United States v. Quigley ( 2016 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
v. )
) Criminal Action No. 09-182 (RWR)
MARLANA QUIGLEY, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant Marlana Quigley pled guilty to production of
child pornography by a parent and distribution of child
pornography, and was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison and
to pay $800,000 in restitution to the child victim. Quigley
moves pro se to defer payment of her restitution until she is
released from prison claiming that her grandmother can no longer
provide Quigley financial help and Quigley has no prison income
since she has been released from her prison job.1 Id. The
government opposes, arguing that she seeks her remedy in the
wrong forum, and that she in any event has shown no meritorious
1 Quigley also states that “[t]here was no payment plan set
by the court.” Mot. at 1. To the extent that Quigley is
arguing that the sentencing court erred by failing to set a
restitution payment schedule, the D.C. Circuit found no plain
error in a sentencing court deferring to the Bureau of Prisons
to schedule restitution payments. See United States v. Hunter,
786 F.3d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also, United States v.
Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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change in economic circumstances since the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) has now reemployed her. Because the timing and amount
of prisoner payments towards a restitution judgment is an
executive and not a judicial decision, Quigley’s motion will be
denied.
“This [C]ourt does not have the authority to grant
[Quigley’s] request to defer or change [her] monthly restitution
payments. [T]he amount an inmate must pay under [the Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”)] is a matter entrusted
to the Executive Branch, and courts are not authorized to
override the BOP’s discretion about such matters, any more than
a judge could dictate particulars about a prisoner’s meal
schedule or recreation.” United States v. Hunter, Criminal
Action No. 11-39-1 (RWR), 2013 WL 4083311, at *2 (D.D.C.
Aug. 13, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d on
other grounds, 786 F.3d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing
United States v. Rush, 853 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (D.D.C. 2012),
and United States v. Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490, 492 (stating that
the IFRP operates “under the exclusive control and authority of
the Executive Branch”)).
“[A] defendant may seek judicial review of [her] IFRP
restitution payment amount after exhausting [her] administrative
remedies.” Hunter, 2013 WL 4083311, at *2 (citing Rush, 853 F.
Supp. 2d at 162 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a))). Quigley “has
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not shown that she has exhausted BOP administrative remedies to
challenge her IFRP restitution payment amount before seeking
judicial relief.” United States v. Small, 13 F. Supp. 3d 24, 28
(D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). “Further, even if she had
exhausted all administrative remedies, ‘the proper method for
challenging how BOP is administering the IFRP in her case may
not be a motion to the sentencing court, but rather a petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district where [the defendant] is
serving her sentence.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing
United States v. Ayers-Zander, Criminal Action No. 11-280 (RWR),
2013 WL 2468300, at *1 (D.D.C. June 7, 2013); Rush, 853 F. Supp.
2d at 162; United States v. Locke, Criminal Action No. 09-259
(JDB), 2012 WL 1154084, at *3 n.5 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2012); United
States v. Diggs, 578 F.3d 318, 319 n.1. (5th Cir. 2009)).
It is unlikely that Quigley has even met her burden of
proving that her economic circumstances have “changed enough to
warrant such a modification.” Hinton v. United States, Civil
Action No. 99-211 (RMU), 2003 WL 21854935, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 5,
2003) (citing United States v. Hill, 1999 WL 801543, at *1 (6th
Cir. Sept. 28, 1999)). The in-prison account statement that
Quigley filed “may establish that [s]he has very few assets in
[her] prison-run account, but it does not address the existence
of any assets [s]he may have in other accounts or locations.”
Id. And any indigence resulting from the fact of her
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incarceration does not alone establish grounds for such a
modification. Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Wolfe, 10 Fed.
Appx. 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2001)). Since Quigley has not shown
that she is entitled to have this Court defer her restitution
payments until she is released from prison, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant’s motion [37] to defer her
restitution obligation be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 19th day of January, 2016.
_________/s/_______________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
Chief Judge