied the premises for nine and a half
months (until April 5, 2019), she would owe $18,715 without any rent abatement.
Applying the 40 percent reduction, the court found that the amount of rent
5
Ms. Lynch owed Mr. Ghaida after abatement was $11,229. Given that Ms. Lynch
made a security deposit of $1,700 and two $1,970 rent payments during her tenancy,
the trial judge concluded that the amount of rent owed by Ms. Lynch and not yet
paid was $5,589. The court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Ghaida for that
amount.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal from a judgment entered after a bench trial, we review the trial
court’s legal conclusions de novo, “but defer to its factual findings if they are
supported by the record.” Chibs v. Fisher, 960 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C. 2008); see D.C.
Code § 17-305(a) (“the judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless
it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it”).
Whether housing code violations existed and whether those violations affected the
property’s habitability are questions of fact to be submitted to the factfinder. See
Reese v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 259 A.2d 112, 113 (D.C. 1969). These findings of
fact may be overturned only when “‘the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), to define the term “clearly
erroneous”).
6
“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 574. “An appellate court
will not redetermine the credibility of witnesses where, as here, the trial court had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor and form a conclusion.” In re S.G., 581
A.2d 771, 775 (D.C. 1990) (quoting WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1328 (8th
Cir. 1984) (quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, “[u]nder Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a), the trial court in a nonjury
case is required to ‘state sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit
meaningful appellate review.’” Wright v. Hodges, 681 A.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C. 1996)
(quoting U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Kaftarian, 520 A.2d 297, 299 (D.C. 1987)).
“Nevertheless, a deficiency in factual findings does not always constitute reversible
error. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling against such a challenge, for example,
where the record clearly reflects the grounds of the trial court’s decision, or where
the trial court’s decision is clearly supported by the record.” Id. (citations and
quotation marks omitted). “[W]e have often sustained rulings of the trial court on
the basis of implied findings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the “judgment of any trial court is presumed to be valid. A losing
party who notes an appeal from such a judgment bears the burden of convincing the
appellate court that the trial court erred. In meeting that burden, it is appellant’s duty
7
to present this court with a record sufficient to show affirmatively that error
occurred.” Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C. 1982) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
Where the landlord has violated the housing code, a tenant may rely upon two
different legal theories to avoid paying rent that otherwise would be due under the
lease: that the lease was void or that the landlord breached the implied warranty of
habitability. These theories “may be used as a sword (to collect damages) as well as
a shield (to contest the obligation to pay rent).” George Washington Univ. v.
Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 46 (D.C. 1983) (quotation marks omitted); see also In re
Stancil, No. 01-02220, 2005 WL 3036647, at *24-29 (Bankr. D.C. Nov. 7, 2005). 1
A lease is void as an “illegal contract” when there were unsafe or unsanitary
conditions at the beginning of the tenancy due to violations of the housing code of
which the owner had knowledge or reasonably should have had knowledge. Brown
v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836-37 (D.C. 1968); 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.1. A
lease may also become void after the tenancy begins. 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.2. This
1
We recognize that In re Stancil is not binding precedent, but we have found
its analysis to be helpful in understanding this case.
8
occurs when housing code violations arise and render the unit unsafe or unsanitary,
if they do not result from the intentional acts or negligence of the tenant, the landlord
has knowledge or reasonably should have knowledge of them, and they are not
corrected by the landlord within the time allowed by the housing regulations. Id.
The second theory relies upon the implied warranty of habitability. Implicit
in all residential leases is an assurance that the housing supplied by the landlord will
comply with the standards of habitability set out in the housing code. Javins v. First
Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Thus, a landlord
breaches the lease contract when he does not substantially comply with the housing
code. Id.; see also Winchester Mgmt. Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 190 (D.C. 1976)
(“We define habitable housing as those dwelling units which substantially comply
with the standards detailed in the Housing Regulations.”). In order to “establish a
violation of the warranty of habitability, a tenant must show that any noncompliance
with the housing regulations is more than de minimis.” Wright, 681 A.2d at 1105;
see also Shannon & Luchs Co. v. Jeter, 469 A.2d 812, 816 (D.C. 1983) (“[I]n order
to determine what amount of rent is owed, the tenant must be afforded the
opportunity to prove housing code violations.”); Standardized Civil Jury Instructions
for the District of Columbia, No. 26.05 (rev. ed. 2023) (warranty of habitability;
9
tenant has the burden to prove a “substantial violation” 2 of the housing code).
There are two major differences between these theories. The first is that a
tenant must demonstrate more significant violations of the housing code to void a
lease than is necessary to prove a breach of the implied warranty. Voiding a lease
requires proof of housing code violations that render the unit “unsafe” or
“unsanitary,” whereas a breach of the implied warranty occurs when violations are
“more than de minimis.” Compare Brown, 237 A.2d at 836 (requiring “unsafe and
unsanitary” conditions to void a lease) with Wright, 681 A.2d at 1105 (requiring
2
When the term “substantial violation” is used in the implied warranty of
habitability setting, we understand it to mean a violation that is more than de
minimis. For example, we used the term “substantial violation” in Curry, noting that
“the landlord’s breach of the warranty of habitability, as measured by substantial
violations of the housing code, can be interposed by a tenant as a defense, in whole
or in part, to the landlord’s claim that possession should be surrendered because rent
is owed.” Curry v. Dunbar House, Inc., 362 A.2d 686, 689 (D.C. 1976). However,
we connected that term to the more than de minimis standard, explaining that,
“[s]ince the predominant concern is the habitability of the premises, violations of
law which are de minimis with respect thereto do not represent a breach of the
landlord’s obligations.” Id. at 690.
Although the standardized jury instruction uses the term “substantial
violation,” it cites Weintraub, which does not use that term but rather requires
landlords to “comply substantially.” Weintraub, 458 A.2d at 46. There, we went on
to explain “that more than de minimis violations of the Housing Regulations are
required to establish breach of the implied warranty of habitability.” Id. at 47 n.5;
see Wright, 681 A.2d at 1105 (“In order to establish a violation of the warranty of
habitability, a tenant must show that any noncompliance with the housing
regulations is more than de minimis.”) (citing id. at 47 n.5)).
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“more than de minimis” housing code violations to breach the warranty of
habitability). If conditions deteriorate during the tenancy, both theories may come
into play. When housing code violations are more than de minimis, the lease itself
entitles a tenant to rent abatement under the implied warranty of habitability, but that
tenant’s lease becomes void if those or additional violations later create unsafe or
unsanitary conditions. See 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.2.
The second difference is found in the manner of assessing damages. Where a
lease is void, the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance without any contractual
obligation to pay rent. William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412, 416 (D.C.
1970). However, the landlord may recover under a quasi-contract theory by proving
“the reasonable value of the premises in its condition as it was when occupied.” Id.By contrast, a breach of the implied warranty is a breach of the lease agreement,
which still remains a valid contract. As a result, “evidence that an apartment is not
in good repair . . . is sufficient to allow a jury to find a decrease in the value of that
apartment, which would provide a basis for assessing damages.” Cowan v. Youssef,
687 A.2d 594, 600 (D.C. 1996); see also Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064,
1072 (D.C. 1991) (concluding that the tenant’s “evidence of the problems
themselves was enough” for the factfinder to “find that the apartment’s ‘as is’ value
was zero, thereby allowing a complete abatement of rent”). Therefore, in an implied
warranty setting, the lease agreement is valid, but breached, and the amount of rent
11
owed is determined by starting with the amount of rent agreed upon and discounting
based on the severity of the breaches, as proven by the tenant. See id. Unlike with
the void lease theory, the burden does not shift to the landlord to prove the value of
the rental unit. 3
We understand the trial court to have concluded that the lease was not void at
its inception, but that Mr. Ghaida breached the implied warranty of habitability.
Ms. Lynch argues that the court erred: (A) by not holding that the lease was void due
to violations of the housing code, and (B) in calculating the amount of rent abatement
due for the breach of the implied warranty.
A. Void Leases
As discussed above, Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d at 836-37, and
14 D.C.M.R. § 302 establish that a lease: (1) may be void at its inception, or (2) may
become void during the tenancy.
3
To the extent that Chibs, 960 A.2d at 590, discusses burden shifting in an
implied warranty context, that discussion is dictum, as the panel ultimately stated
that “we need not decide this issue here.” Importantly, however, Chibs recognizes
that, even in a breach of warranty setting, housing code violations can be so severe
that a full abatement of rent is proper. Id. (“[E]ven if [the tenant] had the burden of
proving that the home had no value, she met that burden.”).
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1. Was the lease void at its inception?
Ms. Lynch asserts that the trial court erred in not holding that the lease was
void from its inception. She makes two arguments: (1) that the trial court
misapprehended the standard for declaring a lease void, and (2) that the trial court’s
decision not only lacks evidentiary support but was contrary to its own factual
findings and other evidence in the record. We remand for clarification of certain
findings related to damage to the roof. 4
First, Ms. Lynch argues that the trial court misapprehended the law when it
characterized Brown, and 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.1 as establishing an “extremely
demanding standard.” However, this reference by the trial court to a concession
made in Ms. Lynch’s written closing argument does not persuade us that the court
misunderstood the legal standard. See Wright, 681 A.2d at 1105 (“[T]rial judges are
presumed to know and apply the proper legal standards.”).
The tenant has the burden of showing that housing code violations existed.
4
Mr. Ghaida argues that the tenant accepted the property in “as-is” condition.
We concur with the trial court that such purported agreements do not absolve the
landlord of responsibility for complying with the housing regulations. See Javins v.
First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The duties
imposed by the Housing Regulations may not be waived or shifted by agreement if
the Regulations specifically place the duty upon the lessor.”).
13
See Nuyen v. Luna, 884 A.2d 650, 659 (D.C. 2005) (where tenant was “requesting
an abatement of rent from the inception of the tenancy,” such abatement “would
necessarily be predicated on proof that there were housing code violations [from that
point] that rendered the apartment unsafe and unsanitary”). When the record is
evaluated, a tenant’s delay in complaining about housing code violations can
constitute affirmative evidence that those violations were not present at the lease’s
inception. See Watson v. Kotler, 264 A.2d 141, 142 (D.C. 1970).
Applying these standards, the trial court held that Ms. Lynch failed to present
enough evidence for it “to make findings necessary to void the lease in its entirety.”
The court noted that Ms. Lynch’s mother, Virginia Moore, who had real estate
experience, conducted a walkthrough of the property before Ms. Lynch moved in
without identifying any major habitability issues, and there was no evidence of
Ms. Lynch making complaints prior to August 30, 2018, which was more than two
months after she moved in. We conclude that, if they are not clearly erroneous, these
are legally sufficient grounds for finding that Ms. Lynch had failed to carry her
burden of proof and that the trial court properly applied 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.1.
Ms. Lynch contends, however, that the record does not support these
conclusions. It is true that Ms. Moore cautioned that her walkthrough was
“preliminary,” and she could only identify problems “visible to [her] eye,” but she
14
acknowledged that, at “the onset of walking in the house,” she saw “nothing major”
and the house “appeared to be okay,” with the exception of some “minor drywall
issues.”
Additionally, although Ms. Lynch points to Ms. Moore’s testimony that she
contacted Mr. Ghaida about flooding caused by a leaking roof during the first week
of the tenancy, the trial court was not persuaded by the testimony regarding “leaks
and flooding.” It did not “credit the testimony of [Ms. Lynch] and her mother about
the extent of the flooding, which is not corroborated by other evidence.” And other
record evidence indicates that Ms. Lynch was aware that Mr. Ghaida would be in
the process of replacing the roof to address leaks at the time she planned to move in.
Indeed, Mr. Ghaida testified that “the roof was replaced and there were no leaks”
because it was “a brand new roof” that was “completed before Ms. Lynch actually
moved into the property.” Nevertheless, the trial court was “reluctant to make any
finding solely based on the testimony of either party or Ms. Moor[e].” We
understand the trial court to have concluded that, to the extent leaks were present
when Ms. Lynch moved in, they did not render the property unsafe or unsanitary.
However, it does appear that the trial court misspoke when it said that
“[t]here’s no evidence of complaints being made by Ms. Lynch until August of
2018, . . . over two months after [she] moved in.” Ms. Lynch points to screenshots
15
of text messages she exchanged with Mr. Ghaida on June 29, either as she was
moving in or shortly thereafter, regarding what the trial court described as an
“incident in which a roofing contractor fell through the ceiling and made a hole that
was taped up.” Several questions remain about the condition of the roof that may
bear on the determination of whether the property was unsafe or unsanitary. The
record is unclear concerning: whether the foot-through-the-ceiling incident also
caused a hole in the roof; when this incident occurred with respect to Ms. Lynch’s
move-in date; whether or when the roof was repaired; and the extent of the damage
caused to the property. On remand, the trial court should clarify these matters and
whether they rendered the property unsafe or unsanitary under 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.1.
Apart from evidence about the roof, we therefore conclude that Ms. Lynch
has not shown that the evidence required the trial judge to find the lease void at the
outset. However, because some key questions about damage to the roof remain
unanswered, we remand the issue to the Superior Court for further consideration.
2. Did the lease become void during the tenancy?
Although the trial court may have implied that the housing code violations
that arose during the term of the lease were not serious enough to render it void under
14 D.C.M.R. § 302.2, it did not refer to that regulation, and we conclude that
additional findings are necessary to resolve this issue. See Wright, 681 A.2d at 1105.
16
For example, the trial court noted that the lack of heat renders the property
“unlivable” “during the winter.” Indeed, Ms. Lynch presented evidence that the lack
of heat forced her to move out of the home in December, but the trial court did not
determine whether this was true and, if so, whether it rendered the property unsafe
or unsanitary or constituted a constructive eviction. Instead, the court calculated that
Ms. Lynch was obligated to pay rent (subject to possible abatement) until early
April, when Ms. Lynch formally relinquished possession of the property by
providing the keys to Mr. Ghaida.
Further, the trial court noted that the property had “a nonworking refrigerator
and oven,” but the DCRA notice of violation and the testimony of the DCRA
inspector appear to indicate that both the stovetop and the oven were not working.
Although a nonworking oven alone may not render the unit unsafe or unsanitary, the
combination of a nonworking stovetop, oven, and refrigerator in a single family
home might make it nearly impossible to store and prepare food in a safe and sanitary
manner. Additionally, the trial court found the property had “various issues of
integrity of the ceilings and the walls,” as well as “water damage,” including
“significant, not merely cosmetic holes.” As discussed in the preceding section, the
extent of this damage is unclear, and the trial court did not expressly evaluate
whether any damage rendered the property unsafe or unsanitary. Finally, although
the trial court concluded that there was “no evidence of mice or other pests before
17
Ms. Lynch became the tenant,” 5 and she did not complain of mice until she had been
living in the house for two months, it did not determine whether the infestation that
arose could be attributed to Mr. Ghaida under the housing code 6 and whether it made
the property unsafe or unsanitary.
If these violations (or some of them) in fact rendered the property “unlivable,”
it would seem that they also rendered the house unsafe or unsanitary. If so, the lease
would become void at that point, and Mr. Ghaida would have the burden to prove
any value of the unit between that time and when Ms. Lynch relinquished
possession. William J. Davis, Inc., 271 A.2d at 416. Therefore, we conclude that
additional findings are necessary to determine whether and when the violations
caused the property to become unsafe or unsanitary. See 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.2.
* * *
In sum, we conclude that Ms. Lynch has not shown that the evidence apart
5
Ms. Lynch points to a document in which a previous tenant complained of a
rodent infestation, but she has not identified any applicable exception to the rule
against hearsay, and we understand the trial court to have concluded that there was
no admissible evidence of a previous infestation.
6
Some housing code provisions hold the owner of a rental unit responsible
for remedying a mouse infestation, such as 14 D.C.M.R. § 805.3, which states, “[i]f
an infestation of a single habitation is caused by failure of the owner or licensee to
maintain a residential building in a rodent-proof or reasonably insect-proof
condition, the exterminating shall be done by the owner or licensee.”
18
from that related to the roof required the trial judge to declare the lease void at its
inception. However, because questions remain about potential damage to the roof
of the property at the time the tenancy began, we remand for the trial court to
consider whether any damage voided the lease under 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.1. We also
remand for further findings clarifying whether the lease was rendered void under 14
D.C.M.R. § 302.2 after the tenancy began. The trial court’s findings related to this
issue may also impact the implied warranty of habitability analysis discussed below.
If, on remand, the trial court finds that the lease became void, the implied warranty
of habitability nonetheless would still apply to the time between the lease’s inception
and the point at which the lease became void, and, for that interim period, the
housing code violations discussed in this opinion would constitute breaches of the
implied warranty. Even if the trial court concludes that the lease did not become
void, it should recalculate the rent abatement due to Ms. Lynch over her entire
tenancy for the breaches of the implied warranty of habitability in accordance with
the discussion in the next section.
B. Implied Warranty of Habitability
Ms. Lynch contends that the trial court miscalculated the amount of rent
19
abatement she was owed under the implied warranty of habitability. 7 She raises two
arguments: (1) that the trial court’s calculations result from a misapprehension of the
law; and (2) that the trial court’s findings did not provide adequate support for its
award of only a 40 percent abatement. We are not persuaded that the trial court
misapprehended the implied warranty of habitability, but agree that the court did not
provide adequate findings of fact to support its calculations.
Here, the trial court described what a tenant who claims that her landlord has
breached the warranty of habitability must show as follows:
First, the condition existing at the beginning or arising
during the tenancy; Second, the condition constitutes a
substantial violation of a specific provision of the housing
code; Third, the landlord knew or reasonably should have
known of the condition; Fourth, the landlord failed to
make repairs in a reasonable time and in a workmanlike
manner; Five, that the conditions affected the tenant’s use
o[r] enjoyment of the premises; and Six, the conditions
decreased the value of the tenancy for the tenant. The
burden of proof is on the defendant [in this case,
Ms. Lynch] as to each element of this defense.
Ms. Lynch claims that the fifth and sixth elements articulated by the trial court
reflect a misapprehension of the applicable law. Specifically, she argues that the
7
Ms. Lynch argues that 14 D.C.M.R. § 302.2 sets out the elements of the
implied warranty of habitability. However, as discussed in the preceding section,
Section 302.2 codifies the principle that a lease may become void after the beginning
of the tenancy. The implied warranty is discussed in 14 D.C.M.R. § 301.
20
trial court should have required Mr. Ghaida to prove the reasonable rental value of
the unit notwithstanding the violations. This argument improperly confuses the
assessment of damages for a breach of the implied warranty of habitability with the
determination of damages when a lease is void. As discussed above, under the
warranty of habitability, the burden does not shift to the landlord to prove the value
of the rental property; rather, the factfinder may abate the rent owed in proportion to
the severity of the breaches, as proven by the tenant. See Cowan, 687 A.2d at 600;
Bernstein, 649 A.2d at 1072.
Ms. Lynch also claims that the fifth and sixth elements identified by the trial
court were improperly drawn from nuisance law. We disagree. The trial court’s
articulation of the elements embodies principles that we have endorsed, although
different formulations of the elements may also be correct. The fifth element is an
appropriate way to evaluate whether the housing code violations were more than de
minimis. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 n.62 (“the violations must affect the tenant’s
apartment or common areas which the tenant uses”); Cowan, 687 A.2d at 605
(affirming that any housing code violations were de minimis where tenants were not
“hindered from using their apartments because of the” alleged violations). The sixth
element is relevant to assessing the severity of the violations in order to calculate
rent abatement. See Cowan, 687 A.2d at 605 (“a decrease in the value of that
apartment . . . would provide a basis for assessing damages”). Therefore, we
21
conclude that Ms. Lynch has failed to show that the trial court misapprehended the
legal standard for applying the implied warranty of habitability. 8
Nevertheless, the court did not articulate adequate factual findings to support
its calculation of a 40 percent abatement of rent. Although we agree with the trial
court that there is “no science” to calculating the proper amount of rent abatement
for housing code violations, the court still must provide “sufficient findings of fact
and conclusions of law to permit meaningful appellate review.” Wright, 681 A.2d
at 1105 (quotation marks omitted). We have not explained what this means in the
context of rent abatement calculations, but the D.C. Rental Housing Commission’s
regulatory framework provides useful guidance. The factfinder’s determination
must be supported by satisfactory findings as to the duration, severity, and nature of
the housing code violations. H.G. Smithy Co. v. James C. and Marlene Arieno, TP
23,329, 1998 DC Rental Housing Comm’n LEXIS 87, at *33-34 (August 7, 1998).
And that determination must show a logical connection between the violations and
8
Perhaps the third element (related to the landlord’s knowledge of the
conditions) requires clarification. “[A]pplication of the implied warranty is
contingent upon the tenant’s affording the landlord notice of defective conditions
and a reasonable time within which to make repairs.” Wright, 681 A.2d at 1105
(quotation marks omitted). But once the tenant has made this initial showing, the
landlord may assert that he did not have notice of a violation as a defense to a claim
that he breached the warranty, and the “burden is upon the landlord to show lack of
notice.” Weintraub, 458 A.2d at 49.
22
the abatement awarded. Id. This framework is similar to that set forth in the relevant
Standardized Civil Jury Instruction. See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the
District of Columbia, No. 26.05 (rev. ed. 2023) (“You should consider the number,
seriousness, and duration of any violation[s] in deciding whether [it/they] justify a
reduction in rent and, if [it/they] do, how large a reduction.” (brackets in original)).
Here, the trial court sensibly noted that the lack of heat in the home has a
variable effect on the value of the unit—meaning that the unit is “unlivable” “during
the winter,” but it did not state the duration when this was so, or how that duration
factored into the ultimate 40 percent calculation. Furthermore, as previously
discussed, there was damage to the ceilings and walls (and perhaps the roof) that
may affect any calculation of rent abatement and should be clarified on remand.
Finally, the trial court noted that two of the violations were “a nonworking
refrigerator and oven,” but, as noted in the previous section, there is evidence that
both the stovetop and the oven were not working. Additional findings are necessary
to identify which portions of the stove were not working, and how any related
violations of the housing regulations factor into the overall calculation of rent
abatement. Therefore, on remand, the trial court should clarify the nature, duration,
and severity of each of the housing code violations that contributed to a breach of
the implied warranty of habitability.
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In sum, we conclude that the trial court’s rent abatement calculations did not
result from a misapprehension of law, but that certain underlying findings and
calculations must be clarified to permit meaningful appellate review.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this case to the Superior Court for
further consideration, as explained.
So ordered.