Association of Administrative Law Judges, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Afl-Cio v. Federal Service Impasses Panel ( 2021 )


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  •                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    ASSOCIATION OF                       )
    ADMINISTRATIVE                       )
    LAW JUDGES,                          )
    )
    Plaintiff,         )
    )
    v.                             )   Civil Action No. 20-1026 (ABJ)
    )
    FEDERAL SERVICE                     )
    IMPASSES PANEL, et al.,             )
    )
    Defendants.       )
    ____________________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In this lawsuit, plaintiff, the Association of Administrative Law Judges, challenges the
    constitutional legitimacy of the Federal Service Impasses Panel. See Complaint [Dkt. # 1]
    (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 41–44. Defendants, the Federal Service Impasses Panel and its Chairman, Mark
    Carter, and intervenor-defendant, the Social Security Administration, have moved to dismiss the
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(1). Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 22] (“Defs.’ Mot.”). Defendants argue that the judicial
    review procedures set out in the statute concerning labor relations with the government bar any
    review of plaintiff’s claims by the district court. Id. at 6. Because the application of binding D.C.
    Circuit precedent requires the Court to agree that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
    dispute, it will grant the motion to dismiss.
    BACKGROUND
    I.     Statutory Framework
    The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7101
    –35 (“the
    statute” or “FSLMRS”), enacted under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, governs
    labor relations between federal government agencies and their employees. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
    Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 
    929 F.3d 748
    , 752 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“AFGE”), citing Bureau of
    Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 
    464 U.S. 89
    , 91 (1983). The statute
    ensures the “right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and participate [in] labor
    organizations of their own choosing.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7101
    (a)(1). To that end, the statute called for
    the creation of several entities and positions, including the Federal Labor Relations Authority, its
    General Counsel, and the Federal Service Impasses Panel. 
    Id.
     §§ 7104, 7119.
    The Federal Labor Relations Authority (“Authority” or “FLRA”) is comprised of three
    members who provide “leadership . . . and guidance relating to matters” under the statute. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7105
    (a). They are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a
    term of five years. 1 
    Id.
     § 7104(b), (c), (f)(1). Among other duties, the Authority is assigned to
    resolve “issues relating to the duty to bargain in good faith,” “conduct hearings and resolve
    complaints of unfair labor practices,” and “take such other actions as are necessary and appropriate
    to effectively administer the provisions of [the statute].” Id. § 7105(a)(2). The Authority is
    assisted in its duties by the General Counsel. See id. § 7004. Among his duties, the General
    Counsel is called upon to “investigate alleged unfair labor practices,” “file and prosecute
    complaints,” and exercise “other powers” prescribed by the Authority. Id. § 7104(f)(2).
    1       Members of the Authority may only be removed “upon notice and hearing and only for
    inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7104
    (b).
    2
    The Federal Service Impasses Panel (“Panel”), an entity within the Authority, includes a
    Chairman and at least six other members, who are appointed by the President. 2 
    5 U.S.C. § 7119
    (c)(2). The Panel is intended “to provide assistance in resolving negotiation impasses
    between agencies and exclusive representatives.” 
    Id.
     § 7119(c)(1). Upon the presentation of an
    impasse, the Panel shall “recommend . . . procedures for the resolution of the impasse” or “assist
    . . . through whatever methods and procedures” in resolving the impasse. Id. § 7119(c)(5)(A). If
    the parties do not arrive at a settlement after the Panel provides assistance, the Panel may take
    action to resolve the impasse, including holding hearings, taking testimony under oath, and
    imposing contract terms on the parties. See id. § 7119(c)(5)(B); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v.
    FLRA, 
    789 F.2d 944
    , 945 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The statute provides that unless the parties agree
    otherwise, the Panel’s final decision is binding. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7119
    (c)(5)(C).
    The D.C. Circuit has explained that, therefore, a Panel decision is ordinarily “final and
    nonreviewable.” Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 
    735 F.2d 1497
    , 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But
    a Panel decision may be reviewed by the Authority if there is an allegation of an unfair labor
    practice. 3 See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7118
    (a)(7). If an unfair labor practice is alleged, the Authority, assisted
    by the General Counsel, may issue an order reviewing a Panel decision in the context of an unfair
    labor practice proceeding. 
    Id.
     Once the Authority has issued an order resolving that proceeding,
    2       The Chairman and members are to be appointed by the President “solely on the basis of
    fitness to perform the duties and functions involved, from among individuals who are familiar with
    Government operations and knowledgeable in labor-management relations.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7119
    (c)(2).
    3       Failure or refusal to cooperate with the Panel or refusal to comply with its decisions may
    constitute an unfair labor practice. 
    Id.
     § 7116(a)(6), (8), (b)(6), (8).
    3
    the parties may seek review directly with the federal courts of appeals. See id. § 7123(a); Brewer,
    
    735 F.2d at 1500
    . 4
    II.     Factual Background
    Plaintiff, the Association of Administrative Law Judges (“AALJ”), is the “national federal-
    sector labor union serving as the exclusive bargaining unit for approximately 1,200 federal
    administrative law judges who work at the Social Security Administration [(“SSA”)] throughout
    the United States.” Compl. ¶ 28. Over the course of several months in 2019, the AALJ and the
    SSA negotiated the terms of a successor collective bargaining agreement. Id. ¶ 30. The parties
    agreed on numerous articles in the contract, but were unable to reach agreement on nine of them.
    Id. During the negotiations, the parties sought the assistance of the Federal Mediation and
    Conciliation Service, which then certified that the parties were at impasse on the remaining nine
    articles. Id.; Defs.’ Mot. at 9.
    In October 2019, the SSA requested that the Panel assert jurisdiction over the dispute.
    Compl. ¶ 31. Plaintiff objected to the Panel’s jurisdiction, claiming that the Panel lacked authority
    to issue a decision because the members’ appointment violated the Appointments Clause of the
    Constitution. Id.; see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Specifically, plaintiff complained that the
    Panel’s members had been appointed without the required advice and consent of the Senate.
    Compl. at 1.
    On January 9, 2020, the Panel notified the parties via email that it would assert jurisdiction
    over the impasse. Compl. ¶ 32. On January 10, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion with the Authority
    4      Alternatively, a party may submit an unfair labor practice complaint to an arbitrator. Id.
    § 7121 (a). The arbitrator’s decision is then subject to review by the Authority, and a determination
    by the Authority is then reviewable by the appropriate court of appeals. Id. § 7122(a).
    4
    to stay the proceedings before the Panel, pending resolution of its jurisdictional objections. Id.
    ¶ 33. Despite plaintiff’s objections, on January 24, 2020, the Panel issued a letter to both parties
    officially asserting jurisdiction over eight of the nine issues at impasse and ordering the parties to
    attempt to resolve the ninth. Id. ¶ 34; Defs.’ Mot. at 9. None of the Panel’s communications
    addressed AALJ’s jurisdictional objections. Compl. ¶ 34.
    On January 30, 2020, the AALJ filed suit in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals asking the
    court to review the Panel’s assertion of jurisdiction, and to stay the Panel’s proceedings until the
    jurisdictional issue was resolved. See Defs.’ Mot. at 9–10. The circuit court dismissed the petition
    and denied the request for a stay. See id.
    On March 31, 2020, the Authority also denied the AALJ’s request for a stay, concluding
    that because Panel orders are “not directly reviewable” by the Authority, a stay was not
    appropriate. Compl. ¶ 35; see 71 F.L.R.A. No. 123 (March 31, 2020). On April 15, 2020, the
    Panel issued its final decision on the impasse. Compl. ¶ 36. It rejected all of the plaintiff’s
    jurisdictional objections and adopted the SSA’s proposals “on the majority of the key disputed
    terms.” Id. ¶¶ 38–37.
    III.   Procedural Background
    On April 20, 2020, five days after the Panel ruled on the impasse, the AALJ filed a
    complaint in this Court asserting jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the Panel’s
    authority. See Compl. at 1. On April 24, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
    Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 5] (Corrected) [Dkt. # 8], which the Court consolidated with the merits
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). See Minute Order (Apr. 28, 2020).
    On May 4, 2020, the Social Security Administration filed an unopposed motion to
    intervene as a defendant [Dkt. # 18], which was granted. Minute Order (May 5, 2020).
    5
    On May 6, 2020, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    See Defs.’ Mot. at 1. Plaintiff opposed the motion, Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 25] (“Pl.’s
    Opp.”), defendants replied, Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt. # 30], and this motion is ripe for
    decision. 5
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    In evaluating a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
    must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all
    inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
    216 F.3d 1111
    , 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States, 
    617 F.2d 605
    , 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 
    642 F.3d 1137
    , 1139 (D.C.
    Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v. Principi, 
    394 F.3d 970
    , 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying principle to
    a Rule 12(b)(1) motion). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff
    if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept
    plaintiff’s legal conclusions.    Browning v. Clinton, 
    292 F.3d 235
    , 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
    (rule 12(b)(6) case); Food and Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 
    808 F.3d 905
    , 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
    (rule 12(b)(1) case).
    Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a
    preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992); Shekoyan
    v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 
    217 F. Supp. 2d 59
    , 63 (D.D.C. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited
    5       The Court deemed the motion for preliminary injunction to be plaintiff’s motion for
    summary judgment, Minute Order (Apr. 28, 2020), which the parties also briefed. See Defs.’ Opp.
    and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. ## 23 and 24]; Intervenor-Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 26];
    Pl.’s Reply and Cross-Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 31]; Def.’s and Intervenor-Def.’s
    Reply [Dkt. # 32].
    6
    jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen
    v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA,
    
    363 F.3d 442
    , 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with
    an examination of our jurisdiction.”). “[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as
    well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction
    upon a federal court.’” Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 
    339 F.3d 970
    , 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
    quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
    456 U.S. 694
    , 702 (1982).
    When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, unlike when deciding a
    motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “is not limited to the allegations of the complaint.”
    Hohri v. United States, 
    782 F.2d 227
    , 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 
    482 U.S. 64
    (1987). Rather, “a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate
    to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of
    Elections & Ethics, 
    104 F. Supp. 2d 18
    , 22 (D.D.C. 2000), citing Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis.,
    
    974 F.2d 192
    , 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 
    402 F.3d 1249
    ,
    1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
    ANALYSIS
    The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute makes Panel decisions “binding
    on [the] parties . . . unless [they] agree otherwise.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7119
    (c)(5)(C). Although the statute
    provides for judicial review of decisions by the Authority, 
    id.
     § 7123, there is no provision for
    judicial review of Panel decisions. See id.; Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass’n v. FLRA, 
    977 F.3d 10
    , 14
    (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that Panel orders “are not directly reviewable in court”). Further, the
    statute “forecloses the assumption of general federal question or mandamus jurisdiction” for the
    purpose of reviewing Panel decisions. Brewer, 
    735 F.2d at 1499
    . A dissatisfied party may “obtain
    7
    judicial review by violating a Panel order and then seeking review of any ensuing [Authority] order
    finding an unfair labor practice.” Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass’n, 977 F.3d at 14, citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 7123
    (a); Brewer, 
    735 F.2d at 1500
    .
    Defendant asserts that given these provisions, a district court does not have jurisdiction
    over this case. It moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because in its view, the
    complaint seeks review of a Panel decision, albeit indirectly, outside of the exclusive statutory
    scheme. Defs.’ Mot. at 1–2. Plaintiff submits that the statute’s provisions do not apply because it
    is not seeking review of a specific Panel decision; rather, it is contesting the Panel’s overall
    authority under the Constitution, raising “a single Appointments Clause challenge and seek[ing]
    no judicial review of any Panel order.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2. It argues that the Court has jurisdiction
    under National Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Federal Service Impasses Panel (“NATCA II”), in
    which the D.C. Circuit held that district courts have jurisdiction over claims challenging the
    Panel’s authority, so long as they do “not entail reviewing a decision of the Panel.” 
    606 F.3d 780
    ,
    787 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Pl.’s Opp. at 3.
    Defendants insist that plaintiff is required to present its claim to the agency first and then
    appeal the agency’s decision to the Circuit, notwithstanding the nature of the claim. They point to
    case law that suggests this principle applies even if what plaintiff is trying to do is challenge the
    agency’s constitutional authority to render the decision in the first place – as opposed to the merits
    of the decision – and even if the agency tribunal would demur on the grounds that it lacked
    authority to rule on that issue, because plaintiff could then bring the matter to the Circuit. See
    Defs.’ Mot. at 16, citing AFGE v. Trump, 
    929 F. 3d 748
    , 758 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
    When a statute specifically provides for administrative and judicial review “it is ordinarily
    supposed that Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive means of obtaining judicial
    8
    review.” City of Rochester v. Bond, 
    603 F.2d 927
    , 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979). To determine whether a
    statutory scheme is the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review, courts consider whether
    (i) congressional intent is “fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,” and (ii) the claims are “of
    the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure.” Thunder Basin Coal
    Co. v. Reich, 
    510 U.S. 200
    , 207, 212 (1994).
    Here, plaintiff does not dispute the obvious congressional intent to provide for exclusivity.
    The statute “provides the exclusive procedures by which federal employees and their bargaining
    representatives may assert federal labor-management relations claims.” Am. Fed’n Gov’t Emps.
    v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 
    716 F.3d 633
    , 636 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Air Force”); see 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7116
    –19, 7121–22. Thus, the first element of the Thunder Basin inquiry is satisfied.
    The parties dispute how to apply the second principle identified in Thunder Basin: whether
    plaintiff’s claims are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory
    structure.” 
    510 U.S. at 207, 212
    ; see also AFGE, 929 F.3d at 755; Jarkesy v. SEC, 
    803 F.3d 9
    , 15
    (D.C. Cir. 2015). A statute does not preclude judicial review if “(1) a finding of preclusion might
    foreclose all meaningful judicial review; (2) the claim[s] [are] wholly collateral to the statutory
    review provisions; and (3) the claims are beyond the expertise of the agency.” AFGE, 929 F.2d
    at 755, citing Arch Coal, Inc. v. Acosta, 
    888 F.3d 493
    , 500 (D.C. Cir. 2018). These factors are not
    “three distinct inputs [of] a strict mathematical formula,” but they serve as “general guideposts
    useful for channeling the inquiry.” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 17.
    While the Court might have been inclined to conclude that the fundamental constitutional
    claim at issue here was not what Congress had in mind when it established review procedures for
    the resolution of individual labor disputes, there is Circuit authority that governs that determination
    9
    and compels a finding that plaintiff’s claims are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed”
    within the statutory structure for purposes of the Thunder Basin analysis. 
    510 U.S. at 212
    .
    AFGE v. Trump was a case brought by a federal employee union in 2019 challenging three
    executive orders affecting federal collective bargaining negotiations. 929 F.3d at 753. The district
    court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, rejecting the argument that
    jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the Authority and then the Court of Appeals. Id. at 754. It
    then decided the case on the merits, holding that nine provisions of the challenged executive orders
    violated the statute, enjoining the executive branch from implementing them. Id. On appeal, the
    D.C. Circuit reversed. Id. at 761.
    Analyzing each of the Arch Coal factors, the D.C. Circuit first held that “meaningful
    judicial review” was available “even though AFGE and its local unions could not obtain immediate
    review of their ‘pre-implementation’ claims” before the Authority or obtain their preferred form
    of relief. Id. at 756, citing Air Force, 
    716 F.3d 637
    –38 (explaining that an aggrieved union may
    raise a claim with the Authority as a negotiability dispute under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7117
    (c), a grievance
    proceeding under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7121
    , or a unfair labor practice claim under 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7116
    (a),
    7118(c), which can then be appealed to the appropriate circuit court). Accordingly, the Court
    found the unions could obtain judicial review “by litigating their claims through the statutory
    scheme in the context of concrete bargaining disputes.” 
    Id. at 757
    . The Court went on:
    [W]e need not map the precise contours of the FLRA’s authority to
    adjudicate the claims in this case. For even if the FLRA could not address
    the claims, circuit courts could do so on appeal from the FLRA. The
    statutory scheme provides that the courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction
    of the [FLRA] proceeding and of the question determined therein” and “may
    make and enter a decree affirming and enforcing, modifying and enforcing
    as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the [FLRA].”
    
    5 U.S.C. § 7123
    (a), (c). Also, the courts of appeals generally may not
    10
    consider objections that were not at least “urged” before the FLRA. 
    Id.
    § 7123(c).
    Id. at 758. The Court specifically noted that it is not unusual for an appellate court reviewing an
    agency decision to consider a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that the agency found it
    lacked authority to decide. Id., citing Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    567 U.S. 1
    , 18 n.8 (2012); see
    also Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 19 (holding that because plaintiff’s constitutional claims can eventually
    reach an Article III Court, “it is of no dispositive significance whether the [agency] has the
    authority to rule on them in the first instance during the agency proceedings”).
    The AFGE opinion also makes it clear that a union must start at the administrative level
    even if it is seeking a form of review or relief that is unavailable under the statute. AFGE, 929 F.3d
    at 756–57, citing Air Force, 716 F.3d at 639 (district court lacked jurisdiction even though the
    union sought to challenge a particular regulation on a “nationwide” basis under the APA rather
    than “on a concrete ‘local-by-local’ basis” through the Authority). The Circuit emphasized that in
    the Air Force case, “[t]he statutory scheme provided no way to assert such a ‘nationwide’ attack,
    but that did not mean [the plaintiff] could resort to the courts.” Id., citing Air Force, 716 F.3d
    at 638.
    As for the second consideration, the Court found that “for many of the same reasons,” the
    plaintiffs’ claims were not “wholly collateral” to the statutory scheme. AFGE, 929 F.3d at 759.
    While the second Arch Coal factor seems to ask a different question, the Circuit observed that the
    factor is “related” to whether “meaningful judicial review” is available; according to the AFGE
    opinion, the two are sometimes analyzed together, and this consideration is examined by asking
    whether a plaintiff seeks the same relief it could seek in the agency proceeding. Id. at 759–60,
    citing Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 22–23 and Elgin, 
    567 U.S. at 22
    . After that discussion, the Court
    11
    concluded that the claims about the challenged executive orders were not “wholly collateral”
    because they were the type of claim “regularly adjudicated” in the statutory scheme. Id. at 760.
    Finally, it found that the claims fell within the expertise of the agency because “[m]any of
    the claims” allege that the executive orders directed agencies to refuse to bargain over mandatory
    subjects or take actions inconsistent with the duty to bargain in good faith, in violation of the
    statute. Id. The Court held these were the type of matters the Authority determined in the
    “ordinary course of business.” Id., citing Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 28.
    Applying the precedent set by the Court of Appeals in AFGE, the Court concludes that
    plaintiff’s claims fall within the statutory scheme and that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
    Another court in this district has recently come to the same conclusion. See Nat’l Veterans Affairs
    Council v. Fed. Svc. Impasses Panel, 1:20-cv-00837-CJN (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021).
    I.     Meaningful judicial review is not foreclosed.
    Plaintiff asserts that the Court has jurisdiction because the FSLMRS prevents parties from
    “meaningfully pursuing their constitutional claims.” Pl.’s Opp. at 8, citing Free Enterprise,
    561 U.S. at 490. This contention echoes the union’s position in AFGE, where the employees’
    organization argued that because constitutional “systemwide” or “nationwide” challenges could
    not be brought and resolved through administrative review on a case-by-case basis, the statute did
    not provide for meaningful judicial review. See 929 F. 3d at 755–57. But the statute does provide
    for review of Panel decisions through the unfair labor practice procedures, and that process
    eventually leads to the Court of Appeals. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7123
    (a). This means, according to the
    decision in AFGE, that meaningful judicial review is available, even if the statute makes it
    “impossible to obtain particular forms of review or relief.” AFGE, 929 F.3d at 756–57 (emphasis
    omitted); see id. at 754 (unions “must pursue their claims through the scheme established by the
    12
    statute, which provides for administrative review by the [Authority] followed by judicial review
    in the courts of appeals”).
    Under the terms of the statute, plaintiff may obtain judicial review of its constitutional
    claim by violating the Panel’s order, then seeking review of the Authority’s ensuing order finding
    that it had engaged in an unfair labor practice. Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass’n, 977 F.3d at 14.
    Plaintiff argues that being relegated to this procedure forecloses meaningful judicial review
    because it “forc[es] a person to ‘incur a sanction,’” and “potentially risk ‘severe punishment.’”
    Pl.’s Opp. at 8 (emphasis omitted), quoting Free Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 490–91. In Free
    Enterprise, though, the plaintiff would have had to risk being convicted of a federal crime
    punishable by up to twenty years of imprisonment or a $25 million fine before he could seek
    judicial review, 561 U.S. at 485–86, so the situations are not analogous. The Court agrees that the
    unfair labor practice procedure is time consuming and ill-suited to resolving the discrete
    constitutional claim raised, but jumping through those hoops will not place plaintiff in jeopardy of
    punitive sanctions. See F.E. Warren Air Force Base Cheyenne, WY, 
    52 F.L.R.A. 149
    , 160-61
    (1996) (stating that remedies for unfair labor practices must be non-punitive, and that “traditional”
    remedies include “a cease-and-desist order accompanied by the posting of a notice to employees”).
    Plaintiff also argues that the procedure cannot be found to offer meaningful review because
    if it were to defy the Panel in order to trigger an unfair labor practice allegation, it would be the
    agency’s General Counsel who would have to decide to bring a complaint, and the General Counsel
    might, in his discretion, decline to do so. Pl.’s Opp. at 8. But this argument is speculative, and
    the statute provides an alternative avenue for plaintiff to obtain review in any event. It may submit
    an unfair labor practice action to an arbitrator, whose decision is reviewable by the Authority, and
    then by a court of appeals. See 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7122
    (a), 7123(a). Accordingly, while judicial review
    13
    may be delayed, it is not foreclosed. See Nat’l Veterans Affairs Council, 1:20-cv-00837-CJN; Air
    Force, 716 F.3d at 638 (“[I]t is the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme involved, not the
    adequacy of specific remedies thereunder, that counsels judicial abstention.”). 6 Thus, meaningful
    judicial review of the claim is not foreclosed. AFGE, 929 F.3d at 755; see also id. at 756–57 (a
    broad constitutional attack on the Panel may not be used to “circumvent the scheme established
    by the Statute”).
    II.    Plaintiff’s claims are not wholly collateral.
    The AFGE decision also requires the Court to find that plaintiff’s claims are not “wholly
    collateral” to the statutory scheme. AFGE, 929 F.3d at 755. Courts consider whether claims are
    “wholly collateral” by determining whether a party’s claims are “aimed to obtain the same relief
    [it] could seek in the agency proceeding.” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 23, citing Elgin, 
    567 U.S. at 22
    ;
    see also NATCA II, 603 F.3d at 787.           Specifically, courts consider whether a complaint
    “identifies,” or a court’s decision would “reverse,” a specific decision of the Panel. See NATCA II,
    603 F.3d at 787. If the complaint identifies, and the Court’s decision would impact, a specific
    Panel decision, the claims are not wholly collateral, and “[t]here can be no doubt . . . [this] [C]ourt
    lacks jurisdiction.” Id. If the complaint “identifies no specific decision of the [Panel],” the
    challenge may be subject to review in a district court. Id.
    Plaintiff relies on NATCA II, a case that preceded AFGE, for the proposition that claims
    not seeking review of a Panel decision are wholly collateral and subject to a district court’s
    jurisdiction. Pl.’s Opp. at 3, citing 
    606 F.3d at 787
     (“In [NATCA II], the D.C. Circuit held that
    6       Plaintiff also argues that the General Counsel position is currently unfilled, Pl.’s Opp. at 8,
    but that is a temporary circumstance and not a statutory impediment to review.
    14
    district courts may properly exercise jurisdiction over actions against the Impasses Panel, like this
    one, that do ‘not entail reviewing a decision of the Panel.’”).             However, NATCA II is
    distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, and importantly, NATCA II, involved a
    challenge to “ongoing policy” of the Panel, and the specific impasse in question “was resolved”
    prior to seeking review in the district court. 
    606 F.3d at 786
    , n.*. Second, the case did not involve
    any challenge, either directly or indirectly, to a specific Panel decision. See 
    id. at 787
    . In fact, in
    NATCA II, there was no specific Panel decision referenced in the complaint. Compare 
    id. at 786
    ,
    with Compl. ¶¶ 36–40 (referencing the April 15, 2020 Panel decision affecting plaintiff, including
    specific details of the decision that are unfavorable to plaintiff).
    Here, plaintiff asserts that its challenge involves a “lone constitutional claim” alleging
    Panel members were appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause. Pl.’s Opp. at 3. But the
    plaintiff devotes a significant portion of the complaint to discussing a specific, and unfavorable,
    Panel decision – the April 15, 2020 decision. 7 See Compl. ¶¶ 36–40. Furthermore, the complaint
    asks the Court to declare Panel decisions “null and void” and to “[e]njoin the Panel . . . from
    issuing, giving effect to, or otherwise enforcing a Panel decision.” Id. at 11. 8
    7       Notably, this suit was filed five days after the Panel’s decision. Compl. at 1.
    8       For the same reasons, plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Brewer, 
    735 F.2d at 1498
    , and
    Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Fed. Serv. Impasses Panel, 
    437 F.3d 1256
    , 1262–63 (D.C.
    Cir. 2006) (“NATCA I”), fail. Those cases held that Congress precluded direct judicial review of
    Panel decisions, and plaintiff attempts to distinguish them on the grounds that they involved
    appeals of specific Panel decisions, while this one does not. See Pl.’s Opp. at 5–6. But plaintiff
    ultimately seeks the invalidation of the Panel’s April 15, 2020 decision. See Compl. ¶¶ 36–40; id.
    at 11; Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Corrected) [Dkt. # 8] at 1 (stating that plaintiff “urgently seeks an
    injunction to prevent implementation of extreme, draconian restrictions imposed on the
    Association on April 15 by the Federal Service Impasses Panel”).
    15
    Given the relief the union is seeking, plaintiff’s challenge can be fairly characterized as a
    “vehicle by which” plaintiff seeks invalidation of a Panel decision, rather than a “lone
    constitutional claim.” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 23. If the Court were to grant the relief plaintiff
    requests, it would reverse and invalidate the April 15, 2020 Panel decision in circumvention of the
    statutory scheme. This means that under circuit precedent, the claims are not wholly collateral to
    the statutory review scheme for purposes of the second prong of Thunder Basin. Id., citing Elgin,
    
    567 U.S. at 22
    ; see also 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7118
    , 7123(a); NATCA II, F.3d at 787. 9
    III.   Agency expertise
    Finally, plaintiff asserts that its claims are “beyond the expertise” of the Authority. Pl.’s
    Mot. at 12, n.4, cross-referencing Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Corrected) [Dkt. # 8] at 27-31, citing
    Arch Coal, 888 F.3d at 500. And there is no question that it is federal district courts, and not the
    Authority, that spend their days resolving constitutional claims. But the Authority’s expertise on
    constitutional issues “is not determinative.” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 28–29, citing Elgin, 
    567 U.S. at
    22–23. “[S]o long as a court can eventually pass upon the [constitutional] challenge, limits on an
    agency’s own ability to make definitive pronouncements . . . do not preclude requiring the
    challenge to go through the administrative route.” 
    Id. at 18
    , citing Elgin, 
    567 U.S. at
    17–18. 10
    9       The Court of Appeals noted in Jarkesy that “[t]he result might be different if a
    constitutional challenge were filed in court before the initiation of any administrative proceeding
    (and the plaintiff could establish standing to bring the judicial action).” 803 F.3d at 23, citing Free
    Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 490, but that may provide little comfort given the rigors of the prerequisites
    for Article III standing.
    10      The Court notes that the Authority has some experience considering constitutional claims.
    See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. Educ. Activity, Arlington, Va., 
    56 F.L.R.A. 119
    , 120, 122 (2000)
    (determining that a Panel order “would violate the Appropriations Clause, the doctrine of
    separation of powers and the doctrine of sovereign immunity contained in the United States
    Constitution”).
    16
    In sum, then, the Court must find that plaintiff’s claims are “of the type Congress intended
    to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure.” Thunder Basin Coal Co., 
    510 U.S. at 207, 212
    ;
    see also AFGE, 929 F.3d at 755; Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 15. They “fall within the exclusive statutory
    scheme,” and plaintiff “may not bypass [the statute] by filing suit in [this Court].” AFGE, 929 F.3d
    at 761. Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction [Dkt. # 22] is GRANTED.               Further, plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
    injunction/summary judgment [Dkt. # 5], defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment [Dkt.
    # 23], and intervenor-defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 26] are DENIED
    as moot. A separate order will issue.
    AMY BERMAN JACKSON
    United States District Judge
    DATE: May 19, 2021
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2020-1026

Judges: Judge Amy Berman Jackson

Filed Date: 5/19/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/19/2021

Authorities (22)

National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n AFL-CIO v. Federal ... , 437 F.3d 1256 ( 2006 )

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich , 114 S. Ct. 771 ( 1994 )

Sparrow, Victor H. v. United Airlines Inc , 216 F.3d 1111 ( 2000 )

Frank A. Schuler, Jr. v. United States of America, ... , 617 F.2d 605 ( 1979 )

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America , 114 S. Ct. 1673 ( 1994 )

Victor Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences , 974 F.2d 192 ( 1992 )

United States v. Hohri , 107 S. Ct. 2246 ( 1987 )

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 112 S. Ct. 2130 ( 1992 )

William Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227 ( 1986 )

Council of Prison Locals v. Roy Brewer , 735 F.2d 1497 ( 1984 )

Elgin v. Department of the Treasury , 132 S. Ct. 2126 ( 2012 )

cadc-79-71-city-of-rochester-a-municipal-corporation-in-the-state-of-new , 603 F.2d 927 ( 1979 )

Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug ... , 402 F.3d 1249 ( 2005 )

Thomas, Oscar v. Principi, Anthony , 394 F.3d 970 ( 2005 )

American Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137 ( 2011 )

Dolly Kyle Browning and Direct Outstanding Creations ... , 292 F.3d 235 ( 2002 )

Akinseye v. District of Columbia , 339 F.3d 970 ( 2003 )

General Motors Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency , 363 F.3d 442 ( 2004 )

Shekoyan v. Sibley International Corp. , 217 F. Supp. 2d 59 ( 2002 )

National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Federal Service ... , 606 F.3d 780 ( 2010 )

View All Authorities »