Valdez v. United States ( 2024 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 18-CF-1340
BENITO M. VALDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2016-CF1-002267)
(Hon. Judith Bartnoff, Trial Judge)
(Argued November 9, 2021 Decided August 15, 2024)
Daniel Gonen, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam, Alice Wang,
and Shilpa S. Satoskar, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant.
Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant United States Attorney, for appellee. Michael R.
Sherwin, Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth
Trosman, Suzanne Grealy Curt, Laura R. Bach, Lindsey M. Merikas, and Daniel G.
Randolph, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
2
Before MCLEESE and SHANKER, * Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, † Senior
Judge.
GLICKMAN, Senior Judge: Benito M. Valdez appeals his convictions after a
jury trial of three counts of kidnapping while armed, one count of sodomy while
armed, and nine counts of first-degree murder while armed, consisting of three
counts each of premeditated murder, felony murder (kidnapping), and felony murder
(sodomy). The jury found appellant guilty based on evidence that he sexually
assaulted one of the victims and then shot and killed her and her two male
companions after he believed the men had tried to cheat him in a drug deal. A
cooperating government witness, who admitted to having been appellant’s
accomplice, provided the jury with a first-hand account of the crimes. The account
was corroborated by other evidence—principally, DNA evidence that linked
appellant to the sexual assault, ballistics evidence, and the testimony of witnesses
who reported appellant’s own incriminating admissions to them.
Appellant asserts several claims of error. First, he contends his constitutional
right to present a defense was violated by the trial judge’s denial of a midtrial
*
Senior Judge Ferren was originally assigned to this case. Following his
retirement on April 21, 2023, Associate Judge Shanker was assigned to take his
place on the division.
†
Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument.
He began his service as a Senior Judge on December 21, 2022.
3
continuance to enable appellant to present the testimony of a hospitalized alibi
witness. Second, appellant challenges several of the judge’s evidentiary rulings
during the trial. Third, he also contends that the judge erred by improperly
undermining defense counsel’s comment in closing argument on the lack of
evidence corroborating certain testimony of his alleged accomplice. Fourth,
appellant argues that his convictions for sodomy and felony murder predicated on
sodomy must be vacated because the (now repealed) sodomy statute was
unconstitutional, and also because the evidence did not support a finding, necessary
for a felony murder conviction, that he committed the homicides while perpetrating
the predicate felony of sodomy. 1
We conclude that appellant’s claims do not entitle him to a new trial, and we
affirm his convictions.
I.
On the night of April 22, 1991, three people—Curtis Pixley, Keith Simmons,
and Samantha Gillard—were shot to death in Langdon Park in northeast
1
We deem it unnecessary, as a three-judge panel of the court, to discuss
appellant’s final contention that his right to a public trial was violated by the use,
over his objection, of a “husher” during individual voir dire of prospective jurors.
Appellant has preserved the issue but, as he acknowledges, the claim is foreclosed
by precedent binding on this panel. See Blades v. United States, 200 A.3d 230,
240-41 (D.C. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 165 (2020).
4
Washington, D.C. The government eventually charged appellant Benito Valdez
with their murders. He was arrested and detained for those murders in February
2016. The prosecution relied heavily at appellant’s trial on the testimony of Michael
Green, who also was arrested for the Langdon Park murders in February 2016. By
the time of appellant’s trial, Green had pleaded guilty to three counts of voluntary
manslaughter for his participation in those murders and to one count of second-
degree murder for another, unrelated homicide (which was referred to at trial as the
“Edgewood murder”). Green had agreed to plead guilty and to cooperate with the
prosecution of appellant in exchange for the dismissal of the greater murder charges
he faced, the government’s agreement not to prosecute him for drug dealing in D.C.,
and the hope of leniency at his eventual sentencing. 2
At appellant’s trial, Green testified that, in April 1991, he and appellant were
working for a drug dealing operation and were selling crack cocaine in Langdon
Park. At that time, the two of them were the only crack sellers in the park, and they
worked as a team; this was confirmed at trial by another government witness,
Michael Thompson, the person in the drug operation who supplied appellant with
the drugs he sold. The park was appellant’s and Green’s particular turf; other drug
2
Because none of the counts to which Green pleaded guilty carried “while
armed” enhancements, his plea did not trigger any mandatory minimum sentences
of incarceration.
5
sellers “wouldn’t come down there,” Green testified, because “[t]hey knew we were
armed in there.”
Appellant and Green were working in Langdon Park on the night of April 22,
1991, “moving around” from place to place “[b]ecause of the police.” 3 Green was
carrying a 9mm handgun, and appellant had both a 9mm handgun and a .22-caliber
revolver. They were near the tennis courts on the west side of the park when two
men approached them. The men were Curtis Pixley, whom Green knew, and Keith
Simmons, whom Green had never seen before. Addressing appellant, Pixley asked
to buy “three for 50,” which meant three crack rocks for $50. Appellant produced
three bags, each containing one rock of crack, and handed them to Pixley.
Green testified that Pixley “looked at it for a while and decided he didn’t want
it,” so he purported to hand the drugs back to appellant. Appellant examined what
he received and claimed Pixley had not returned all the crack to him. Pixley insisted
he had done so, and the two men began to argue. Appellant became upset, started
cursing, and told Pixley “he better find it.” Pixley and Simmons began looking for
3
Appellant’s presence selling drugs in Langdon Park that particular night was
confirmed by another government witness, Rodney Slayton. Slayton testified that
he was addicted to crack in 1991 and appellant was his dealer. Slayton, who knew
one of the victims of the triple murder in this case, learned of it the following
morning. He remembered buying crack from appellant in Langdon Park the
previous night, and hearing several gunshots from the park after he left.
6
the missing crack on the ground, and appellant and Green pulled their guns out.
Pixley pulled his pockets inside out to show that he did not have the supposedly
missing crack in them. In doing so, Pixley revealed to Green and appellant that he
also did not have any money with which he could have paid for the crack he
supposedly had come to buy.
At some point in this standoff, a woman whom Green did not know came up
to them. This was Samantha Gillard, a friend of Pixley’s. Pixley told her to go back
to the car, but according to Green, appellant said “no, she’s going to have to do
something for the drugs that are missing.” Pixley told Gillard to “go ahead and do
it” so that they could leave. While Green stayed with Pixley and Simmons and stood
guard over them, appellant walked Gillard, who had begun crying, to a spot by the
tennis courts. Green saw appellant force Gillard, at gunpoint, to perform oral sex
and what Green described as “sex from behind.”
Appellant then returned with Gillard, who was still crying, and asked Green
whether he wanted to have sex with her; Green testified that he declined. Green
testified that he expected the three individuals now would be free to go, but appellant
ordered Gillard to get down on the ground with Pixley and Simmons. They obeyed,
lying face down next to each other. Ignoring their pleas to be allowed to leave,
appellant then shot all three of them, first with the 9mm handgun, then with the .22-
7
caliber revolver. Green testified at trial that he just stood there and did not fire any
of the shots. Appellant and Green then ran to appellant’s car, which was parked on
the east end of Langdon Park, and drove away. 4
The bodies of the three murdered persons were discovered the morning after
they were shot. Each victim had received multiple gunshot wounds. The ballistics
evidence recovered by police from their bodies and at the scene consisted of thirteen
9mm bullet casings, nine 9mm bullets, and four .22-caliber bullets. A firearm and
tool-mark identification expert opined that all the 9mm bullets and casings were fired
by the same firearm, and that the same was true of all the .22-caliber bullets. 5 The
absence of any .22-caliber casings indicated that the bullets were fired by a revolver.
Semen was found on the left lower arm and the right upper arm of Gillard’s
jacket, and on the front right thigh and back left knee of Gillard’s jeans. Appellant’s
4
Green also testified that appellant later told him he had arranged for someone
known as “Tricky Rick” to provide an alibi for them both in exchange for drugs. As
we discuss below, appellant intended to call this person to testify as a defense witness
at trial, but was unable to do so because the witness was hospitalized. By agreement
of the parties, the court instructed the jury that Green’s testimony regarding Tricky
Rick was stricken and that the jury should not consider it.
5
The trial court admitted this opinion testimony over defense objection,
having concluded after briefing and a hearing that the testimony satisfied the
requirements of Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172 (D.C. 2016). Appellant
has not contended on appeal that the court erred in doing so.
8
DNA matched the DNA that later was recovered from semen on the lower left arm,
front right thigh, and back left knee, and it was excluded as a contributor to the semen
on the right upper arm. Green was excluded as a contributor to any of the semen
found on Gillard’s clothing (as were a number of other potential sources, including
Pixley and Simmons). Green testified that in his first debriefing by the government,
which occurred in August 2016, he predicted that the then-pending DNA analysis of
Gillard’s clothes would show the presence of appellant’s DNA. Green also testified
that appellant had told him (prior to his first debriefing) that he would explain any
such finding by saying he had been “trick[ing]” Gillard, meaning he had given her
drugs in exchange for sex on an earlier occasion. Green denied that appellant told
him he actually had been “tricking” Gillard. 6
Four witnesses testified at trial that appellant had made admissions about the
Langdon Park killing directly to them or to other persons in their presence. Three
of these witnesses were called by the government. One of them was Samuel
Edmonds. He met appellant in 2001 and sold drugs with him before they both were
charged in 2003 in federal district court with conspiring to distribute cocaine.
Edmonds pleaded guilty in that case, agreed to cooperate with the government, and
6
Appellant suggests that the presence of unidentified semen on Gillard’s
clothing lends support to the hypothesis that the semen containing his DNA was
similarly attributable to a prior, consensual sexual encounter with her. There was no
evidence at trial supporting this hypothesis, however.
9
testified before a grand jury in 2005 about appellant’s admissions to the homicides,
among other matters. Edmonds recapitulated that testimony at appellant’s trial. He
testified that, in a conversation in 2001 regarding money they were owed for drugs,
appellant declared, “Well, these motherfuckers will get killed. I already did it once,
three times as a matter of fact at one time. So I’ll do it again.” Edmonds testified
that, in subsequent conversations around the same time, appellant said he committed
the killings in Langdon Park. (He also acknowledged prior grand jury testimony in
which he stated that he thought appellant had said the victims were “two males and
one female,” but Edmonds could not remember as of trial whether appellant or
someone else had said that.) Edmonds said appellant told him the killings were over
some missing drugs: appellant “couldn’t find them,” he questioned the three victims
about it but “no one confessed” to having taken the drugs, “[s]o he shot them.”
Appellant also told Edmonds that someone named “Mike” was with him during the
shooting but “was just standing there.” Appellant did not tell Edmonds that Mike
shot anybody. 7
7
Edmonds also recalled that appellant said a third person, identified as “Black
Harry,” was waiting for him in a car. Appellant did not say Black Harry had
anything to do with the shooting.
10
Another government witness who testified about appellant’s admissions was
Odrianne Beckwith. 8 Around 2001, she and appellant began dating, and he moved
in with her in January 2002. In the spring of 2002, Beckwith testified, appellant, in
a “fit [of] rage,” accused her of cheating on him with another man he saw downstairs
in her house (who, as she explained to him, was merely her nephew paying a visit).
Beckwith testified that appellant said “I killed three people,” and “for me to just kill
you and everybody downstairs is nothing.” According to Beckwith, appellant again
mentioned his commission of this triple murder “when he would go in his fits about
six or seven times maybe.” She recalled that he told her he had “killed these three
people over drugs,” that the victims were “short [of] money,” and “he told them to
lay [sic] down on the ground and then he shot the three people.” Appellant also
“mentioned [to Beckwith] that some guy named Mike . . . was there and another
gentleman named Black Harry.” But appellant said he was the shooter, and he never
said what Mike or Black Harry did. 9
8
Beckwith also had testified before the grand jury in 2005. Because she had
suffered severe memory impairment and loss due to injuries she sustained in a
serious car accident in 2009, her relevant testimony was mainly what she provided
in her 2005 grand jury appearance.
9
As we discuss infra, Beckwith testified on cross-examination that she ended
her relationship with appellant in July 2002, when she went to the police and reported
his abuse of her, his possession of guns and drugs in the home, and his ongoing drug
11
The government’s third witness who reported a confession by appellant was
Neeka Sullivan (“Neeka” 10), who looked after Beckwith’s children in 2002. In that
connection, Neeka said she got to know appellant and that he called her his
“godmother.” Neeka testified that one day in 2002, appellant came over to her
house, sat down next to her, put his head on her shoulder, and started “rambling off.”
As they chatted, Neeka testified,
[H]e stated that, do you remember what happened down
on Langdon Park? . . . And I—I said, I know you ain’t
talking about the three people down there, and he said
yeah. And I said, Benito; and he says, I did it. I said,
Benito, why is you telling me something like this? You
know. And I was, like, I don’t know whether to say I was
in a state of shock or just paranoid or I didn’t know what
to say. . . . I asked him why would he do something like
that, and the only thing he said was a rock. And I said a
rock? He said, yeah, a rock.
Neeka understood appellant to mean a rock of crack cocaine.
The fourth witness who reported incriminating admissions by appellant was
Neeka Sullivan’s son, Harry Sullivan. He had pleaded guilty in the 2003 federal
court case to having conspired with appellant and Edmonds to distribute drugs, and
he had agreed to cooperate with the government. The government did not call Harry
activity. She first reported appellant’s statements to her about having killed three
people in 2005.
10
We refer to her as “Neeka” to avoid confusion with her son, Harry Sullivan,
a witness whom the defense called, as we discuss below.
12
Sullivan as a witness at appellant’s trial, however. But the defense called him as
part of its effort to rebut the testimony of Edmonds, Beckwith, and Neeka by
suggesting that Sullivan had colluded with them to fabricate and report admissions
of guilt by appellant. In his direct examination, appellant’s counsel elicited
Sullivan’s claim (which he did not disavow) that appellant had “confessed” the triple
homicide to him, but Sullivan denied having colluded with the other witnesses who
reported appellant’s confessions to the murders. Sullivan testified that, in 2002,
appellant began siphoning off some of the cocaine they were selling for his own use.
Appellant told Sullivan he needed the drugs in order to relax and sleep at night,
because he was “so bothered by what he had done in the park.” Appellant confessed
to Sullivan that “he laid the three people down and shot them in the park” “because
they violated and had to pay.” Sullivan also confirmed that Neeka later told him that
appellant had confessed the killings to her as well (“[S]he was, like, I need to talk to
you. . . . [T]hat boy is going crazy. He talking about he kilt [sic] some people back
in the park.”).
II.
A. Denial of a Midtrial Continuance
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
constitutional rights when it denied his request for a midtrial continuance that might
13
have enabled him to present the testimony of a purported alibi witness who had just
been hospitalized after suffering an incapacitating stroke. The government argues
that the court did not err, mainly because it was unlikely the witness would have
been able and willing to testify within a reasonable period of time (if at all), and
because the witness’s proffered testimony would not have been exculpatory, but
rather would have corroborated Michael Green’s account of appellant’s involvement
in the shootings. For the following reasons, we agree that the court did not err in
denying appellant’s request for a midtrial continuance.
1. Background
The proposed alibi witness was a person named Ricky Staton, a drug user who
frequented Langdon Park in 1991 and went by the nickname “Tricky Rick.” Michael
Green testified that, shortly after the murders, appellant told him he was going to
have Tricky Rick “put us at a different location at the time of the murder.” Green
testified that when he and appellant were arrested in 2016, appellant assured him
that “he still had the alibi with Tricky Rick.”
The police questioned Staton about the Langdon Park murders in March 2016.
He told the police he “knew nothing about the murders other than what he heard the
next day.” Staton said that “he was a DJ for [a group called] Rare Essence” in 1991;
14
that “he was at the club the night of the murders and he was nowhere near Langdon
Park at the time of the murders.”
However, Staton told a defense investigator something else. At appellant’s
April 2016 preliminary hearing, the investigator testified that Staton said he was in
Langdon Park in 1991 and saw appellant near the swimming pool on the east side of
the park shortly after hearing gunshots coming from the west side of the park. This
was the essence of the testimony that appellant’s defense counsel planned to offer at
trial. Appellant and his counsel were aware of Staton’s contrary statements to the
police. But as the investigator testified at the preliminary hearing and defense
counsel later represented to the trial court, Staton had explained that he lied to the
police because “he felt this was information for Mr. Valdez’s lawyer,” and that if he
provided an alibi for appellant to the police they would “press him” to retract it.
So the defense proposed to call Staton as a witness at trial and apparently was
going to do so on February 7, 2018. His testimony was deferred, however, because
the government identified a Fifth Amendment privilege issue arising from the
possibility that Staton would incriminate himself (apparently by admitting in his
testimony that he had made false statements to the police). The court appointed
counsel to represent and advise Staton. The next day, Thursday, February 8, the
court was informed that Staton’s counsel, Mr. Healey, agreed there might be a Fifth
15
Amendment issue and sought a Carter debriefing of Staton by the government. 11
The implication of this proposal was that Staton likely would assert his privilege
against self-incrimination and not testify for the defense if he did not receive use
immunity for his testimony. The government was willing to do the debriefing, and
the prosecutor told the court she expected that the matter could be “resolved first
thing Monday morning” (when the trial was scheduled to resume after a three-day
recess). The court approved this approach. If the government agreed to grant use
immunity, defense counsel anticipated that Staton would testify on Monday,
February 12, and that the defense would rest its case that day.
Over the weekend, however, before the government could debrief him, Staton
was hospitalized. Mr. Healey reported to the court on Monday that Staton had
11
In Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), the court
endorsed a debriefing procedure that may be followed when a potential defense
witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify. If the
defendant establishes to the trial court’s satisfaction that the proposed testimony is
material, (clearly) exculpatory, non-cumulative, and otherwise unobtainable, the
prosecution may debrief the witness to determine whether the government “will
accede to a grant of use immunity to the witness” and thereby enable the defendant
to obtain the witness’s testimony. Id. at 344-45. We later clarified in Young v.
United States, 143 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016), that “exculpatory” or “clearly
exculpatory” evidence means the same the thing in Carter as it means in the context
of applying Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), i.e., “evidence that ‘tends
substantively to negate guilt.’” Young, 143 A.3d at 756 (quoting Love v. Johnson,
57 F.3d 1305, 1313 (4th Cir. 1995)). Likewise, as in the Brady context, a witness’s
exculpatory testimony is only “material” if it “would . . . give rise to a reasonable
probability of a different outcome” in the trial. Id. at 759.
16
suffered a stroke, had intracranial bleeding, and was being treated in the intensive
care unit. Although his condition had improved over the weekend so that emergency
surgery was not required, Healey said Staton was likely to remain in the ICU for up
to a week, and then to spend a week or two more in the hospital followed by several
weeks in a rehabilitation facility. Mr. Healey emphasized that the extent and
permanence of the damage to Staton’s cognitive functioning was not yet known and
that he would be unable to provide testimony for an indefinite period of time; “the
pressure of testifying,” Healey said, “is radically out.”
Defense counsel, noting the prospect for Staton’s further improvement,
requested a “brief” continuance to see whether Staton would improve and be able to
testify. In support of that request, defense counsel proffered that Staton would testify
he was in Langdon Park when he heard gunshots on the west side of the park, and
that he then “ran towards the pool area [on the east side of the park] and saw
Mr. Valdez by the pool in Langdon Park.” The court later was informed that the
defense also expected Staton to testify that appellant was with Michael Green at the
time. It was unclear from the defense proffer how Staton linked his recollection to
the particular night in 1991 on which the three murders in Langdon Park were
committed, but that linkage may be explained by the fact (proffered by the
17
government, not the defense) that Staton told the police he learned of those murders
the next day. 12
The government opposed the request for a continuance. The prosecutor
argued that the defense proffer was contrary to what Staton had told the police (i.e.,
that he was at work and not in Langdon Park the night of the murders); that the
proffered testimony would not be exculpatory (and “[d]efinitely not clearly
exculpatory”) because it was consistent with Green’s testimony that he and appellant
ran to the east side of the park after the shooting; and that it was doubtful the
government would give Staton the use immunity he sought in order to testify, even
if he recovered to the point where he could be debriefed, in view of the government’s
concerns about his credibility and his competence to testify.
Summing things up, the judge stated that from what she had heard up to that
point, she had “no idea” how long Staton would be in intensive care or when if ever
12
The court asked defense counsel whether Staton would “testify to the date
of that.” Counsel responded that she did not know if Staton knew the actual date,
but what he recounted was “in the context of . . . the triple homicide which
everybody knew about.” This response left unsettled the issue of whether Staton
would be able to link the event he recalled to the night of the triple homicide.
Defense counsel did not proffer how Staton was able to make that connection;
counsel did not suggest that it was because Staton heard the very next day or shortly
thereafter that the bodies of the three murder victims had been discovered that
morning in Langdon Park. The prosecutor, however, reported that Staton told the
police he learned of the Langdon Park homicides the next morning (when he also
told the police he had not been in Langdon Park the night of the murders).
18
he would be “physically and medically able to testify”; in light of Staton’s
conflicting statements, she also did not know what to expect his testimony would be
if he were called as a witness and placed under oath; and that it was “not at all clear”
Staton’s testimony, even as proffered by the defense, would be exculpatory for
appellant. Under those circumstances, the judge declared she was “not prepared” to
grant what “would be essentially an indefinite continuance at the beginning of the
fourth week of this trial.” Appellant’s counsel responded that the defense was not
asking for an indefinite continuance, but only “a continuance of two to three days to
see if [Staton’s] condition improves.”
The judge agreed to hear from Staton’s treating physician about his prognosis
before ruling on the continuance request. The following day, Dr. Francisco Hoyos
testified under oath in a phone call with the court. Dr. Hoyos confirmed that Staton
was suffering from intracerebral bleeding with “active inflammation in [his] brain”
and was on medication, including morphine. Staton, who was sixty-three years old,
would sometimes become “totally confused,” and his memory, abstract reasoning
skills, and his “capacity to understand . . . the consequences of” his statements all
were impaired. Dr. Hoyos explained that Staton’s “brain [was] still swollen” and
opined that Staton was not “medically” ready to testify, because such activity would
likely elevate his blood pressure and worsen his precarious condition. Dr. Hoyos
stated that “medically we would not like him to go through that stress.” Dr. Hoyos
19
also described the medications Staton was receiving, which included antiseizure and
sedative drugs because he had been having seizures when he arrived at the hospital.
Dr. Hoyos testified that it was “hard to predict the timeframe” for Staton’s
recovery. He would need a period of rehabilitation even after his stay in the hospital.
Dr. Hoyos considered it possible Staton might “improve significantly after 48
hours,” but even so he believed that Staton would need “three to four weeks” before
he could safely participate in the trial proceedings, and that Staton “[d]efinitely”
would be unable to testify in court “in the next ten days.” And Dr. Hoyos likewise
recommended against trying in the next ten days to obtain Staton’s testimony
remotely from the hospital (i.e., from his hospital bed). Dr. Hoyos noted that the
doctors were still running tests “to make sure there’s no worsening of [Staton’s]
brain condition . . . [due to] the brain inflammation [that] is still there.” Dr. Hoyos
said Staton’s “neurologic findings . . . are telling us that still the brain inflammation
is very active.”
Following this testimony, defense counsel again asked for “a continuance of
two days to see where we are in two days.” The government opposed that request.
Crediting Dr. Hoyos’s testimony, the court denied the request. 13 The judge
13
The defense argued that Dr. Hoyos had said “this was a day by day thing
and he may surprise us and he could improve within the next 48 hours.” The court
20
concluded that Staton “has become incapacitated and we don’t have any reason to
believe he will regain capacity to testify in a reasonable time.” The judge explained
that “it makes no sense . . . to recess the trial for two days” when Staton “certainly
currently [was] not able to testify” and would need at least “the next ten days” and
likely more time than that to recover and be able to testify. It likewise was “not at
all clear” that Staton would regain the capacity in a reasonable amount of time to
engage in the debriefing/immunity procedure with the government (or to validly
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege) which was a necessary prerequisite to his
testimony. 14 “[W]hat you don’t want to do,” the judge emphasized, “is to put a
patient with an int[ra]cranial bleed in a position that would increase his blood
pressure and do other things that would endanger his life.” Moreover, the judge
noted, the trial was in its fourth week (it would conclude with jury instructions and
closing arguments that same day) and the jury had been told the trial would last three
to four weeks.
responded that this was not “how I heard it, actually” and indicated “what’s notable
is that he came into the hospital on Friday and left on Saturday and came back on
Saturday. It’s now Tuesday. So, we’re well beyond 48 hours . . . .”
14
Practically speaking, the judge observed, “[w]e’re talking about at least two
weeks if we’re talking about ten days and even at that point, we have no reason to
believe that [Staton] actually would be able to [testify].”
21
Because the defense was unable to present Staton’s proffered testimony, the
parties and the court agreed to strike Michael Green’s testimony regarding the
enlistment of Tricky Rick to provide a false alibi, and the court instructed the jury to
disregard that testimony.
2. Discussion
Appellant contends the trial court’s reasons for denying a continuance to
obtain Staton’s testimony were mistaken and insufficient, and that the ruling denied
him a fair trial by preventing him from presenting his alibi defense. The government
argues that the court did not err, principally because Staton’s proffered testimony
was not exculpatory and the requested continuance would have been futile. We
review a trial judge’s denial of a request for a midtrial continuance to secure a
witness for abuse of discretion. 15 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion here.
15
Jones v. United States, 127 A.3d 1173, 1189 (D.C. 2015); see also, e.g.,
Dorsey v. United States, 154 A.3d 106, 120 (D.C. 2017) (“[T]he grant or denial of a
continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, to whom we accord
wide latitude.” (quoting Moctar v. United States, 718 A.2d 1063, 1065 (D.C.
1998))).
22
Our cases have identified several relevant “[f]actors to be considered” in
determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a midtrial
continuance to secure a witness. 16 These include:
[1] the probative value of the absent witness’s proffered
testimony, [2] the likelihood the witness would have
appeared had the continuance been granted, [3] the
diligence and good faith of the party seeking the
continuance, [4] the prejudice [to that party] resulting
from the denial of the continuance, [5] any prejudice the
opposing party would have suffered had the continuance
been granted, and [6] the duration of the requested
continuance and any likely resulting disruption or delay of
the trial.[17]
Thus, a defendant seeking a midtrial continuance to obtain the testimony of an absent
witness must show what that testimony would be and that it “could probably be
obtained if the continuance were granted.” 18 In weighing the defendant’s need for
the witness, “[t]he trial court also may properly consider the public’s interest in the
16
Jones, 127 A.3d at 1189.
17
Id. (citing Gilliam v. United States, 80 A.3d 192, 202 (D.C. 2013)).
18
Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Moctar, 718 A.2d at 1065-66. The
parties dispute whether this is a “more likely than not” standard or something less
than that (e.g., a “reasonable possibility”), a question we need not resolve because,
as explained, there was very little likelihood of the witness’s availability to testify
within two or three days.
23
‘prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice.’” 19 However, “[w]hile
efficiency in the conduct of the trial is a laudable goal, it must yield when a party
has demonstrated that a requested continuance is ‘reasonably necessary for a just
determination of the cause.’” 20
19
Dorsey, 154 A.3d at 121 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 130 A.3d 952,
960 (D.C. 2016)). We note that past cases of this court sometimes have mentioned
other relevant considerations or expressed them in varying but essentially equivalent
or overlapping terms. See, e.g., Brooks, 130 A.3d at 960 (listing “the reasons for the
request for a continuance” and “any lack of good faith” as among the relevant factors
(quoting Daley v. United States, 739 A.2d 814, 817 (D.C. 1999))); Bedney v. United
States, 684 A.2d 759, 766 (D.C. 1996) (stating that the movant for a continuance to
secure a missing witness “must establish (1) who the missing witness is, (2) what
the witness’ testimony would be, (3) the relevance and competence of that
testimony, (4) that the witness could probably be obtained if the continuance were
granted, and (5) that the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence
in trying to locate the witness”). For present purposes, we think it unnecessary to
sort out the divergent ways our cases have formulated the factors bearing on whether
a continuance must be granted in the interest of justice to obtain the testimony of a
missing witness. We consider the other formulations to be subsumed within the
factors listed in the above text.
There also may be a question raised by the language of our past cases
concerning the extent to which certain minimum prerequisites must be satisfied
before the judge may exercise discretion to grant a midtrial continuance for a missing
witness. Certainly it would seem that the party seeking such an interruption in the
trial ordinarily should proffer what testimony the absent witness is expected to
provide, and some reason to believe the witness might be available, for the judge to
render an informed discretionary judgment granting a continuance. That said, given
our resolution of the continuance issue in this case, we need not grapple further with
the question and we refrain from doing so.
20
Gilliam, 80 A.3d at 202 (quoting O’Connor v. United States, 399 A.2d 21,
28 (D.C. 1979)); see also Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 131-32 (D.C. 1991)
(holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial that was necessary
24
In our view, the paramount considerations in this appeal are the probative
value of the proffered testimony of Staton, the probability that his testimony would
have been received had the court granted the request for a continuance, and (to a
somewhat lesser extent) whether granting a continuance would have unduly delayed
and disrupted the trial proceedings. We discuss each of these three considerations
in turn. 21
a. The Proffered Testimony and Its Probative Value
Appellant proffered minimal information about what Staton was expected to
say if he testified. The court was told only that Staton would say he was in Langdon
Park, heard gunshots on the west side of the park, ran toward the pool area on the
east side of the park, and saw appellant and Green there. Without more, and even
to enable defendant to call an available witness whose testimony, if it were credited
by the jury, would have been exculpatory).
21
We view the other relevant factors mentioned above as being of less
significance here. First, the government does not dispute, and we do not question,
defense counsel’s diligence and good faith in seeking the midtrial continuance in
order to call Staton as a witness. Second, whether appellant was prejudiced by the
denial of the continuance turns, in this case, on the probative value of Staton’s
proffered testimony or lack thereof, and on the probability that Staton’s testimony
would have been received had the continuance been granted. Third, setting aside
the adverse consequences of delay and disruption of the trial, any prejudice to the
government’s legitimate interests from granting the continuance would have been
minimal, for the government already had completed its case-in-chief, it had expected
Staton to be a defense witness, and it would not have been surprised or otherwise
disadvantaged by the late receipt of his testimony in the defense case.
25
assuming Staton would say this occurred on the night when the murders were
committed, his proffered testimony did not establish an alibi for appellant and was
not exculpatory. On the contrary, the proffered testimony tended to inculpate
appellant in the crimes. Not only did it put appellant in Langdon Park close in time
to the shootings there, it put him there with Green (who admitted having participated
in the homicides), and it corroborated Green’s testimony that he and appellant
themselves ran to the east side of the park immediately after the shootings. 22 For
these reasons alone, Staton’s proffered testimony, even if credited in full by a jury,
22
On appeal, appellant claims Staton also would have testified that he saw
appellant in the area of the swimming pool less than a minute after he heard the
gunshots. The only record basis for this claim is the testimony of the defense
investigator at appellant’s preliminary hearing in 2016. The investigator, who had
interviewed Staton but had not taken a written statement from him, initially testified
that Staton had not told him how much time passed between when he heard the shots
and when he saw appellant. Later that day, after a break, the defense recalled the
investigator to the witness stand. The investigator then testified that he had spoken
again with Staton during the break, and that Staton said “[u]nder one minute” passed
between the time he heard the gunshots and the time he saw appellant.
Appellant argues that such testimony at trial by Staton himself would have
been exculpatory because, if his time estimate was accurate, it would have placed
appellant “the equivalent of five or six city blocks away” from the location of the
shooting less than a minute later. But the defense made no mention of such
testimony by Staton in its proffer of his anticipated testimony to the trial judge (who
was not the judge who presided at appellant’s preliminary hearing). It is too late
now to try to expand that proffer. The trial court cannot be faulted for failing to
consider information not given to it. Cf. Moctar, 718 A.2d at 1066 n.5 (rejecting
argument that a sufficient proffer was not necessary where the witness sought had
testified at a prior suppression hearing but that hearing was “held before a different
judge”).
26
had little probative value for appellant and likely would have been, on balance, more
prejudicial to the defense than exculpatory. 23
To put it differently, appellant did not proffer enough to show that the
continuance he requested was reasonably necessary to a just determination of his
guilt or innocence. If this were a case in which the proffered testimony would have
been exculpatory if believed, that fact would weigh heavily in favor of granting a
reasonable continuance. But this is not such a case.
23
In addition, of course, the proffered testimony, if given at trial, would have
been impeached by Staton’s statements to the police denying he had been in Langdon
Park when the murders were committed. Staton’s foreseeable claim that he lied to
the police about such an important matter “would surely have lessened the jurors’
trust” in his exculpatory testimony on appellant’s behalf. Bennett v. United States,
797 A.2d 1251, 1257 (D.C. 2002). And even without that impeachment, the jury
would have had many reasons to disbelieve Staton’s testimony. This court has said,
however, that in determining whether to grant a motion to sever (or, by analogy, a
continuance) sought by a defendant to secure a potential witness’s testimony, “[a]
trial court should not rely upon credibility determinations of . . . proposed testimony
when assessing whether the testimony is substantially exculpatory as credibility
determinations are reserved for the jury.” Rollerson v. United States, 127 A.3d 1220,
1227 (D.C. 2015); see also, e.g., Daley v. United States, 739 A.2d 814, 818 (D.C.
1999) (“Although the government argues that it presented significant opposing
evidence and that [the witness’s] testimony could be discredited and would not have
affected the outcome of the trial, we cannot say that his testimony would not have
aided [appellant’s] case. That testimony therefore was reasonably necessary to
enable [appellant] to present his case.”); Martin, 606 A.2d at 129 (holding that where
the absent witness’s proffered testimony would be exculpatory if credited, “the
question of [the witness’s] credibility [is] for the jury, not the judge”). Accordingly,
we do not attempt to base our decision in this appeal on any judgment as to Staton’s
likely credibility or the persuasiveness of his account.
27
b. Staton’s Availability to Testify
Appellant requested a midtrial continuance of two to three days. Dr. Hoyos’s
testimony describing Staton’s medical condition and prognosis amply supported the
trial court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood Staton would have been
able to testify in such a short period of time (or even within a longer period on the
order of ten days or two weeks) without serious jeopardy to his health. 24 The court
was sufficiently clear on this point that we are not persuaded by appellant’s objection
that the court erroneously based its decision on a mistaken concern about Staton’s
lack of legal competency to testify rather than the danger to his wellbeing. We are
also not persuaded that the court based its decision on a clearly erroneous
understanding of Dr. Hoyos’s statement that Staton might improve significantly
within forty-eight hours. It is true that when defense counsel accurately summarized
this testimony, the court claimed to have “heard it” differently and then commented
on the lack of improvement in the preceding forty-eight hours. See note 13, supra.
It is not entirely clear to us what exactly the court disagreed with about defense
24
On appeal, appellant faults the trial court for not granting a midtrial
continuance of ten days or so. But appellant specifically and repeatedly requested
only a two or three day continuance. Even after hearing Dr. Hoyos’s prognosis,
appellant did not ask for a longer continuance. We consider appellant to have
forfeited any claim that the court should have granted a longer continuance, and we
certainly cannot find plain error in the court’s failure to do so.
28
counsel’s characterization of that testimony. But, at base, we perceive no error,
much less clear error, in the court’s conclusion that the overall import of Dr. Hoyos’s
testimony was that Staton would not have been able to testify safely, either remotely
or in court, for at least the next ten days. At no point did Dr. Hoyos testify that forty-
eight hours might have made a dispositive difference—the possibility of significant
improvement notwithstanding.
Moreover, the record raises a substantial question as to whether Staton would
have testified even if the court had granted a continuance of sufficient duration to
enable him to recover from his stroke. Staton and his counsel were seeking a grant
of use immunity in exchange for his testimony. This eventually would have required
Staton to be debriefed by the United States Attorney’s Office and to satisfy the
government that his proffered testimony would have been substantively
exculpatory. 25 It is doubtful that Staton could have met that requirement; as we have
noted, the prosecutor viewed his proffered testimony as not exculpatory at all. In
addition, his proffered testimony would have had to satisfy the additional Carter
requirement that it be “material,” i.e., that it would “give rise to a reasonable
25
See Carter, 684 A.2d at 345; Young, 143 A.3d at 756.
29
probability of a different outcome.” 26 For essentially the same reasons, this too is
highly doubtful.
Finally, even if the testimony met the above requirements, the United States
Attorney’s Office could have declined to grant use immunity if it had a “reasonable
basis” for doing so, including, for example, “clear indications of potential perjury.”27
In light of Green’s testimony that appellant had arranged for Staton to furnish them
a false alibi, and Staton’s statements to the police denying he had been in Langdon
Park on the night of the murders, we suppose it likely that the government reasonably
would have evaluated Staton’s proposed testimony as probably perjurious and thus
refused to grant him immunity for it. On the record before us, we have no reason to
think that without a grant of immunity, Staton, represented by counsel, would have
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and gone ahead with his testimony.
Moreover, there is a further question on this record whether Staton, in his medically
26
Young, 143 A.3d at 759.
27
Carter, 684 A.2d at 342; see also, e.g., Hayes v. United States, 109 A.3d
1110, 1112, 1116-18 (D.C. 2015) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the
prosecution did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant use immunity to a
witness “after finding potential for perjury during a debriefing procedure pursuant
to Carter”).
30
compromised state, could have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights even had he been inclined to do so. 28
For these reasons, we conclude that appellant has not carried his burden of
showing that Staton’s testimony “probably” could have been obtained in two or three
days or any reasonable period of time if the trial court had granted a continuance.
c. Delay and Disruption of the Trial
The record supports the trial court’s finding that a continuance of at least two
weeks would have been necessary to have any realistic hope of securing Staton’s
availability to testify. For that reason, and the reasons explained above, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a shorter two or three day continuance.
Insofar as a weeks-long delay might have secured Staton’s testimony, such
delay would have substantially disrupted the trial. The trial then was in its fourth
week and, since neither side had other witnesses to present, the case was otherwise
ready to go to the jury. The continuance therefore would have meant a hiatus of at
least two weeks until the unpredictable day on which the trial could be resumed with
28
We likewise have no reason to think that the court would “sanction” the
government for its refusal to immunize Staton in order to obtain his testimony. See
Carter, 684 A.2d at 344; Hayes, 109 A.3d at 1116 (explaining when the trial court
may impose a sanction under Carter).
31
Staton’s testimony. This would have inconvenienced all the trial participants, and
especially the members of the jury, who had been told the trial would last only three
or four weeks. They would have been obliged to remain on call well beyond that
time and to put other plans on hold. The disruption might well have resulted in the
loss of some of those jurors. Perhaps most importantly, the lengthy hiatus and
prolongation of the trial would likely have had a deleterious effect on the jury’s
eventual deliberations—not merely because the jurors’ patience would have been
strained, but also because their memories of the testimony would have suffered from
the passage of time and the delay in discussing the evidence, and because their views
of the case might well have hardened in the interim.
The key considerations we have identified and discussed point in only one
direction—that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
continuance request. We so hold.
B. Evidence of Past Acts of Violence or Intimidation
Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting limited testimony about
his past use of violence and intimidation to establish and maintain his control over
the sale of drugs in Langdon Park. The brief testimony at issue concerned (1) an
incident in which members of a rival drug crew shot at appellant in Langdon Park
and he fired back at them and (2) appellant’s pattern of aggressive behavior toward
32
drug buyers to deter them from purchasing from rival sellers or attempting to cheat
him. Appellant also asserts that the court erred when it ruled that defense counsel’s
questioning of Odrianne Beckwith and Harry Sullivan “opened the door” to limited
testimony from them about appellant’s prior domestic violence in his relationship
with Beckwith. Appellant argues that the foregoing testimony contravened the basic
rule that “evidence of prior bad acts independent of the crimes charged is
inadmissible to show the defendant’s disposition or propensity to commit the
charged offenses, from which the jury improperly could infer the defendant actually
did commit them.” 29
The government argues that appellant’s prior acts of violence and intimidation
at Langdon Park described in the testimony in question were admissible under Drew
v. United States for the “substantial, legitimate purpose[s]” of proving appellant’s
motive to commit the murders and his identity as the perpetrator, 30 and also under
Johnson v. United States as being “necessary to place the charged crime in an
understandable context.” 31 And the government argues that appellant’s
examinations of Beckwith and Sullivan did indeed “open the door” to testimony
29
Harrison v. United States, 30 A.3d 169, 176 (D.C. 2011); see also Johnson
v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1101 (D.C. 1996) (en banc).
30
331 F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
31
683 A.2d at 1098.
33
about domestic violence for the purpose of refuting impressions invited by the
defense questioning.
“We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, including evidence
of other crimes, for an abuse of discretion.” 32 For the following reasons, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the limited
testimony that appellant challenges.
1. Testimony Concerning Appellant’s Control of Langdon Park and His
Treatment of Drug Buyers
In advance of trial, the government moved in limine for permission to present
evidence that appellant’s crew controlled the drug trade in Langdon Park through
violence and intimidation, including evidence that “when other individuals
perceived to be a threat or rival came into Langdon Park, they were fired upon by
the defendant(s)” (and thus were kept out of appellant’s sales territory). The
government argued that this evidence would show there were no other drug dealers
in the park who might have committed the murders, and would help explain to the
jury why appellant would go so far as to murder three people in a seemingly trivial
dispute “over a $10 rock of crack.” Thus, the government argued, the evidence
would be admissible under Drew as proof of appellant’s identity as the perpetrator
32
Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130, 1143 (D.C. 2011).
34
and his motive to kill the victims, and under Johnson as evidence placing the crime
in an understandable context. Essentially accepting the government’s argument, the
trial court ruled the proffered “control of the park” evidence admissible under Drew
and Johnson, with the caveat (sought by the defense and accepted by the
government) that this would not be a “blank check” for the government to present
evidence of other drug-related crimes that it had not described and that were not
linked to the rationale approved by the court.
The government introduced testimony from several witnesses to establish
that, by April 1991, appellant’s crew had monopolized the selling of crack cocaine
in Langdon Park, and that appellant and Green were the only drug dealers operating
there. One of those witnesses was Michael Thompson, the crew member who
supplied appellant and Michael Green with the drugs they purveyed in the park.
When he was asked on direct examination how other drug dealers were kept
out of the park, Thompson attributed it to the crew’s “reputation”—by implication,
its violent reputation. Thompson testified that “everybody,” including appellant,
Michael Green, and Thompson himself, carried guns while selling drugs in the park.
The prosecutor then inquired about the incident mentioned in the government’s
motion in limine of a clash with rival drug sellers. According to Thompson, it
involved some individuals who sold drugs on Montana Avenue, not far from
35
Langdon Park. Thompson stated that the relationship between these individuals and
his dealers in Langdon Park “wasn’t good,” that members of the Montana Avenue
group “were always com[ing] past the park in . . . a truck,” and that “one time they
actually fired into . . . the park while we were down there.” On that occasion,
Thompson testified, he ran while appellant “went after them, shooting up the hill,”
and the attackers departed.
The prosecutor also asked Thompson if he could describe how appellant
“interacted with . . . drug addicts.” Thompson said appellant was “a little aggressive
with his sales” and “would sometimes bully” them “to buy from him as opposed to
. . . someone else.” When asked whether he had ever seen appellant “put his hands
on any drug addicts,” Thompson answered, “Like, roughing up, yeah.” Thompson
acknowledged having described appellant as a “loose cannon” in the sense that
“[s]mall things”—like not “get[ting] a sale” or “somebody . . . try[ing] to take
something from him”—“could tick him off.” 33 Defense counsel did not object to
the relevance or admissibility of this brief testimony when it was elicited; instead,
33
Thompson testified that drug addicts had “tricks” they would pull to try to
“scam drugs” from dealers: “Sometimes they would say, Let me see the product.
Maybe grab it and run. Sometimes they would take a look at it and maybe pinch
some off, open the bag, pinch some off, close it before you can notice that they took
something out of the package.”
36
counsel cross-examined Thompson about it. 34 In response to questions about
appellant’s “aggressive” conduct toward drug buyers, Thompson agreed with
defense counsel’s statements that appellant would “get mad if someone tried to cheat
him” and “had no problems confronting a cheating buyer and straightening him out
with his bare hands.” Thompson did not testify that appellant ever confronted a
buyer with a weapon or ever threatened to shoot or kill a buyer.
Appellant argues that Thompson’s testimony about his shooting back at
threatening rival drug dealers and his violent tactics in dealing with troublesome and
dishonest drug customers should not have been admitted because it “served no
legitimate purpose and allowed the government to argue that he was the sort of
unusually violent person who would kill three people over a single crack rock.” To
be sure, “[i]f evidence of prior bad acts that are criminal in nature and independent
of the crime charged is offered to prove predisposition to commit the charged crime,
it is inadmissible.” 35 This “is a principle of long standing in our law.” 36 But the
34
Later in the trial, however, the defense moved to strike Thompson’s
testimony about appellant’s treatment of drug buyers, arguing it was impermissible
evidence of appellant’s propensity for violence. The court denied the motion; it
viewed the testimony not as evidence of appellant’s character or propensity, but
rather as “background” information about the “tactics” appellant employed to
maintain his control of drug dealing in Langdon Park.
35
Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1092.
36
Jones, 27 A.3d at 1142 (quoting Drew, 331 F.2d at 89).
37
government did not offer Thompson’s challenged testimony to prove appellant’s
disposition to commit the crimes with which he was charged, and the prosecutor did
not make a propensity argument such as that appellant was so unusually violent that
he would commit murders over a mere rock of crack. Rather, the government
primarily contended that evidence demonstrating and confirming appellant’s central
role in maintaining exclusive and firm control over the drug trade and drug buyers
in Langdon Park was legitimately probative of appellant’s motive for killing persons
he perceived as having tried to steal crack from him and of his identity as the
perpetrator of the murders. 37 For example, in closing argument, regarding
appellant’s motive, the prosecutor argued that he committed the murders “to keep
[his] territory”; that, as a drug dealer in appellant’s position, “you protected this area
through your reputation” and “couldn’t be seen as the drug dealer that folks get over
on”; and that appellant shot the victims “because three [c]rack addicts came into his
37
As we have said, the government also argued that Thompson’s challenged
testimony was admissible for the additional reason that it was “necessary to place
the charged crime in an understandable context.” See Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1098.
We find it unnecessary to decide whether this separate ground was applicable to
Thompson’s testimony. (Contrary to appellant’s argument in his reply brief, we do
not understand the judge’s ruling to have been limited to the rationale of Johnson
such that admissibility under Drew, i.e., for motive and identity, was “a discretionary
ground that the trial court did not reach” and thus (appellant argues) an improper
basis for affirmance.)
38
park and tried to get one over on him and you cannot be the guy that people get over
on.”
This court has held that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal acts unrelated
to the crime charged is admissible if three conditions are met: (1) the evidence is
“offered for a substantial, legitimate purpose”; (2) the prosecution demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the prior criminal acts;
and (3) the legitimate probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. 38 “Valid, non-propensity purposes ‘includ[e], but
[are] not limited to[,]’ proof of identity [or] motive . . . .” 39 We conclude that these
conditions were met in this case, and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Thompson’s challenged testimony.
This court recognized in Boone v. United States that “evidence of drug-related
activity is routinely admitted when it provides motive and context for other crimes,
including homicide.” 40 In that first-degree murder case we held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting, as probative of the defendants’ motive to
commit the charged murder, testimony that the defendants had firearms and served
38
Id. at 1092-93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39
Jones, 27 A.3d at 1143 (quoting Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1092).
40
769 A.2d 811, 817 (D.C. 2001).
39
as enforcers and crack cocaine sellers for a drug distribution operation. 41 We
explained that the trial court reasonably concluded that this testimony was “not
offered to prove [the defendants’] predisposition to commit the charged homicide”
but rather to show their motive, which was to fulfill their duty as enforcers and show
the leader of the drug operation that they were loyal. 42
In the present case, the prosecution similarly offered Thompson’s testimony
about appellant’s shooting at the Montana Avenue crew and his aggressiveness
toward drug customers for the “substantial, legitimate purpose” of proving
appellant’s motive and identity as the perpetrator of the Langdon Park murders. We
are satisfied that the court reasonably judged the testimony to be relevant and
probative of those issues. It would not have been enough for the prosecution merely
to elicit general testimony that appellant was in control of the drug trade in Langdon
Park. Details of how appellant maintained that control also were admissible, even
if they involved prior bad acts, in order to “persuasively establish” the fact. 43
41
See id. at 813, 815-17.
42
Id. at 816-17; see also Jackson v. United States, 329 A.2d 782, 790 & n.16
(D.C. 1974) (evidence that the defendant distributed drugs held admissible to prove
that shooting was motivated by “a desire to eliminate a weak link in a drug
distribution chain” and to avenge a friend’s shooting).
43
Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 30 (D.C. 2014); see, e.g., Minick v.
United States, 506 A.2d 1115, 1119-20 (D.C. 1986) (per curiam) (testimony about
40
We also are satisfied that the prosecution’s evidence of appellant’s drug
dealing activity in Langdon Park, including the criminal behavior Thompson
described, was clear and convincing. 44 The testimony on this point went uncontested
at trial, and, on cross-examination, appellant’s counsel actually amplified
Thompson’s account of appellant’s behavior toward drug buyers.
Lastly, we are satisfied that the legitimate probative value of Thompson’s
challenged testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to appellant from that testimony. While Thompson called appellant a
“bully” and a “loose cannon,” his testimony that appellant was aggressive with drug
buyers on occasion, and that appellant fired back at rival crew members who shot at
defendant’s parole papers was admissible despite “imply[ing] . . . a prior criminal
record” because “witnesses’ specific references to a detail like the parole papers
added ‘narrative veracity’ to their testimony and reinforced their credibility”
(quoting United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 1973))); see also
Jones, 27 A.3d at 1147-48 (given high burden of proof in criminal trials, jury may
reasonably demand more than “a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction” (quoting
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997)).
44
Appellant states in his reply brief that “the judge never made the requisite
finding that these incidents were established by clear and convincing evidence, a
prerequisite for Drew.” We review a trial court’s failure to sua sponte make that
prerequisite finding explicitly on the record for plain error. See Bacchus v. United
States, 970 A.2d 269, 275 (D.C. 2009) (“It is well established that, unless requested
by a party, the absence of explicit findings is not necessarily reversible error.”);
Daniels v. United States, 613 A.2d 342, 347 n.11 (D.C. 1992). However, since
appellant “raised this argument for the first time in his reply brief,” we accordingly
“do not address it.” Long v. United States, 312 A.3d 1247, 1271 n.10 (D.C. 2024).
41
him, was brief and neither graphic nor inflammatory. Thompson did not testify to
conduct by appellant comparable to, or suggestive of, the homicides and rape for
which appellant was on trial. Nor did the prosecution cite the testimony to the jury
as evidence of appellant’s violent proclivities; it did not argue propensity at all. 45
2. The Domestic Violence Evidence
In its direct examination of Odrianne Beckwith, the government took care not
to elicit prejudicial testimony about appellant’s violent behavior toward her during
their relationship. At one point, when defense counsel became concerned that
Beckwith might bring it up, the prosecutor explained in a bench conference that
Beckwith had been cautioned in advance not to do so (e.g., “I specifically told her
not to bring up the fact that he fired a gun at her”). The prosecutor offered to lead
Beckwith through her testimony to avoid eliciting anything about appellant’s
violence against her, and defense counsel approved that approach. Thus, during
Beckwith’s direct examination, the jury heard only that she and appellant had been
45
See Hagans, 96 A.3d at 30 (explaining that while “other crimes evidence
should omit, where possible, unnecessary details of the defendant’s violence and use
of a weapon,” it was not an abuse of discretion to admit “evidence” showing “wanton
violence” where, inter alia, it was probative of the defendant’s possession of the
crime weapon and the prosecution did not “exploit[] the evidence to prejudice the
jury against him” (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 999 (D.C. 2013))).
42
arguing, that appellant had accused her of infidelity, and that he said he could kill
her as he had killed three people in the past.
On cross-examination, the defense sought to show that Harry Sullivan had
been Beckwith’s paramour and that he had induced her to implicate appellant in
criminal activity. As counsel clarified this defense theory for the court in a bench
conference, Sullivan himself had entered into a cooperation agreement with the
police, and the defense posited that he had “prompted” Beckwith to help him by
corroborating what he was telling the police about appellant’s criminal activities—
including, eventually, by falsely reporting that appellant had confessed to the
Langdon Park murders. The judge warned defense counsel that their theory would
open the door for the government to “show directly or indirectly why that’s not
credible” and “not true.” 46 The defense was not deterred by the court’s warning.
In support of the collusion theory, defense counsel pressed Beckwith to admit
on the witness stand that she had been in a sexual relationship with Harry Sullivan
in 2002 when her relationship with appellant was breaking down. Beckwith
responded that she had been friends with Sullivan (whom she had met through
46
The prosecution had argued that if the defense pursued this line of
questioning, it would introduce, among other things, evidence of appellant’s felony
assault against Beckwith.
43
appellant), but she emphatically denied ever having had a “sexual” or “romantic”
relationship with him. 47 In response to further questions, Beckwith also said she had
no memory at all (possibly on account of the memory loss she suffered after the car
accident, see note 8, supra) of ever having talked with Sullivan about his status and
benefits as a cooperating witness, or of Sullivan telling her he would send a detective
to get information from her in 2002 or 2003. Beckwith recalled that a detective did
eventually contact her, but she understood it was because appellant “was about to be
released from jail.”
However, defense counsel did succeed in obtaining Beckwith’s agreement
that her relationship with appellant “didn’t end particularly pleasantly” (as counsel
put it in a leading question to which Beckwith assented), and that their relationship
finally came to an end when she went to the Fifth District police station in July 2002,
told the police appellant had guns and drugs in the house, and gave them written
permission to search the premises. As a result, Beckwith acknowledged, appellant
was arrested and he eventually pleaded guilty to “some charges.” Defense counsel
did not ask Beckwith why she reported appellant to the police in 2002, leaving the
47
There was no evidence at trial supporting the suggestion that Beckwith and
Sullivan were ever lovers.
44
implication that Beckwith was spiteful and might have gone to the police at
Sullivan’s instigation, in line with the defense collusion theory.
Beckwith also admitted on cross-examination that she did not report
appellant’s confession to the Langdon Park murders until three years later, when she
went before the grand jury in 2005. Counsel did not ask her why she did not report
appellant’s admission when she first went to the police in 2002, leaving the
implication that her belated account of his murder confession might have been a
fabrication (also in line with the defense theory of her collusion with Sullivan).
In addition, the defense showed Beckwith phone records that appeared to
evidence her continuing communications with Sullivan in 2016, close in time to the
date of her appearance before the grand jury that eventually indicted appellant for
the murders. Thus, in sum, the cross-examination of Beckwith, taken at face value,
arguably tended to support the defense effort to portray her as appellant’s vindictive
ex-girlfriend who went to the police and falsely incriminated appellant in the
Langdon Park murders at her new lover’s urging.
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that this cross-examination opened
the door for the government, on redirect examination, to elicit what the government
believed to be the actual reason Beckwith went to the police in 2002. The true
reason, the government contended, had nothing to do with Sullivan’s malignant
45
influence or Beckwith’s supposed desire to help Sullivan by corroborating his
allegations against appellant and echoing a fabricated account of appellant’s
confession to the Langdon Park murders. Rather, Beckwith went to the police in
desperation, as a victim of domestic abuse seeking protection from appellant.
At the outset of the redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Beckwith
whether she “ever had any kind of a romantic relationship with Harry Sullivan.” As
before, Beckwith answered, “No.” She confirmed that appellant repeatedly accused
her, unjustly, of carrying on romantic relationships with others. Beckwith also stated
that she did not know anything about Harry Sullivan having been a cooperating
witness.
The prosecutor asked Beckwith “what [her] relationship was like with
Mr. Valdez.” Beckwith answered that it “was not a very good relationship. It was
a very unhealthy relationship. One that I’ve blocked so deep inside of me because
it was not a good relationship.” Beckwith testified that appellant was physically
violent with her. She said she had “tried so many, so many days and nights to . . .
forget that violent part of it.” She did not recall whether appellant ever had
threatened her with a weapon. “But what I do remember,” she testified, “is my neck
being choked out on several occasions . . . .” The prosecutor next asked Beckwith
what she remembered about going to the Fifth District police station in 2002, “the
46
part that does stand out in your mind.” Beckwith answered, “I needed to get
[appellant] out of my house.” “[W]hy?” the prosecutor asked. “For the safety of
myself and my children,” Beckwith answered. 48
Beckwith did not remember everything she “specifically” said to the police in
2002. “As best as I recall,” she testified, “I believe I told them the truth.”
When Sullivan thereafter took the witness stand, defense counsel questioned
him extensively about his contacts with Beckwith. Sullivan too denied having had
“any kind of intimate relationship” with Beckwith. However, when counsel asked
him whether he had ever gone to Beckwith’s house, Sullivan said he had gone there
once, but also said he never went there to see Beckwith and he did not recall going
there to see appellant. Defense counsel did not inquire further into the visit. The
48
In closing argument, the prosecutor cited this testimony to explain why
Beckwith did not tell the police in 2002 about appellant’s admissions to having
committed the Langdon Park murders. The prosecutor argued:
The Defense says you can’t believe her because when she
went to the police in 2002, she didn’t tell them about what
Mr. Valdez did in the Park.
She told you on Redirect. When she went to the police in
2002, she was in an abusive relationship with Mr. Valdez.
He had just choked her and all she was worried about was
the safety of herself and her family. She wasn’t worried
about telling them about something he confessed to that
happened 11 years earlier. Does that mean she’s not
credible[?] Does that mean she’s part of some conspiracy
with Harry Sullivan?
47
obscurity of Sullivan’s answers to the questions about his one-time visit to
Beckwith’s house may have suggested to the jury that he was hiding something
about his relationship with Beckwith, in line with the defense claim.
On cross-examination by the government, Sullivan reiterated that he had
never been “romantically involved” with Beckwith and had never had “sex with
her.” The prosecutor then asked Sullivan about the time he said he had gone to
Beckwith’s house. Over defense counsel’s objections that the inquiry was beyond
the scope of direct, which the court overruled (and which appellant does not press
on appeal), 49 Sullivan testified that when he arrived there, he saw appellant
assaulting Beckwith, and that she fled to him for help:
She ran—she was running out the house to me and my
buddy that was with me, and we jumped out the car. And
he was trying to choke her. He hit her on the steps. And
I was, like, you can’t do that. And I got into it and me and
him tussling and she ran to the car to my buddy.
Sullivan testified that appellant then accused Beckwith of evidently wanting to have
sex with Sullivan.
49
The defense did not object at trial to the relevance of the cross-examination
or contend that it was unduly prejudicial, nor did it move to strike Sullivan’s
testimony about appellant’s assault on Beckwith.
48
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
defense examinations of Beckwith and Sullivan opened the door to the testimony of
those witnesses about appellant’s violently abusive treatment of Beckwith. By itself,
the cross-examination of Beckwith opened the door for the prosecution to elicit not
only her testimony about that violence but also Sullivan’s corroborative testimony
that he had seen appellant assault Beckwith in the very manner she claimed he had.
Under the doctrine of curative admissibility recognized by the decisions of
this court, the prosecution may be allowed to introduce otherwise inadmissible
evidence after the defense has “opened the door” to it. 50 “At bottom, the notions of
‘opening the door’ and ‘curative admissibility’ rest on the more general concept that
the balance of prejudice against probative value may change during the course of a
trial” 51 as a result of the approach taken by the defense. The “test,” then, is “whether
50
See Furr v. United States, 157 A.3d 1245, 1251-52 (D.C. 2017); Busey v.
United States, 747 A.2d 1153, 1166 (D.C. 2000); Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d
1176, 1192 (D.C. 1999). We pause to note that, although we speak here of applying
the doctrine of curative admissibility when the door is “opened” by the defendant in
a criminal case, the doctrine is applicable to the prosecution as well, and in civil
cases. We note also that we have “enjoined” trial judges “to exercise caution and
restraint before relying on the curative admissibility rationale” because “the idea that
the one side might ‘open the door,’ is often oversimplified.” Furr, 157 A.3d at 1252.
51
Busey, 747 A.2d at 1166.
49
the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
proffered evidence.” 52
Accordingly, other-crimes evidence that is not admissible against a defendant
to prove propensity or under Drew or the Johnson exceptions may be rendered
admissible if the defense, through delimited, incomplete, or misleading examination
of a witness, invites factual inferences materially adverse to the prosecution that
revelation of the criminal context would dispel or undercut. In Busey, for example,
the trial judge initially permitted a prosecution witness to testify to having seen the
defendant with a gun two days before the charged murder, but precluded the
prosecution from “eliciting the context—that Busey held the gun to [the witness’s]
head and pulled the trigger—during [the witness’s] direct examination.” 53 However,
“this exclusionary ruling was provisional, because the balance of probative value
versus unfair prejudice could be altered by defense counsel’s cross examination of”
the witness. 54 That alteration occurred when, on cross-examination, defense counsel
challenged the witness’s claim to have seen Busey with a gun by eliciting her
inability to remember details of the incident. “At that point,” we held, “the probative
52
Id. (citing Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1092-93).
53
Id. at 1165.
54
Id. at 1166.
50
value of testimony about the assault increased dramatically[, and t]he context
became highly relevant in evaluating whether to believe [her],” as she could explain
that “she vividly remembered seeing Busey with a gun because he threatened her
with it.” 55
In the present case, testimony about appellant’s violent crimes against
Beckwith was presumptively inadmissible during her direct examination by the
prosecution, and the prosecution did not seek to elicit such testimony at that time.
Such other-crimes evidence was not legitimately probative of appellant’s guilt of the
crimes charged. But as the trial court warned it might, the probative balance shifted
when the defense cross-examined Beckwith. Through targeted cross-examination,
the defense suggested that Beckwith’s relationship with appellant had not ended
“pleasantly”; that she had taken another lover, Sullivan, who was cooperating with
the police; that she vindictively reported appellant’s crimes to the police at Sullivan’s
bidding and for his benefit as a cooperator; and that her failure to tell the police about
appellant’s murder confession when she reported his drug and gun offenses in 2002
implied that the confession was a later fabrication, attributable to her collusion with
Sullivan. At that point, to paraphrase what we said in Busey, the probative value of
testimony about appellant’s violent abuse of Beckwith increased dramatically,
55
Id.
51
because it tended to refute the defense theory of collusion by providing a plausible
alternative explanation for Beckwith’s conduct and testimony. The prosecutor
argued to the jury that Beckwith’s desperate need for immediate protection from
appellant’s assaults explained why she didn’t think to mention his incriminating
admissions to old crimes against other, unknown persons when she went to the police
for help in 2002. This answered the suggestion that her reports of appellant’s
confessions to the Langdon Park murders must have been later fabrications. 56
We are satisfied that the risk of unfair prejudice to appellant from the
admission of the domestic violence testimony did not substantially outweigh the
considerable probative value of the testimony. To paraphrase Busey again, “[w]e do
not doubt that the evidence of [appellant’s] assault[s] on [Beckwith] was prejudicial
to [him]. . . . But because the relevance of the assault[s] increased dramatically after
the cross examination of [Beckwith], we are satisfied that the trial judge exercised
[her] discretion soundly in concluding that testimony about the assault[s] would be
56
The persuasiveness of this answer in explaining why Beckwith did not
report appellant’s murder confessions in 2002 (or in the intervening years prior to
her grand jury testimony) was ultimately for the jury to decide. Defense counsel
was free to argue that appellant’s domestic violence would have actually given
Beckwith an even greater incentive to tell the police that appellant had confessed to
three murders and thereby increase the likelihood of his arrest and continued
incarceration.
52
admissible on redirect despite the risk of prejudice.” 57 The jury in this case “was not
asked improperly to infer criminal propensity from the evidence of the prior
assault[s].” 58
We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
the cross-examination of Beckwith opened the door to evidence of appellant’s
violent assaults on her. In presenting such evidence, the government was not limited
to just Beckwith’s own testimony where, as here, it could be corroborated by the
testimony of a professed eyewitness to the violence, namely Sullivan. Of course,
Sullivan was not merely such an eyewitness. He also was the person whom the
defense accused of being Beckwith’s paramour and conniving with her (and others)
to falsely report that appellant had confessed to the Langdon Park murders; and it
was defense counsel who raised the subject of Sullivan’s visit to Beckwith’s house
on direct examination, implying it was further evidence of their intimacy. Sullivan’s
testimony about the visit on direct was inconclusive. All this amounted to an open
invitation to the prosecutor, on cross-examination, to ask Sullivan what happened on
that visit, if only to support or rehabilitate the witness’s credibility and dispel the
suspicions raised on direct examination. So even assuming arguendo that appellant
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1167.
53
has preserved an objection to Sullivan’s eyewitness testimony of appellant’s assault
on Beckwith (but see note 49, supra), we are not persuaded that the trial court erred
in admitting it.
C. Rulings Limiting Defense Cross-Examination and Presentation of Extrinsic
Evidence to Show Bias of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to demonstrate the
bias of witnesses against him by two rulings of the trial court. One of the rulings
precluded defense counsel from cross-examining Michael Green about the facts
underlying the second-degree murder charge to which he had pleaded guilty (along
with the three voluntary manslaughter counts arising from the Langdon Park
homicides) as part of his cooperation agreement. The other ruling prevented the
defense from calling appellant’s daughter to testify that Harry Sullivan had sexually
molested her in 2002, after Sullivan had denied that allegation on cross-examination.
The constitutional right appellant invokes is the Sixth Amendment right of the
accused in a criminal trial to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.” 59 This
right of confrontation guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to expose the
motivation and bias of adverse witnesses, “not only through cross-examination, but
59
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
54
also by the introduction of extrinsic evidence.” 60 This court has held it to be
“immaterial under the Sixth Amendment whether the adverse witness has been
called by the defense or the government, so long as [the attempt to expose the
witness’s bias] is not a ‘mere subterfuge’ to present otherwise inadmissible
evidence.” 61
However, as the Supreme Court has stated, “trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits” on
bias cross-examination or the presentation of extrinsic evidence of an adverse
witness’s bias. 62 Such limits, committed to the trial court’s discretionary judgment,
may be “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, the witness’[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant.” 63 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
60
Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 852 (D.C. 2012).
61
Id. at 849-50 (citation and footnote omitted).
62
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
63
Id.55
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish.” 64
Quoting Van Arsdall, we have held that “a violation of the Sixth Amendment
is established if ‘a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different
impression of the witness’s credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue
the proposed line of cross-examination.’” 65 By a parity of reasoning, this test applies
as well to rulings precluding the introduction of extrinsic proof of bias. We view
this test as encompassing the principle, invoked by appellant, that “[i]t is not enough
that the possibility of bias be mentioned; counsel must be permitted to present the
nature and extent of the bias.” 66 The Van Arsdall test that we endorsed in J.W. is the
test we will apply here to appellant’s claims.
64
Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
65
In re J.W., 258 A.3d 195, 203 (D.C. 2021) (brackets omitted); see also id.
at 202-03 (reviewing the “wide variety of formulations” in our case law of the scope
of the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine, and ultimately focusing on the
Supreme Court’s statement in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, as appropriately
“fram[ing] the ‘controlling question’”); accord Williams v. United States, 268 A.3d
1265, 1272 (D.C. 2022); see also Longus, 52 A.3d at 852 (“A trial court’s ‘refusal
to allow questioning about facts indicative of [a witness’s] bias from which the jury
could reasonably draw adverse inferences of reliability is an error of constitutional
dimension.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cunningham v. United States, 974
A.2d 240, 245 (D.C. 2009))).
66
Longus, 52 A.3d at 851.
56
1. The Limitation of Green’s Cross-Examination Regarding the Facts
Underlying His Plea to Second-Degree Murder
One of the crimes to which Michael Green pleaded guilty as part of his
cooperation agreement with the government related to a homicide he committed in
1999 in the Edgewood neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Green was arrested for
that homicide in July 2015 and charged with first-degree murder while armed. 67 His
deal with the government allowed him to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
(unarmed) second-degree murder (in addition to three counts of voluntary
manslaughter arising from the Langdon Park murders). At trial, the government
moved in limine to preclude the defense from cross-examining Green about the
“specific details” of the Edgewood murder. The government acknowledged that it
would be proper for the defense, in exposing Green’s testimonial bias and
motivation, to examine him about his plea deal—in particular, about the charges and
the lesser offenses to which he was allowed to plead guilty, and the potential
penalties he faced before and after the plea (as well as about Green’s obligations,
expectations, and other details of his agreement to cooperate). The government
argued, however, that cross-examination of Green on the specific details of the
Edgewood murder (which was not, of course, one of the crimes for which appellant
67
This was several months before he and appellant were arrested and charged
with the unrelated Langdon Park murders in February 2016.
57
was on trial) would be inappropriate because “the defense is not entitled to a mini-
trial involving every potential charge or allegation,” and exploration of the specific
details of the crime would not be necessary (in the government’s view) to enable the
jury to make a “discriminating appraisal of the witness’s motives and bias.” 68
In a written opposition, appellant objected to the proposed limitation. He
argued that the specific manner in which (he proffered) Green had committed the
Edgewood murder—by stabbing the unarmed victim in the back—was relevant to
the issue of his bias because “some murders are more heinous than others,” and a
jury could conclude that “a witness who committed a more heinous murder would
naturally have a greater motive to curry favor with the government” than a person
who “did not commit as heinous a killing.”
The trial court ruled in favor of the government’s position. The judge stated
that “what [Green] was charged with [for the Edgewood murder], what he was
facing, what he pled guilty to, what he’s facing now, all of that is fair game” on
cross-examination for bias. However, the judge continued, she had “no intention of
having any mini trials within a trial in this case about other charges,” and she did not
“see any basis for the underlying allegations or facts” of the Edgewood murder
68
Quoting Longus, 52 A.3d at 851 (quoting United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d
1466, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
58
charge “to come in.” Defense counsel asked to be permitted to cross-examine Green
briefly on the fact that he initially told the police his “codefendant in [the Edgewood
murder] case did everything, did the violent act and [Green] didn’t do anything.”
Counsel explained that she sought “to ask that question because this is somebody
who shifts blame. My theory with him is that he tries to minimize his role . . . even
though he had an agreement” to cooperate (as in the present case). The court said
this would be “fine,” and that it was “not saying the defense can’t cross-examine
about the nature of the bias. But the defense can’t cross-examine about anything
that would deal with the underlying details of the crime.”
In Green’s ensuing testimony, on both direct and cross-examination, the bases
for his motivation to cooperate with the prosecution, plead guilty, and testify against
appellant were thoroughly explored for the jury to consider. The defense introduced
his plea and cooperation agreement in evidence. Among other things, the jury
learned that Green had pleaded guilty to three counts of voluntary manslaughter for
the Langdon Park murders and one count of second-degree murder for the Edgewood
murder, and had agreed to cooperate with the government and testify truthfully, in
exchange for the dismissal of the greater and additional charges arising from those
crimes (i.e., including four counts of first-degree murder while armed) and the
government’s promise not to prosecute him for drug dealing in the District of
59
Columbia, and the expectation of leniency at sentencing if he fulfilled his
commitments.
Green admitted that, when he entered into this agreement, he was “scared,”
knowing he might spend the rest of his life in prison if convicted of the murders.
The jury learned that even the reduced offenses to which Green pleaded guilty
exposed him to lengthy prison sentences—twenty years to life on the second-degree
murder count and fifteen years to life for each of the three voluntary manslaughter
counts. But as the jury also heard, Green had “no intention of doing 65 [years] to
life” and “hope[d] not” to do anywhere near that after he cooperated with the
government pursuant to his agreement. He explained that his “hopes” to receive a
lenient sentence for living up to his commitments were based on the government’s
promise to tell his sentencing judge about the information he provided in aid of the
prosecution of this and other cases. And Green repeatedly testified that he
understood his hopes depended on his truthfulness and, by clear implication, whether
the government was satisfied with his truthfulness and cooperation.
Underscoring the strength of his motivation to do everything within his power
to fulfill his bargain with the government, Green also acknowledged on cross-
examination that he had much to lose if he did not succeed in receiving a lenient
sentence. He had a fiancée, a son, a “nice home,” and his “life was good.” Green
60
had reassured his fiancée that he would be “coming home” soon and they had
discussed their future plans upon his return. He was strongly motivated to enable
himself to return to his happy life and fulfill those plans.
The trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine also did not impede the cross-
examination sought by defense counsel regarding Green’s initial attempt to
minimize his complicity in the Edgewood murder. Green admitted that he first told
the government that “[he] didn’t actually do the stabbing, it was just the other man,”
and only later admitted the “truth” that he had stabbed the victim himself. 69 Green
also admitted that he similarly had tried to “minimize” his involvement in the
Langdon Park killings when, at first, he told the government he did not have a gun
at the time of the shootings. (Eventually, after it was clear the police did not believe
him, Green recanted and conceded that he did have a gun in Langdon Park.)
We are satisfied that the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine was a
narrow one that permitted defense counsel to present the nature and extent of Green’s
bias. The cross-examination exposed his powerful incentives to do what the
69
Thus, we note, the jury did learn the “specific facts” that Green committed
the Edgewood homicide by stabbing the victim to death, and that he was the principal
rather than an aider and abettor. As these facts were undisputed, they did not threaten
to result in a “mini trial” over other aspects of the killing, such as whether the victim
was armed, where and how he was stabbed, Green’s motive for the killing, or
whether there were any mitigating circumstances. There was no suggestion of any
extenuating circumstances in the Edgewood homicide.
61
government wanted him to do and testify against appellant. The problems with
Green’s credibility—not just his self-interest and all he had at stake, but also his
admissions on the witness stand to having tried to minimize his own culpability at
the expense of co-defendants even when he was “cooperating” with the
government—were on display. The defense was well-armed to argue that Green’s
powerful motives to advance his own interests at appellant’s expense made him a
biased and untrustworthy witness.
We are not persuaded that revelation of additional facts about how or under
what circumstances Green committed the Edgewood murder would have given a
reasonable jury “a significantly different impression” of appellant’s credibility as a
witness against appellant. Specific details of the Edgewood murder were hardly
necessary to convey to the jury that Green had committed a “heinous” offense
subject to severe sanction; a malicious taking of a human life without justification,
excuse, or mitigation is presumptively heinous and, more importantly, the jury was
informed that Green was exposed to a lengthy term of incarceration (twenty years to
life) for the offense. 70 If Green had denied having committed the Edgewood murder
70
See Williams, 268 A.3d at 1272 (“Although defense counsel was precluded
from asking any questions about the facts underpinning that charge, counsel was
‘permitted to present the nature and extent of the [possible] bias’ by bringing to light
the fact that there was a charge pending against [the witness], the nature of that
62
or had materially mischaracterized it, then it might well have been necessary to allow
defense counsel to elicit the underlying facts in order to show the true nature and
extent of Green’s bias. 71 But that was not the case here. The in limine ruling
therefore did not impede the accurate and effective exposure of Green’s motivation
or otherwise prejudice appellant. Rather, we hold, the ruling was within the court’s
discretionary authority to impose reasonable limits on bias cross-examination to
avoid confusion of the issues and interrogation of only marginal relevance.
2. The Exclusion of Testimony from Appellant’s Daughter Offered as
Extrinsic Evidence of Harry Sullivan’s Bias
The goal of the defense in calling Harry Sullivan as a witness was to impeach
the “earwitness” testimony of Edmonds, Beckwith, and Neeka Sullivan that they
heard appellant admit to the Langdon Park murders. The theory of the defense was
that Sullivan—who testified on direct examination that he, too, heard appellant
crime, and the potential penalty.” (alteration in original) (quoting Longus, 52 A.3d
at 851)).
71
See, e.g., In re J.W., 258 A.3d at 203-04 (where defense counsel sought to
show that pending armed-robbery charges gave witness a motive to curry favor with
the prosecution, and the witness denied having such a motive because she was
innocent, counsel should have been permitted to cross-examine the witness about
the facts underlying the charges from which the jurors could evaluate the witness’s
disavowal of partiality); Longus, 52 A.3d at 850-51 (where detective acknowledged
he was being investigated for allegations of witness tampering, but denied the
substance of the allegations, the trial court’s refusal to permit defense counsel to
question the detective about the underlying facts prevented counsel from eliciting
enough information to enable the jury to appraise the detective’s motives and bias).
63
admit the murders—had colluded with the other three earwitnesses in 2005 to falsely
inculpate appellant. “Our whole theory about these confessions,” defense counsel
told the trial court, “is [that] they originated with Mr. Sullivan.” However, though
Sullivan was a defense witness, he denied this accusation. In the absence of any
other proof that he had orchestrated an agreement among the earwitnesses to
implicate appellant by reporting his supposed confession to the police, the defense
sought to show that Sullivan himself had a strong motive to incriminate appellant
(and therefore, implicitly, to enlist others to help him do so).
The defense theory advanced at trial was that Sullivan’s motive to falsely
accuse appellant stemmed from his sexual molestation of appellant’s daughter
sometime in 2002 (when she was twelve years old). It appears that the child had
made an accusation of that kind to Sullivan’s mother, who had discounted it. No
claim of such molestation had ever been made to the authorities, and appellant
himself had not confronted Sullivan about it. Nonetheless, the defense posited,
Sullivan must have feared not only the possibility of criminal prosecution if his
abuse of appellant’s daughter were ever to be reported (the statute of limitations still
had not run), but also the possibility of retaliation from appellant; for even though
appellant was incarcerated in 2005 (serving time in prison on unrelated drug
charges), he was due to be released soon. So, defense counsel argued to the trial
court, Sullivan had a dual motive to implicate appellant in the Langdon Park
64
murders—both to curry favor with the government (even before any criminal
investigation had begun) and to keep appellant locked up (unable to avenge himself
on Sullivan).
Defense counsel was not prevented from cross-examining Harry Sullivan
about the sexual abuse allegation to establish his bias. However, Sullivan dismissed
the allegation as completely false. 72 He also denied having known about the claim
when he told the grand jury about appellant’s confession in 2005. Consequently, the
defense proposed to present extrinsic evidence to prove Sullivan’s bias by calling
appellant’s daughter to testify that Sullivan did indeed molest her in 2002. If her
testimony were credited, it would mean that Sullivan might have had the posited
motivations when he first implicated appellant in the Langdon Park murders.
The trial court precluded the daughter’s testimony, however, ultimately ruling
that “the truth of the allegation is not properly litigated in this case,” and that it did
not “matter whether it’s true,” because Sullivan’s admitted awareness of the
accusation by the time of trial sufficed by itself to support the claim of his testimonial
bias. The court also identified other concerns that supported its ruling, notably the
unattractive prospect of a “trial within a trial” and what the court anticipated would
72
The defense also questioned Neeka Sullivan about the allegation. She too
dismissed it as false.
65
be the difficulty of assessing the truth of the allegation of abuse given its age and the
absence of a contemporaneous report of it.
We agree with appellant that the trial court committed “an error of
constitutional dimension” 73 in precluding the defense from calling his daughter to
testify to facts—Sullivan’s alleged sexual abuse of her—from which the jury could
infer that Sullivan was biased when he first reported that appellant had admitted the
Langdon Park murders. For the bias to matter in this case, it had to exist when
Sullivan first made that report.
Appellant was afforded the opportunity to try to establish the basis for
Sullivan’s bias through cross-examination of him. He was thwarted by Sullivan’s
denials. But “[b]ecause bias is not a collateral issue, ‘evidence from which the jury
can infer bias may be presented not only through cross-examination, but also by the
introduction of extrinsic evidence.’” 74 Such extrinsic proof of a witness’s bias is
most appropriate when it is necessary in order to establish the factual basis of the
claim because the witness has denied that basis. We are persuaded that the test for
a constitutional violation has been met in this instance: a reasonable jury might have
73
Longus, 52 A.3d at 852.
74
Coates v. United States, 113 A.3d 564, 570 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Longus,
52 A.3d at 852).
66
received a significantly different impression of Sullivan’s credibility had defense
counsel been permitted to present testimony that he had molested appellant’s
daughter, and that this occurred before he ever implicated appellant in the Langdon
Park murders.
Nonetheless, we conclude that this constitutional error does not entitle
appellant to relief. That is because we perceive that the error could not have affected
the jury’s verdict and therefore was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 75
Proof of Harry Sullivan’s alleged bias—his imputed fear of appellant’s
retaliation and incentive to curry favor with the government—was important only to
the extent that it increased the plausibility of the defense theory that Sullivan
colluded with the government’s earwitnesses in 2005 to perpetrate a lie that appellant
had confessed to the Langdon Park murders.
But even assuming Sullivan’s postulated bias would have been shown by
credible testimony from appellant’s daughter, the defense theory would still have
been unsupported and highly implausible. First, although each of the government’s
75
See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (“The correct inquiry [in the event of a
Confrontation Clause error] is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
67
earwitnesses knew Harry Sullivan and were involved with him in one way or
another, 76 there still would have been no evidence at trial that they conspired to
falsely incriminate appellant. To the extent the witnesses themselves were asked
about such collusion, they denied it, and their denials were not impeached. That
there were similarities in what each witness reported appellant had said was not
indicative of collaboration; there is no reason to think that if the witnesses were
telling the truth, they would have reported that appellant told materially different
stories to each of them. Even if the four earwitnesses did talk among themselves
about reporting appellant’s confessions (which was not demonstrated), that does not
mean they were colluding or lying about them. 77 And the confessions were
corroborated by other evidence, not falsified or contradicted in any meaningful way.
That brings us to the fundamental flaw in the defense theory of collusion, a
flaw that could not have been cured by any proffered testimony from appellant’s
daughter. The supposition that the earwitnesses made up appellant’s confessions in
76
Neeka Sullivan was Sullivan’s mother, Beckwith knew him through
appellant and maintained some contact with him, and Edmonds had sold drugs with
Sullivan along with appellant.
77
Some of the earwitnesses admitted on cross-examination that, even though
they had not kept in touch generally, they had spoken with one another by phone
shortly after their grand jury testimony. But it would require a significant
speculative leap on the jury’s part to conclude that these phone calls were about a
scheme to provide false testimony to the grand jury.
68
order to falsely implicate him in the Langdon Park murders implies it was just an
extraordinary and unforeseeable coincidence when those supposedly fabricated
confessions turned out to be powerfully corroborated a decade later by the recovery
of appellant’s DNA from semen stains on the sexual assault victim’s clothing, along
with the testimony of an admitted accomplice and eyewitness to the murders, and
corroborating witnesses. 78 The utter implausibility of such a coincidence strikes at
the heart of the defense theory of collusion and fabrication. The DNA evidence and
the other corroborative evidence confirmed that the earwitnesses were telling the
truth about appellant’s confessions.
For the foregoing reasons, we think any reasonable jury would have rejected
the defense theory as both unsupported and contradicted by the evidence, even if
appellant’s daughter had testified and provided credible extrinsic evidence of
Sullivan’s bias. We therefore conclude that the error in excluding the daughter’s
testimony did not prejudice appellant and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
78
Appellant (understandably) does not contend the alleged colluders had other
(undisclosed) grounds in 2005 to believe he had anything to do with the Langdon
Park murders.
69
D. Appellant’s Objections to the Curative Instruction Given During the
Defense Closing Argument, and to the Government’s Rebuttal Argument
During the defense closing argument, the prosecutor objected to what she
perceived to be an improper suggestion that the government had undertaken to
conceal evidence from Michael Green’s debriefings that would have weakened the
force of his testimony and the prosecution case against appellant. The court shared
that perception of the defense argument and responded by instructing the jury that
the government had fulfilled its obligation to turn over any exculpatory evidence in
its possession. This was not in dispute; there was no evidentiary foundation for a
claim of wrongful concealment of evidence by the government, and defense counsel
had stated she would not “mind [if] the [c]ourt would instruct the jury that there were
no materials that were supposed to have been turned over that [weren’t] turned over.”
Appellant contends, however, that the defense argument did not accuse the
government of withholding exculpatory evidence, and that the court’s instruction
“gutted” a legitimate argument—that the lack of a record corroborating when Green
provided information to the government in his debriefings supplied a reason to doubt
his testimony and appellant’s guilt. Based on that contention, appellant moved for
a mistrial or other relief, which the court denied. Appellant further argues that the
court compounded its error by allowing the government to imply in its rebuttal
70
argument that there actually was a corroborative record of the debriefings, which the
rules of evidence just did not allow the government to present at trial.
Our review of the court’s challenged instruction and rulings is for abuse of
discretion. 79 We are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion in giving its
curative instruction, denying a mistrial or other requested relief, and overruling the
defense objection to the government’s rebuttal argument.
1. Background
As the parties stipulated at trial, the first time that Michael Green spoke with
the government about the Langdon Park murders was on August 31, 2016, when he
was debriefed by a police detective and the same Assistant U.S. Attorney (Ms. Laura
R. Bach) who conducted Green’s direct and redirect examinations at trial. This
initial debriefing was for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a plea deal. Prior
79
See, e.g., Tornero v. United States, 94 A.3d 1, 9 (D.C. 2014) (“Because a
trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, we
review a decision to restrict such argument [for] . . . abuse of discretion.” (alteration
and omission in original) (quoting Haley v. United States, 799 A.2d 1201, 1207
(D.C. 2002))); Trotter v. United States, 121 A.3d 40, 53 (D.C. 2015) (“The decision
whether to grant a mistrial motion in lieu of alternative relief in response to a
prejudicial development at trial is committed to the trial court’s discretion. We will
reverse a discretionary denial of a mistrial only if the trial court’s decision ‘appears
irrational, unreasonable, or so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a
miscarriage of justice.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Coleman v. United States, 779
A.2d 297, 302 (D.C. 2001))).
71
to the debriefing, the government had taken DNA swabs from Green and appellant,
and it had disclosed at a court hearing in their case that an independent laboratory,
Bode Cellmark Forensics, would test the semen stains on the clothing of victim
Samantha Gillard for the presence of their DNA. The results of the testing were still
unknown at the time of Green’s August 2016 debriefing.
In Green’s direct examination at trial, the prosecutor asked him whether,
during that first debriefing, he had said “anything about the DNA testing that was
about to be done.” Green answered that “I told you that the DNA would come back
for Benito [i.e., appellant] on the young lady.”
Green did not have another meeting with the government until May of 2017;
up until then, the government was unwilling to enter into a plea agreement with him
because of concerns about his truthfulness. (As the government disclosed, and as
Green admitted at trial, he had persisted in his debriefing in attempting to minimize
his culpability, for example, by denying that he had a gun at the time of the Langdon
Park murders.) The perception of Green changed, however, when Bode Cellmark
Forensics reported the results of its DNA testing to the government on April 25,
2017. Those results verified Green’s assertion that appellant’s DNA would be found
in the semen samples from Gillard’s clothing. Green then resumed talks with the
government in May 2017, which culminated in the plea and cooperation agreement
72
that Green signed on June 2, 2017. Green had several subsequent meetings with the
government in preparation for appellant’s trial, which commenced in January 2018.
When appellant’s trial counsel cross-examined Green, she did not challenge
(or even ask about) his testimony that he told the government in August 2016 that
appellant’s DNA was on Gillard’s clothing. When the government rested, that
testimony appeared to be undisputed.
In the defense case, however, appellant called Metropolitan Police Detective
Michael Fulton, the detective who had participated in Green’s debriefing meetings.
Neither party asked Detective Fulton about anything Green told him and the
prosecutor in those meetings, or when he first told them about anything, nor about
the DNA evidence at all. Rather, defense counsel focused on whether
contemporaneous recordings or notes had been made or taken in the meetings.
Detective Fulton testified that no video or audio recordings were made, and that it is
not his practice to take notes during debriefings because “the prosecutors[] typically
take all the notes of what’s going on in the debriefing.” On cross-examination,
Detective Fulton confirmed that “the prosecutors often type things up later,” and that
in this case, Green also was “put into the grand jury . . . [a]nd his statement was
memorialized under oath.”
73
On redirect, defense counsel attempted, over government objection, to elicit
testimony from the detective that it was “a practice” not to take notes in witness
debriefings “[s]o there’s no record of the fact their witnesses give different versions”
that the defense could use to impeach the witnesses. Defense counsel argued that “a
jury might wonder why you meet with somebody and don’t write notes down,” to
which the court responded that Detective Fulton had testified that “somebody else
[i.e., the prosecutor] took notes.” Defense counsel denied that she was suggesting
anything “nefarious” on the part of the government, but she admitted that “the jury
could think that.” Defense counsel then stated she would have no objection if the
court were to instruct the jury that “there were no materials that were supposed to
have been turned over that [weren’t] turned over,” and that “the [c]ourt could
certainly say there was nothing from the debriefing that existed that we didn’t get,”
because “[t]hat’s not our argument.” Ultimately, however, the court sustained the
government’s objection to the proposed line of questioning on the ground that it was
beyond the scope of the cross-examination. 80
2. Closing Argument and Rebuttal
In closing argument, the prosecutor cited as evidence of Green’s credibility
the (seemingly undisputed) fact that before anyone knew the results of the DNA
80
That ruling is not challenged on appeal.
74
testing, Green told the government in his August 2016 debriefing that appellant’s
DNA would be in the semen samples recovered from Gillard’s clothing. This was
strong confirmation that Green actually was an eyewitness to appellant’s sexual
assault of Gillard; how else would he have known?
In response, defense counsel sought in her argument to raise doubts about
“when Mr. Green first said” the things that he told the government. Significantly,
defense counsel did not dispute or question what Green had reportedly said in his
meetings with the police and the prosecutor; in particular, counsel did not dispute
that Green had predicted the result of the DNA testing, and she did not discuss that
prediction. Counsel argued only that, without recordings or other records of the
meetings, the jury had to take Green’s uncorroborated word as to when he first said
things to the government. In making that argument, counsel appeared to imply that
the government deliberately made no record of the meetings in order to avoid
revealing when Green said what he said. Counsel put the defense argument to the
jury this way (emphasis added):
[Green ha]s met with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the
police numerous times. He met with them during his
debriefing and then a bunch of times in January [2018]
before this trial[,] and you’re going to have to rely on
Mr. Green telling you what is what about when he said
what. . . . Detective Fulton told you that he was there for
those. You have not seen a single note, video, audio or
anything of all these meetings with Michael Green. I
75
mean, why not? Why not make a record? Because they’re
going to tell you when he said things. . . . I expect that the
Government is going to argue that it’s [a] compelling
argument that before any reports were in, Mr. Green told
them this stuff about what Mr. Valdez is supposed to have
said.[81] Well, how do we know when Mr. Green first said
this to them? How do we know it was in August[] 2016
and not in January? Because he says so and how does
anybody know if they aren’t recording it in all these
meeting[s?]
The prosecutor objected at this point. Counsel approached the bench, where
the prosecutor complained that “[defense counsel]’s calling us Brady[82] violators
and she’s saying how do we know that we’re not.” Defense counsel denied making
that allegation (“I’m not saying law to anybody”), and the prosecutor then “just
ask[ed] the [c]ourt to tell the jury that we have an obligation to turn this information
over.” Defense counsel did not oppose that request, the court agreed to it, and
counsel returned to their respective seats. The court thereupon instructed the jury as
follows: “Ladies and gentlemen, if there is any information that is given to the
Government that is exculpatory to the Defendant, the prosecution has an obligation
81
Here, defense counsel appears to have been referring to Green’s trial
testimony that appellant had told him he would claim he traded crack for sex with
Gillard if his DNA were found in the semen samples on her clothing. But Green did
not testify, and the government did not claim, that he reported this statement in his
first debriefing or before the DNA test results were received.
82
Referring to the government’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose evidence that is materially favorable to the defendant in
a criminal case, including evidence that would have impeachment value.
76
to turn it over, as it did in this case.” There was no contemporaneous objection to
this instruction.
Defense counsel then resumed and finished her argument focused on doubt as
to when “these things were said” by Green:
Okay. So, let’s just say this. There’s no evidence other
than what comes out of Michael Green’s mouth about
when these things were said and whether people can
remember exactly what dates.
If there was some record of the date and what he said on
what date, then you all could rest assured or not rest
assured, but be a lot more convinced about how his story
evolved because you know his story evolved.
Without further explaining how the particular dates might be significant, defense
counsel then moved on to other topics before concluding her closing argument.
Although the point of the defense lack-of-corroboration argument was murky,
it evidently was meant to cast doubt on whether Green actually told the government
in his first debriefing that appellant’s DNA would be found on Ms. Gillard’s
clothing, rather than at a later time. (There was no reason to think the date or
occasion on which Green provided other information to the government was of any
significance.) Yet defense counsel did not even mention Green’s prediction. That
Green in fact did predict the finding of appellant’s DNA on Ms. Gillard’s clothing
at some point before Bode Cellmark Forensics reported the test results was never in
77
dispute. The government received Bode’s report in April 2017, and according to the
evidence, Green’s only debriefing before then was the first one, which was in August
2016. But even if there was some uncertainty about precisely when Green first told
the government what he knew Bode’s DNA findings would be, it obviously must
have been before Bode finally disclosed in April 2017 what its findings were. To
posit otherwise would have made no sense, and appellant never made such a
suggestion. Whatever the precise date, therefore, the fact remained that,
notwithstanding the lack of any corroborative records of Green’s debriefing, he
made an accurate prediction that enhanced his credibility as an eyewitness to the
murders. The defense lack-of-corroboration argument did not undercut this.
After the defense concluded its closing argument, the court adjourned for the
evening. Before the government’s rebuttal argument the next day, appellant moved
for a mistrial. Citing Greer v. United States, 83 appellant contended that the defense
had made a legitimate argument that a lack of corroboration bore on whether the
government had met its burden of proof. Appellant denied that the defense had
accused the government of withholding exculpatory evidence. In countering an
accusation that had not been made, appellant argued, the court had improperly
undermined his lack-of-corroboration argument, and undercut the standard of proof
83
697 A.2d 1207 (D.C. 1997).
78
beyond a reasonable doubt, by assuring the jury that the government had disclosed
any exculpatory information in its possession. In lieu of a mistrial, appellant
requested the court to instruct the jury that “the defense argument was proper and
that the government always bears the burden of proof.”
In response, the government argued that the defense argument went beyond
fair comment on the lack of corroboration and amounted to an improper “missing
evidence argument plus.” This occurred, the prosecutor explained, when the defense
claimed that the government did not record what Green said in his debriefings
“because the Government knew that there would be some kind of inconsistency and
then by not recording it we didn’t have to turn it over.” This claim, the prosecutor
argued, was both false and unfairly misleading. False, because there in fact were
records of Green’s debriefings; as Detective Fulton had testified, the prosecutor did
take notes during witness interviews, and it previously had been acknowledged in
court outside the jury’s presence that the government had disclosed “all of [Green’s]
inconsistent statements” to the defense. Unfairly misleading as well, because the
defense implied that the government could have played recordings of Green’s out-
of-court statements to corroborate his testimony had they existed, “knowing full
well” that the government could not do so under the rules of evidence.
79
The trial court declined to declare a mistrial or to retract its Brady instruction.
The court stood by its determination that the defense closing argument “was made
in a way that . . . at least suggested . . . that the Government . . . had exculpatory
information that it was hiding.” “That’s exactly how I understood the argument,”
the judge added, and “in the context of a claim that somehow the Government is
hiding the ball in terms of the information that they provided to the Defense,” the
judge deemed it “appropriate for the jury to know . . . that the Government had an
obligation to turn things over and there’s no reason to believe that they didn’t.”
However, in an effort to alleviate the defense’s concern, the court decided to
reinstruct the jury on the government’s burden of proof. (The court did so
immediately following the government’s rebuttal argument.)
In its rebuttal, the government briefly addressed the defense “allegation [that]
we’re hiding things from you.” “[W]hen they say . . . wouldn’t you want to hear
those recorded statements if there were recorded statements in a debriefing,” the
prosecutor said, “ask yourselves can the Government just come in here and play all
those recorded statements?” At this point, defense counsel voiced an unspecified
objection (i.e., by saying the word “objection” without specifying any ground for it),
which the court overruled. The prosecutor continued:
If we could come in here and play recorded statements,
wouldn’t we just rely on the Grand Jury testimony? Why
80
would we bring all of these witnesses before you? The
point is there are rules and there is law and the
Government is obligated to follow those things. So, don’t
just assume that because we have the burden of proof, we
can introduce just anything into evidence.
At trial the defense did not pursue any objection to the foregoing statements
by the prosecutor or request a curative instruction or other relief. On appeal,
however, appellant argues that those statements exacerbated the trial court’s
allegedly improper undermining of the defense’s comment on the lack of
corroborative evidence by implying there actually was such corroboration of Green’s
debriefing statements that the government simply was not allowed to present at trial.
3. Discussion
As this court explained in Greer, “in assessing whether the government has
met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may properly
consider not only the evidence presented but also the lack of any evidence that the
government, in the particular circumstances of the case, might reasonably be
expected to present.” 84 Accordingly, “defense counsel may appropriately comment
in closing argument on the failure of the government to present corroborative . . .
84
697 A.2d at 1210.
81
evidence.” 85 Simply put, defense counsel may “point out to the jury that no
[corroborative] evidence has been introduced” and “argue that the absence of such
evidence weakens the Government’s case.” 86 “[A] reasonable doubt may arise . . .
from a lack of evidence, after consideration of all the evidence.” 87
However, “[i]t is, of course, improper to argue or imply . . . that corroborative
evidence, if obtained, would have been favorable to the defendant,” 88 let alone to
suggest that the government’s mere failure to present corroborative evidence
indicates the government has suppressed available evidence favorable to the
defendant. A proper Greer argument is different from a missing evidence argument,
in which “counsel asks the jury to infer that certain evidence, which exists and would
elucidate the transaction, was not presented because it was unfavorable to the
85
Id.; see also, e.g., Washington v. United States, 965 A.2d 35, 44 n.29 (D.C.
2009) (“[T]he defense is always free to comment on the absence of evidence in
arguing to the jury that the government has not met its burden to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (alteration in original) (quoting Wheeler v. United States, 930
A.2d 232, 238 (D.C. 2007))).
86
Greer, 697 A.2d at 1210 (quoting United States v. Hoffman, 964 F.2d 21,
26 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
87
Id. at 1211 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bishop
v. United States, 107 F.2d 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1939)).
88
Id. (citing Hoffman, 964 F.2d at 24-25).
82
opposing party’s case.” 89 So, for example, in Hoffman, where the police did not
obtain fingerprints, the court held it permissible for the defendant to argue that the
lack of fingerprint evidence weakened the government’s case, but not (without
laying a proper evidentiary foundation) to urge the jury to infer that fingerprint
evidence would have been favorable to the defense, or “the existence of [other] facts
not in the record.” 90 An argument suggesting that the police deliberately did not
look for fingerprint evidence because they did not want to turn over evidence
favorable to the defense would have been equally improper. “It is elementary . . .
that counsel may not premise arguments on evidence which has not been
admitted.” 91
In this case, defense counsel went beyond pointing out the failure of the
prosecution to introduce corroborative records of Green’s debriefings as a weakness
in the government’s proof. Counsel told the jury, “You have not seen a single note,
video, audio or anything of all these meetings with Michael Green. I mean, why
not? Why not make a record? Because they’re going to tell you when he said
89
Id. The requirements for making a proper missing evidence argument are
more stringent than they are for a Greer argument. See generally Thomas v. United
States, 447 A.2d 52, 57-58 (D.C. 1982). Appellant does not argue that the defense
made or sought to make a proper missing evidence argument.
90
964 F.2d at 24-25 (emphasis in original).
91
Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 283 (D.C. 2007) (omission in
original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 347 F.2d 803, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
83
things.” In those words, defense counsel invited the jury to infer that the government
deliberately made no record of the debriefings in order to avoid revealing
information that would have contradicted Green’s testimony at trial regarding “when
he said things.” Even if it was not defense counsel’s intent to convey that message,
what she said was reasonably susceptible to being so understood. And that is how
both the court and the prosecutor understood it. The suggestion that the jury could
draw such an adverse inference from the missing evidence was not a proper Greer
argument.
As it was reasonable to understand this argument as implicitly accusing the
prosecution of withholding exculpatory evidence, a suitable curative instruction was
appropriate. We are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion with the
instruction it gave, that the prosecution had an obligation to turn over any
exculpatory information and had done so. Defense counsel had confirmed as much,
and the government’s fulfillment of its Brady obligations was not in dispute.
Contrary to appellant’s contention, this instruction was consistent with (and did not
contradict or impair) appellant’s legitimate lack-of-corroboration argument, which
defense counsel reiterated without objection (and without inviting the improper
adverse inference) immediately after the court gave the instruction. A proper Greer
argument is based not on the proposition that the missing corroborative evidence
84
would be exculpatory, but on the proposition that the presented evidence alone is
insufficiently probative without corroboration.
As for appellant’s objection to the rebuttal, the prosecutor was entitled to
answer the implicit defense accusation that the government was hiding the truth by
failing to introduce records confirming the dates on which Green said things in his
debriefings. The court’s Brady instruction left a lingering question as to why the
government did not present records of Green’s prior statements to bolster his trial
testimony. In brief response, the prosecutor cautioned the jury against assuming,
even “if there were recorded statements in a debriefing,” that the rules of evidence
would have permitted the government to introduce them at trial. 92 Appellant asserts
92
See, e.g., Worthy v. United States, 100 A.3d 1095, 1096-97 (D.C. 2014)
(“As a general rule, prior consistent statements are not admissible to bolster the
credibility of a witness.”). Appellant argues that a recording of one particular
statement by Green—that appellant’s DNA would be found on Gillard’s clothing—
would have been admissible in evidence, as it would not have been offered for its
truth, but only to show Green’s knowledge. But defense counsel had not singled out
this statement (or even mentioned it at all) in her argument, and the prosecutor was
responding to a more general defense contention that the government had failed to
present the jury with corroborative recordings of when Green said things in his
debriefings.
We note that the government conceded at oral argument, and we agree, that it
is not generally permissible for a prosecutor to refer to the rules of evidence or the
possibility of excluded evidence or other information that “might or might not exist”
in response to a valid burden of proof argument by the defense. Our holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the defense objection here is
specific to the context in which that argument was made in this case.
85
on appeal that the government thereby impermissibly “argue[d] in rebuttal that there
actually was a corroborating record of Green’s debriefing.” Appellant did not state
this claim in the trial court, and it lacks merit. We disagree that the prosecutor made
such an argument, either expressly or by implication; and we are not persuaded that
the jury would have thought so or forgotten Detective Fulton’s recent testimony—
the only testimony on the point—that there were no video or audio recordings of the
debriefings, only notes taken by the prosecutor. In her rebuttal, the prosecutor did
not contradict Detective Fulton, and she said nothing about whether her notes
corroborated Green. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling appellant’s non-specific objection to the prosecutor’s rejoinder.
E. The Sodomy and Felony Murder (Sodomy) Counts
Appellant was convicted of sodomy in violation of former D.C. Code
§ 22-3502(a) (repealed 1995) and three counts of felony murder predicated on his
commission of three homicides in perpetrating that sodomy. Appellant contends his
convictions on these four counts should be reversed because the District’s sodomy
statute was unconstitutional on its face under the Supreme Court’s holding in
Lawrence v. Texas. 93 The government argues that reversal is unwarranted because
the sodomy statute was constitutionally applied to appellant’s nonconsensual sexual
93
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
86
assault of Samantha Gillard. Appellant further contends that even if the sodomy
statute was constitutionally applied in his case, he is entitled to reversal of his
convictions for felony murder because the sodomy was over and done with before
the murders were committed. The government disagrees, arguing that there was a
sufficiently close causal connection between the sodomy and the murders to support
the felony murder convictions.
For the following reasons, we agree with the government on each of these
issues.
1. Constitutionality of the Sodomy Statute as Applied to Appellant
The District’s former sodomy statute, which was repealed in 1995, made it a
felony offense to engage in oral or anal sex, regardless of the circumstances. The
statute criminalized not only sexual assaults and other predatory, nonconsensual
acts, 94 but also private acts of sodomy between consenting adults. 95 In this respect,
94
See, e.g., Gardner v. United States, 698 A.2d 990, 991 (D.C. 1997) (sodomy
convictions “resulting from a gang rape”); Glascoe v. United States, 514 A.2d 455,
458-59 (D.C. 1986) (defendant employed a gun, knife, and threats and forcibly
committed oral sodomy on the victim).
95
See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 571 A.2d 218, 221 (D.C. 1990) (noting
that the trial court properly “evaluated whether the acquittal of rape necessarily
implied that the sodomy was consensual,” for “[i]f it did, then presumably the
sentence should be considerably lighter than for nonconsensual sodomy”); United
87
the sodomy statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, for as the Supreme Court held
in Lawrence (eight years after the District’s statute was repealed), the due process
right to liberty protects private, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between
consenting adults (including acts defined as sodomy) from government
proscription. 96
This was a limited holding. The Lawrence Court emphasized that the case
before it did not involve minors or “persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.” 97 It is clear
and undisputed that there is no constitutional right to engage in nonconsensual
sodomy (or other predatory sexual conduct), and that the Constitution does not bar
the criminalization of such conduct. Lawrence therefore did not render the District’s
sodomy statute unconstitutional in every application; the Supreme Court’s decision
means only that certain conduct (essentially, the private and noncommercial sexual
behavior of consenting adults) is exempt from the sodomy statute’s purview.
Nonconsensual sodomy remains subject to prosecution.
States v. Buck, 342 A.2d 48, 48-49 (D.C. 1975) (citing cases rejecting the proposition
that the sodomy statute “cannot constitutionally be applied to acts described therein
when performed by mutually consenting adult males”).
96
539 U.S. at 578.
97
Id. The Court also noted that the case did not involve “public conduct or
prostitution.” Id.
88
In the present case, the grand jury indicted appellant specifically for
nonconsensual sodomy; Count Seven charged that appellant, “while armed with a
firearm, placed his penis in the mouth of Samantha Gillard, without the consent of
Samantha Gillard.” At the conclusion of appellant’s trial, when the court submitted
the case to the jury, the court likewise instructed the jury that the government had to
prove that appellant committed the act of sodomy without Gillard’s consent (and
while armed with a firearm). Thus, appellant’s sodomy conviction did not infringe
his right to due process as recognized in Lawrence; appellant has not shown that the
sodomy statute was unconstitutionally applied to him.
Appellant nonetheless argues that he was convicted under a statute that was
facially unconstitutional, and hence a nullity, because it categorically banned acts of
sodomy regardless of consent. As we have already said, we agree that the statute
was overbroad on its face. But a facial challenge such as this typically requires the
challenger to show that “the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications,” and
such a challenge “must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.” 98 “As
a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to
98
Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323, 338 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).
89
a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if
applied to third parties in hypothetical situations.” 99
In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of remedy when a federal court confronts a state statute
that “may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to
another.” 100 “Generally speaking,” the Court said,
when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try
to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, for
example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications
of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or to
sever its problematic portions while leaving the remainder
intact.[101]
Thus, the first principle is that “we try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work
than is necessary, for we know that ‘a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the
intent of the elected representatives of the people.’” 102 “Accordingly, the ‘normal
rule’ is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course,’ such that
99
Cnty. Ct. of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979).
546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
100
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921)).
101
Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
Id. at 329 (brackets omitted) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
102
652 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
90
a ‘statute may . . . be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but
otherwise left intact.’” 103
In pursuing that course, a court should take care not to overstep its role and
usurp the prerogatives of the legislature by “rewrit[ing] [the] law to conform it to
constitutional requirements.” 104 If a statute “fails to require the government to prove
everything the Constitution requires it to prove for a criminal sanction to be imposed,
. . . and if the legislative design and the limits of the judicial function do not permit
us to read the critical missing elements into the statute, then [the] appellant has
carried his burden of showing that every application of [the statute] is
unconstitutional—even if a validly written statute could have reached [the]
appellant’s particular conduct.” 105 In Tilley and Conley, the limits of our judicial
103
Id. (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985)).
104
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n,
Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). Although, in construing a D.C. statute, this court
may not be in quite the same position as a federal court would be, in that we may
have somewhat more leeway to interpret a D.C. statute to avoid a constitutional
problem, we view any difference as immaterial in this case. See, e.g., Conley v.
United States, 79 A.3d 270, 289 (D.C. 2013) (“As this court has stated on more than
one occasion, ‘[i]t is not within the judicial function . . . to rewrite the statute, or to
supply omissions in it, in order to make it more fair.’” (alteration and omission in
original) (quoting In re Te.L., 844 A.2d 333, 339 (D.C. 2004))).
Conley, 79 A.3d at 277; accord Tilley v. United States, 238 A.3d 961,
105
969-70 (D.C. 2020).
91
role did indeed preclude us from saving overbroad statutes by the simple expedient
of limiting their scope, such as by reading in a missing element. In Tilley, we
explained that we could not “undertake to rewrite the [Sexual Psychopath Act] in
order to save it . . . [by] merely severing an unconstitutional provision and leaving
the rest of the statute as it is,” because “[s]aving the SPA would require changing it
drastically by making difficult policy choices.” 106 And in Conley this court was
prepared to save the statute at issue if it could have done so merely by excising a
provision that unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense with respect to one element of the offense 107; but as the court explained,
the statute suffered from another constitutional flaw that judicial rewriting could not
correct without “thwart[ing] the Council’s intent” in enacting the statute. 108
Ultimately, “the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative
intent, for a court cannot ‘use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the
legislature.’” 109 Thus, “[a]fter finding an application or portion of a statute
106
238 A.3d at 978.
107
79 A.3d at 281.
108
Id. at 289.
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94
109
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
92
unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left
of its statute to no statute at all?” 110
We answer that question differently in this case than we did in Conley and
Tilley. We adhere to Ayotte’s guidelines and follow the “normal rule” by holding
that the sodomy statute is still validly applicable to nonconsensual conduct and other
activity within its scope that is not constitutionally protected as set forth in
Lawrence. That case is clear and the dividing line is not ambiguous. We do not
“rewrite” the sodomy statute or trespass on the legislature’s domain merely by
recognizing that certain conduct between consenting adults to which the words of
the statute would otherwise apply is constitutionally privileged and immune from
prosecution. We have no doubt that the D.C. Council and Congress would prefer
that we uphold application of the sodomy statute to conduct that always was (and
still is) permissibly proscribed by it. Striking down the statute in its entirety and
leaving such conduct possibly immune from prosecution (if the conduct was
committed when the statute was in force) would unacceptably “thwart the
110
Id.
93[legislature’s] intent.” 111 Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion when
confronted with constitutional challenges based on Lawrence to similar statutes. 112
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s constitutional challenge to the sodomy
counts on which he was convicted.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying Appellant’s Convictions of Felony
Murder Based on His Purposeful Killings in Perpetrating the Offense of
Sodomy
The eighth, ninth, and tenth counts of appellant’s indictment charged him with
felony murder in violation of D.C. Code § 22-2401 (1981), 113 in that he killed
Samantha Gillard, Curtis Pixley, and Keith Simmons “in perpetrating or attempting
111
Conley, 79 A.3d at 289.
112
See, e.g., Toghill v. Commonwealth, 768 S.E.2d 674, 681 (Va. 2015)
(holding that Virginia’s sodomy statute “cannot criminalize private, noncommercial
sodomy between consenting adults, but it can continue to regulate other forms of
sodomy, such as sodomy involving children, forcible sodomy, prostitution involving
sodomy and sodomy in public”); State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576, 581 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (in light of Lawrence, “crime against nature” statute is unconstitutional
in some applications but not “to prosecute . . . conduct involving non-consensual or
coercive sexual acts,” among other things); Gilbert v. State, 220 So. 3d 1099, 1105
& n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (defendant lacks standing for facial challenge to
“deviate sexual intercourse” statute because the charged offense was not “protected
under Lawrence”; the statute had “many [legitimate] applications”).
113
Recodified as amended at D.C. Code § 22-2101.
94
to perpetrate” the crime of sodomy against Ms. Gillard. In Lee v. United States, 114
this court explained the “in perpetrating” requirement as follows:
To prove felony murder, the government must establish
“some causal connection between the homicide and the
underlying felony.” “Mere temporal and locational
coincidence is not enough: it must appear that there was
such actual legal relation between the killing and the crime
. . . that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part
of the perpetration of the crime . . . .” One way of meeting
this requirement is to show that the underlying felony and
the killing were “all part of one continuous chain of
events.”
Thus, on appeal, the question before us is whether “a reasonable jury could have
found that the shootings were a means of facilitating the successful completion of
the [sodomy], and that the [sodomy] and the killings were ‘all part of one continuous
chain of events.’” 115 In answering that question, “we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to
determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact,
and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.” 116
114
699 A.2d 373, 385 (D.C. 1997) (citations and brackets omitted).
115
Id. at 386 (quoting West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 866 (D.C. 1985)).
116
Hooks v. United States, 191 A.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Offutt
v. United States, 157 A.3d 191, 193-94 (D.C. 2017)).
95
We conclude that the evidence sufficed to show that appellant’s sexual assault
on Gillard and the ensuing murders of Gillard, Pixley, and Simmons were “part of
one continuous chain of events.” Both the sexual assault and the murders arose from
appellant’s anger at what he perceived to be Pixley’s attempt to steal crack cocaine
from him. When Gillard unwittingly (and most tragically) appeared on the scene,
appellant declared she would have to “do something” for the missing drugs and
walked her a short distance away to a place where he then committed the assault.
Appellant then walked her back to the others and invited Green to sexually assault
Gillard as well. When Green declined, appellant had all three victims lie down on
the ground next to each other and shot them all to death. The shootings occurred
just moments after appellant had sodomized Gillard. Throughout the entire incident,
appellant maintained continuous control over her, while his accomplice Green
similarly maintained uninterrupted control over Pixley and Simmons. It was readily
inferable, moreover, that appellant killed all three victims for the same basic reason,
namely, to eliminate them as witnesses and thereby ensure the “successful
completion” of the sodomy. 117 Clearly, the jury could “find a substantial causal
117
That appellant may have had additional motives for the killings does not
undermine the conclusion that the evidence showed a sufficient causal relationship
linking the killings to the sodomy. See Johnson v. United States, 671 A.2d 428, 434
(D.C. 1995) (“In practically any felony murder case the defendant may have
additional reasons to want to avoid capture for the just-committed felony.”).
96
relationship between the felony [sodomy] and resultant homicide[s]”; this was not a
case of “mere coincidence of space and time.” 118
Appellant argues that because “any sex acts were over before the shootings,”
the sodomy “could no longer be a predicate for felony murder.” However, our case
law does not support the proposition that a homicide committed in the immediate
wake of a concluded felony cannot be charged as felony murder. We have held, for
example, that “[w]hile [a] burglary . . . ‘was a separate and distinct act from the
killing’ and was complete at the time of entry, it nevertheless ‘may be deemed to be
a continuing offense for purposes of the felony-murder statute.’” 119 More recently,
this court noted that in general, “for purposes of felony murder, [the predicate] felony
is deemed to be still in progress if [the] defendant has not left [the] scene or if [the]
defendant is fleeing [the] scene” at the time of the homicide. 120
118
Id. at 435.
Lee, 699 A.2d at 385-86 (quoting Marshall v. United States, 623 A.2d 551,
119
558 (D.C. 1992)).
120
In re D.N., 65 A.3d 88, 94 (D.C. 2013) (citing Charles E. Torcia, 2
Wharton’s Criminal Law § 150 (15th ed. 1994)). The current edition of Wharton’s
Criminal Law also states that “for the purpose of felony-murder, a rape or [other
felony] is deemed to be in progress after the felony proper when defendant is still on
the scene or when defendant is fleeing from the scene.” Jens David Ohlin, 2
Wharton’s Criminal Law § 21:14 (footnotes omitted) (16th ed. 2021); see also
Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 14.5(f)(1) (3rd ed. 2018); id.
§ 14.5(f)(2) (“In short, whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the
97
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the
causal connection between the sodomy and the murders necessary for convictions of
felony murder.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions and the judgment
of the Superior Court. As some of the counts of conviction are subject to merger,
felony and the homicide depends on whether the defendant’s felony dictated his
conduct which led to the homicide. If it did, and the matters of time and place are
not too remote, the homicide may be ‘in the commission of’ the felony; but if it did
not, it may not be.”).
For examples of cases upholding felony murder convictions for homicides
committed following sexual assaults, under statutes requiring the murder to have
been committed “in the commission” or “in the perpetration” of the underlying
felony, see Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 169 N.E.3d 496, 503 (Mass. 2021) (“To
support a conviction of felony-murder in the first degree, the killing need not have
occurred during the course of the predicate felony itself, but only as part of one
continuous transaction, a standard which is met if the two took place at substantially
the same time and place. . . . Where rape is the predicate felony, it is not necessary
that the homicide occur while the rape is in progress nor that it be caused by the
rape.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); People v. Thompson, 785P.2d 857, 877-78 (Cal. 1990) (stating that the “only nexus required is that the felony
and the killing be part of a continuous transaction,” a condition that was satisfied
where the victim remained under the defendant’s control for some two hours after
the felonious sexual act was committed before the defendant killed him).
98
we remand the case for the trial court to address that remaining issue and vacate
counts that merge. 121
So ordered.
121
See, e.g., Hairston v. United States, 264 A.3d 642, 652-53 (D.C. 2021).