Sadat v. Stuart Allan & Associates ( 2016 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    MIR NEMATULLAH SADAT,                        )
    )
    )
    Plaintiff,                     )
    )
    v.                                     )       Civil Action No. 16-cv-2146 (TSC)
    )
    )
    STUART ALLAN & ASSOCIATES                    )
    Now Known As                                 )
    STUART-LIPPMAN & ASSOCIATES,                 )
    INC.,                                        )
    )
    Defendant.                     )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter was removed to this court from the District of Columbia Superior Court by
    the Defendant. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and the law presumes “that a
    cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994). The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.
    Kormendi/ Gardner Partners v. Surplus Acquisition Venture, LLC, 
    606 F. Supp. 2d 114
    , 120
    (D.D.C. 2009) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 
    298 U.S. 178
    , 189
    (1936)).
    A plaintiff is normally the master of her complaint and may select her own court, even if
    it means foregoing remedies that might be available elsewhere. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,
    
    482 U.S. 386
    , 392 (1987). However, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
    presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 
    Id. “Federal jurisdiction
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    cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense,” nor can federal jurisdiction “rest upon
    an actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 
    556 U.S. 49
    , 60 (2009).
    It is well established that “the removal statute should be construed narrowly and against
    removal.” Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 
    677 F.2d 571
    , 576 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
    Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 
    313 U.S. 100
    , 108 (1941); Arkansas v. Kan. & Tex. Coal
    Co., 
    183 U.S. 185
    , 188 (1901)). Consequently, “[i]f a defect in removal procedures . . . becomes
    apparent at any point prior to final judgment, the removal court must remand the case to the state
    court.” Julien v. CCA of Tenn., Inc., 
    268 F. Supp. 2d 19
    , 21 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
    1447(c)); see also Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 
    369 F.3d 811
    , 815–16 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
    (noting “if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is necessary”) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)).
    In its notice of removal, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that
    Defendant violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and therefore this court has
    federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 3, 5)(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441,
    1446). However, while Plaintiff used the phrase “federal debt collection laws” in a letter sent to
    Defendants before filing the lawsuit in Superior Court, the complaint indicates that Plaintiff is
    seeking damages “for violations of the DC equivalent of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.”
    (Notice of Removal at Ex. A, ECF pp. 22, 4) (emphasis added). Therefore, the record does not
    support Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s complaint contains federal claims, and
    consequently, this court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this action. See 28
    U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
    under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
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    Likewise, the complaint does not support diversity jurisdiction: Plaintiff seeks only
    $2,000 in damages, well below the federal court jurisdictional limit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“The
    district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions [between citizens of different
    states] where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . .”).
    Because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, by separate order, this action will be
    REMANDED to the District of Columbia Superior Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any
    time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
    case shall be remanded.”).
    The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this order to:
    MIR NEMATULLAH SADAT
    1901 Connecticut Ave. NW
    #223
    Washington, DC 20009
    Date: October 31, 2016
    Tanya S. Chutkan
    TANYA S. CHUTKAN
    United States District Judge
    Page 3 of 3