Walker v. D.C. Department of Employment Services ( 2024 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Nos. 21-CV-0275 & 21-CV-0276
MARY OATES WALKER, APPELLANT,
V.
D.C. OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE APPEALS, et al., APPELLEES.
Appeals from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2019-CA-002406-P(MPA), 2019-CA-003093-P(MPA))
(Hon. Jose M. Lopez, Trial Judge)
(Argued October 19, 2022 Decided February 29, 2024)
Daniel J. McCartin, with whom Anthony M. Conti was on the brief, for
appellant.
Lasheka Brown filed a Statement in Lieu of Brief for the D.C. Office of
Employee Appeals.
Stacy L. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A.
Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile,
Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief,
for the Executive Office of the Mayor.
2
Before EASTERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, * Senior
Judge.
EASTERLY, Associate Judge: Mary Oates Walker challenges the decision by
the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”) upholding the Executive Office of the
Mayor’s (“EOM”) decision to terminate her employment as Chief Administrative
Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings. Specifically she asserts that
OEA’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence; OEA erred in rejecting
her claims that she was terminated without due process and in violation of D.C. Code
§ 2-1831.04(b)(7) and 6-B D.C.M.R. § 907.3; and OEA erred in rejecting her
argument that the Mayor was obligated to consider the Douglas factors, see infra
note 7, in deciding whether termination of her employment was the appropriate
response to her misconduct.
The OEA’s decision was affirmed by the Superior Court, but we “review[]
agency decisions on appeal from the Superior Court the same way we review
administrative appeals that come to us directly.” Sium v. Off. of State Superintendent
of Educ., 218 A.3d 228, 232 (D.C. 2019). “Thus, . . . confining ourselves strictly to
the administrative record, we review the OEA[’s] . . . decision, not the decision of
*
Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge at the time of argument. His status
changed to Senior Judge on December 21, 2022.
3
the Superior Court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We will affirm the
OEA’s decision as long as it is “supported by substantial evidence in the record and
otherwise in accordance with law.” Love v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 90 A.3d 412,
421 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these standards, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Ms. Walker was appointed by Mayor Adrian Fenty in 2010 as Chief
Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). In
2012, OAH came under public scrutiny in the media. Concerns were raised about
Ms. Walker’s leadership at OAH, as well as about the fact that she had hired her
business partner and friend, Kiyo Oden, 1 to serve as OAH’s general counsel in 2010,
and recommended the company TPM, owned by Lincoln Tyson, Ms. Oden’s
then-fiancé, to assist the Department of General Services (“DGS”) with the
relocation of OAH’s offices in 2011. The District’s Office of the Inspector General
(“OIG”) and a private law firm retained by OAH launched investigations, as did the
1
Ms. Oden married in 2011 and became Kiyo Tyson, but we use her maiden
name in this memorandum opinion for consistency with the contemporaneous record
materials.
4
D.C. Board of Ethics and Government Accountability (“BEGA”). On Feb. 6, 2014,
BEGA issued a Notice of Violation to Ms. Walker, charging her with nineteen
violations of specific D.C. ethics statutes and regulations 2 in relation to
Ms. Walker’s co-ownership of a business licensed in D.C. and Maryland, MKM
Ventures, LLC, with Ms. Oden; her preferential treatment of Mr. Tyson and failure
to disclose his relationship to Ms. Oden; her related misrepresentations to BEGA
investigators; and her leadership at OAH.
The next day, Mayor Vincent Gray placed Ms. Walker on administrative leave
with pay and issued an Advance Written Notice of Intent to Remove. The Advance
Notice identified five “findings of good cause”: the first incorporated by reference
the entirety of the BEGA Notice of Violation and the statutes and regulations BEGA
2
D.C. Code §§ 1-1162.23(a) (conflicts of interest), 22-722(a)(6) (prohibiting
obstructing or impeding “the due administration of justice in any official
proceeding”); District Personnel Manual (“DPM”) §§ 1800.3 (private business
conflict), 1803.1(a)(1) (appearance of using public office for private gain);
1803.1(a)(2) (giving preferential treatment to anyone), 1803.10 (interfering with or
obstructing an investigation by a district agency), 1803.11 (harassment or retaliation
against employees acting in good faith), and 1804.1(i) (engaging in other interest in
violation of district law) (2006). (BEGA miscited this last DPM regulation as DPM
§ 1803.1(i), but it was clear that BEGA meant to refer to § 1804.1(i), given that it
reproduced the text of that regulation.)
5
cited; the second identified violations of Chapter V(D) & (P) 3 of the Code of Ethics
for ALJs based on the same constellation of facts described in the BEGA Notice of
Violation; and the last three identified grounds for removal notwithstanding the
outcome of BEGA proceedings in relation to Ms. Walker’s failure to disclose her
relationship with Ms. Oden to OIG investigators, her misrepresentation under oath
to BEGA that she had not suggested TPM be hired to assist with OAH’s move, and
her inability to resolve conflict at OAH. Ms. Walker sent the Mayor a twenty-page
letter in response on Feb. 20, 2014, responding to these findings and denying any
wrongdoing.
On May 19, 2014, while the BEGA investigation continued, Mayor Gray
issued a Final Notice terminating Ms. Walker. At the outset of the letter, the Mayor
stated that he had considered her response, but based on “the entire record available
to me” had found against her on all five findings listed in the Advance Notice. The
Mayor then made certain findings of fact and set forth his “Determination of Good
Cause for Removal.” In the good cause discussion, the Mayor seemingly repackaged
the five bases for termination for good cause as nine specific violations of ethics law,
3
The Mayor miscited the relevant code chapter as Chapter IV, but it was clear
that the Mayor meant to refer to Chapter V(D) & (P) given that he reproduced the
text of those two rules and given that Chapter IV(C) and Chapter IV(P) do not exist.
6
regulations, or codes, almost all of which had been cited in the BEGA Notice of
Violation and the Advance Written Notice, 4 all relating to the same facts alleged in
the BEGA Notice of Violation and the Advance Written Notice.
Ms. Walker appealed her termination to the OEA. Meanwhile, in 2014 she
entered into a negotiated disposition with BEGA in which she admitted she had
violated D.C. Code § 1-1162.23(a), and DPM §§ 1800.3, 1803.1(a)(2) by virtue of
“maintaining a private business and financial relationship with [Ms. Oden],” and
failing to disclose Ms. Oden’s relationship with Mr. Tyson to DGS when it hired
Mr. Tyson’s company to assist with OAH’s office move. Ms. Walker agreed to pay
a fine of $20,000.
In 2017, OEA held an evidentiary hearing at which more than twenty-five
4
See supra note 2. The two additions were D.C. Code § 1-618.02 (conflict of
interest) and DPM § 1803.1(f). Regarding the latter, we assume the EOM meant to
cite to DPM § 1803.1(a)(6) (affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the government), given that § 1803.1(f) does not exist.
In its Final Notice, the EOM also incorrectly cited DPM § 1803.1(a)(a)
instead of DPM § 1803.1(a)(1) (using public office for private gain), which had been
included both in the BEGA Notice and the Advance Written Notice, but it was clear
that the Mayor meant to cite § 1803.1(a)(1) given that the Mayor reproduced its text
in his letter.
7
witnesses, including Ms. Walker, Ms. Oden, Mayor Gray, and Mayor Gray’s
General Counsel at the time of Ms. Walker’s termination, Brian Flowers, testified. 5
On March 26, 2019, the OEA issued its decision upholding Ms. Walker’s
termination, focusing on “Mayor Gray’s five charges.” Although the OEA
concluded that good cause did not exist to terminate Ms. Walker based on her
inability to resolve conflict within OAH, it ruled that she had (1) violated D.C. Code
§ 1-1162.23 by failing to divest herself of her interest in MKM Ventures;
(2) violated Chapter V(D) and (P) of the OAH Code of Ethics for ALJs by
maintaining her engagement in an outside business, MKM Ventures; (3) failed to
disclose information to BEGA investigators regarding Ms. Oden’s involvement with
MKM Ventures; and (4) made misrepresentations under oath to BEGA investigators
when she denied she recommended TPM to DGS officials. The OEA rejected
Ms. Walker’s due process claims that she was entitled to a pre-termination hearing
and that Mayor Gray had failed to personally consider her response to his Advance
Notice of termination. The OEA also rejected Ms. Walker’s argument that the
Mayor was required to justify her removal under a Douglas 6 factor analysis. On
5
The OEA initially issued a decision without holding a hearing but the
Superior Court reversed, ruling that Ms. Walker was due a post-termination hearing
as a matter of due process, and remanded.
Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981) (Merit System
6
Review Board decision that it possesses authority to mitigate agency imposed
8
consideration of Ms. Walker’s petition for review of the OEA’s decision, the
Superior Court affirmed.
II. Substantial Evidence Claims
As noted above, we review the OEA’s factual findings only for “substantial
evidence.” Brown v. Watts, 993 A.2d 529, 532 (D.C. 2010). “Substantial evidence
is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. If the administrative findings are supported by substantial
evidence, we must accept them even if there is substantial evidence in the record to
support contrary findings.” Hutchinson v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 710 A.2d 227,
230-31 (D.C. 1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The OEA upheld four good cause findings from the EOM’s Final Notice for
Ms. Walker’s removal from office. But because the Final Notice stated that each
listed finding independently constituted good cause for Ms. Walker’s removal, and
Ms. Walker has not challenged the validity of that statement, we see no need to
penalties that are excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable and identifying twelve factors that are generally recognized as relevant
to that analysis).
9
address all four. Instead, in the interest of economy, we address only one: the finding
that Ms. Walker violated the ALJ Code of Ethics. Cf. Jones v. D.C. Unemp. Comp.
Bd., 395 A.2d 392, 395-96 (D.C. 1978) (explaining that the agency could have
upheld discharge on only one ground if it was clear the employer intended each
ground to be an independent basis).
The Code of Ethics for Administrative Law Judges states in pertinent part that
“[a]n [ALJ] shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties,
[or] exploit the [ALJ’s] official position” and “shall not serve as an officer, director,
manager, general partner, advisor, independent contractor[,] or employee of any
business entity.” D.C. Off. of Admin. Hearings, Code of Ethics for OAH
Administrative Law Judges Chapter V(D) & (P) [hereinafter ALJ Code of Ethics]
(adopted by the Chief ALJ pursuant to Section 8(a)(9) of the OAH Establishment
Act of 2001, D.C. Law 14-76, codified at D.C. Official Code § 2-1831.05(a)(9)).
The OEA, like the Mayor before it, found that Ms. Walker had violated this rule
because it was undisputed that she had “held a one-third interest as a member of
MKM Ventures MD and DC while employed as OAH’s [Chief] ALJ.” The OEA
further found that Ms. Walker’s “involvement with the various MKM entities
should . . . have required her to legally divest herself from the business entities upon
10
her appointment to the position of [Chief] ALJ” and “should have precluded her
from offering the OAH General Counsel position to [Ms.] Oden.”
As the EOM highlights, Ms. Walker did not make any argument in her briefs
to this court (or in her filings in the Superior Court) that the OEA’s finding that she
violated these Ethics Code provisions lacked a substantial evidence foundation. 7
Ms. Walker attempts to contest her forfeiture of this argument in her reply brief,
asserting that she has “not conceded any good cause for her removal.” But she points
only to her challenge to the good cause finding under D.C. Code § 1-1162.23, which
does not preserve a challenge to the application of Chapter V(D) & (P) of the Code
of Ethics for OAH Administrative Law Judges, and her discussion of her asserted
disclosure of her involvement in MKM Ventures to various individuals and entities,
which is unhelpful given that the Ethics Code provisions impose flat bans on certain
conduct and do not recognize exceptions to those bans so long as the conduct is
disclosed. See ALJ Code of Ethics, Chapter V(D) & (P).
Regardless, the OEA’s findings here were supported by substantial evidence
7
Before the OEA Ms. Walker argued that she should not be found in violation
of these Ethics Code provisions because the MKM “entities had been essentially
abandoned and were losing money,” but the OEA rejected these arguments.
11
in the record, including: (1) various organizational documents, bank statements,
property conveyances, and emails entered into evidence during the OEA hearings,
confirming that MKM Ventures was founded in 2006 and that Ms. Walker and
Ms. Oden jointly participated in it through their time as government employees;
(2) testimony from the OEA hearings in which Ms. Walker and Ms. Oden as well as
the third MKM manager confirmed their participation in MKM Ventures during
their government employment; and (3) findings of fact in the BEGA Negotiated
Disposition 8 to which Ms. Walker agreed, stating that Ms. Walker and Ms. Oden
and a third-party started MKM Ventures in 2006 and “maintained a private business
and financial relationship that continued during their employment” in D.C.
government, including monetary contributions at least through 2012.
III. Procedural Claims
It is undisputed that Ms. Walker had a property interest in her employment as
8
Even though the Negotiated Disposition postdated both the EOM’s Advance
Notice and its Final Notice of Removal, the OEA explained that the Negotiated
Disposition was “nevertheless [] relevant and material in this matter as . . . clear
proof of [Ms. Walker’s] unethical misbehavior, particularly because several of the
reasons for termination set forth in the Final Notice were admitted to by
[Ms. Walker] in the [negotiated disposition].” Ms. Walker did not object to the
OEA’s consideration of the Negotiated Disposition although she now seeks to
minimize its significance, see infra note 18.
12
Chief ALJ of OAH. See D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(b)(7) (2014) (restricting
termination before the end of the Chief ALJ’s term except for “good cause”). As a
result, she was constitutionally entitled to “due process of law”—notice and the
opportunity to be heard—before permanent deprivation of that interest. See U.S.
Const. amend. V; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)
(“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We review her constitutional
claims de novo. See Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 238 A.3d
222, 226 (D.C. 2020).
We do not understand Ms. Walker to make a due process-notice challenge to
her removal. 9 Rather, she asserts she should have been granted a full evidentiary
9
Ms. Walker does make a regulatory argument that she was “never provided
a meaningful pre-termination opportunity to respond to the charges against her
because the grounds for termination in the Mayor’s advance notice of intent to
remove differed from the grounds for termination in the Mayor’s final termination
letter,” as required by 6-B D.C.M.R. § 907.3, highlighting that only five findings of
good cause were listed in the Advance Notice while nine were listed in the Final
Notice. Ms. Walker did not make this argument before the OEA and as discussed
above, we see no material variation between the two notices. In any event
Ms. Walker has never argued that she did not have specific notice that the Mayor
was considering her removal due to her violation of Chapter V(D) and (P) of the
Ethics Code for OAH Administrative Law Judges.
13
hearing pre-termination, and second, that the Mayor violated the maxim of “[t]he
one who decides must hear,” Feldman v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 160 A.2d 100, 102 (D.C.
1960) (quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)), by not
personally considering her written response. Like the OEA, we disagree.
As for Ms. Walker’s first argument, the OEA rightly concluded that
Ms. Walker had “not present[ed] any credible binding case or statu[t]e that mandates
that her [evidentiary] hearing occur before her removal was effectuated.”
Ms. Walker’s reliance on Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532(1985), is misplaced. Loudermill analyzed the process due to a public employee
who, by statute, could only be terminated for cause and had a right to appeal his
decision and receive a “full post-termination hearing.” 470 U.S. at 535, 546. After
conducting the requisite “balancing of the competing interests at stake” under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the court concluded that a full
evidentiary hearing, pre-termination, was not needed. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542,
545 (holding that a “‘hearing,’ though necessary, need not be elaborate”). Instead,
at that juncture, the employee need only be accorded “an opportunity to present
[their] side of the story,” “either in person or in writing.” Id. at 546.
Ms. Walker received an opportunity “to present [her] side of the story” before
14
she was removed from office. Id. In his February 7, 2014, Advance Notice, the
Mayor invited her to “respond in writing.” She did so, on February 20, 2014,
submitting a twenty-page response with 186 pages of exhibits. (Although she asked
the Mayor to postpone his decision until BEGA and other proceedings had
concluded, she did not request an evidentiary hearing at that time. 10) On such
analogous facts to Loudermill, Ms. Walker received all the “process [she was] due.”
Id. at 541.
We are unpersuaded by Ms. Walker’s citation to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), a case decided pre-Loudermill, entitling public assistance recipients to
an evidentiary hearing before those benefits are terminated. Ms. Walker asserts
Goldberg supports her claim that when “credibility and veracity are at
issue . . . written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.” Id. at
269. While termination of employment undeniably has a profound effect on
someone’s life, the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg was focused on the
distinct and dire situation that someone reliant on public benefits, by definition low-
income and often already without employment, would face if those benefits were
Ms. Walker made her request for an evidentiary hearing three months later,
10
on May 12, 2014, after she learned that the Mayor had set a May 14, 2014, deadline
to proceed with his removal decision.
15
unjustly terminated, and the Court specifically distinguished this scenario from that
of “the discharged government employee,” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, which it
subsequently addressed in Loudermill. See 470 U.S. at 545 (noting that Goldberg
was the only case in which “the Court [had] required a full adversarial evidentiary
hearing prior to adverse governmental action” and explaining that “that case
presented significantly different considerations than are present in the context of
public employment”).
We are likewise unpersuaded by Ms. Walker’s argument that her liberty
interest in clearing her name gave her a due process right to a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing under Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564(1972). Ms. Walker fails to explain how Board of Regents, which held an untenured
professor did not have a due process right to a pre-termination hearing, id. at 578,
supports her argument. Nor does she reconcile her argument with the Supreme
Court’s express consideration of this concern in Loudermill, when it analyzed the
process due to a government employee in Ms. Walker’s circumstances. The Court
acknowledged that a terminated employee seeking new employment “is likely to be
burdened by the questionable circumstances under which [an employee] left [their]
previous job,” 470 U.S. at 543; nonetheless the Court held in Loudermill that a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing was not required as a matter of due process. Id. at
16
547-48.
Alternatively, Ms. Walker argues that she was deprived of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard prior to her removal because the Mayor testified that he did
not personally review her written response to the Advance Notice, nor the evidence
supporting it. Ms. Walker argues that the Mayor violated the principle that “[t]he
one who decides must hear,” Feldman, 160 A.2d at 102 (quoting Morgan, 298 U.S.
at 468). She further relies on D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(b)(7) (2014), which specifies
that the Chief ALJ of OAH can be terminated only upon a “written finding of the
Mayor.” Id. (emphasis added).
We affirm the OEA’s conclusion that the Mayor was empowered to reach
decisions using his staff and without delving into the “minutiae of work necessary
to effectively carry out every policy and procedure necessary for good
governance.” 11 Although the Mayor was statutorily obligated to make the final
decision to remove Ms. Walker from office, see id., he was also statutorily
authorized to make broad delegations of power in coming to that decision, see D.C.
Code § 1-204.22(6) (2014). And it is wholly within the bounds of due process for a
11
The OEA came to this conclusion in assessing Ms. Walker’s due process
arguments and did not explicitly reference D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(b)(7) in this
context. But we conclude the same rationale governs.
17
statutorily obligated decision maker to delegate the review and interpretation of
evidence to staff and rely on those staff members to inform their final decision. See
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 12
(“It is well settled that . . . an administrative officer may rely on subordinates to sift
and analyze the record and prepare summaries and confidential recommendations,
and the officer may base his decision on these reports without reading the full
transcript.”); Feldman, 160 A.2d at 102 (noting that it does not violate due process
for a “hearing officer . . . [to] submit[] a report to a superior board or agency for its
decision”); see also Morgan, 298 U.S. at 481 (explaining that “[e]vidence may be
taken . . . [and] sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates”); S. Garment Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (“Realism negatives the idea
that a subordinate is to exercise no intelligence . . . .”).
Thus it is immaterial that the Mayor did not personally review Ms. Walker’s
written submission or her exhibits, as his role in “consider[ing] and apprais[ing]” the
evidence, Feldman 160 A.2d at 102, did not require such a personal review. Instead
it was sufficient that (1) the Mayor’s general counsel and other staff reviewed these
12
Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit prior to February
1, 1971, are binding on this court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971).
18
materials, conducted additional investigation, and prepared for his review and
approval of a Final Notice 13 that referenced Ms. Walker’s response, 14 and that (2) the
Mayor, contrary to the representations made by Ms. Walker’s counsel at oral
argument, in fact approved and signed the letter. 15
IV. Consideration of the Douglas Factors in Determining Whether Removal
of Ms. Walker from Office Was Justified
Lastly, Ms. Walker argues that the Mayor’s decision to remove her was
arbitrary and capricious because he concededly did not consider the Douglas factors.
13
Ms. Walker highlights the fact that Mr. Flowers admitted that he did not
draft good cause findings seven through nine in the Final Notice (when the Mayor
repackaged the five bases for termination for good cause as nine specific violations
of ethics law, regulations, or codes). But given that we have concluded that we only
need to look to the Mayor’s determination that good cause existed to remove
Ms. Walker based on her violation of the Code of Ethics for ALJs—number five in
this list of nine—this admission cannot give rise to reversible error.
14
Given our assessment that the Final Notice and the Advance Notice were
not materially different in detailing the Mayor’s good cause findings, see supra note
9, we agree with Ms. Walker that the OEA was wrong to conclude that Ms. Walker
had actually persuaded the Mayor not to rely on certain findings listed in the
Advance Notice.
15
Hodges v. U.S. Postal Serv., 118 M.S.P.R. 591 (M.S.P.B. 2012), which is
not binding authority on this court, is not to the contrary, as Ms. Walker claims. See
id. 593-94 (holding that due process was violated when the only official involved in
the decision did not consider the employee’s response).
19
See supra note 6. The OEA concluded that these factors do not apply to Ms. Walker
because her position as the Chief ALJ of OAH is designated “excepted service,” see
D.C. Code § 2-1831.04(9) (designating the Chief ALJ of OAH as excepted service),
and under the D.C.M.R., the Douglas factors do not apply to individuals in excepted
service positions, 6B D.C.M.R. § 1600.2(f) (excluding excepted service positions
from the career and educational service regulations); id. § 1606.2 (requiring Douglas
factor consideration only for the career and education service). We assume without
deciding that the Douglas factors do apply to Ms. Walker and affirm the OEA’s
ruling uphold the Mayor’s decision to remove Ms. Walker as the Chief ALJ of OAH.
In Stokes v. District of Columbia, 502 A.2d 1006 (D.C. 1985), this court
affirmed a Superior Court decision ruling that the OEA had overstepped its bounds
in reinstating a career service employee to his job. 502 A.2d at 1007. Explaining
that the OEA’s job was “like that of its federal counterpart, the Merit Systems
Protection Board, . . . simply to ensure that managerial discretion has been
legitimately invoked and properly exercised,” “not to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency,” this court endorsed the OEA’s decision in an earlier case to be
“guided” in its review of agency decision-making by the Douglas factors. Id. at
1010-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the cases cited by Ms. Walker
reflect, the Douglas factor analysis is a tool for the OEA and this court to ensure an
20
agency’s decision to sanction or terminate an employee is well-grounded. 16 See,
e.g., Love, 90 A.3d at 417 n.10 (explaining that in Stokes, this court “essentially
adopted Douglas to aid our review of employment terminations, reviewed by [the]
OEA”); D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 88 A.3d 724, 730
n.3 (D.C. 2014) (“There is no requirement that an agency articulate its Douglas
analysis before terminating an employee.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we
reject Ms. Walker’s argument that the Mayor was required to engage in an analysis
of the Douglas factors. At most, the Mayor was simply required to reach a decision
that could survive a Douglas factor review by the OEA.
Furthermore, although the OEA determined (correctly) that the Mayor “was
not required to perform an explicit Douglas Factor analysis” it then determined that
had a Douglas factor analysis been performed[,] it is likely
that Douglas Factors 1 [the nature and seriousness of the
offense and its relation to the employee’s duties, including
whether the offense was intentional or technical or
inadvertent, or was committed intentionally or maliciously
for gain, or was frequently repeated], 2 [the employee’s
job level and type of employment, including supervisory
or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and prominence
of the position], 5 [the effect of the offense on the
employee’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its
effect on supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability
16
We have never held that Douglas applies to members of the excepted
service, and all the cases Ms. Walker cites in her briefs to this court involve career
service employees.
21
to perform assigned duties], 8 [the notoriety of the offence
or its impact on the reputation of the agency] and 9 [the
clarify with which the employee was on notice of any rules
that were violated in committing the offense, or had been
warned about the conduct in question] would have been
aggravating factors in her removal analysis.
Ms. Walker has not challenged the OEA’s assessment of these Douglas factors (or
identified factors that the OEA should have but failed to consider). 17 Even if she
had, we would see no basis to reverse on this record.
As explained above, the Mayor determined there was good cause to remove
Ms. Walker from her office as the chief jurist for the Office of Administrative
Hearings, because she had violated the Code of Ethics for the Administrative Law
Judges. Subsequent to that determination Ms. Walker entered into a negotiated
disposition with BEGA, in which she admitted to multiple charges of ethical
wrongdoing. Specifically she admitted that she had violated the District Code of
Conduct, D.C. Code § 1-1162.23(a), regarding conflicts of interest, and had violated
provisions of the District Personnel Manual, DPM §§ 1800.3, 1803.1(a)(2), based
on (1) her “private business and financial relationship” with Ms. Oden that existed
at the time Ms. Walker hired Ms. Oden and continued thereafter while she
17
Even as to the Mayor, Ms. Walker has never explained how an analysis of
the Douglas factors would have led to a different outcome; she only posits that his
failure to consider them was in itself arbitrary and capricious.
22
“supervised and was a superior to” Ms. Oden, and (2) her failure to disclose to DGS
her “social relationship” with Lincoln Tyson or her knowledge of his relationship
with Ms. Oden. Ms. Walker agreed to a $20,000 fine in return for BEGA dismissing
the remaining ethics charges against her, and expressly conceded that the Negotiated
Discipline is “not just an admission but constitutes various factual admissions by
her” that could be used in any future efforts to enforce the agreement. 18 Based on
these facts, we agree that the Douglas factors the OEA identified supported
Ms. Walker’s removal.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
So ordered.
18
Based on this language, we reject Ms. Walker’s argument that the
Negotiated Disposition cannot be construed as an admission and was only a
“settlement agreement that [she] entered into to resolve the baseless allegations
levied against her by BEGA.”