Ben-Yishai v. Syrian Arab Republic ( 2022 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    YITZHAK BEN-YISHAI, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    Case No. 1:18-cv-3150-RCL
    v.
    THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC and
    THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
    Defendants.
    ;
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On November 4, 2001, sixteen-year-old Shoshana Ben-Yishai was riding a bus home from
    school through the French Hill neighborhood of Jerusalem, Israel when a terrorist with an
    automatic rifle shot and killed her. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad ("PIJ") claimed responsibility for
    the attack. Plaintiffs, Shoshana's parents and younger siblings, ask the Court to hold the Syrian
    Arab Republic ("Syria") and the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran") liable for materially supporting
    the PIJ in carrying out the attack. They raise claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
    ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), which guarantees a private cause of action for victims of state-
    sponsored terrorism. Neither defendant responded to this lawsuit, so the plaintiffs have moved for
    default judgment.
    In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will set forth its findings of fact and conclusions
    of law on the plaintiffs' claims. After considering the plaintiffs' motion and evidence, applying
    relevant case law, and taking judicial notice of related cases, the Court will GRANT the plaintiffs'
    motion for default judgment against Syria and Iran.
    1
    I.      LEGAL STANDARD
    The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against Syria and Iran because neither defendant
    has appeared or defended this lawsuit. See Mot. for Default J, ECF No. 44; Pis.' Mem. in Supp.,
    ECF No. 44-1; Pis.' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ECF No. 44-4 ("Pis.'
    PFFCL"). But even when a defendant fails to appear, "the entry of a default judgment is not
    automatic." Mwani v. bin Laden, 
    417 F.3d 1
    , 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The FSIA expressly provides that
    "[n]o judgment by default shall be entered ... against a foreign state ... unless the claimant
    establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (e);
    see Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 
    775 F.3d 419
    , 423 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A district court retains
    discretion "to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must
    provide" to establish her claim or right to relief. See Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of
    Korea, 
    774 F.3d 1044
    , 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014). "[I]ndeed, the quantum and quality of evidence that
    might satisfy a court can be less than that normally required." Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 
    864 F.3d 751
    , 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted), vacated and remanded
    on other grounds sub nom. Opati v. Republic ofSudan, 
    140 S. Ct. 1601
     (2020).
    Additionally, a plaintiff moving for default judgment "must persuade the trial court" that
    it may exercise subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Karcher
    v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    396 F. Supp. 3d 12
    , 21 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab
    Republic, 
    167 F. Supp. 3d 22
    , 33 (D.D.C. 2016)). After all, a default judgment "rendered in excess
    of a court's jurisdiction is void." Jerez, 775 F.3d at 422. And a default judgment "must not differ
    in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
    2
    II.     FINDINGS OF FACT
    Before this Court can enter default judgment against defendants, it must "reach its own,
    independent findings of fact" notwithstanding prior cases implicating the same issues. Rimkus v.
    Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d 163
    , 172 (D.D.C. 2010). "[N]umerous evidentiary
    sources" can support a default judgment. 
    Id. at 171
    . Additionally, "a court may take judicial notice
    of related proceedings _and records in cases before the same court." _Id. (internal quotations and
    citations omitted); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The plaintiffs here submitted evidence-personal
    declarations, declarations by experts, and expert reports. The Court also takes judicial notice of
    Schertzman Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1214 (JEB), 
    2019 WL 3037868
    , *1
    (D.D.C. July 11, 2019), which involved the same attack, 1 as well as Cohen v. Islamic Republic of
    Iran, 
    238 F. Supp. 3d 71
     (D.D.C. 2017) and Force v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    464 F. Supp. 3d 323
     (D.D.C. 2020), which involved similar attacks. With these principles in mind, the Court enters
    the following findings of fact.
    A. Plaintiffs' Claims
    Plaintiffs are Shoshana's immediate family members-her parents, Yitzhak and Miriam,
    as well as her younger siblings Jacob, Israel,2 Chana, Yael, and Aviel. Am. Compl., ECF No. 22,
    ,r,r 7-12. Shoshana's parents also bring a claim on behalf of her estate. 
    Id.
     ,r 7. They sued Syria
    and Iran 3 under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), alleging that the defendants "provided the
    1
    The plaintiffs in Schertzman Cohen were survivors of the bus attack and their family members. See 
    2019 WL 3037868
    , at *1.
    2
    The Court will use the English spelling of Mr. Ben-Yishai's name, consistent with his U.S. passport, rather than the
    Hebrew pronunciation. See Israel Ben-Yishai Deel., ECF No. 40, ,r 1.
    3
    The plaintiffs originally named the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security ("MOIS") as a defendant as well.
    Am. Compl. ,r 15. Service was never successfully completed on MOIS, therefore the plaintiffs are no longer pursuing
    a claim against MOIS. See Pis.' Mem. 'in Supp. at 9 n. l. Thus, having never served MOIS, any claims against MOIS
    are dismissed by the Order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion.
    3
    Palestine Islamic Jihad with material support and resources, for acts of extrajudicial killing within
    the meaning of[the FSIA], including the French Hill Terrorist Attack, and performed other actions
    that enabled, facilitated and caused the French Hill Terrorist Attack and harm to the plaintiffs
    herein." 
    Id.
       ,r,r 13-14. The Amended Complaint in this action advances various theories ofliability,
    including wrongful death, battery, survival, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
    infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and vicarious liability. See 
    id.
    ,r,r 61-97. The plaintiffs also seek several forms of damages, such as economic damages, pain and
    suffering, solatium, and punitive damages. 
    Id.
     ,r,r67-69, 72-73, 77-78, 82-83, 86-87, 90-91, 96.
    B. Service of Process
    The plaintiffs first attempted to serve process on the defendants by requesting that the Clerk
    of the Court-pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (a)(3)-mail Syria and Iran a summons, complaint,
    and notice of suit. Aff. Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 5-7. That attempt at service failed
    because no company would ship packages to Iran. See 12/11/2019 Summons Return, ECF No. 9;
    01/13/2020 Summons Return, ECF No. 12. The plaintiffs then attempted service on Syria and Iran
    via diplomatic channels pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § l 608(a)(4). Aff. Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF
    No. 15. The plaintiffs successfully served Syria and Iran with a summons, a complaint, a notice of
    suit, and translations of each under cover of diplomatic note on August 10, 2020 and August 19,
    2020, respectively. Return of Service, ECF No. 16 & 17. Both defendants failed to answer the
    complaint or appear in this litigation within sixty days of service. Accordingly, the Clerk of the
    Court entered default against Syria on December 3, 2020, Entry of Default, ECF No. 19, and
    against Iran on February 21, 2021, Entry of Default, ECF No. 24.
    4
    C. Evidence Connecting Iran and Syria to the Attack and the PIJ
    To detail Syria and Iran's connection to the PIJ, the Court relies on the expert reports and
    declarations submitted by plaintiffs in this case as well as the judicial findings in the Cohen, Force,
    and Schertzman Cohen decisions themselves.
    1. Expert Testimony
    To begin, the Court qualifies seven individuals as experts. The plaintiffs provided the Court
    with selected materials submitted in the Cohen and Force cases, namely, declarations prepared by
    and transcripts of testimony from five experts-Dr. Harel Chorev, Dr. Patrick Clawson, Dr. Marius
    Deeb, Dr. Matthew Levitt, and Col. (Ret.) Arieh Dan Spitzen. See Clawson Deel., ECF No. 41-1
    [hereinafter "Clawson Force Deel."]; Levitt Deel., ECF No. 41-2; Deeb Deel., ECF No. 41-3
    [hereafter "Deeb Force Deel."]; Spitzen Deel., ECF No. 41-4; Levitt and Spitzen Test. Tr., ECF
    No. 41-5; Clawson and Deeb Test. Tr., ECF No. 41-6; Chorev Deel., ECF No. 41-7; Clawson
    Deel., ECF No. 41-8 [hereinafter "Clawson Cohen Deel."]. Plaintiffs also provided the Court with
    materials unique to this case from three experts-Dr. Marius Deeb, Mr. Michael Soudry, and Dr.
    Rael Strous. See Deeb Deel., ECF No. 43 [hereinafter "Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel."]; Soudry Deel.,
    ECF No. 39; Soudry Rep., ECF No. 39-2; Strous Deel., ECF No. 42; Strous Reps., ECF No. 42-
    2-42-8.
    After reviewing these materials, the Court will take judicial notice of expert reports and
    testimony from the Cohen and Force proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 171
    . The Court therefore qualifies the following experts in this case:
    •     Harel Chorev. The court qualifies Dr. Chorev as an expert in
    "Palestinian terrorist networks." See Cohen Tr. 111 :21-24, ECF No.
    41-9; see also Chorev Deel.; Schertzman Cohen, 
    2019 WL 3037868
    ,
    at *2.
    5
    •   Patrick Clawson. The Court qualifies Dr. Clawson as an expert "on
    Iran's role as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Iran's Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps ["IRGC"], ... and the IRGC's material
    support of Palestinian Is1amic Jihad. 'See Cohen Tr. 139:20-25· see
    also Clawson Cohen Deel.; Clawson Force Deel.; Schertzman
    Cohen, 
    2019 WL 3037868
    , at *2.
    •   Marius Deeb. The Court qualifies Dr. Deeb as an expert "on Syrian
    support for terrorism, specifically for Hamas and PIJ." See Force
    464 F. Supp. 3d at 337; see also Deeb Beti-Yishai Deel.; Deeb Force
    Deel.
    •   Matthew Levitt. The Court qualifies Dr. Levitt as an expert on
    "Iranian sponsorship of terrorism including Hamas and PIJ. ' See
    Levitt and Spitzen Test. Tr. 10:19-22, ECF No. 41-5; see also
    Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 337; Levitt Deel.
    •   Arieh Dan Spitzen. The Court qualifies Col. Spitzen as an expert
    "on the topic of Palestinian terror groups that operate within the
    Palestinian territories." See Levitt and Spitzen Test. Tr. 53:1-4; see
    also Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 337; Spitzen Deel.
    •   Michael Soudry. The Court qualifies Mr. Soudry as an expert in
    forensic accounting. See Soudry Deel.; Soudry curriculum vitae,
    ECF No. 39-1; Soudry Rep.; Pls.' PFFCL at 31.
    •   Rael Strous. The Court qualifies Dr. Strous as an expert in
    psychiatry. See Strous Deel.; Strous curriculum vitae, ECF No. 42-
    1; Strous Reps.
    2. November 4, 2001 Attack
    The Court finds satisfactory evidence in the record to demonstrate that the PIJ was
    responsible for the attack that killed Shoshana. As the court in Schertzman Cohen remarked,
    "[t]here is little controversy over whether the PIJ is responsible for the November 4, 2001, attack."
    
    2019 WL 3037868
    , at *4. That afternoon, a Palestinian gunman armed with an M-16 assault rifle
    neared an intersection in Jerusalem's French Hill neighborhood as the Egged bus No. 25 traveled
    toward the intersection. See Chorev Deel., ,r,r 24, 25. As the bus approached, the gunman emptied
    a full magazine of bullets into the bus's side. 
    Id.
     Shoshana and fourteen-year-old Menashe Regev
    were killed and forty-five others were injured. 
    Id.
     The PIJ claimed responsibility for the attack via
    6
    the organization's official website and weekly newspapers. See 
    id.
         ,r,r 26-29. Dr. Chorev, qualified
    as an expert in Palestinian terror networks, believes that these claims of responsibility are credible.
    
    Id.
     Dr. Chorev also noted how the Israeli government attributed the attack to the PIJ, lending
    credence to the PIJ's claims. See 
    id.
        ,r,r 30-34. Based on this evidence, Dr. Chorev, in his expert
    opinion, "conclude[d] with a high degree of confidence that PIJ is responsible for the Attack." 
    Id.
    ,r 38. Based on the representations of plaintiffs' expert as well as the Court's review of the materials
    before and findings by the Schertzman Cohen court, this Court finds the PIJ responsible for the
    November 4, 2001 attack.
    3. Iran's Material Support for the PIJ
    Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has actively opposed Israeli interests in the Middle
    East, primarily through like-minded non-state actor proxy forces, such as the PIJ. See Clawson
    Force Deel.    ,r,r 27-28, 30-31; Levitt Deel. ,r,r 90-91, 93. One such strategy Iran has employed to
    attack Israel through proxies is to encourage and monetarily incentivize "lone wolves" to injure or
    kill Israeli civilians. Clawson Force Deel.    ,r 28.
    The PH-short for Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Al-Jihad Al-Islami fi Filastin-grew out of
    a Palestinian student movement in Cairo led, most notably, by Fathi Shiqaqi. Levitt Deel.           ,r 90.
    Inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shiqaqi formed the PIJ in the early 1980s. 
    Id.
            ,r 93. The
    PIJ's official goal "is the destruction of the State ·of Israel and the establishment of a sovereign,
    Islamic Palestinian state" which "can only be achieved through armed struggle." Deeb Ben-Yishai
    Deel.   ,r 12. Iran has been funding the PIJ since as early as 1993. Levitt Deel. ,r 110. After a lull in
    attacks in the late 1990s following Shiqaqi's assassination, the PIJ's attacks picked up sharply in
    2000. 
    Id.
       ,r,r 102, 109. This increase in the PIJ's activity-and success in its efforts against Israeli
    targets--coincided with an increase in Iranian support of the PIJ. 
    Id.
            ,r 108   (explaining Iran's
    7
    promise to increase funding for the PIJ by 70 percent in 2002 "to cover the expense of recruiting
    young Palestinians for suicide operations"); see also 
    id.
     ("Tehran instituted an incentive system in
    which millions of dollars in cash bonuses are conferred to [the PIJ] for successful attacks.").
    In October 2001, the month before the attack at issue here, the PIJ's Secretary General
    asserted, "[ w ]ith the grace of God and the blessing of the blood martyrs, the Islamic Jihad
    movement is the best condition it has ever been in," as result of "its jihadist effectiveness and
    qualitative operations." Clawson Cohen Deel.     ,r 34. And the PIJ was keen to act at its height of
    strength: from November 4, 2001 through October 2003, the PIJ carried out more than 440 terrorist
    attacks (including suicide bombings and other attacks), killing over 130 individuals and wounding
    about 880 more. Levitt Deel.     ,r 103.
    Accordingly, the Court finds that Iran provided material support to PIJ during the time
    period relating to the attack.
    4. Syria's Material Support/or the PIJ
    Like Iran, Syria has sought to reduce Israel's influence in the Middle East since the 1970s,
    primarily by supporting proxy forces. See Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 341. Syria formed a
    particularly close relationship with the PIJ, based on their "total agreement to forcefully fight
    against and obstruct the peace process" between Israel and Palestine. Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel. ,r 16.
    In fact, since 1988, the PIJ's senior leadership has been based out of Damascus, Syria. Spitzen
    Deel. ,r 312. PIJ leaders consistently praise Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel.
    ,r 20. In the mid-2000s, the U.S. Department of the Treasury remarked that that "PIJ leadership in
    Damascus, Syria control[led] all PIJ officials, activists and terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza."
    Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 343 (internal citation omitted). Since 1993, Syria has supported the PIJ's
    efforts to obstruct any peace agreements between Israel and Palestine through the provision of
    8
    "funds, logistics, weapons, provision of safe haven, training in terrorist methods and strategic
    planning for terrorist operations." Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel.    ,r 16. By hosting and equipping the PIJ,
    Syria offered symbolic validation, political support, legitimacy, and freedom of maneuver, all of
    which enabled the PIJ to grow, develop, and carry out its violent activities. Id.   ,r,r 21-22.
    Accordingly, the Court finds that Syria provided material support to the PIJ during the time
    period relating to the attack.
    III.    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    This Court's conclusions of law will proceed in several parts. The Court will then address
    why it has subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA's terrorism exception. Next, the Court will
    explain why it may validly exercise personal jurisdiction over Iran and Syria in this case. The
    Court will then discuss potential issues of timeliness and venue. After that, the Court will assess
    whether plaintiffs have stated cognizable claims for relief under§ 1605A(c) of the FSIA. As the
    Court will explain, the plaintiffs have validly stated claims for relief, meaning that the Court can
    grant default judgment on these claims. Finally, the Court will award damages based on the claims
    and evidence presented here.
    A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
    The FSIA is the "sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts."
    Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 
    488 U.S. 428
    ,434 (1989). Under the FSIA,
    federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over (1) nonjury civil actions (2) for
    claims seeking relief in personam (3) against a foreign state (4) when the foreign state is not
    entitled to immunity under the FSIA. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (a). Plaintiffs meet the first three
    requirements here. While the plaintiffs have demanded "trial by jury of all issues legally triable to
    a jury," Am. Compl.   ,r 97, no jury trial is available for FSIA claims. Thus, by default, this action
    9
    is a "nonju:ty civil action." See Braun v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    228 F. Supp. 3d 64
    , 75 (D.D.C.
    2017). Additionally, the plaintiffs bring civil claims against the defendants-Syria and Iran-as
    foreign sovereigns for in personam relief.
    That leaves the question of Syria and Iran's sovereign immunity. Foreign states are
    presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts subject to several enumerated
    exceptions. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1604
    . A district court "has subject matter jurisdiction over a suit
    against a foreign state if-and only if-[a] plaintiffs claim falls within" one of these exceptions.
    Odhiambo v. Republic ofKenya, 
    764 F.3d 31
    , 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014). "[I]fno exception applies, the
    district court has no jurisdiction." 
    Id.
     Since federal courts must consider issues of subject matter
    jurisdiction sua sponte, Gonzalez v. Thaler, 
    565 U.S. 134
    , 141 (2012), a district court adjudicating
    FSIA claims must decide whether an exception to immunity applies "even if the foreign state does
    not enter an appearance," Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
    461 U.S. 480
    , 493 & n.20
    (1983).
    Plaintiffs argue that Iran's conduct falls within the FSIA's terrorism exception. That
    provision of the FSIA states that a foreign state has no immunity:
    in any case ... in which [l] money damages are sought [2] against
    a foreign state [3] for personal injury or death [4] that was caused
    by [5] an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
    hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for
    such an act if such act or provision of mat()rial support or resources
    is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state
    while acting in the scope of his or her office, employment, or
    agency.
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l). This exception applies only if plaintiffs meet three additional
    requirements. First, the foreign state must have been designated a state sponsor of terrorism when
    the underlying attack occurred or designated as a result of the attack. Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
    Second, at the time of the underlying attack, the "claimant or victim" must have been a "national
    of the United States," a "member of the armed forces," or an employee or contractor of the United
    States Government acting within the scope of her employment. Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii). Third, if
    "the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought," the claimant must
    have "afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate" the claim. Id.
    § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii).
    Plaintiffs undoubtedly meet these elements. They seek money damages against Syria and
    Iran, foreign states. See Am. Compl., at ,r,r 53-96. Plaintiffs allege personal injuries arising out of
    the attacks. 4 See id. Syria has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979, including at
    the time of the attacks. See Revision of Foreign Policy Controls on Exports to Syria, Iraq, Libya,
    and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
    45 Fed. Reg. 33955
     (May 21, 1980). Similarly,
    Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, including at the time of the
    attacks. See Determination Pursuant to Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979-
    Iran, 
    49 Fed. Reg. 2836
     (Jan. 23, 1984). The attack took place in Israel-not Syria or Iran-
    meaning that plaintiffs need not afford defendants an opportunity to arbitrate these claims. And
    plaintiffs are also "claimant[s] or victim[s]" within the meaning of the FSIA because they are U.S.
    citizens. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2); Am. Compl.
    Three elements remain. The Court may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction if
    Syria and Iran (1) provided "material support or resources" for (2) acts of "extrajudicial killing"
    that (3) caused plaintiffs' injuries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a){l). The Court will address each
    element in tum.
    4
    The FSIA does not restrict the "personal injury or death" requirement to injury or death suffered directly by a
    claimant. Valore v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d 52
    , 66 (D.D.C. 2010). Rather, the injury or death "must
    merely be the basis of a claim for which money damages are sought." 
    Id.
     (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l)).
    11
    I. Material Support or Resources
    First, plaintiffs must show that Syria and Iran provided "material support or resources" for
    bus attack that resulted in their injuries. See id. The FSIA defines "material support or resources"
    as:
    any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency
    or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
    lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false
    documentation or identification, communications equipment,
    facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel ... , and
    transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
    18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(l) (emphases added); see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3) (adopting definition of
    "material support or resources" found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A). The material support or resources
    must have been provided "by an official, employee, or agent of [the] foreign state" acting in the
    scope of her "office, employment, or agency." 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l).
    Plaintiffs satisfy this element. Dr. Chorev, an expert in Palestinian terrorist networks,
    "conclude[d] with a high degree of confidence" that the PIJ was responsible for the attack. Chorev
    D.ecl.   ,r 38. Dr. Clawson, an expert on Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and support for the PIJ,
    concluded in his expert opinion that "there is ample evidence that Iran has supplied substantial
    material support to PIJ." Clawson Force Deel. ,r 70. Additionally, Dr. Deeb, qualified as an expert
    on Syria's support for terrorism, stated that "Syria has continuously and consistently supported the
    PIJ" since the organization's inception in late 1980s. Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel.      ,r,r 16, 21. The Court
    concurs with Dr. Chorev, Dr. Clawson, and Dr. Deeb and similarly agrees that Iran and Syria
    provided material support to the PIJ in the period leading up to the attack. This finding is consistent
    with the other judicial findings in this District which have found that Syria and Iran supported the
    PIJ during the timeframe surrounding the November 4, 2001 attack. See, e.g., Wultz v. Islamic
    Republic ofIran, 
    864 F. Supp. 2d 24
    , 30 (D.D.C. 2012); Belldn v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    667 F. 12
    Supp. 2d 8, 6-17 (D.D.C. 2009); Schertzman Cohen, 
    2019 WL 3037868
    , at *4; Force, 363 F.
    Supp. 3d at 337---43. The plaintiffs have therefore proven that Syria and Iran materially supported
    the PIJ in the attack that resulted in their injuries.
    2. Extrajudicial Killing
    Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the underlying terrorist attack is an "act of ...
    extrajudicial killing" under the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l). The FSIA defines an
    "extrajudicial killing" by reference to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA"). See
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). An "extrajudicial killing"-as defined by the TVP A-is "a deliberated
    killing not authorized by a previous judgment" of a "regularly constituted court" that "afford[s] all
    the judicial guarantees ... recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." TVPA, 
    Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
     Stat. 73, § 3(a) (1992). Thus, an "extrajudicial killing" contains three elements: "(1)
    a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a
    regularly constituted court." Owens, 864 F.3d at 770.
    The French Hill neighborhood bus attack meets all three requirements of an extrajudicial
    killing. The attack resulted in the death of Shoshana, in other words, a completed killing. The
    attack at issue in this case was also "deliberated." A deliberated killing is "one undertaken with
    careful consideration, not on a sudden impulse." Lee v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    518 F. Supp. 3d 475
    , 491 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Salzman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    2019 WL 4673761
    , at *13
    (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2019)). Col. Spitzen, an expert on Palestinian terror groups, describes how the
    PIJ "has dedicated itself to the violent struggle against Israel, focusing its activities on anti-Israeli
    terror." Spitzen Deel.   ,r 315. Dr. Chorev adds that the PIJ views "each Jewish civilian of Israel is
    illegitimate and personally responsible for displacing Palestinians, and therefore a legitimate target
    for violent attack." Chorev Deel. ,r 17. Dr. Levitt, an expert on Iranian sponsorship of PIJ terrorism,
    13
    notes how Iran has long provided funding and specific training for terrorist activities to PIJ
    operatives. Levitt Deel.    ,r,r 30,   112, 114. Dr. Deeb, an expert on Syrian support for terrorism,
    confirmed that Syria has similarly assisted the PIJ in planning and executing attacks against
    civilians. Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel.         ,r 22.   Thus, the Court finds that the attack was deliberated.
    Finally, no evidence in the record suggests that the attack at issue in this case was authorized by a
    judgment pronounced by a court of law. The Court therefore concludes that Syria and Iran's
    material support for the attack qualify as material support for acts of extrajudicial killing.
    3. Causation
    ·To prove causation under the FSIA's terrorism exception, a plaintiff must show that the
    foreign state's actions proximately caused the alleged injuries. Owens, 864 F.3d at 794. Proximate
    causation requires "some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and
    the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." Id. (quoting Kilburn v. Socialist People 's Libyan
    Arab Jamahiriya, 
    376 F.3d 1123
    , 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). This inquiry contains two elements: (1)
    the defendant's actions "must be a 'substantial factor' in the sequence of events" leading to the
    injury; and (2) the injury must have been "'reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural
    consequence' of the defendant's conduct." 
    Id.
     (quoting Rothstein v. UBS, 
    708 F.3d 82
    , 91 (2d Cir.
    2013)).
    The plaintiffs have shown that Syria and Iran proximately caused their injuries stemming
    from the French Hill neighborhood bus attack. First, financial, material, and strategic support from
    Iran and Syria to the PIJ were substantial factors in the chain of events leading to the plaintiffs'
    injuries. See Levitt Deel. ,r 108; Deeb Ben-Yishai Deel. ,r,r 21-22. Second, plaintiffs' injuries were
    reasonably foreseeable consequences of Iran and Syria's promotion of the PIJ's terrorist attacks
    against civilians. As the Force court explained:
    14
    Iran not only supported these groups, they actively encouraged them to carry out
    attacks on civilians in Israel as part of a broader geopolitical strategy and provided
    [the PIJ] with the weapons and know-how to do so effectively.... Although Syria's
    support took a different form, it, too, was part of a broader geopolitical strategy that
    supported [ ] PIJ' s operations and necessarily understood that Syrian support would
    enable them to carry out attacks on civilians in Israel. The death and injury to
    innocent people and the suffering of their families was, by any measure,
    foreseeable.
    464 F. Supp. 3d at 369 (internal citations omitted).
    Accordingly, this Court concludes that Syria and Iran proximately caused the plaintiffs'
    injuries through its material support for the extrajudicial killing of Shoshana. Since the plaintiffs
    have proven each element of the FSIA's terrorism exception, the Court possesses subject matter
    jurisdiction over this dispute under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (a) and§ 1605A(a)(l).
    B. Personal Jurisdiction
    The Court now turns to its personal jurisdiction over Syria and Iran. A court has "an
    independent obligation ... to satisfy itself of its personal jurisdiction before entering a default
    [judgment] against a missing party." Kaplan v. Central Bank of the Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    896 F.3d 501
    , 512 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Federal courts have personal jurisdiction over a foreign state if (1)
    the court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (a), and (2) plaintiffs properly
    effectuate service under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    . See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (b). As explained above, the Court
    possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute under Section 1330(a). The remaining issue
    is whether plaintiffs followed the procedures required by Section 1608(a).
    The FSIA prescribes four valid methods of service. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (a). If a method
    of service is unavailable or unsuccessful, a plaintiff may attempt the next method listed. Worley v.
    Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    75 F. Supp. 3d 311
    , 327 (D.D.C. 2014). First, a plaintiff should follow
    "any special arrangement[s]" for service--e.g., contractual provisions-between the plaintiff and
    the foreign state. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (a)(l). Second, a plaintiff may serve a defendant state "in
    15
    accordance with an applicable international convention" on service of process. 
    Id.
     § 1608(a)(2).
    Neither option is available in this case. See Lee, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 495.
    Plaintiffs thus attempted service under Section 1608(a)(3), which permits service by
    mailing copies of the complaint, summons, and notice of suit on a defendant state's head of
    ministry of foreign affairs. See 28 U.S. C. § 1608(e)(3); Aff. Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No.
    5-7. When that attempt failed, plaintiffs tried to serve Iran via diplomatic channels. See id.
    § 1608(a)(4); Aff. Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 15. According to the Department of State,
    these documents were served on August 10, 2020 and August 19, 2020, under cover of diplomatic
    note. Return of Service, ECF No. 16 & 17. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have complied with
    Section 1608(a)(4) and properly served Syria and Iran in accordance with the FSIA. The Court
    may exercise personal jurisdiction over the parties.
    C. Timeliness
    Actions under the FSIA's terrorism exception "may be brought or maintained" only if filed
    "not later than" the later of (1) "10 years after April 24, 1996" or (2) "10 years after the date on
    which the cause of action arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b). But when a defendant state "fail[s] to
    enter an appearance or submit a filing at any stage of [a] case[]," it forfeits any potential statute-
    of-limitations defenses. Maaloufv. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    923 F.3d 1095
    , 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
    A federal court has no authority to raise this statute oflimitations defense "on behalf of an entirely
    absent defendant." 
    Id. at 1112
    . Because neither Syria nor Iran have not appeared in this case-
    and, therefore, have not raised a statute-of-limitations defense-the Court will not, and indeed
    cannot, enforce the limitations period sua sponte.
    16
    D. Venue
    For civil actions "against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof," venue is proper
    "in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
    (f)(4). Iran and
    Syria are "foreign state[s]" as defined by Section 1603 of the FSIA. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1603
    (a);
    Henkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 18-cv-1273 (RCL), 
    2021 WL 2914036
    , *4 (D.D.C. July
    12, 2021). Since Syria and Iran are foreign states, the Court concludes that venue is proper in this
    District.
    E. Liability
    The Court will now assess Syria and Iran's liability for the plaintiffs' injuries. The seven
    plaintiffs in this action bring claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, some on behalf of themselves and
    some on behalf of the estate of Shoshana Ben-Yishai. See Am. Compl.                   ,r,r 53-91.   "Although
    § 1605A provides a private right of action, it requires plaintiffs to prove a theory of liability."
    Schertzman Cohen, 
    2019 WL 3037868
    , at *4 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also
    Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76
     ("[P]laintiffs in § 1605A actions ... must articulate the
    justification for such recovery, generally through the lens of civil tort liability."). In adjudicating
    the plaintiffs' FSIA claims, courts "rely on well-established principles oflaw, such as those found
    in Restatement (Second) of Torts." See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 
    659 F. Supp. 2d 31
    , 61 (D.D.C. 2009).
    The Court reads the plaintiffs' complaint as advancing five main theories of liability: (1)
    wrongful death; (2) battery; (3) survival; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5)
    negligent infliction of emotional distress. 5 However, plaintiffs who advance several theories of
    5
    The Complaint lists eight separate claims. The first claim need not be addressed independently because it purports
    to be only a request for damages. See Am. Compl. (First Claim for Relief for Damages Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)).
    The second claim advances two theories of liability. See id. (Second Claim for Relief for Wrongful Death and Battery
    Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a) and common law). In addition, the conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims, the sixth
    17
    liability "may recover under only one of any such theories, as multiple recovery is prohibited."
    Valore v. Islamic Republic Iran, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d 52
    , 77 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Beer v. Islamic
    Republic ofIran, 574 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2008)).
    1. Shoshana Ben-Yishai's Estate
    Shoshana Ben-Yishai, represented in this action by her parents through her estate, was born
    in New York and was a United States citizen at the time of the attack and, therefore, is entitled to
    bring claims against defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c); Am. Compl. ,r 3.
    a. Wrongful Death
    Shoshana's estate may recover for her wrongful death. Wrongful death liability arises
    "upon establishing that the defendants caused her death." Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 79 (citing
    Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 925)). Successful plaintiffs are entitled to "economic losses which
    result from [the] decedent's premature death." Id. (citing Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 78
    ). Here, as
    discussed above, plaintiffs have presented satisfactory evidence that Shoshana's untimely death
    was the result of a killing perpetrated by the PIJ. Because the defendants materially supported the
    PIJ in carrying out the attack, they are liable to Shoshana's estate.
    b. Survival
    A survival action accrues at the time of death and allows recovery for "damages for loss or
    impairment of earning capacity, emotional distress and all other harms, to harms suffered before
    the death." 
    Id.
     (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 926)). In the FSIA context, survival actions
    allow for the awarding of"damages for the victim's pain and suffering that occurred between the
    attack and the victim's death shortly thereafter." Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp.
    and seventh claims, need not be addressed separately in view of this Court's determination, discussed supra in Part
    III.A, that the defendants provided material support to the PIJ, which also establishes their liability for acts, such as
    the attack, perpetrated by the PIJ. See Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 78 n.5. Finally, the Court need not address the
    plaintiffs' vicarious liability claim, the eighth claim, as the MOIS is no longer a defendant.
    18
    2d 56, 71 (D.D.C. 2006). However, "a court must refuse to award damages for pain and suffering
    if the plaintiff is unable to prove that the decedent consciously experienced the time between an
    attack and his or her death." Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    78 F. Supp. 3d 379
    , 402 (D.D.C.
    2015).
    The plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Shoshana was
    conscious after the attack, and therefore have not met the required showing for a survival action.
    The plaintiffs assert "[f]rom the time of the French Hill Terrorist Attack until the time of her death,
    decedent Shoshana Ben-Yishai suffered great conscious pain, shock and physical and mental
    anguish." Am. Compl.         ,r 71.   However, plaintiffs do not point to any evidence to support this
    assertion. Shoshana's father recalls that, following the attack, he "heard on the radio that one
    woman had been sent to Shaarei Zedek hospital and was dead on arrival" and that when he arrived
    at the hospital, he "was told Shoshana had been murdered." Yitzhak Ben-Yishai Deel., ECF No.
    38,   ,r 2.    Shoshana's mother recalls receiving a call from the school principal telling her that
    Shoshana had suffered a head injury and had been taken to Shaarei Zedek hospital. Miriam Ben-
    Yishai Deel., ECF No. 37, ,r 4. Based on her experience as a nurse, Miriam Ben-Yishai knew that
    "if she had a head injury Shoshana would have been taken to Hadassah hospital since that was
    where the expert neurosurgical unit was located. Therefore, if she was indeed taken to Shaarei
    Zedek hospital, she must not have had a head injury but instead was dead." 
    Id.
     She further recalls
    that when Yitzhak arrived at the hospital, "[h]e found Shoshana there in the morgue with her injury
    from the bullet at the back of her neck." 
    Id.
     Based on the nature of her injuries as described by her
    parents and the relatively short window of time between the attack and confirmation of death, the
    Court is unable to determine if Shoshana survived after the attack, and thus unable to conclude
    that defendants are liable to her estate in a survival action.
    19
    2. Yitzhak, Miriam, Jacob, Israel, Chana, Yael, and Avie! Ben-Yishai
    The remaining plaintiffs are Shoshana's parents and siblings. They may recover damages
    under the theories of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 6 They are United
    States citizens and, therefore, are entitled to bring these claims against defendants. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 1605A(c); Am. Compl. ,r,r 7-12.
    a. Battery
    Plaintiffs have established Syria and Iran's liability for battery. To be liable for battery, a
    defendant must act "[(1)] intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with, or an imminent
    apprehension of such a contact by, those attacked and (2) a harmful contact with those attacked
    directly or indirectly resulted." Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13). "[I]t is clear that defendants acted with intent to cause
    harmful contact and the immediate apprehension thereof: acts of terrorism are, by their very nature,
    intended to harm and to terrify by instilling fear of such harm." Id. (quoting Va/ore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 77
    ). Syria and Iran, through the PIJ, intended to-and did--cause harm to civilians like
    Shoshana, and that contact indirectly created injury to the families. This is clearly sufficient to
    establish the defendants' liability under a battery theory.
    6
    In the portion of their Complaint alleging wrongful death, plaintiff: state that the Attack caused "decedent, her estate
    and all the other plaintiffs severe injury, including: pain and suffering· pecuniary loss and loss of income; loss of
    guidance, companionship and society; loss of consortium; severe emotional distress and mental anguish; and loss of
    solatium." Am. Compl. ,r 67. Accordingly, it appears the plaintiffs seek to recover for the emotional pain and suffering
    caused to them by Shoshana's death under a claim of wrongful death, as well as their claims for intentional and
    negligent infliction of emotional distress. This Court, mindful of the bar on double recovery and consistent with the
    practice of other courts in this District, will consider the defendants' pain and suffering liability to Shoshana's family
    members for harms resulting from Shoshana's wrongful death in the context of their emotional distress claims. See
    Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 79-80; Opati v. Republic ofSudan, 
    60 F. Supp. 3d 68
    , 76 (D.D.C. 2014). Also, because the
    plaintiffs have established entitlement to recovery under intentional infliction of emotional distress, and in light of the
    bar on double recovery, this Court will not address their claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
    20
    b. Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress
    Plaintiffs have similarly established Syria and Iran's liability under intentional infliction of
    emotional distress. As a threshold matter, even though plaintiffs were not present at the French
    Hill neighborhood bus attack, they are still proper plaintiffs under the FSIA. Section 1605A(a)(2)
    includes as plaintiffs "those whose claims arise out of those injuries" suffered as a result of a
    terrorist attack "but who might not be victims themselves." Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 68
    ; accord
    Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    697 F.3d 561
    , 572 (7th Cir. 2012). One such category of
    permitted plaintiffs is the "immediate family" of claimants mentioned in 28 U.S.C.
    § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii). Shoshana's family members bring claims centered on their own emotional
    distress from her death, which resulted from the attack. This causal link brings the family member
    plaintiffs within the scope of claimants contemplated by the FSIA. See id. at§ 1605A(a)(2).
    This Court has set out the following standard for recovery on an intentional infliction of
    emotional distress theory in Section 1605A(c) cases: "One who by extreme and outrageous
    conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
    for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."
    Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d 20
    , 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Restatement
    (Second) of Torts § 46(1)). An actor may also be liable for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress to a party against whom the extreme and outrageous conduct was not directed if that party
    is a member of the victim's immediate family and that party was present at the time of the extreme
    and outrageous conduct. See Murphy v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    740 F. Supp. 2d 51
    , 75 (D.D.C.
    2010) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2)). Thus, intentional infliction of emotional
    distress claims by family members in the FSIA context must meet both the "immediate family
    member" and "presence" requirements to recover. As previously discussed, the plaintiffs here meet
    21
    the "immediate family" requirement. See Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 400. As to the issue of presence,
    one "need not be present at the time of a terrorist attack upon a third person to recover for severe
    emotional injuries suffered as a result." Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 80
    . This is because terrorism is
    sufficiently extreme and outrageous to demonstrate that it is intended to inflict severe emotional
    harm on even those not present at the site of the act. Id.; Murphy, 
    740 F. Supp. 2d at 74
     ("Acts of
    terrorism are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest
    degree of emotional distress") (quoting Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 22).
    The plaintiffs have stated a valid theory of recovery as to their intentional infliction of
    emotional distress claim. The evidence establishes that Syria and Iran intentionally provided
    material support to the PIJ with the intent that the PIJ would carry out attacks that would cause
    severe emotional distress. And the attack did cause such mental anguish and emotional trauma,
    which all of Shoshana's family members still experience. See infra Part IILF.c.iii. Although the
    family member plaintiffs do not allege that they were present at the site of the attack, this
    requirement is not imposed when the extreme and outrageous conduct is a terrorist attack such as
    the ones alleged. Thus, Iran and Syria are liable to plaintiffs for solatium damages. See Roth, 78
    F. Supp. 3d at 402.
    F. Damages
    The Court will now discuss the damages that the plaintiffs will be awarded. The plaintiffs
    seek compensatory damages for "pain and suffering; pecuniary loss and loss of income; loss of
    guidance, companionship and society; loss of consortium; severe emotional distress and mental
    anguish; and loss of solatium," Am. Compl.    ,r 67, as well as punitive damages, id. ,r,r 69, 73, 78,
    22
    83, 87. 7 All such forms of damages are potentially available, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), provided
    that plaintiffs "prove the amount of damages by a reasonable estimate consistent with this
    [Circuit]'s application of the American rule on damages." Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (quoting
    Salazar v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 
    370 F. Supp. 2d 105
    , 115-16 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation
    marks omitted and alteration in original)). "In determining the 'reasonable estimate,' courts may
    look to expert testimony and prior awards for comparable injury." Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 82
    (citing Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    845 F. Supp. 2d 204
    , 214 (D.D.C. 2012) and Acosta v.
    Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    574 F. Supp. 2d 15
    , 29 (D.D.C. 2008)).
    The damages to which each plaintiff is entitled are described below.
    1. Economic Damages
    Shoshana's estate seeks to recover for "pecuniary loss and loss of income." See, e.g., Am.
    Comp1. ,r 67. In support of this damages claim, the plaintiffs present the declaration and report of
    Mr. Michael Soudry, an expert in forensic accounting, who calculated Shoshana's expected future
    earnings. Mr. Soudry declared that, due to Shoshana's untimely death, her estate experienced a net
    economic loss of$1,011,835. SoudryRep. at 1. Therefore, the Court will award economic damages
    to Shoshana's estate in the amount of $1,011,835.00.
    2. Pain and Suffering
    As discussed above, the plaintiffs have not presented satisfactory evidence that Shoshana
    was conscious between the attack and her death. Therefore, the Court cannot award any pain and
    suffering damages to her estate. See Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 39 n.4 (declining to award
    survival damages where the plaintiffs "submitted no evidence, and made no argument in their
    7
    The Court will discuss damages owed to the family members resulting from their intentional infliction of emotional
    distress claim as solatium damages. See Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402 ("Solatium under the FSIA is functionally identical
    to intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
    23
    memorandum, showing that either of the [v]ictims suffered any pain and suffering prior to their
    deaths in the suicide bombings, but instead ... their deaths were more likely instantaneous");
    Mwila v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    33 F. Supp. 3d 36
    , 42---43 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to award
    survival damages where "[n]o one testified that any of the deceased victims survived the blast
    itself for any period of time, and the evidence indicates that they likely did not").
    3. Solatium
    Yitzhak, Miriam, Jacob, Israel, Chana, Yael, and Aviel Ben-Yishai seek solatium damages
    to compensate for the emotional distress they experienced as family members of Shoshana. See
    Am. Comp1.    ,r 67.   This Court developed a standardized approach to calculating FSIA solatium
    damages in Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, where it surveyed past awards in the context of
    deceased terrorism victims to determine that, based on averages, "parents [typically] receive
    greater awards than siblings." 
    466 F. Supp. 2d 229
    ,269 (D.D.C. 2006). Relying upon the average
    awards, the Court in Heiser articulated a framework in which parents of deceased victims were
    awarded approximately $5 million and siblings received $2.5 million. Id.; see also Va/ore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 85
     (observing that courts have "adopted the framework set forth in Heiser as 'an
    appropriate measure of damages for the family members of victims"' (internal citation omitted)).
    Courts may deviate from the Heiser baseline, especially when there is "evidence
    establishing an especially close relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, particularly in
    comparison to the normal interactions to be expected given the familial relationship; medical proof
    of severe pain, grief or suffering on behalf of the claimant; and circumstances surrounding the
    terrorist attack which made the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing." Oveissi v. Islamic
    Republic of/ran, 
    768 F. Supp. 2d 16
    , 26-27 (D.D.C. 2011). "Decisions to deviate from the starting
    points provided by the Heiser framework are committed to the discretion of the particular court in
    24
    each case[.]" 
    Id. at 26
    . Finally, any departures from the Heiser framework are generally small
    relative to the award specified by the developed framework, absent "circumstances that
    appreciably worsen" a claimant's "pain and suffering, such as cases involving torture or
    kidnapping." Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    451 F. Supp. 2d 90
    , 108 (D.D.C. 2006); see
    also Haim, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
    The plaintiffs argue that a higher award of solatium damages than the initial Heiser
    framework numbers of at least $5 million each to Shoshana's parents and $2.5 million each to
    Shoshana's siblings is warranted here. With respect to Shoshana's parents, the plaintiffs urge a
    higher number is appropriate because "Shoshana, as the oldest child, was truly the glue of their
    family and her sudden and violent death destroyed Miriam and Yitzhak's lives and their family for
    the worse with long lasting effects and trauma." Pls.' PFFCL at 63. Additionally, the plaintiffs
    argue that this Court should award Shoshana's siblings more than the baseline "because Shoshana
    was like a second mother to her siblings and her sudden and violent death destroyed her brothers
    and sisters' childhoods with profound adverse permanent long term effects on their lives." Id. The
    Court will discuss its award of solatium damages to Shoshana's parents and then her siblings.
    a. Miriam and Yitzak Ben-Yishai
    Shoshana's parents suffer from depression and other disorders as a result of her death. In
    her declaration, Miriam notes that Shoshana was her "right hand" and Miriam "always rel[ied]
    upon her." Miriam Ben-Yishai Deel.~ 18. Miriam recounts that Shoshana was "a central figure in
    [her] home and family" in many respects, including assisting in the family's transition to Israel
    from New York, raising her younger siblings, and providing emotional support to her parents. Id.
    Miriam also shares that she was two months pregnant at the time of Shoshana's death but suffered
    a miscarriage shortly thereafter. Miriam Ben-Yishai Deel. ~ 10. Dr. Rael Strous, the expert
    25
    psychiatrist who examined Miriam, diagnosed her with "Persistent Complex Bereavement
    Disorder," "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder," and "Persistent Depressive Disorder." Miriam Ben-
    Yishai Rep., ECF No. 42-5, at 9. According to Dr. Strous, because of the attack and Shoshana's
    death, Miriam "remains suffering intensely" and that "[s]he clearly describes the intensity of her
    pain and ongoing distress associated with dysfunctional family relationships and preoccupation
    with the welfare of her family members." Id. at 8. Dr. Strous states that "it is not expected that her
    mood and complicated grief issues affecting many areas of her personal and interpersonal
    functioning will resolve in the short term, and they will continue to affect her indefinitely." Id.
    Like Miriam, Yitzhak Ben-Yishai feels the continuing emotional pain stemming from
    Shoshana's death. Yitzhak Ben-Yishai Deel. ,r 8. In particular, he states that "nothing tempers the
    pain" from the loss of Shoshana and that he "continue[s] on solely as a responsibility [he] owe[ s]
    to [his] wife and other children-a responsibility [he] can barely meet because of the pain [he]
    endure[ s] every day." Id.   ,r 16. Dr. Strous diagnosed Yitzhak Ben-Yishai with "Persistent Complex
    Bereavement Disorder," "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder," and "Persistent Depressive Disorder."
    Yitzhak Ben-Yishai Rep., ECF No. 42-7, at 8. Dr. Strous observed that Yitzhak "experienced
    significant social, occupational and emotional effects over the past years majorly affecting his
    function in several areas of his life including loss of ability to work as he did prior to his daughter's
    death and significant dysfunction in family and social relationships." Id. at 7. Like his assessment
    of Miriam, Dr. Strous believes that "it is not expected that [Yitzhak's] mood, anxiety and grief
    difficulties affecting many areas of his personal and interpersonal functioning will resolve in the
    short term, and they will continue to affect him indefinitely." Id.
    This lasting mental anguish that Shoshana's parents experience warrants an upward
    departure from the Heiser framework. Though Miriam and Yitzhak were not present at the scene
    26
    of the attack, they have first-hand observations and vivid memories of their daughter's lifeless
    body shortly afterward. These emotionally traumatic experiences were compounded by the loss of
    their unborn child and their continuing struggles with mental and emotional health. Thus, the Court
    finds it appropriate to award a 25 percent enhancement from the Heiser framework-for a total of
    $6,250,000 each-to Miriam and Yitzhak Ben-Yishai. This enhancement is consistent with
    decisions by other courts in this District to award enhanced damages to parents suffering persistent,
    significant distress emotional due to the death of their child. See Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 86.
    b. Jacob, Israel, and Chana Ben-Yishai
    Jacob, Israel, and Chana, the next-eldest Ben-Yishai children after Shoshana, have acutely
    felt the impact of Shoshana's death.
    Jacob was thirteen years old at the time of the attack. Jacob Ben-Yishai Deel., ECF No. 30,
    ,r 2. Dr. Strous notes that, after Shoshana's death, Jacob experienced "severe withdrawal (school,
    social), low mood and associated post-traumatic symptomatology lasting several years to the
    present." Jacob Ben-Yishai Rep., ECF No. 42-4, at 10. He has been treated by numerous
    psychologists and psychiatrists, hospitalized several times, attempted suicide, and is currently
    being treated with a psychiatric medication. Jacob Ben-Yishai Deel. ,r,r 12-15. Jacob's conditions
    make it difficult for him to maintain relationships or consistent employment. Id.     ,r,r 18-21.   Dr.
    Strous, in his expert opinion, diagnosed Jacob with "Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder,"
    "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder," and "Persistent Depressive Disorder." See Jacob Ben-Yishai
    Rep. at 10.
    Israel, who was eleven years old at the time of Shoshana's death, Israel Ben-Yishai Deel.,
    ECF No. 40,   ,r 4, has been hospitalized on multiple occasions as a result of "the development of
    an affective disorder in his teens later being expressed in full blown bipolar disorder." Israel Ben-
    27
    Yishai Rep., ECF No. 42-8, at 7-8. Dr. Strous further states that "[i]t is known that bipolar disorder
    is associated with the negative consequences of early life stress, as well as childhood trauma. The
    extremely adverse childhood experience of losing a sister close to him under such sudden and
    violent circumstances may be associated with his later development of bipolar disorder." Id. at 8.
    Due to his bipolar diagnosis and condition, Israel is categorized as disabled and receives support
    from the Israeli health system. Israel Ben-Yishai Deel. ,r 15. Israel lives with his parents. Id.   ,r 3.
    Chana was eight years old when the attack occurred and feels that her identity has been
    defined by the attack, primarily because her parents expected her to fill Shoshana's role in the
    family. See Chana Ben-Yishai Deel., ECF No. 31,        ,r~p,   14, 21. After experiencing "emotional
    difficulties, social difficulties, and difficulties in learning at school" in the wake of the attack,
    Chana "was referred for comprehensive psychological testing," which led to further psychiatric
    treatment and medication. Chana Ben-Yishai Rep., ECF No. 42-2, at 8. Chana, who continues to
    receive psychiatric treatment and medication, has been categorized as disabled by the Israeli health
    system. Chana Ben-Yishai Deel. ,I 19. She lives with her parents and has been unable to maintain
    employment or relationships. Id.   ,r,I 2, 26. Dr. Strous, in his expert opinion, diagnosed Chana with
    "Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder," "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder," and "Persistent
    Depressive Disorder." Chana Ben-Yishai Rep. at 9-10.
    The Court finds that these serious, lasting impacts warrant an upward departure of 25
    percent from the Heiser framework-for a total of $3,125,000 each-to Jacob, Israel, and Chana
    Ben-Yishai. See Brown v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    872 F. Supp. 2d 37
    , 43-44 (D.D.C. 2012)
    (finding upward departure was appropriate when sister was hospitalized and received medication
    following the death of her sibling); Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 
    775 F. 28
    Supp. 2d 48, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding enhanced damages when sibling's death caused
    brother to exhibit "self-destructive behavior" and sister to suffer life-long depression).
    c. Yael and Avie! Ben-Yishai
    Shoshana's remaining siblings, Yael, and Aviel, were quite young at the time of her
    death---6 and 4 years old, respectively. Yael Ben-Yishai Deel., ECF No. 29, ,r 4; Aviel Ben-Yishai
    Deel., ECF No. 32,    ,r 3.   The grief they experience has prevented them from pursuing personal
    relationships, educational, and employment opportunities, and has undermined their religious
    faith. See Yael Ben-Yishai Deel.       ,r,r 17-18;   Aviel Ben Yishai Deel.   ,r,r 8,   12, 14. Dr. Strous
    diagnosed Yael and A viel with "Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder" and "Persistent
    Depressive Disorder." Aviel Ben-Yishai Rep., ECF No. 42-3, at 6-7; Yael Ben-Yishai Rep., ECF
    No. 42-6, at 6-7. However, their conditions have not required similar levels of treatment or
    medication as their siblings. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to award damages consistent
    with the Heiser framework-$2,500,000 each-to Yael and Aviel Ben-Yishai.
    4. Punitive Damages
    The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages. Punitive damages serve to punish and deter the
    actions for which they are awarded, rather than to compensate the victim. In re Islamic Republic
    of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 61; Heiser II. In determining the proper punitive
    damages award, courts evaluate four factors: "( 1) the character of the defendants' act, (2) the nature
    and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to cause, (3) the need
    for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants." Acosta, 
    574 F. Supp. 2d at
    30 (citing
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908)). Though there was some confusion among circuits as to
    whether punitive damages were available in 28 U.S.C. § 1065A actions for conduct occurring prior
    to the statute's enactment, such as the instant case, the Supreme Court recently answered the
    29
    question in the affirmative. See Opati, 140 S. Ct. at 1608 ("Congress was as clear as it could have
    been when it expressly authorized punitive damages under § 1605A(c) and explicitly made that
    new cause of action available to remedy certain past acts of terrorism.").
    This District has developed three primary methods of calculating punitive damages in FSIA
    cases. The first, used more commonly in mass-casualty events, involves multiplying the foreign
    state's "annual expenditures on terrorism" by a factor between three and five. See Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88
    . The second approach awards a fixed amount of $150 million per affected
    family. See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 
    580 F. Supp. 2d 53
    , 75 (D.D.C. 2008). The third
    approach involves multiplying the total compensatory damages award by a factor of between one
    and five. See Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    77 F. Supp. 3d 57
    , 73 (D.D.C. 2015). The
    multiplier approach is especially appropriate when the defendants "did not directly carry out the
    attack, but funded [a proxy actor], [and] it is doubtful whether a large amount ... would have the
    deterrent effect that it might have had in times past." Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    268 F. Supp. 3d 19
    , 28 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Bluth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    203 F. Supp. 3d 1
    , 26
    (D.D.C. 2016)).
    The nature of the defendants' acts is heinous and the extent of the harm they caused is
    tragic. Defendants intentionally supported a proxy actor who specifically sought to wreak violence
    upon innocent civilians. Nevertheless, the conduct here fits more squarely within the line of cases
    awarding punitive damages as a multiplier of compensatory damages. Given that punitive damages
    calculated as "a multiplier of three" of the compensatory damages is "the usual practice in state
    sponsored terrorism cases," see Roth v. l'Slamic Republic of Iran, No. 14-cv-01946 (RCL), 
    2018 WL 4680270
    , at* 17 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018), and the plaintiffs have not offered a reason to depart
    from this practice, this Court concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in the
    30
    amount three times the compensatory damages, to be apportioned according to each plaintiffs
    share of the compensatory damages. See 
    id.
     ( awarding punitive damages equal to three times
    compensatory damages for Syria and Iran's sponsorship of a bombing in Jerusalem that killed
    fifteen people, including a plaintiff); Gill v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    249 F. Supp. 3d 88
    , 105-06
    (D.D.C. 2017) (awarding punitive damages equal to three times compensatory damages for
    plaintiffs injured in a shooting in Israel); Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 
    882 F. Supp. 2d 23
    , 50-
    51 (D.D.C. 2012) (using a three times multiplier in a case involving a terrorist bombing); Bland v.
    Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    831 F. Supp. 2d 150
    , 158 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Murphy, 
    740 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83
     (same).
    G. Prejudgment Interest
    Lastly, the Court will address the plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest to be applied
    to their damages award. Whether to award prejudgment interest is a matter committed to the
    discretion of the court, subject to equitable considerations. Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., 
    127 F.3d 43
    , 54 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Prejudgment interest may be awarded on compensatory damages but
    there are limitations on when such awards are appropriate. First, prejudgment interest should not
    be added to economic loss damages when such awards are already discounted to present value
    because this would result in double counting of the interest multiplier. See Doe v. Islamic Republic
    ofIran, 
    943 F. Supp. 2d 180
    , 185-86 (D.D.C. 2013). Also, this Court has consistently declined to
    award prejudgment interest on solatium damage awards calculated according to the Heiser
    framework. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 
    879 F. Supp. 2d 44
    , 58-59 (D.D.C. 2012). This is
    because the Heiser framework represents a calculation of the appropriate level of compensation,
    regardless of an attack's timing. 
    Id.
    31
    Plaintiffs have requested prejudgment interest. See Am. Compl. at 23. The Court
    concludes, however, that it cannot award such interest. First, the economic loss damages awarded
    to the estate of Shoshana Ben-Yishai have already been discounted to present value. See Soudry
    Rep. at 1. Second, as discussed above, the Court does not award prejudgment interest on solatium
    damage awards that are based on the Heiser framework, as the awards here are. These rules
    encompass every type of compensatory damages the Court is awarding in this case.
    IV.     CONCLUSION
    For the reasons outlined above, the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment will be
    GRANTED. The defendants are jointly and severally liable for the death of Shoshana Ben-Yishai
    and the injuries to the family member plaintiffs on all claims except for survival. The plaintiffs are
    awarded monetary damages in the following amounts: the plaintiffs are entitled to $83,660,505 in
    punitive damages; Shoshana Ben-Yishai's estate is entitled to $1,011,835 in economic damages;
    Shoshana's parents, Yitzhak and Miriam Ben-Yishai, are each entitled to $6,250,000 in solatium
    damages; Jacob Ben-Yishai is entitled to $3,125,000 in solatium damages; Israel Ben-Yishai is
    entitled to $3,125,000 in solatium damages; Chana Ben-Yishai is entitled to $3,125,000 in solatium
    damages; Yael Ben-Yishai is entitled to $2,500,000 in solatium damages; and A viel Ben-Yishai is
    entitled to $2,500,000 in solatium damages. Thus, the total damages award is $111,547,340.
    A separate and consistent Order shall issue this date.
    SIGNED this        z..rr'aay of November, 2022.
    Royce C. Lamberth
    United States District Judge
    32