Leopold v. Department of Treasury ( 2018 )


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  •                                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    JASON LEOPOLD and
    RYAN NOAH SHAPIRO,
    Plaintiffs,                             Civil Action No. 16-1827 (BAH)
    v.                                      Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
    SECURITY,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The plaintiffs, Jason Leopold, an investigative reporter, and Ryan Noah Shapiro, “an
    historian of national security, the policing of dissent, and governmental transparency,” First Am.
    Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 4, challenge the responses of the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (“FBI”), a component of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the Secret
    Service, a component of the Department of Homeland Security, to their four records requests
    submitted pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552.1 The FOIA
    requests at issue seek information about “how” the FBI and Secret Service “referenced or
    discussed internally,” Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.
    (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) at 2, ECF No. 22-1, two statements made in July and August 2016 by then-
    Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, and a third statement made in July 2016 by a
    New Hampshire state legislator. These statements, in the plaintiffs’ view, “arguably crossed the
    1
    The complaint originally challenged the response of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to a fifth FOIA
    request, but the plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed the claim against the IRS. See Pls.’ Notice of
    Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 10.
    1
    line between free speech and inciting imminent unlawful action.” 
    Id. at 1.
    The parties have now
    cross-moved for summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 18; Pls.’
    Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Cross-Mot.”), ECF No. 22. For the
    reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion is granted and the plaintiffs’ cross-motion is
    denied.
    I.        BACKGROUND
    A news article published on July 20, 2016, attributed to a New Hampshire legislator,
    Alfred P. Baldasaro, the following statement: “Hillary Clinton should be put in the firing line and
    shot for Treason.” Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue
    (“Defs.’ SMF”) ¶ 23 (citing Asawin Suebsaeng, Secret Service Investigating Trump Adviser Al
    Baldasaro for Hillary Execution Comments, THE DAILY BEAST (July 20, 2016),
    https://www.thedailybeast.com/secret-service-investigating-trump-adviser-al-baldasaro-for-
    hillary-execution-comments), ECF No. 18-1.2 This statement purportedly urging the shooting of
    a Democratic presidential candidate prompted the U.S. Secret Service Spokesperson Robert
    Hoback to give the following statement to the Daily Beast: “The U.S. Secret Service is aware of
    this matter and will conduct the appropriate investigation.” 
    Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
    The following week, on July 27, 2016, then-candidate Trump stated: “Russia, if you’re
    listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing,” and, “I think you will
    probably be rewarded mightily by our press.” FAC ¶ 17. Two weeks later, on August 9, 2016,
    then-candidate Trump made what the plaintiffs’ characterize as an “astonishing statement” that
    “was a thinly veiled threat on Secretary Clinton’s life,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 1, that “[i]f she gets to
    pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks,” and, “[a]lthough the Second Amendment people —
    2
    The facts set forth in the defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue
    are undisputed. See Pls.’ Resp. To Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 21-1.
    2
    maybe there is, I don’t know.” FAC ¶ 16. Similarly to the Secret Service’s earlier response to
    the state legislator’s statement urging the shooting of the Democratic presidential candidate, the
    Secret Service responded to Trump’s statement on the same day, stating in an official Tweet:
    “The Secret Service is aware of the comments made earlier this afternoon.” Defs.’ SMF ¶ 24
    (emphasis omitted). By contrast, however, to the Secret Service’s earlier response to the New
    Hampshire legislator’s statement, the Secret Service’s response to the Trump statement did not
    indicate that the agency would conduct any investigation.
    These provocative statements by the Republican presidential candidate and a state
    legislator prompted the plaintiffs, on August 18, 2016, to submit, by separate emails, two FOIA
    requests to the FBI and two FOIA requests to the Secret Service. FAC ¶¶ 23–25, 30–32; Defs.’
    SMF ¶¶ 1–2, 22, 24. The plaintiffs explain that “[b]ecause these statements could be viewed as
    illegal incitement, they would likely have at least piqued the interest of federal law enforcement
    agencies if made by an ordinary citizen,” and the FOIA requests were intended to obtain records
    regarding how “federal law enforcement agencies react to such statements from a major political
    party’s candidate for President” and “convey their response or lack thereof to the public.” Pls.’
    Opp’n at 1.
    The responses by each agency are described below.
    A.      FBI’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FOIA REQUESTS
    The plaintiffs’ FOIA requests to the FBI seek: (1) “disclosure of any and all records,
    including investigative records, mentioning or referring to Donald J. Trump’s statements on 9
    August 2016, ‘If she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do folks,’ and ‘Although the
    Second Amendment people – maybe there is, I don’t know,’” (“Second Amendment Request”),
    Defs.’ SMF ¶1 (quoting Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 5, Decl. of David M. Hardy, Section Chief of
    Records Management Division (FBI), dated July 26, 2017 (“Hardy Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 18-5);
    3
    and (2) “disclosure of any and all records, including investigative records, mentioning or
    referring to Donald J. Trump’s statement on 27 July 2016, ‘Russia, if you’re listening, I hope
    you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing,’ and ‘I think you will probably be
    rewarded mightily by our press,’” (“Russia Reward Request”), 
    id. ¶2 (quoting
    Hardy Decl. ¶ 5).3
    Relying on FOIA Exemptions 7(A) and 7(E), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(A) & (E), the FBI,
    on November 18, 2016, issued Glomar responses, indicating the agency could “neither confirm
    nor deny the existence of records responsive” to either request. 
    Id. ¶ 3–6
    (quoting Hardy Decl.
    ¶¶ 7–8).4 A few months later, however, on March 20, 2017, then-FBI director James Comey
    publicly acknowledged for the first time in congressional testimony an ongoing FBI
    counterintelligence investigation into “the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016
    presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals
    associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any
    coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts.” 
    Id. ¶ 7
    (quoting Hardy Decl. ¶ 9).
    In light of the then-FBI Director’s confirmation of an investigation, and interpreting the
    Russia Reward Request as seeking “records from the investigation that Director Comey
    acknowledged on March 20, 2017,” the FBI withdrew “its Glomar response, and is now relying
    on FOIA Exemption (b)(7)(A) to withhold in full, on a categorical basis, all records responsive
    to the” Russia Reward Request. 
    Id. ¶ 9
    (citing Hardy Decl. ¶ 11). The FBI construed the Russia
    Reward Request to cover “all records from the relevant investigative files (which are now part of
    Special Counsel Mueller’s Russia investigation),” and therefore “assum[ed] that the universe of
    3
    Although each exhibit and submission from the parties has been reviewed, only those exhibits necessary to
    provide context for resolution of the instant motion are cited herein.
    4
    A “Glomar” response that the agency can neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of
    responsive records is named after the vessel, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, that was the subject of a FOIA request
    for records in Phillippi v. CIA, 
    546 F.2d 1009
    (D.C. Cir. 1976).
    4
    responsive records is co-extensive with the contents of the investigative files as they existed on
    March 20, 2017.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 29. The search of the “relevant investigative files” by counsel
    from the FBI’s National Security and Cyber Law Branch “confirmed that all records responsive
    to Plaintiffs’ request” are part of the Special Counsel’s investigation, and served as the basis for
    the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 7(A). 
    Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
    The FBI’s Glomar response to the Second Amendment Request relies on Exemptions
    7(A) and 7(E). Defs.’ SMF ¶ 4. The FBI explains that Exemption 7(A) is implicated because
    declaring “the existence or non-existence of any records responsive to the Second Amendment
    Request” would effectively acknowledge the existence or non-existence of “a pending
    investigation it has not previously acknowledged, and that, assuming such an investigation
    existed, ‘acknowledging its existence prematurely could reasonably be expected to hamper and
    interfere with it.’” 
    Id. ¶ 12
    (quoting Hardy Decl. ¶ 19). Similarly, the FBI invokes Exemption
    7(E), explaining that confirming the existence or non-existence of a previously unacknowledged
    investigation “would expose information about the types of statements, actions, allegations, or
    threats the FBI deems appropriate to commit (or not commit) investigative resources toward,”
    thereby providing “significant insight into the activities likely to attract (or not attract) the FBI’s
    law enforcement attention,” which insight could facilitate circumvention of the law without
    drawing the FBI’s notice. 
    Id. ¶ 13
    (quoting Hardy Decl. ¶ 24).
    B.      SECRET SERVICE’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FOIA REQUESTS
    The plaintiffs’ FOIA requests to the Secret Service sought records regarding the agency’s
    public statements in response to the statement by the New Hampshire legislator urging the
    shooting of the Democratic presidential candidate and Trump’s “Second Amendment people”
    statement. FAC ¶¶ 30–32; Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 22, 24. Specifically, the request regarding the New
    Hampshire legislator urging the shooting of the Democratic presidential candidate, stated that
    5
    “On 20 July 2016, U.S. Secret Service Spokesperson Robert Hoback gave the following
    statement to the Daily Beast: ‘The U.S. Secret Service is aware of this matter and will conduct
    the appropriate investigation,’” and requested “disclosure of any and all records that mention or
    refer to the matter,” along with “any records compiled as part of any investigation into the
    referenced matter.” Defs.’ SMF ¶ 22 (citing Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 6, Decl. of Kim E. Campbell,
    Special Agent in Charge of Secret Service FOIA Division, dated July 12, 2017 (“Campbell
    Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 18-6). The plaintiffs’ other request to the Secret Service stated that “On 9
    August 2016, the U.S. Secret Service tweeted the following message: The Secret Service is
    aware of the comments made earlier this afternoon,” and requested “disclosure of any and all
    records that mention or refer to these comments,” along with “any records compiled as part of
    any investigation into the referenced comments.” 
    Id. ¶ 24
    (citing Campbell Decl. ¶ 3) (emphasis
    in original).
    The Secret Service interpreted the first request as seeking information regarding the
    agency’s response to “comments that had been attributed to Alfred P. Baldasaro, a member of
    the New Hampshire House of Representatives: ‘Hillary Clinton should be put in the firing line
    and shot for Treason,’” 
    id. ¶23 (citing
    Campbell Decl. ¶ 4), and the second request as referring to
    Trump’s “Second Amendment people” statement, 
    id. ¶ 24
    (citing Campbell Decl. ¶ 3).
    Following a search of “all locations likely to contain responsive records,” 
    id. ¶ 25
    (citing
    Campbell Decl. ¶ 7), and a “line by line [examination], to identify non-exempt information that
    could be reasonably segregated from exempt information for release,” 
    id. ¶ 36
    (citing Campbell
    Decl. ¶ 21), the Secret Service, on or before February 17, 2017, produced “268 pages of
    responsive records, most of them in partially redacted form,” 
    id. ¶ 27
    (citing Campbell Decl. ¶¶
    7–8). The Secret Service withheld information reflected in the partial redactions pursuant to
    6
    FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(E). 
    Id. ¶ 28
    (citing Campbell Decl. ¶ 8). While not disputing
    the adequacy of the Secret Service’s search or withholdings under Exemptions 6 or 7(C), the
    plaintiffs dispute the redactions on 41 pages under Exemptions 5 and 7(E).5
    As urged by the plaintiffs, see Pls.’ Reply Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Reply”) at
    22, ECF No. 27, the Court ordered the Secret Service to submit for in camera inspection the
    disputed redacted pages, see Minute Order, February 5, 2018.
    II.     LEGAL STANDARD
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if
    the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “In FOIA cases, ‘summary
    judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity
    of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by
    contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” Judicial Watch, Inc.
    v. U.S. Secret Serv., 
    726 F.3d 208
    , 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Agric., 
    455 F.3d 283
    , 287 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (alteration adopted). Indeed, the D.C.
    Circuit has observed that “the vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary
    judgment.” Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 
    641 F.3d 521
    , 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
    The FOIA was enacted “to promote the ‘broad disclosure of Government records’ by
    generally requiring federal agencies to make their records available to the public on request.”
    DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 
    795 F.3d 178
    , 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
    Julian, 
    486 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1988)). Reflecting the necessary balance between the public’s interest in
    5
    The disputed pages have the following Bates-stamp numbers: 10, 101, 135, 148–51, 156–58, 165–66, 168–
    69, 171, 174–75, 177, 179, 180–81, 183, 185, 187, 189, 195, 208–10, 212–13, 226, 228–29, 231, 233–36, 243, and
    252. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 31; Pls.’ Opp’n at 16 n.7 (withdrawing challenge to withholdings on pages 163, 217, 225, 237–
    39, and 250); see also Defs.’ Opp’n Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Reply Supp. Defs.’ Mot. at 25 n.11, ECF No. 23.
    7
    governmental transparency and “legitimate governmental and private interests that could be
    harmed by release of certain types of information,” United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Def., 
    601 F.3d 557
    , 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear
    Regulatory Comm’n, 
    975 F.2d 871
    , 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (alterations omitted)), the
    FOIA contains nine exemptions, set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), which “are explicitly made
    exclusive and must be narrowly construed,” Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 
    562 U.S. 562
    , 565
    (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Murphy v. Exec. Office for U.S.
    Attys., 
    789 F.3d 204
    , 206 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Justice (“CREW”), 
    746 F.3d 1082
    , 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Office of
    Mgmt. & Budget, 
    598 F.3d 865
    , 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010). “[T]hese limited exemptions do not
    obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.”
    Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 
    425 U.S. 352
    , 361 (1976).
    In litigation challenging the sufficiency of “the release of information under the FOIA,
    ‘the agency has the burden of showing that requested information comes within a FOIA
    exemption.’” Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 
    185 F.3d 898
    , 904
    (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
    169 F.3d 16
    ,
    18 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 
    508 U.S. 165
    , 171 (1993)
    (noting that “[t]he Government bears the burden of establishing that the exemption applies”);
    Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 
    443 U.S. 340
    , 352 (1979) (finding that
    the agency invoking an exemption bears the burden “to establish that the requested information
    is exempt”); Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    739 F.3d 1
    , 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This
    burden does not shift even when the requester files a cross-motion for summary judgment
    because “the Government ‘ultimately [has] the onus of proving that the [documents] are exempt
    8
    from disclosure,’” while the “burden upon the requester is merely ‘to establish the absence of
    material factual issues before a summary disposition of the case could permissibly occur,’” Pub.
    Citizen Health Research 
    Grp., 185 F.3d at 904
    –05 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v.
    Campbell, 
    593 F.2d 1023
    , 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (alterations in original).
    An agency may carry its burden of showing an exemption was properly invoked by
    submitting sufficiently detailed affidavits or declarations, a Vaughn index of the withheld
    documents, or both, to demonstrate that the government has analyzed carefully any material
    withheld and provided sufficient information as to the applicability of an exemption to enable the
    adversary system to operate. See Judicial Watch, 
    Inc., 726 F.3d at 215
    (“In FOIA cases,
    ‘summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable
    specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into
    question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” (quoting
    Consumer Fed’n of 
    Am., 455 F.3d at 287
    ) (alteration adopted)); 
    CREW, 746 F.3d at 1088
    (noting
    that an agency’s burden is sustained by submitting an affidavit that “describe[s] the justifications
    for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate[s] that the information withheld
    logically falls within the claimed exemption, and [is] not controverted by either contrary
    evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith” (quoting Larson v. U.S. Dep’t of
    State, 
    565 F.3d 857
    , 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009))); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 
    79 F.3d 1172
    , 1176
    (D.C. Cir. 1996) (instructing that an agency’s description “should reveal as much detail as
    possible as to the nature of the document, without actually disclosing information that deserves
    protection[,] . . . [which] serves the purpose of providing the requestor with a realistic
    opportunity to challenge the agency’s decision.” (internal citation omitted)). While “an agency’s
    task is not herculean” it must “‘describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably
    9
    specific detail’ and ‘demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed
    exemption.’” 
    Murphy, 789 F.3d at 209
    (quoting 
    Larson, 565 F.3d at 862
    ). “Ultimately, an
    agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or
    ‘plausible.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    715 F.3d 937
    , 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
    (quoting ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    628 F.3d 612
    , 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); 
    Larson, 565 F.3d at 862
    (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 
    473 F.3d 370
    , 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
    The FOIA provides federal courts with the power to “enjoin the agency from withholding
    agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the
    complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). District courts must “determine de novo whether non-
    disclosure was permissible,” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    777 F.3d 518
    , 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015), by reviewing the Vaughn index and any supporting declarations “to
    verify the validity of each claimed exemption,” Summers v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    140 F.3d 1077
    ,
    1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
    In addition, the court has an “affirmative duty” to consider whether the agency has
    produced all segregable, non-exempt information. Elliott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    596 F.3d 842
    ,
    851 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (referring to court’s “affirmative duty to consider the segregability
    issue sua sponte” (quoting Morley v. CIA, 
    508 F.3d 1108
    , 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); Stolt–Nielsen
    Transp. Grp. Ltd. v. United States, 
    534 F.3d 728
    , 734 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[B]efore approving the
    application of a FOIA exemption, the district court must make specific findings of segregability
    regarding the documents to be withheld.” (quoting Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 
    494 F.3d 1106
    , 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); Trans-Pac. Policing Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 
    177 F.3d 1022
    , 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e believe that the District Court had an affirmative duty to
    consider the segregability issue sua sponte . . . even if the issue has not been specifically raised
    10
    by the FOIA plaintiff.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a
    record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which
    are exempt under this subsection.”).
    III.   DISCUSSION
    The plaintiffs challenge aspects of the responses of both the FBI and the Secret Service to
    their four FOIA requests, as discussed below.
    A.  THE FBI CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE SEARCH AND PROPERLY
    WITHHELD RECORDS
    The FBI released no records in response to either of the plaintiffs’ FOIA requests,
    invoking Exemption 7(A) as to the Russia Reward Request and a Glomar response, predicated
    on Exemptions 7(A) and 7(E), as to the Second Amendment Request. The plaintiffs contend that
    the FBI conducted an inadequate search for records responsive to both requests, due to the FBI’s
    construction of the requests as seeking only investigative records, and improperly withheld
    records.
    1.      The Russia Reward Request
    The crux of the plaintiffs’ dispute over the FBI’s response to the Russia Reward Request
    stems from the FBI’s construction of this request: namely, the FBI, as a law enforcement agency,
    interpreted the plaintiffs’ request as seeking “the sort of records that the FBI was likely to have
    (if any).” Defs.’ Opp’n Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Reply Supp. Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 5,
    ECF No. 23. Consequently, the FBI searched “for only investigative records,” 
    id. (quoting Ex.
    A, Second Decl. of David M. Hardy, dated Sept. 19, 2017 (“Second Hardy Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No.
    23-3), “coextensive with the FBI’s Russia investigation (at least, as it stood on the search cut-off
    date of March 20, 2017), 
    id. at 9.
    This active and ongoing investigation is now being supervised
    by Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 27, 31–32. The plaintiffs
    11
    complain that this “construction is both broader and narrower than Plaintiffs’ request.” Pls.’
    Opp’n at 2; Pls.’ Reply at 4 (complaining that the FBI did not process the “Russia request
    consistent with how it is written”). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ position, the FBI reasonably
    interpreted the Russia Reward Request.
    As the plaintiffs correctly point out, “[a]gencies have ‘a duty to construe a FOIA request
    liberally,’” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, Dep’t of
    Health & Human Servs. (“PETA”), 
    745 F.3d 535
    , 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Nation
    Magazine, Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 
    71 F.3d 885
    , 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), but
    that duty does not obviate the requester’s burden to “‘reasonably describe[ ]’ the records sought,”
    Nation 
    Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890
    (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)) (alteration in original). “The
    linchpin inquiry is whether the agency is able to determine precisely what records [are] being
    requested,” Yeager v. DEA, 
    678 F.2d 315
    , 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks
    omitted), with the responsibility firmly on the requester “to frame requests with sufficient
    particularity to ensure that searches are not unreasonably burdensome,” Assassination Archives
    & Research Ctr., Inc. v. CIA, 
    720 F. Supp. 217
    , 219 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, No. 89-5414, 
    1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 27799
    (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 1990) (citing Yeager, 
    678 F.2d 315
    ). Moreover,
    agencies “are not required to . . . perform searches which are not compatible with their own
    document retrieval systems,” 
    id., and they
    “need not respond to overly broad and unreasonably
    burdensome requests,” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 681 F. App’x 2, 4 (D.C. Cir.
    2017) (citing Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
    907 F.2d 203
    , 208–09 (D.C.
    Cir. 1990)); see also Anderson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
    661 F. Supp. 2d 6
    , 12 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009)
    (an agency does not have to “honor a FOIA request that requires it to conduct an unduly
    burdensome search” (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Ed., 
    292 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 6 (D.D.C.
    12
    2003))). When confronted with a challenge to the adequacy of a search, “an ‘agency must show
    that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods
    which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested,’ which it can do by
    submitting ‘[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search
    performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist)
    were searched.’” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. FBI, 
    877 F.3d 399
    , 402 (D.C. Cir.
    2017) (quoting 
    Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68
    ) (alteration in original).
    In the plaintiffs’ view, the FBI’s interpretation of the Russia Reward Request was too
    narrow since the reference in the request to “investigative files” was prefaced by the word
    “including,” and thereby indicated that the “request was not limited solely to investigative files
    and thus would include records beyond Special Counsel Muller’s [sic] investigative files.” Pls.’
    Opp’n at 3. The FBI does not dispute that, “taken literally and divorced from context, the plain
    text of these requests, standing alone, would call for non-investigative records (to the extent they
    exist).” Defs.’ Opp’n at 4. Yet, the FBI has credibly explained that such a literal construction of
    this request “as seeking more than law enforcement records” would be “overly broad, unduly
    burdensome, and inadequate to describe the records sought,” such that the FBI “would have been
    unable to craft a reasonable search for such non-investigative records.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 8.
    Indeed, FOIA requests with similarly broad phrasing as the plaintiffs’ request for “any and all
    records . . . mentioning or referring to” Trump’s Russia Reward statement, Defs.’ SMF ¶ 2,
    without any more specification of targeted locations or more particularity have been found
    “fatally overbroad and burdensome,” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
    925 F. Supp. 2d
    55, 61 (D.D.C. 2013) (granting summary judgment to agency confronted with FOIA request
    for “‘all’ records that ‘relate to’” a subject); see also Cable News Network, Inc. v. FBI, 
    271 F. 13
    Supp. 3d 108, 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that a request for “[a]ny and all documents and
    records” relating to memoranda written by former FBI Director Comey was fatally overbroad);
    Dale v. IRS, 
    238 F. Supp. 2d 99
    , 104 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding FOIA request for “any and all
    documents, including but not limited to files, that refer or relate in any way to” an individual did
    “not describe the records sought with ‘reasonably sufficient detail’ in light of both statutory
    guidance and case law”).
    For example, the plaintiffs criticize the FBI for not “look[ing] for noninvestigative
    records within its Central Records System (CRS),” Pls.’ Reply at 4, or in other possible locations
    such as “within the FBI’s Office of Public Affairs (responding to questions from reporters);
    senior leadership (discussing the matters internally); and the FBI’s Moscow overseas office (with
    respect to the Russia request),” 
    id. at 3.
    This criticism, however, only proves the FBI’s point. At
    the outset, a CRS search is typically used for “investigative, law-enforcement records,” Second
    Hardy Decl. ¶ 8, not the non-investigative records that the plaintiffs apparently had in mind. In
    any event, a search of CRS “was not necessary in this case because the responsive records were
    located by other means.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 30. Specifically, subject matter experts from the
    National Security and Cyber Law Branch (“NSCLB”) of the FBI’s Office of General Counsel
    (“OGC”), “who were already familiar with the relevant records,” 
    id., were called
    upon to
    conduct a “manual search and review of the entirety of the relevant investigative files” before
    “confirm[ing]” that all responsive records were now part of the Special Counsel’s investigation,
    
    id. ¶ 31.
    Moreover, the plaintiffs’ suggested non-exhaustive list of potential locations for searches
    illustrates the broad scope of the request as to non-investigative records without providing “a
    sufficient description of the records sought to permit a search.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 8. As the
    14
    defendants explain, “[d]ivorced from the context of the FBI’s investigative, law enforcement
    functions, literally any one of the FBI’s more than 35,000 employees might have had an email
    mentioning one of the campaign comments in question,” but “‘[w]ithout identified (or even
    described) employee-custodians, the FBI cannot conduct e-mail or electronic searches’” due to
    technical search limitations within the agency. Defs.’ Opp’n at 5–6 (quoting Second Hardy
    Decl. ¶ 8); see also Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 8 (“[I]t is simply not reasonable (or even feasible) to
    ask every FBI office and the more than 35,000 employees of the FBI to conduct searches for
    some unspecified, non-investigative records, unrelated to the FBI’s law-enforcement mission,
    which may or may not exist, about two comments made by a Presidential candidate.” (emphasis
    in original)); Defs.’ Opp’n at 6 (noting that plaintiffs’ request for non-investigative records is so
    broad and non-specific that it is beyond the FBI’s “technical capability” (quoting Second Hardy
    Decl. 8)).6
    Even if the FBI’s interpretation of their request as “seeking all records from the relevant
    investigative files” of Special Counsel Mueller, Hardy Decl. ¶ 29, was “a reasonable one,” the
    plaintiffs assert that the FBI nonetheless lacked authority to apply a “saving construction” of the
    request “without prior notice or permission from Plaintiffs,” Pls.’ Reply at 1–2. Absent such
    prior notice of the FBI’s otherwise concededly “reasonable” interpretation, the plaintiffs “seek an
    order . . . requiring the FBI to process the Russia request as written.” 
    Id. at 9.
    The plaintiffs’
    6
    The plaintiffs rely on “cases within this Circuit [that] have often disapproved of agencies narrowing the
    scope of a FOIA request to exclude materials reasonably within the description provided by the requester,” Pls.’
    Reply at 1 (quoting Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 
    931 F. Supp. 2d 77
    , 102 (D.D.C. 2013)), but this reliance is
    misplaced. The plaintiffs cite, for example, LaCedra v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 
    317 F.3d 345
    , 346–47 (D.C.
    Cir. 2003), where the court concluded that the agency improperly narrowed a request for “all documents pertaining
    to” plaintiff’s criminal case to “only the specifically enumerated items.” By contrast to such cases in which an
    agency improperly narrows an otherwise clear FOIA request and thereby improperly delimits the search, here the
    FBI necessarily narrowed the scope of the Russia Reward Request to “only investigative records” because a more
    expansive reading to cover non-investigative records “would have prevented the FBI from being able to conduct an
    adequate search.” Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot at 21, ECF No. 18-2.
    15
    invitation to impose an obligation on agencies to provide notice and/or to confer with a requester
    before construing an otherwise fatally overbroad request in a manner to which a response may be
    provided, is declined. As support, the plaintiffs cite to 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(b), which directs DOJ
    components to clarify FOIA requests with requestors if the request “does not reasonably describe
    the records sought.” This regulation is unavailing, however. This regulation is inapplicable
    since the Russia Reward Request’s reference to “investigative records” provided a reasonable
    description of the records sought and allowed the FBI to limit the scope of the request to a
    reasonably manageable search, avoiding the need to trigger any conferral obligation under the
    cited regulation. Moreover, even if the regulation were applicable and the FBI had made an
    effort to confer with the plaintiffs to narrow the scope of their Russia Reward Request, the
    plaintiffs’ posture in this litigation in continuing to seek non-investigative records indicates that
    any such conferral would have been futile. Thus, while the law is clear that FOIA requests must
    be liberally construed, this obligation is limited by the agency’s ability to identify the locations
    where the requested records may be located and the concomitant administrative burdens of
    conducting the search with available search tools.
    The plaintiffs further complain that the FBI’s construction of their Russia Reward request
    was too broad because “Special Counsel Muller’s [sic] investigative file would include
    documents that do not ‘mention[] or refer[]’ to Mr. Trump’s statement about Secretary Clinton’s
    emails.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 2–3 (alterations in original). As the plaintiffs explain, their request was
    drafted “so as to obtain records about the FBI’s response to a public call for a foreign
    government to violate United States law, not to obtain any and every record about the Trump
    campaign’s potential collusion with Russia (i.e., the documents now contained in Muller’s [sic]
    investigative file).” Pls.’ Opp’n at 4. The plaintiffs’ critique that the FBI’s interpretation of the
    16
    Russia Reward Request as co-extensive with the Special Counsel’s investigative files is over-
    broad may be accurate, but that observation does not help the plaintiffs. As the defendants note,
    this overbroad interpretation of the request “would [not] have actually missed any [responsive]
    documents.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (citing Hemenway v. Hughes, 
    601 F. Supp. 1002
    , 1005 (D.D.C.
    1985). Whether the FBI categorically withholds all materials that are part of the Special
    Counsel’s investigation, or just the subset that “mention[] or refer[] to” Trump’s statement,
    Hardy Decl. ¶ 5, makes no difference in the applicability of Exemption 7(A), Defs.’ Opp’n at 9–
    10.
    FOIA’s Exemption 7(A) allows an agency to withhold “records or information compiled
    for law enforcement purposes,” but only to the extent that the production of such records or
    information “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C.
    § 552(b)(7)(A). In adopting this exemption, Congress recognized that “law enforcement
    agencies ha[ve] legitimate needs to keep certain records confidential, lest the agencies be
    hindered in their investigations or placed at a disadvantage when it [comes] time to present their
    case.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 
    437 U.S. 214
    , 224 (1978). In this case, the FBI has
    amply established that the investigative materials now part of the Special Counsel’s investigation
    were “compiled for law enforcement purposes,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), and are “part of an active,
    ongoing counterintelligence investigation,” Hardy Decl. ¶ 32, such that production of these
    records “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. §
    552(b)(7)(A). As the agency’s declarant explains, disclosure of any specific records “would
    reveal non-public information about the nature and scope of the pending investigation, the extent
    to and manner in which the comment fit within (or was deemed irrelevant to) the larger
    17
    investigation as a whole (if at all), the relative significance of the comment (or lack thereof) to
    the investigation, and so on.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 10.
    Although the plaintiffs apparently contest the applicability of Exemption 7(A), see Pls.’
    Reply at 9–10 (stating that “Plaintiffs’ response should not be understood as a concession that
    the assertion of Exemption 7(A) is proper”), the focus of their dissatisfaction is with the FBI’s
    blanket invocation of this exemption without “conduct[ing] a document-by-document review in
    order to assign documents to the proper category,” 
    id. at 5
    (quoting Bevis v. U.S. Dep’t of State,
    
    801 F.2d 1386
    , 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The plaintiffs’ characterization is contrary to the
    description provided by the FBI about how the search was conducted. Specifically, the FBI had
    subject matter experts from the NSCLB of the FBI’s OGC conduct a “manual search and review
    of the entirety of the relevant investigative files.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 31. The agency then withheld
    records “on a categorical basis,” Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot at 24, ECF No. 18-2, because
    even a Vaughn index or other precise description of the records being withheld would “reveal
    non-public information about the targets and scope of the investigation” which “could reasonably
    be expected to” interfere with it, Hardy Decl. ¶ 35. In lieu of specific information about each
    withheld record, the agency describes for each type of responsive record, how disclosure could
    interfere with the Special Counsel’s investigation and any prospective enforcement proceedings.
    
    Id. ¶¶ 38,
    41–51.
    In considering the plaintiffs’ objection to the manner in which the FBI has invoked
    Exemption 7(A), the Court is mindful that categorical withholdings under Exemption 7(A) may
    be appropriate. See Robbins 
    Tire, 437 U.S. at 224
    , 236 (holding that 7(A) allows “certain
    generic determinations [to] be made” and “that Congress did not intend to prevent the federal
    courts from determining that, with respect to particular kinds of enforcement proceedings,
    18
    disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is pending would generally
    ‘interfere with enforcement proceedings’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A))); 
    CREW, 746 F.3d at 1098
    (“Categorical withholding is often appropriate under Exemption 7(A).”); Manning v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    234 F. Supp. 3d 26
    , 35 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[A] document-by-document
    approach is not required, however, when invoking Exemption 7(A).”). In this case, the FBI has
    provided a sufficient explanation, see Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 10, to render the categorical
    withholding permissible. See Judicial Watch, 
    Inc., 726 F.3d at 215
    (an affidavit must “contain
    reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements” to support the
    categorical use of Exemption 7(A) (quoting Consumer Fed’n of 
    Am., 455 F.3d at 287
    )); 
    Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1389
    (holding that an agency may “group[] documents into relevant categories that
    are sufficiently distinct to allow a court to grasp ‘how each . . . category of documents, if
    disclosed, would interfere with the investigation’” (quoting Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
    Human Services, 
    682 F.2d 256
    , 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).7
    Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the
    plaintiffs’ Russia Reward Request.
    2.       The Second Amendment Request
    The plaintiffs contend that the FBI’s Glomar response, predicated on Exemptions 7(A)
    and/or 7(E), to the Second Amendment Request is improper because the FBI has failed to satisfy
    the requirements of Exemption 7(A) with “evidence that there is a ‘concrete prospective law
    enforcement proceeding.’” Pls.’ Reply at 14 (quoting Carson v. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    631 F.2d 7
              In light of the “affirmative duty” to consider whether the agency has produced all segregable, non-exempt
    information, 
    Elliott, 596 F.3d at 851
    (quoting 
    Morley, 508 F.3d at 1123
    ), the Court notes that the FBI, which is
    “entitled to a presumption that [it] complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material,”
    
    Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1117
    , has met its burden by explaining that “given the active and fluid nature of the
    investigation, the sensitivities of the materials, and the reasonable expectation of harm from premature disclosure of
    investigative materials here, the FBI has concluded that no non-exempt information exists that can be reasonably
    segregated and released,” Hardy Decl. ¶ 52.
    19
    1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1980).8 The FBI argues that its Glomar response is supported by
    Exemption 7(A) because “any responsive records . . . would necessarily relate to an FBI
    investigation the existence of which has never been publicly confirmed or denied.” Defs.’ Opp’n
    at 12.
    “In certain cases, merely acknowledging the existence of responsive records would itself
    ‘cause harm cognizable under [a] FOIA exception.’” 
    PETA, 745 F.3d at 540
    (quoting 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374
    ) (alteration in original). In such cases, “an agency can issue a Glomar response,
    refusing to confirm or deny its possession of responsive documents,” and “[a] Glomar response
    is valid ‘if the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records falls within a FOIA
    exemption.’” Id. (quoting 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374
    ). To determine whether acknowledging the
    existence or non-existence of responsive records “fits a FOIA exemption, courts apply the
    general exemption review standards established in non-Glomar cases.” 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374
    ;
    accord ACLU v. CIA, 
    710 F.3d 422
    , 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Thus, the agency bears the burden of
    showing that the fact of whether it possesses requested records is protected from disclosure under
    a FOIA exemption. See 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374
    .
    Exemption 7(A) protects records when disclosure “could reasonably be expected to
    interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), where those proceedings are
    “pending or reasonably anticipated,” Mapother v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    3 F.3d 1533
    , 1540 (D.C.
    Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs, citing Mapother, Pls.’ Reply at 13, contend that
    8
    The plaintiffs also contend that, similarly to their Russia Reward Request, the FBI improperly construed the
    Second Amendment Request “as seeking only investigative records.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 13 (quoting Hardy Decl. ¶ 19
    n.3). This contention is not persuasive. The FBI properly construed the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment Request for
    “any and all records mentioning or referring to” then-candidate Trump’s “Second Amendment people” statement as
    seeking investigative records since otherwise the request “would be overly broad, unduly burdensome, and
    inadequate to describe the records sought,” such that “[t]he FBI would have been unable to craft a reasonable search
    for such non-investigative records unconnected to the FBI’s law-enforcement mission.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 8.
    20
    the FBI has not shown that such enforcement proceedings are “contemplated,” 
    id. (quoting Mapother,
    3 F.3d at 1540), with respect to then-candidate Trump’s “Second Amendment people”
    statement. Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that “it is conceptually incoherent to premise a Glomar
    response on Exemption 7(A),” because this exemption “ʻis temporal in nature,’ and an agency
    must show not only ‘that the material withheld relates to a concrete prospective law enforcement
    proceeding,’ but also that ‘[t]he proceeding . . . remain[s] pending at the time of our decision, not
    only at the time of the initial FOIA request.’” Pls.’ Opp’n at 8 (quoting 
    CREW, 746 F.3d at 1097
    ) (alterations in original).
    The defendants, however, correctly point out that the relevant inquiry “is not whether the
    hypothetical investigation is actually pending,” but “whether confirming or denying its existence
    via a substantive FOIA response would cause harm that is protected under” Exemption 7(A).
    Defs.’ Opp’n at 16. The agency affidavit sufficiently explains why disclosure of the Glomar fact
    would result in the type of harm Exemption 7(A) protects against. See 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374
    (“In determining whether the existence of agency records vel non fits a FOIA exemption, courts
    apply the general exemption review standards established in non-Glomar cases.”). Specifically,
    requiring the FBI to respond to the Second Amendment Request with a substantive report would
    effectively reveal whether or not the agency instituted an investigation of then-candidate
    Trump’s “Second Amendment people” comment, which “some interpreted as [] threatening
    another presidential candidate.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 6. No such investigation of what the
    plaintiffs describe as “veiled threats made by a major political party’s presidential candidate
    against his opponent,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 11, has been publicly acknowledged, and any response
    other than a Glomar response would establish the existence or non-existence of an investigation
    prompted by then-candidate Trump’s “Second Amendment people” comment, see James
    21
    Madison Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 17-cv-00144, 
    2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1674
    at *7
    (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2018) (granting summary judgment to FBI on assertion of Glomar response
    based on Exemption 7(A) and accepting agency’s explanation “that merely acknowledging the
    existence or non-existence of responsive records in the FBI’s files would require the FBI to
    confirm or deny whether it has and is investigating the alleged dossier and synopsis, either in a
    separate investigation or as part of its Russian interference investigation, which itself could
    hamper and interfere with any such investigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Valdez v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    474 F. Supp. 2d 128
    , 133–34 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that “DEA adequately
    justified its decision neither to confirm nor deny the existence of responsive records” pertaining
    to confidential informant who testified at requester’s criminal trial by relying on Glomar and
    Exemption 7(A)); Cozen O’Connor v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    570 F. Supp. 2d 749
    , 789 (E.D.
    Pa. 2008) (granting summary judgment to agency on assertion of Glomar response based on
    Exemptions 1 and 7(A), noting that agency “has never publicly revealed that it has opened
    investigatory evidentiary files on these sixteen organizations nor has it stated that it is actively
    investigating any one of the sixteen organizations” that were the subject of the FOIA request at
    issue).
    If an investigation related to then-candidate Trump’s “Second Amendment people”
    statement did exist, any confirmation in response to the plaintiffs’ FOIA request “could
    reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A),
    because disclosure “would tip off subjects and persons of investigative interest, thus giving them
    the opportunity to take defensive actions to conceal their criminal activities, elude detection, and
    suppress and/or fabricate evidence. It would also expose any potential witnesses or sources to
    harassment, intimidation, or coercion.” Defs.’ SMF ¶ 12 (quoting Hardy Decl. ¶ 19).
    22
    As the D.C. Circuit noted with respect to Exemption 7(C), if an agency “were required to
    acknowledge responsive documents in instances where there was no investigation but were
    permitted to give a Glomar response in cases where there had been one, it would become
    apparent that a Glomar response really meant that an investigation had occurred.” 
    PETA, 745 F.3d at 544
    . The same logic applies to Exemption 7(A) in the instant case: “The agency must be
    permitted to issue a Glomar response in both situations to maintain the uncertainty essential to
    Glomar’s efficacy.” Id.; see Hardy Decl. ¶ 19 (“[A]ssuming that the FBI does not have any
    pending investigation on this subject, the FBI’s Glomar response is nevertheless required,
    because if the FBI were to invoke a Glomar response only when it actually possessed responsive
    records, the Glomar response would be interpreted as an admission that responsive records exist,
    thus rendering it ineffective.”).9
    Accordingly, the FBI properly issued a Glomar response to the plaintiffs’ Second
    Amendment Request, entitling the defendants to summary judgment on this aspect of the
    plaintiffs’ claim.
    B.       THE SECRET SERVICE PROPERLY WITHHELD RECORDS
    In response to the plaintiffs’ two FOIA requests to the Secret Service, the agency
    produced 268 pages of records with a number of redactions that the agency contends are justified
    by several exemptions. Only certain of the redactions under Exemptions 5 and 7(E) are disputed.
    Defs.’ SMF ¶ 31; Pls.’ Opp’n at 16 n.7; Defs.’ Opp’n at 24 & n.10.10 The plaintiffs argue that
    9
    Having resolved the sufficiency of the FBI’s Glomar response to the Second Amendment Request on the
    basis of Exemption 7(A), the plaintiffs’ vigorous challenge to the appropriateness of the FBI’s invocation of
    Exemption 7(E) to this same request need not be addressed. See Judicial Watch, 
    Inc., 715 F.3d at 940
    n.4 (having
    resolved propriety of withholding under Exemption 1, no need to “reach” “agency’s alternative argument that some
    of the images could be withheld under FOIA Exemption 3”); 
    Larson, 565 F.3d at 862
    –63 (“[A]gencies may invoke
    the exemptions independently and courts may uphold agency action under one exemption without considering the
    applicability of the other.”).
    10
    Specifically, the plaintiffs dispute the redactions under Exemption 5 on bates-numbered pages 10, 101, 183,
    210, 226, 229, 231, and 252, Defs.’ Opp’n at 25 n.11; Campbell Decl. ¶ 11, and the redactions under both
    23
    the agency’s explanations are too “general” to support these disputed redactions and suggest in
    camera review “to supplement the Secret Service’s declaration.” Pls.’ Reply at 21–22. The
    Court has reviewed in camera unredacted copies of the pages at issue, along with a supplemental
    declaration, see Decl. of Brian S. Lambert, Special Agent in Charge, Protective Intelligence and
    Assessment Division, U.S. Secret Service, dated February 20, 2018 (“Lambert Decl.”), to
    determine whether the redactions under Exemption 5 and Exemption 7(E) were appropriate. As
    explained below, beginning with consideration of the redactions under Exemption 5, the Secret
    Service properly withheld the disputed records.11
    FOIA’s Exemption 5 applies to “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
    that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”
    5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Two conditions must be met for a record to qualify for this exemption and
    be withheld: “[1] its source must be a Government agency, and [2] it must fall within the ambit
    of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the
    agency that holds it.” U.S. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 
    532 U.S. 1
    , 8 (2001); see also Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    512 F.3d 677
    , 680 & n.4
    (D.C. Cir. 2008). Exemption 5 may be used to withhold records subject to “the deliberative-
    process privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work-product privilege.” Nat’l
    Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec. Office for U.S. Attys. & U.S. Dep’t
    Exemption 5 and 7(E) on bates-numbered pages 135, 148–51, 156–58, 165–66, 168–69, 171, 174–75, 177, 179,
    180–81, 185, 187, 189, 195, 208–09, 212–13, 228, 233–36, and 243, Defs.’ Opp’n at 24 n.10; Decl. of Brian S.
    Lambert, Special Agent in Charge, Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division, U.S. Secret Service ¶ 10 n.1
    (clarifying that certain disputed redactions were “subject to withholding under both Exemption 5 and Exemption
    7(E), notwithstanding any implication in the Campbell Declaration that they were only subject to withholding under
    one of those two exemptions”). The Lambert Declaration was filed in camera as part of the Secret Service’s in
    camera production of the pages at issue, and the portion of that Declaration cited here is unsealed.
    11
    The Secret Service’s in camera production was also reviewed with consideration given to the Court’s
    “affirmative duty” to consider whether the agency has produced all segregable, non-exempt information, 
    Elliott, 596 F.3d at 851
    (quoting 
    Morley, 508 F.3d at 1123
    ), and the Court concurs with the Campbell Declaration that “[n]o
    reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of the documents have been withheld,” Campbell Decl. ¶ 21.
    24
    of Justice, 
    844 F.3d 246
    , 249 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Energy, 
    617 F.2d 854
    , 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
    For the deliberative process privilege to apply, the materials must be “both predecisional
    and deliberative.” 
    Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1537
    . A document is predecisional if “it was generated
    before the adoption of an agency policy” and is deliberative if “it reflects the give-and-take of the
    consultative process.” Coastal 
    States, 617 F.2d at 866
    . Thus, Exemption 5 “covers
    recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents
    which reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency.” 
    Id. “Factual material
    that does not reveal the deliberative process is not protected by this
    exemption.” 
    Morley, 508 F.3d at 1127
    (quoting Paisley v. CIA, 
    712 F.2d 686
    , 698 (D.C. Cir.
    1983), vacated in part on other grounds, 
    724 F.2d 201
    (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The D.C. Circuit has
    emphasized that “[t]he identity of the parties to the memorandum is important; a document from
    a subordinate to a superior official is more likely to be predecisional, while a document moving
    in the opposite direction is more likely to contain instructions to staff explaining the reasons for a
    decision already made.” Coastal 
    States, 617 F.2d at 868
    .
    The defendants explain that the Exemption 5 withholdings on pages 10 and 101 cover
    “pre-decisional deliberations between subordinates and supervisors regarding how to respond (if
    [a]t all) to media inquiries concerning the public comments that are the subject of Plaintiffs’
    Second Amendment request.” Campbell Decl. ¶ 11. Similarly, the defendants explain that the
    redactions on the remaining disputed pages “protect the deliberative process that was used to
    determine what particular course of criminal investigative or protective action, if any, was to be
    taken in response to the public comments that were the subject of both of Plaintiffs’ FOIA
    requests,” and similarly “contain the pre-decisional opinions and thoughts of a variety of Secret
    25
    Service employees . . . about how the Secret Service should respond (if at all) to potential threats
    or perceived threats to Secret Service protectees,” which opinions and thoughts “played a part in
    the process by which specific decisions were made” in response. 
    Id. ¶ 13
    ; Lambert Decl. ¶ 10
    n.1.
    Review of the redacted text on each of those pages confirms that this material is indeed
    pre-decisional and deliberative, and protected from disclosure under Exemption 5. The redacted
    information “reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process,” Coastal 
    States, 617 F.2d at 866
    , as employees of the Secret Service “prepared for and participated in discussions with upper
    and lower level management about how the Secret Service should respond (if at all) to potential
    threats or perceived threats to Secret Service protectees,” Campbell Decl. ¶ 13. While some of
    the redacted material is “‘factual’ in form,” the D.C. Circuit has held that Exemption 5 is
    nonetheless applicable if that material “reflect[s] an agency’s preliminary positions or
    ruminations about how to exercise discretion on some policy matter” or would “reveal an
    agency’s or official’s mode of formulating or exercising policy-implicating judgment,”
    Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
    976 F.2d 1429
    , 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg,
    J.), and the redacted material meets that standard.
    The redactions on pages 135, 148–51, 156–58, 165–66, 168–69, 171, 174–75, 177, 179,
    180–81, 185, 187, 189, 195, 208–09, 212–13, 228, 233–36, and 243 were also justified under
    Exemption 7(E). This exemption protects law enforcement records for which disclosure “would
    disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would
    disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
    reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The
    “requirement that disclosure risk circumvention of the law ‘sets a relatively low bar for the
    26
    agency to justify withholding.’”12 Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l
    Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico, 
    740 F.3d 195
    , 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting
    Blackwell v. FBI, 
    646 F.3d 37
    , 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The D.C. Circuit has held that “[t]o clear
    that relatively low bar, an agency must demonstrate only that release of a document might
    increase the risk ‘that a law will be violated or that past violators will escape legal
    consequences.’” 
    Id. at 205
    (quoting Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 
    562 F.3d 1190
    , 1193 (D.C. Cir.
    2009)). “Rather than requiring a highly specific burden of showing how the law will be
    circumvented, exemption 7(E) only requires that the [agency] demonstrate logically how the
    release of the requested information might create a risk of circumvention of the law.” 
    Blackwell, 646 F.3d at 42
    (quoting Mayer 
    Brown, 562 F.3d at 1194
    ) (alteration in original).
    The Secret Service explains that the material redacted under Exemption 7(E) on pages
    135, 148–51, 156–58, 165–66, 168–69, 171, 174–75, 177, 179, 180–81, 185, 187, 189, 195, 208–
    09, 212–13, 228, 233–36, and 243 “relate[s] to certain specific techniques that the Secret Service
    uses in order to both detect and investigate potentially threatening comments,” as well as
    “internal analysis,” the release of which “would reveal the techniques used” for threat
    assessment. Campbell Decl. ¶ 19; Lambert Decl. ¶ 10 n.1. According to the agency, release of
    the information “would offer would-be violators of the law a powerful road map,” Lambert Decl.
    ¶ 11, which “would enable the targets of those methods and techniques to avoid detention and to
    develop countermeasures against the Secret Service’s use of such methods and procedures,”
    Campbell Decl. ¶ 19. This explanation “demonstrate[s] logically how the release of th[at]
    12
    Despite some disagreement among the circuits as to whether the phrase “could reasonably be expected to
    risk circumvention of the law” applies only to “guidelines for law enforcement investigations,” or to “techniques and
    procedures” as well, the D.C. Circuit “has applied the ‘risk circumvention of the law’ requirement both to records
    containing guidelines and to records containing techniques and procedures,” noting that “given the low bar posed by
    the ‘risk circumvention of the law’ requirement, it is not clear that the difference matters much in practice.” Pub.
    Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico, 
    740 F.3d 195
    ,
    204 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
    27
    requested information might create a risk of circumvention of the law.” 
    Blackwell, 646 F.3d at 42
    (quoting Mayer 
    Brown, 562 F.3d at 1194
    ). Examination of the disputed Exemption 7(E)
    redactions confirms that this material was properly withheld.
    In sum, the Secret Service has adequately explained the disputed redactions under
    Exemption 5 and Exemption 7(E). Accordingly, the Secret Service’s motion for summary
    judgment is granted.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted and
    the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. An appropriate Order accompanies
    this Memorandum Opinion.
    Date: March 19, 2018
    __________________________
    BERYL A. HOWELL
    Chief Judge
    28
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2016-1827

Judges: Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

Filed Date: 3/19/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/19/2018

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