Williams v. Washington D.C. Eviction Marshals ( 2016 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
DONYA WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 15-cv-1801 (KBJ)
)
WASHINGTON D.C. EVICTION )
MARSHALS, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 29, 2015, pro se Plaintiff Donya Williams (“Williams”) filed an action
in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against the “Washington D.C.
Eviction Marshals” related to the allegedly harsh manner in which individual deputy
Marshals executed an eviction notice. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 1–3.) 1 Williams
maintains that, on June 19, 2015, the deputy Marshals entered her apartment with guns
drawn, shone flashlights into the eyes of her 13 year-old daughter and frightened her,
and then forced Williams to come out of her bedroom and into the living room without
allowing her to don clothes. (Id. at 1–2.) Williams further asserts that the deputy
Marshals laughed at and taunted her, her daughter, and her male friend who was at the
apartment during the eviction, and that after the eviction, she could not locate certain
items of personal property. (Id. at 2–3.) Williams’s complaint regarding this
incident—which was removed to federal court on October 23, 2015 (Notice of
1
Page numbers referenced herein refer to those that the Court’s electronic case filing system
automatically assigns.
Removal, ECF No. 1)—seeks $40,000 in damages from the “Washington D.C.
Eviction Marshals,” which the Court will construe as the United States Marshals
Service (“USMS” or “the Service”). 2
Before this Court at present is the USMS’s motion to dismiss the complaint
(see ECF No. 8.), in which it argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over
Williams’s action because Williams did not file a claim with the Service prior to
bringing this lawsuit, and thus has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2675,
2679-80. In response, Williams asserts that she called USMS a number of times to
lodge a complaint, but that her communications were “ignored or deleted.” (Opp. to
Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp.”), ECF No. 10, at 2–3.)
On September 30, 2016, this Court issued an order that GRANTED
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DISMISSED this case without prejudice. The
instant Memorandum Opinion explains that the Court issued that order because there
is no dispute that Williams has yet to present her claim in writing to the Service, and
as a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Williams’s claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
According to Williams’s complaint, on the morning of June 19, 2015, Williams
heard “a very loud banging on the front door” of her apartment located in the District
of Columbia’s southeast quadrant. Williams asserts that she was inside the apartment
2
Defendant removed this case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
2
along with her thirteen-year old daughter and a third person (James), and that all of
them were confronted with “highly aggressive Marshals saying ‘freeze’” and pointing
guns at James. (Compl. at 1.) Williams further alleges that the deputy Marshals
forced James out of the apartment without a shirt or shoes, and that the deputy
Marshals then flashed a light in Williams’s daughter’s face and began questioning her
and “aggressively yelling at her to get in the hallway.” (Id. at 2.) While witnessing
“the camotion [sic]” from her bedroom, Williams claims that she “was scared[]” and
began looking for clothes to put on, but the deputy Marshals began yelling at her “to
come out now.” (Id.) Williams states that she was naked, and that two deputy
Marshals entered her bedroom and forced her out “without nothing” on. (Id.)
Williams alleges that she grabbed her daughter’s pants and a top “and was shoved out
into the hall w[h]ere 20+ men were standing and laughing.” (Id.) She also asserts
that her daughter “was crying” and “asking why are they doing this to us.” (Id.)
When Williams told the officers that “they [were] scaring [her] daughter,” a deputy
Marshal allegedly responded: “well I pay my bills you should to[o].” (Id.) And when
Williams asked about “a writ,” the deputy Marshal purportedly “said we have one see”
and held up a piece of paper, but not in a position where Williams could read it. (Id.)
Williams claims that eventually the deputy Marshals allowed her daughter and
James back into the apartment to dress, “but the leader would not let [Williams] get
dressed.” (Id.) Instead, she maintains that “[h]e brought out [her] purse,” and left her
“with cheap flip flops, no bra, no underwear and a hole the size of grapefruit in the
front of [her] pants.” (Id. at 3.) The deputy Marshals then “put [Williams’s]
belongings out [on the street] a 1/2 block long[.]” Williams asserts that sometime
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after the eviction she noticed that certain items of her personal property were missing;
namely, gold earrings, Bluetooth headphones, and a Windows tablet. (Id.) In her
complaint, Williams demands $40,000 in damages. (Id. at 1.)
B. Procedural Background
On July 28, 2015, Williams filed a hand-written complaint in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, Civil Division, against the “Washington DC Evictions
Marshals.” 3 The Service removed Williams’s complaint to federal court on October 23,
2015, and on November 24, 2015, the Service filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Williams failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies that the FTCA requires. (See Def.’s Mem at 3–6.)
USMS attached to its motion a declaration from its General Counsel, who stated that he
had reviewed the Service’s files and had not located any written claim from Williams
relating to the June 19th eviction. Williams filed an opposition to the motion on
December 31, 2015; in it, she recounted the circumstances surrounding the eviction and
her efforts to call the Marshals office to file a complaint. (Pl.’s Opp. at 3–9.) Williams
also attached to her opposition a letter that her daughter drafted regarding her
3
The government’s statements in this Court regarding the identity of the defendants—and, in
particular, whether the government perceives Williams to be proceeding against the individual deputy
Marshals who conducted the eviction, or USMS as an entity, or both—are muddled. (See, e.g., Notice
of Removal ¶ 5 (characterizing Williams’s claims as one “against Defendants the United States
Marshals, who are officers of the United States and who are sued in their official capacity for acts
under color of such office and on account of right, title, or authority claimed under an Act of
Congress[,]” but not attaching any Westfall Certification that would allow the United States to be
substituted as the named defendant); Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF
No. 8-1, at 3 (arguing that Williams has brought suit against the United States).) Because Williams did
not name any “Doe” defendants and completed only one summons, which was directed at the “D.C.
Eviction Marshals,” this Court will construe her complaint as being brought against the Service and not
the individual officers.
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recollection of the events of June 19th and the impact those events have had on her.
(Id. at 10–13.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motions To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under
Rule 12(b)(1)
USMS contends that this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
Williams’s claim against it, and thus that Williams’scomplaint must be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Def.’s Mem. at 3–6.) When the
court’s jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Halcomb v. Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms of the
U.S. Senate, 209 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D.D.C. 2002). Moreover, and importantly,
under Rule 12(b)(1), it is “‘presumed that a cause lies outside [the federal courts’]
limited jurisdiction,’ unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Court possesses jurisdiction[.]” Muhammad v. FDIC, 751 F. Supp.
2d 114, 118 (D.D.C. 2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
“[T]he court must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more closely when
considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under . . . Rule
12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011)
(citing Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Still, the
court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d
1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008). However, it need not “accept inferences unsupported by
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the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations.” Rann v.
Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). And if the court finds that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the matter ends there, because “the court [can] no more
rule in favor of [a party] than against it.” Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 108
F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
B. Standards For Pro Se Plaintiffs
In applying the legal standards addressed above, this Court is mindful of the fact
that Williams is proceeding in this matter pro se. The pleadings of pro se parties are to
be “liberally construed,” and it is well established that a pro se complaint “must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). “This benefit is not,
however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United
Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted); see also
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). That means that even a pro se
plaintiff must plead facts that establish subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Green v.
Stuyvesant, 505 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing complaint where pro se
plaintiff failed to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction).
III. ANALYSIS
As a component of a federal agency—the United States Department of Justice—
USMS enjoys sovereign immunity. See Lyle Hughes, 83 F. Supp. 3d 315, 321–22
(D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing tort claims against USMS on sovereign immunity grounds).
“[S]overeign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit[,]”
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unless that immunity has been waived by statute. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
475 (1994)) (citations omitted)). And the FTCA constitutes “a limited waiver of the
Government’s sovereign immunity,” pursuant to which “plaintiffs may sue the United
States in federal court for state-law torts committed by government employees within
the scope of their employment.” Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80)).
In essence, Williams’s complaint claims abuse of process, infliction of
emotional distress, and conversion, all of which are state-law torts that are generally
cognizable under the FTCA. However, before filing suit against the United States for a
tort under the FTCA, a claimant must timely present a written claim to the relevant
agency, and thereby exhaust her administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. §2401(b) (“A
tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues.”);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (prohibiting the institution of a tort claim against the
United States absent exhaustion of administrative remedies). “For purposes of the
provisions of [the FTCA], a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a
Federal agency receives from a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal
representative, an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an
incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain[.]” 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.2. 4
4
Standard Form 95 is available to the public on the Department of Justice’s website. See Standard
Form 95, Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/11/01/SF-95.pdf).
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Here, the record is clear that Williams has not submitted to the Service
Standard Form 95 or any other written claim regarding the unfortunate events
surrounding her eviction. A search of records in the Office of General Counsel for the
U.S. Marshals Service did not “reveal any FTCA claim presented to the USMS by or
on behalf of Donya Williams.” (Decl. of Gerald M. Auerbach ¶ 5, ECF No. 8-2.)
What is more, Williams herself admits in her opposition brief that she has not made
any claim in writing to USMS, but instead attempted “to file a complaint with internal
affairs,” by making telephone calls to “the marshal’s office.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 2–3.) The
law of this Circuit is clear that Williams’s efforts on this front are insufficient because
“the FTCA presentment requirement requires that the statement describing the injury
be in writing.” Lacey v. United States, 74 F. Supp.2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 1999) (emphasis
omitted) (citing GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see
also GAF, 818 F.2d at 919 (holding that, to exhaust administrative remedies, an FTCA
claimant must “file (1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable
the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain damages claim[]”).
And without having submitted such a writing to USMS, Williams cannot now
proceeding federal court because a federal court can only assert subject-matter
jurisdiction over an FTCA claim after the relevant federal agency has finally denied the
written claim or has failed “to make final disposition of a claim within six months
after it is filed.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 (affirming
dismissal of FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “[t]he FTCA
bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their
administrative remedies”); Smalls v. Emmanuel, 840 F. Supp. 2d 23, 35 (D.D.C. 2012)
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(“Failure to comply with the administrative requirements of the FTCA deprives the
Court of jurisdiction to hear the case.”).
In short, because Williams has not filed a written claim with USMS, this Court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over Williams’s complaint. See Simpkins, 108 F.3d at 371
(explaining that “the FTCA’s requirement of filing an administrative complaint with
the appropriate agency prior to instituting an action [i]s jurisdictional”); Abdurrahman
v. Engstrom, 168 Fed. Appx. 445, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of unexhausted FTCA claim “for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction”); James v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 3d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2014)
(concluding that “[t]his Court can only assert jurisdiction over [FTCA] claim after the
relevant federal agency has finally denied the claim”) (citing cases)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court presently has no jurisdiction over the tort
claims that Williams presents in this action. Accordingly, as stated in the Order dated
September 30, 2016, USMS’s motion to dismiss has been GRANTED, and William’s
complaint has been DISMISSED without prejudice to her right to file suit again, if and
when she exhausts the required administrative process.
DATE: October 17, 2016 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
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