Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Department of Justice ( 2017 )


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  •                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    ELECTRONIC PRIVACY                       )
    INFORMATION CENTER,                      )
    )
    Plaintiff,                  )
    )
    v.                          )      Civil No. 13-cv-1961 (KBJ)
    )
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                   )
    )
    Defendant.                  )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This decision marks the Court’s third foray into the dispute between plaintiff
    Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
    regarding a document request that EPIC submitted to DOJ under the Freedom of
    Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, in October of 2013. EPIC seeks records
    about a now-expired U.S. government national security program that involved the
    surreptitious use of pen register and trap-and-trace (“PR/TT”) devices to collect
    communications information (see Compl., ECF No. 1), and this Court previously denied
    EPIC’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which the organization had filed
    contemporaneously with its complaint. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, 
    15 F. Supp. 3d
    32 (D.D.C. 2014) (“EPIC I”) (denying the request for an order that required DOJ to
    process the pending FOIA request immediately and provide responsive documents
    within 20 days). This Court has also summarily denied previous cross-motions for
    summary judgment in this matter, largely due to the government’s continued release of
    additional responsive materials while the parties were briefing those motions. See Elec.
    Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, No. 13cv1961, 
    2016 WL 447426
    (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2016)
    (“EPIC II”).
    The parties have now narrowed the scope of the dispute, such that the only issues
    left for this Court to resolve are whether the government has properly withheld two
    categories of materials pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and/or 7(E): (1) Westlaw
    printouts that were attached to a certain brief that the government submitted to the
    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), and (2) portions of certain reports
    that DOJ issued to Congress, consisting of summaries of FISC legal opinions,
    descriptions of the scope of the FISC’s jurisdiction, and discussions of process
    improvements (collectively, the “Remaining Challenges”). 1 DOJ has submitted a
    revised Vaughn Index and supplemental affidavits speaking to the propriety of these
    withholdings (see Revised Vaughn Index, ECF No. 35; Fourth Decl. of David M. Hardy
    (“Hardy Suppl. Decl.”), ECF No. 35-1; Decl. of David J. Sherman (“Sherman Suppl.
    Decl.”), ECF No. 35-2), and it has also filed—ex parte and in camera—both unredacted
    copies of the withheld materials and classified versions of the government’s
    supplemental declarations (see Notice of Lodging Documents for In Camera Review
    with the Classified Info. Sec. Officer (“Notice of Classified Lodging”), ECF No. 34; In
    Camera, Ex Parte Classified Fourth Decl. of David M. Hardy (“Classified Hardy Suppl.
    1
    As explained herein (see infra Part III.A.1), in the course of evaluating the response to EPIC’s FOIA
    request, DOJ referred particular responsive documents to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
    and the National Security Agency (“NSA”) for review and exemption determinations. (See Decl. of
    Mark A. Bradley (“Bradley Decl.”), ECF No. 22-3, ¶ 7.) The NSA and the FBI are not parties to this
    lawsuit; however, the Remaining Challenges involve withholding determinations that these agencies
    made. Therefore, the Court will collectively refer to those two agencies, along with DOJ (the named
    defendant), as “the government” when discussing the various withholdings.
    2
    Decl.”); In Camera, Ex Parte Decl. of David J. Sherman (“Classified Sherman Suppl.
    Decl.”)).
    Before this Court at present are the parties’ renewed cross-motions for summary
    judgment regarding these two categories of materials. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
    (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 36; Pl.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No.
    37.) DOJ argues that the government properly withheld all of the information at issue
    in this case pursuant to Exemptions 3 and 7(E) (see Def.’s Mot. at 18–23), and that the
    classified material in the Congressional reports and FISC filing is further properly
    withheld under Exemption 1 (see 
    id. at 13–16).
    2 DOJ also contends that the
    government has released all non-exempt, reasonably segregable portions of the records
    that EPIC has requested. (See 
    id. at 23–24.)
    EPIC’s cross-motion insists that the fact
    that some of the material that DOJ initially withheld as exempt has now been released
    suggests that DOJ is acting in bad faith with respect to the withheld materials. (See
    Pl.’s Mot. at 12–14.) EPIC further asserts that none of the information that the
    government has withheld is properly deemed classified (see 
    id. at 16–19),
    nor is it
    specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (
    id. at 19
    –21), nor do the materials
    satisfy the Exemption 7(E) criteria for protected law-enforcement information (see 
    id. at 21–23).
    EPIC also argues that the government has failed to release all reasonably
    segregable information. (See 
    id. at 24–25.)
    On September 30, 2017, this Court issued an order that GRANTED IN PART
    AND DENIED IN PART DOJ’s motion for summary judgment, and also DENIED
    2
    Page numbers cited herein refer to those that the Court’s electronic case filing system automatically
    assigns.
    3
    EPIC’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice. (See ECF No. 45.)
    This Memorandum Opinion explains the reasons for that order. In sum, and as
    discussed fully below, the Court has conducted an in camera review of the relevant
    materials, and it concurs with DOJ’s contention that FOIA Exemption 3 was properly
    invoked with respect to the Westlaw printouts and the redacted portions of the
    Congressional reports that EPIC is challenging in this action. (See infra Sec. III.A.1.)
    It is also clear to the Court that the government has identified an Executive order that
    specifically authorizes it to maintain the secrecy of the material at issue in the interest
    of national defense, and that the challenged withheld material is properly classified
    pursuant to that order; therefore, the government is also entitled to rely on Exemption 1
    to withhold the requested information.
    Notably, however, DOJ’s general success in establishing that the disputed
    information can be withheld comes with a caveat: the Court has identified at least three
    redactions in the Congressional reports that DOJ has categorized as undisputed (i.e.,
    “outside the Remaining Challenges”) but that do appear to fit within the categories of
    disputed redactions still at issue in this case. Given this mischaracterization, DOJ has
    not provided any reasons for the government’s withholdings with respect to these
    particular redactions; therefore, this Court is in no better position to evaluate the
    appropriateness of these particular redactions than it was prior to the government’s
    supplemental submissions. See EPIC II, 
    2016 WL 447426
    , at *3 (remarking that “the
    current sworn statements are too general in scope” and that “because the declarations
    fail to home in on the specific withholdings now at issue, they are manifestly
    inadequate to assist the Court in determining whether the declarants have made a
    4
    reasonable assessment” under the FOIA). The Court has also identified two other
    aspects of the government’s withholdings with respect to the congressional reports—a
    footnote on page 57 of Document 126 and a notation on page 59 of Document 127—that
    require further clarification, as explained below. Consequently, the accompanying
    Order requires DOJ to submit one or more supplemental declarations with respect to the
    congressional reports, in order to address the issues identified herein, and the Order
    also sets a schedule for submission of renewed motions for summary.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    A.     Prior Proceedings
    The prior proceedings in this matter are described in detail in the two opinions
    that this Court has previously issued in this case. See EPIC I, 
    15 F. Supp. 3d
    32; EPIC
    II, 
    2016 WL 447426
    . Thus, only a brief recounting of the relevant background details
    is necessary here. In short, EPIC submitted a FOIA request to DOJ on October 3, 2013,
    seeking certain records that pertain to the United States government’s prior
    surreptitious use of PR/TT devices under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
    (“FISA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–46:
    1. All reports made to the Permanent Select Committee on
    Intelligence in the House of Representatives and the Select
    Committee on Intelligence in the Senate, detailing the total
    number of orders for pen registers or trap and trace devices
    granted or denied, and detailing the total number of pen
    registers or trap and trace devices installed pursuant to 50
    U.S.C. § 1843.
    2. All information provided to the aforementioned
    committees concerning all uses of pen registers and trap and
    trace devices.
    3. All records used in preparation of the above materials,
    including statistical data.
    5
    (EPIC FOIA Request, Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 3-2.) EPIC filed the
    instant lawsuit, along with a motion for a preliminary injunction, when DOJ did not
    respond to this FOIA request by the statutory deadline. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)
    After this Court denied EPIC’s motion for a preliminary injunction, EPIC I, 
    15 F. Supp. 3d
    32, DOJ proceeded to process EPIC’s FOIA request, and in doing so,
    referred certain documents to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the
    National Security Agency (“NSA”) for review and a withholding determination. (See
    Bradley Decl. ¶ 7.) See also 28 C.F.R. § 16.4(d)(2)(i) (“When the component
    processing the request believes that a different component, agency, or other Federal
    Government office is best able to determine whether to disclose the record, the
    component typically should refer the responsibility for responding to the request
    regarding that record, as long as the referral is to a component or agency that is subject
    to the FOIA.”). The government completed processing EPIC’s FOIA request by late
    summer of 2014, and the parties then proceeded to brief cross-motions for summary
    judgment.
    On October 31, 2014, DOJ submitted its opening summary judgment brief and
    supporting declarations from declarants of DOJ, the NSA, and the FBI, and it also filed
    a Vaughn Index that contained 92 entries and invoked Exemptions 1, 3, 6, 7(C), and
    7(E). EPIC II, 
    2016 WL 447426
    , at *2. (See Vaughn Index, Ex. A to 2d Decl. of Mark
    A. Bradley (“Bradley Decl.”), ECF No. 22-3, at 8–24.) Then, during the course of the
    remaining briefing of the summary judgment motions, the number of documents at issue
    shrank substantially, until at a motion hearing that this Court held on January 21, 2016,
    counsel for EPIC represented that only two issues remained for this Court to resolve:
    6
    (1) whether the government has properly withheld the Westlaw printouts that are
    attached to Vaughn Index Document 68, which is a classified legal brief that the
    government once submitted to the FISC, and (2) whether the government properly
    redacted from the Semi-Annual Reports that DOJ made to Congress regarding use of
    FSIA PR/TT devices (hereinafter, the “SARs”) information that consisted of summaries
    of FISC legal opinions, descriptions of the scope of the FISC’s jurisdiction, and
    discussions of FISA process improvements. 
    Id. at *3.
    Importantly, upon its
    consideration of the parties’ briefs and supporting materials, this Court found “that the
    declarations that DOJ has submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment do
    not address these withholdings in particular” and, thus, DOJ’s evidence was
    insufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the government had properly
    invoked FOIA exemptions to withhold the information in dispute. 
    Id. (emphasis in
    original). Consequently, the Court denied the parties’ cross-motions without prejudice,
    and required DOJ to submit additional declarations that were tailored to the
    withholdings at issue. 
    Id. at *4.
    The Court also mandated that DOJ submit the two
    categories of contested documents for in camera review. 
    Id. B. Current
    Proceedings
    On March 18, 2016, DOJ filed an updated Vaughn Index and unclassified
    declarations from David M. Hardy of the FBI and David J. Sherman of the NSA. (See
    Revised Vaughn Index; Hardy Suppl. Decl.; Sherman Suppl. Decl.) On that same day,
    DOJ also lodged with the Classified Information Security Officer classified versions of
    the Hardy and Sherman supplemental declarations, as well a copy of Document 68 (the
    FISC brief) and the attached Westlaw printouts, and unredacted copies of the five
    contested SARs, which are documents 124–127 and 129 on the Vaughn Index. (See
    7
    Notice of Classified Lodging; Classified Hardy Suppl. Decl.; Classified Sherman Suppl.
    Decl.)
    On April 8, 2016, the parties filed renewed cross-motions for summary judgment
    based on this significantly narrowed range of documents. (See Def.’s Mot.; Pl.’s Mot.)
    These are the motions that are presently before this Court. In its motion, DOJ argues
    that it is entitled to summary judgment because the government properly invoked FOIA
    Exemption 1 to withhold the Westlaw printouts attached to Document 68 and the
    redacted portions SARs, given that these materials contain classified NSA or FBI
    information. (See Def.’s Mot. at 13–16.) DOJ also contends that it was appropriate for
    the government to rely on FOIA Exemption 3, which permits the withholding of records
    that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by [a] statute [that] . . . establishes
    particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
    withheld[,]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). (See Def.’s Mot. at 16–21.) In this regard, DOJ
    maintains that the withheld material contains classified information regarding United
    States communications intelligence activities, or pertains to the NSA’s operations, and
    is thus exempted from disclosure under Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act
    of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1) (exempting “intelligence sources and methods” from
    disclosure), or Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
    § 3605 (authorizing the withholding of information that relates to “the organization or
    any function of the [NSA], or any information with respect to the activities thereof”), or
    18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) (prohibiting disclosure of “classified information. . . concerning
    the communication intelligence activities of the United States”). (Def.’s Mot. at 18–
    21). DOJ further insists that the Westlaw printouts and the Congressional reports were
    8
    “compiled for law enforcement purposes[,]” and thus fall within the protective ambit of
    FOIA Exemption 7(E) (id. at 23), and that the government has released all non-exempt,
    reasonably segregable portions of records that are responsive to EPIC’s FOIA request
    (id. at 23).
    For its part, EPIC argues that by continuously releasing materials that it
    originally withheld, DOJ has called into question not only the propriety of the initial
    withholdings but also the government’s continued withholding of the material that
    remains at issue in this case. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 13–15.) EPIC also challenges DOJ’s
    Exemption 1 arguments, asserting that the material at issue is not “properly classified”
    given its nature (id. at 16 (citations omitted)), and that the government’s withholding of
    otherwise publicly available Westlaw printouts is especially “absurd[]” (id. at 17).
    With respect to the government’s reliance on Exemption 3, EPIC contends, first, that
    the government invoked Exemption 3 belatedly and in bad faith; and second, that
    affidavits from the FBI and the NSA are legally insufficient to justify the Exemption 3
    withholdings because DOJ’s National Security Division (“NSD”) created and controls
    the documents at issue, and NSD is not a member of the intelligence community that is
    permitted to invoke the National Security Act for purposes of Exemption 3. (Id. at 19–
    21). EPIC also strenuously objects to DOJ’s Exemption 7(E) arguments (id. at 21–23),
    and insists that “it is implausible that entire legal opinions” such as the Westlaw
    printouts “would be devoid of reasonably segregable material” (id. at 24). Similarly,
    EPIC states that the summaries of FISC opinions, FISC jurisdiction, and FISA
    procedures are reasonably segregable, non-exempt material that must be disclosed (id.
    at 24–25).
    9
    The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe for this Court’s
    review. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 38;
    Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 39; Def.’s Reply in Supp.
    of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 42; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No.
    43.)
    II.    LEGAL STANDARDS
    A.    The FOIA And Its Exemptions
    The FOIA seeks to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency
    action to the light of public scrutiny.” U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 
    502 U.S. 164
    , 173
    (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As relevant here, the statute
    prescribes that “each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably
    describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating the
    time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records
    promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). However, “[i]n enacting
    FOIA, the Congress sought to balance the public’s interest in governmental
    transparency against legitimate governmental and private interests [that] could be
    harmed by release of certain types of information.” United Tech. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Def., 
    601 F.3d 557
    , 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (second alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    To that end, the FOIA specifies nine exemptions that permit agencies to withhold
    information from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
    U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
    796 F. Supp. 2d 13
    , 18 (D.D.C. 2011). For example,
    agencies are authorized to withhold otherwise responsive documents and information
    10
    that are “properly classified” pursuant to an Executive order or otherwise “specifically
    exempted from disclosure” under certain statutes. 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(1), (3). “These
    exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, and must be narrowly construed.” Milner v.
    Dep’t of the Navy, 
    562 U.S. 562
    , 565 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted). Moreover, even if a portion of the records is justifiably withheld pursuant to
    one of the enumerated exemptions, the FOIA provides that “[a]ny reasonably segregable
    portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion
    of the portions which are exempt[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Assassination
    Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA., 
    334 F.3d 55
    , 58 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that
    “even if an agency establishes an exemption, it must nonetheless disclose all reasonably
    segregable, nonexempt portions of the requested record(s)” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b));
    Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 
    566 F.2d 242
    , 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
    (“The focus of the FOIA is information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify
    withholding an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt
    material.”).
    B.      Summary Judgment In FOIA Cases Generally
    “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary
    judgment.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    25 F. Supp. 3d 131
    , 136 (D.D.C.
    2014) (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 
    623 F. Supp. 2d 83
    , 87 (D.D.C.
    2009)). A district court reviewing a motion for summary judgment in the FOIA context
    conducts a de novo review of the record, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), analyzing all
    underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester. See
    Willis v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    581 F. Supp. 2d 57
    , 65 (D.D.C. 2008). Because Rule 56 of
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is warranted only
    11
    if the pleadings, disclosure materials on file, and affidavits “show[] that there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Judicial Watch v. 
    Navy, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 136
    (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247 (1986)), in a FOIA
    case, summary judgment for an agency is appropriate only when the agency proves that
    it has “fully discharged its [FOIA] obligations[,]” Moore v. Aspin, 
    916 F. Supp. 32
    , 35
    (D.D.C. 1996). Thus, an “agency must demonstrate that ‘each document that falls
    within the class requested either has been produced . . . or is wholly exempt from
    [FOIA’s] inspection requirements[.]’” Gov’t Accountability Project v. FDA, 206 F.
    Supp. 3d 420, 430 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Gilda Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border
    Prot. Bureau, 
    457 F. Supp. 2d 6
    , 9 (D.D.C. 2006) (first and second alterations in
    original).
    If an agency contends that it is entitled to withhold information under a FOIA
    exemption, it “bears the burden of proving the applicability of [the] claimed
    exemptions[,]” and such a showing is typically made in agency affidavits. Am. Civil
    Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 
    628 F.3d 612
    , 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Such affidavits
    are entitled to a presumption of good faith, and the court can award the agency
    summary judgment based solely on the information so provided. See Hedrick v. FBI,
    
    216 F. Supp. 3d 84
    , 94–95 (D.D.C. 2016). However, to be sufficient to support a
    summary judgment motion, the agency’s affidavits must describe “the justifications for
    nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, [and] demonstrate that the information
    withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption,” and must not be “controverted
    12
    by either contrary evidence in the record []or by evidence of agency bad faith.”
    Military Audit Project v. Casey, 
    656 F.2d 724
    , 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
    Although a reviewing court evaluates de novo an agency’s invocation of a FOIA
    exemption and its supporting declarations, see Wolf v. CIA, 
    473 F.3d 370
    , 374 (D.C.
    Cir. 2007), “in conducting de novo review in the context of national security concerns,
    courts must accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of
    the classified status of the disputed record.” 
    Id. (emphasis, internal
    quotation marks,
    and citation omitted). This is because “‘the Executive departments responsible for
    national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse
    [e]ffects might occur as a result of a particular classified record[.]’” McGehee v.
    Casey, 
    718 F.2d 1137
    , 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d
    Sess. 12, U.S. Code & Admin. News 1974, p. 6267 (1974) (Conf. Rpt. on the FOIA
    Amendments)).
    That said, the Court is authorized to conduct its own evaluation of whether or not
    disputed documents fall within the scope of the enumerated exemptions. The FOIA
    permits in camera review of withheld records, but notably, “‘the use of in camera
    affidavits has generally been disfavored[.]’” Shapiro v. DOJ, 
    239 F. Supp. 3d 100
    , 110
    (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 
    97 F.3d 575
    , 580
    (D.C. Cir. 1996)). When presented with an in camera submission, the court must
    ensure that “as much as possible of the in camera submission [is made] available to the
    opposing party” without disclosing the material that the agency seeks to protect.
    
    Armstrong, 97 F.3d at 580
    ; see also Barnard v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    598 F. Supp. 2d
    1, 16 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[W]here, as here, an agency indicates that no additional
    13
    information concerning an investigation may be publicly disclosed without revealing
    precisely the information that the agency seeks to withhold, the receipt of in camera
    declarations is appropriate.”).
    Finally, with respect to the duty to produce all reasonably segregable information
    that remains after exempt information has been withheld, “[t]he government bears the
    burden of demonstrating that no reasonably segregable material exists in the withheld
    documents[,]” and “must provide[ ] a detailed justification and not just conclusory
    statements to demonstrate that all reasonably segregable information has been
    released.” Barouch v. DOJ, 
    962 F. Supp. 2d 30
    , 56 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    To their credit, the parties in this case have diligently narrowed the range of
    documents at issue from 92 to six, such that only five SARs (Documents 124–127 and
    129) and one set of Westlaw printouts (which are attached to Document 68) remain in
    dispute at this time. 
    See supra
    Part I.A. The detailed facts that underpin the
    government’s decision to withhold these responsive records are revealed only in the
    classified declarations that DOJ has provided to this Court—which, admittedly, puts
    EPIC at a distinct disadvantage with respect to its argument that the withheld
    information should be released. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 (noting that DOJ makes only
    “conclusory assertions” in the public filings, and “has redacted nearly all of the
    substantive arguments in support of the withholdings”).) This Court is sensitive to the
    public’s interest in having a fulsome public record, and it is also aware that “in camera
    review ‘deprives the FOIA requester of an opportunity to present his interpretation of
    14
    the withheld documents’” as a general matter. Jarvik v. CIA, 
    741 F. Supp. 2d 106
    , 111
    (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Quinon v. FBI, 
    86 F.3d 1222
    , 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
    However, as explained above, the FOIA authorizes an agency to support its
    withholdings through classified, in camera declarations when there is a reasonable risk
    “that public itemization and detailed justification would compromise legitimate secrecy
    interests[.]” Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 
    608 F.2d 1381
    , 1385 (D.C.
    Cir. 1979); see also Edmonds v. FBI, 
    272 F. Supp. 2d 35
    , 46–47 (D.D.C. 2003)
    (explaining that in camera review is warranted “when extensive public justification
    would threaten to reveal the very information for which a FOIA exemption is claimed”
    (quoting Lykins v. DOJ, 
    725 F.2d 1455
    , 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (alteration in original))).
    This is such a case. In this Court’s view, the content of the classified
    declarations, along with the unredacted materials to which they pertain, justify the
    government’s concerns about potentially harmful disclosure. To the extent that this
    Court is able, it has explained below its reasons for concluding that the government has
    properly relied on FOIA Exemption 3, and alternatively FOIA Exemption 1, to withhold
    nearly all of the redacted and undisclosed materials that are still at issue in this case,
    including the Westlaw printouts and nearly all of the portions of the SARs that are at
    issue. However, in camera review of the SARs reveals that the government may have
    failed to address a handful of withholdings that are still in dispute, and as a result, the
    Court will require supplemental submissions regarding these redactions, as described
    below.
    15
    A.     The Government Properly Invoked Exemption 3 To Withhold The
    Information At Issue
    An agency may rely on Exemption 3 to withhold records in response to a FOIA
    request where a statute “specifically exempt[s]” the requested information from
    disclosure, so long as that statute either “requires that the matters be withheld from the
    public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue[,]” or “establishes
    particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
    withheld[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The two listed conditions are disjunctive, and thus
    the statute at issue “need satisfy only one of them to qualify under Exemption 3.”
    Gov’t Accountability 
    Project, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 428
    (citing Pub. Citizen, Inc. v.
    Rubber Mfrs. Ass’n, 
    533 F.3d 810
    , 813 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). However, notably, “[b]efore
    a court inquires into whether any of the [two statutory] conditions [for withholding
    information] are met . . . it must first determine whether the statute is a withholding
    statute at all by deciding whether it satisfies ‘the threshold requirement that it
    specifically exempt matters from disclosure.’” Pub. 
    Citizen, 533 F.3d at 813
    –14
    (emphasis in original) (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. DOJ, 
    816 F.2d 730
    , 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
    “To determine whether a statute qualifies as a withholding statute as required,
    courts look to ‘the language of the statute on its face[.]’” Gov’t Accountability 
    Project, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 429
    (quoting Zanoni v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    605 F. Supp. 2d 230
    ,
    236 (D.D.C. 2009)). “In other words, a statute that is claimed to qualify as an
    Exemption 3 withholding statute must, on its face, exempt matters from disclosure.”
    Reporters 
    Comm., 816 F.2d at 735
    , rev’d on other grounds, 
    489 U.S. 749
    (1989). If the
    statute passes this threshold test, the court next determines whether the statute satisfies
    16
    either of the two statutory disjunctive conditions for withholding the responsive
    information. See Gov’t Accountability 
    Project, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 428
    ; see also
    
    Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 761-62
    (“[T]he sole issue for decision [with respect to
    Exemption 3] is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld
    material within the statute’s coverage.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    Here, the government has pointed to three separate statutes—Section 102A(i)(1)
    of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1); Section 6 of the National
    Security Agency Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. § 3605; and 18 U.S.C. § 798—and asserts that
    each qualifies as a withholding statute for the purpose of Exemption 3. (See Def.’s
    Mot. at 18-21.) The government further argues that these statutes required the relevant
    government agencies to withhold the redacted portions of the SARs and the Westlaw
    printouts, because that material either concerns U.S. communications intelligence
    activities and is classified, or pertains to NSA operations. (See id.) As explained
    below, there appears to be no dispute about this legal analysis; instead, EPIC seeks to
    advance the novel contention that, even though DOJ’s NSD referred certain documents
    to the FBI and the NSA for exemption determinations under governing FOIA
    regulations, the government cannot assert certain otherwise applicable FOIA
    exemptions in the instant context because the FOIA request was directed to NSD in the
    first instance. As explained below, this Court agrees with the government that
    Exemption 3 is applicable to the withholdings at issue, and it rejects EPIC’s assertion
    that this FOIA exemption has nevertheless been improperly invoked under the
    circumstances presented in this case.
    17
    1.     The Statutes That The Government Relies Upon Qualify As
    “Withholding Statutes,” And The Challenged Information Was
    Within The Scope Of Each Statute
    The FBI and the NSA have each reviewed the materials responsive to EPIC’s
    FOIA request, and both have cited Exemption 3 to withhold certain information. (
    See supra
    Section I.B.) The FBI seeks to withhold the Westlaw printouts and to make
    redactions on 20 pages of the SARS, and it relies on a single statute to justify all of
    these withholdings under Exemption 3—Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security
    Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), which requires the “Director of National
    Intelligence” (“DNI”) to “protect from unauthorized disclosure intelligence sources and
    methods.” (Hardy Suppl. Decl. ¶ 15.) The DNI has delegated enforcement of this
    National Security Act mandate to the heads of the 17 agencies that constitute the
    “Intelligence Community[,]” see Intelligence Community Directive 700, at 3 (June 7,
    2012), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_700.pdf, and the FBI
    and the NSA (but not the NSD) are among these agencies, see Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence,
    Members of the IC, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic; see
    also DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 
    795 F.3d 178
    , 197–99 (D.C. Cir. 2015); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t
    of Def., 
    628 F.3d 612
    , 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The NSA has also relied on Section
    102(A)(i)(1) of the National Security Act to justify certain withholdings. (See Vaughn
    Index at 3.) Additionally, with respect to its withholding on page 51 of Document 129,
    the NSA also points to 50 U.S.C. § 3605 (Section 6 of the National Security Agency
    Act of 1959), which authorizes the government to withhold information that relates to
    “the organization or any function of the [NSA], or any information with respect to the
    activities thereof,” and 18 U.S.C. § 798, which prohibits disclosure of “classified
    18
    information . . . concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United
    States[.]” (See Sherman Suppl. Decl. ¶ 2.)
    It is well established that each of the statutes that the FBI and the NSA relies
    upon qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding statute, because each specifically
    exempts particular material from disclosure and satisfies one aspect of Exemption 3’s
    disjunctive tests. See, e.g., 
    DiBacco, 795 F.3d at 199
    (noting that Section 102A(i)(1) is
    an Exemption 3 withholding statute that mandates withholding of intelligence sources
    and methods); Hayden v. NSA, 
    608 F.2d 1381
    , 1389–90 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining
    that Section 6 is an Exemption 3 withholding statute that specifies information to be
    withheld); Larson v. Dep’t of State, 
    565 F.3d 857
    , 868 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that 18
    U.S.C. § 798 is an Exemption 3 withholding statute that mandates withholding of the
    covered material). Thus, the question this Court must address is whether the withheld
    material at issue here falls within the scope of these statutes.
    With respect to the portions of the SARs that the FBI has withheld and that are
    discussed in the unredacted materials that the government has submitted, this Court
    finds that withheld material pertains to specific surveillance techniques (see Document
    124 at 3–4, 47, 50; Document 125 at 3–5, 50–52; Document 126 at 56–60; Document
    127 at 58–61), or discusses particular strengths or limitations of the FISC process in
    relation to surveillance techniques, and thus the reactions broadly pertain to intelligence
    methods that must be protected from disclosure under Section 102A(i)(1). Turning to
    the Westlaw printouts, this Court likewise finds that, given the context in which the
    printouts exist in this litigation—i.e., as part of a classified brief submitted to the
    FISC—the printouts also constitute intelligence sources and methods for purposes of
    19
    Section 102A(i)(1), and therefore the FBI properly withheld those materials. With
    respect to the portions of the SARs that the NSA has redacted, this Court’s own in
    camera review of the unredacted text of the material reveals that the withheld material
    discusses a particular classified NSA surveillance method (see Document 129 at 51),
    and thus is protected from disclosure. 3
    In light of its own in camera review and the submitted declarations, the Court
    readily finds that the material falls within the ambit of each cited statute—specifically,
    the withheld information pertains to intelligence sources and methods and NSA
    activities within the scope of 50 U.S.C. §§ 3024(i)(1) and 3605, and also contains
    classified information concerning communication activities within the ambit of 18
    U.S.C § 798.
    2.      DOJ Is Entitled To Invoke Exemption 3 Based On Affidavits From
    The FBI And The NSA Under The Circumstances Presented Here
    EPIC does not contest that the statutes that the government relies upon are
    withholding statutes, nor does it appear that EPIC rejects the prior substantive
    analysis—i.e., that the withheld information at issue in this case can properly be
    withheld under Exemption 3. Indeed, it has made no argument to the contrary. But
    EPIC does vigorously maintain that DOJ has not followed the right procedure for
    establishing the applicability of Exemption 3 with respect to the withholdings at issue.
    Specifically, EPIC maintains that a division of DOJ—the NSD—“created and controls
    the records at issue” (Pl.’s Mot. at 19), yet there is no declaration from NSD to justify
    any of the withholdings; rather, the only declarations the government has provided are
    3
    Section III.B infra, further explains why the redacted material either constitutes intelligence sources
    and methods, or is classified, or has otherwise been properly withheld.
    20
    from the FBI and NSA (see id.). Continuing along this track, EPIC argues that “[i]t is a
    matter of first impression in this Circuit whether a non-[Intelligence Community]
    agency can assert an Exemption 3 claim based on [Section 102A(i)(1) of] the National
    Security Act.” (Id. at 20.) EPIC further maintains that DOJ has asserted Exemption 3
    belatedly and in bad faith, and that DOJ in fact waived the exemption by not asserting it
    during the prior round of summary judgment briefing in this matter. (Id. at 19; Pl.’s
    Opp’n at 10–11.)
    The Court will address this last alleged procedural deficiency first: given the
    convoluted procedural history of the instant case, EPIC’s argument that the government
    has waived the right to rely on Exemption 3 by failing to invoke that exemption in its
    earlier Vaughn Index is not well-founded. The parties here have engaged in two rounds
    of summary judgment briefing before this Court, and at this Court’s request, the
    government has now provided a more detailed explanation of its withholdings, asserting
    Exemption 3 along with the previously-raised Exemptions 1 and 7(E). The Court does
    not perceive the government as having acted in bad faith, nor does it view the
    government’s filings as providing post-hoc rationalizations for withholdings already
    made. Rather, the document-production process is a fluid one at the district-court level,
    and it often includes contemporaneous review and continuous production
    determinations by agency-defendants. Thus, in this Court’s view, the government is
    entitled to articulate fully all of the justifications for the withholdings that it makes
    prior to the Court’s ruling on summary judgment—and this is especially so when the
    Court has expressly invited it to do so.
    21
    To be sure, the D.C. Circuit’s precedent prohibits an agency from invoking new
    FOIA exemptions when the proceeding is before the district court after remand,
    following an appeal, as EPIC points out. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10 (citing Maydak v. DOJ,
    
    218 F.3d 760
    , 764 (D.C. Cir. 2000).) But the D.C. Circuit’s holding is clearly grounded
    in finality concerns. See 
    Maydak, 218 F.3d at 764
    (finding that allowing an agency to
    invoke new FOIA exemptions on remand—thereby essentially restarting the litigation—
    could interfere with the FOIA’s “statutory goals of ‘efficient, prompt, and full
    disclosure of information,’ and with ‘interests of judicial finality and economy’”
    (quoting Senate of Puerto Rico v. DOJ, 
    823 F.2d 574
    , 580 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); see also
    CREW v. DOJ, 
    854 F.3d 675
    , 680–81 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that district court erred
    in allowing agency to assert new FOIA exemption when considering case on remand);
    Senate of 
    Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 580
    (noting that agencies cannot “make new
    exemption claims to a district court after the judge has ruled in the other party’s favor”)
    (citation omitted). And no such problem is present here, because the Court never
    reached the merits of the parties’ initial summary judgment motions, and there have not
    yet been any appellate proceedings. What is more, as far as this Court can tell, EPIC
    has not been prejudiced in any meaningful sense by the delay in the government’s
    assertion of Exemption 3, nor has it provided any evidence of bad faith with respect to
    the government’s timing on this issue. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 19.)
    EPIC’s contention that DOJ is not the proper agency to invoke Exemption 3 (see
    Pl.’s Mot. at 20 (“The National Security Act restricts the ability of the DNI, not civilian
    agencies, to release certain information”)), and that its reliance on affidavits from NSA
    and the FBI is improper (see 
    id. at 19
    (“The DOJ has not submitted any declaration
    22
    from the NSD, the agency that created and controls the records at issue, to justify the
    Exemption 3 claim”)), fares no better. The record clearly reveals that DOJ followed a
    referral process when it responded to EPIC’s FOIA request, consistent with the
    agency’s regulations. Specifically, DOJ’s regulations expressly provide that, when a
    DOJ component that is processing a FOIA request “believes that a different component,
    agency, or other Federal Government office is best able to determine whether to
    disclose [a certain] record, the component typically should refer the responsibility for
    responding to the request regarding that record, as long as the referral is to a component
    or agency that is subject to the FOIA.” 28 C.F.R. 16.4(d)(2)(i). Moreover, and
    importantly, when such a referral takes place, “the second agency . . . then becomes
    responsible for directly responding to the requester as to those documents.” Schoenman
    v. FBI, No. 04-cv-2202, 
    2009 WL 763065
    , at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2009). The
    applicable regulations further prescribe a more limited “consultation” procedure that
    applies “[w]hen records originated with the component processing the request, but
    contain within them information of interest to another component, agency, or other
    Federal Government office[.]” 28 C.F.R. § 16.4(d)(1). In that circumstance, “the
    component processing the request should typically consult with that other component or
    agency prior to making a release determination.” 
    Id. Here, the
    undisputed evidence establishes that DOJ’s NSD referred the SARs and
    Westlaw printouts to the FBI and NSA pursuant to these regulations with the intent of
    having those other agencies determine whether any exemptions should be invoked. (See
    Bradley Decl. ¶ 7 (“In addition, NSD referred documents to the [NSA, FBI, and CIA].”)
    Courts in this district have long recognized the permissibility of such a referral, see,
    23
    e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. NSA, 
    795 F. Supp. 2d 85
    , 92 (D.D.C. 2011), and EPIC
    neither challenges the validity of DOJ’s referral regulations nor cites any authority that
    limits the ability of the agency receiving the FOIA referral to invoke any otherwise-
    applicable FOIA exemption. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 19–21.) 4 EPIC also fails to explain, or
    support, its suggestion that an agency’s compliance with its own referral regulations
    constitutes “bad faith[.]” (See 
    id. at 19
    .) As such, EPIC’s arguments about NSD’s
    limited authority provide no basis for invalidating the government’s assertion of
    Exemption 3.
    In the final analysis, this Court finds no procedural impropriety in DOJ’s
    reliance on the FBI and NSA affidavits to support the invocation of Exemption 3,
    despite the fact that the withheld records are under NSD’s control. And with respect to
    Section 102A(i)(1) in particular, the referral process that was followed here indicates
    that a member of the Intelligence Community was the relevant decision-maker with
    respect to these records, and has called for their withholding, precisely as Section
    102A(i)(2) envisions.
    B.      The Government Can Also Withhold The Information At Issue Under
    Exemption 1
    FOIA’s Exemption 1 provides an independent and alternative justification for the
    government’s withholding of the disputed portions of the SARs and the Westlaw
    printouts. Exemption 1 permits an agency to withhold information that is “specifically
    authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
    4
    This is for good reason, as it makes little sense to instruct an agency to refer documents to another
    agency for the latter agency to make exemption determinations (or, if the consultation process is used,
    to consult with another before making its own release determination), but at the same time circumscribe
    the ability of either agency to invoke an otherwise-applicable FOIA exemption as a result of the referral
    or consultation.
    24
    interest of national defense or foreign policy” and is “in fact properly classified
    pursuant to such Executive order[,]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A). “Thus, an agency
    attempting to withhold information under [E]xemption 1 must show that it ‘complies
    with classification procedures established by the relevant executive order and withholds
    only such material as conforms to the order’s substantive criteria for classification.’”
    Mobley v. DOJ, 
    870 F. Supp. 2d 61
    , 66 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting King v. DOJ, 
    830 F.2d 210
    , 214 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
    As relevant here, Executive Order 13,526 governs the classification of national
    security information and delineates four conditions that must be met for information to
    be deemed “classified” properly:
    (1) an original classification authority is classifying the
    information;
    (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the
    control of the United States Government;
    (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of
    information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
    (4) the original classification authority determines that the
    unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be
    expected to result in damage to the national security, which
    includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original
    classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
    Exec. Order 13,526 of Dec. 29, 2009 § 1.1, Classified National Security Information, 75
    Fed. Reg. 705, 707 (Jan. 5, 2010) (“E.O. 13,526”). Notably, in section 1.4, the
    Executive order references eight specific categories of information that “could
    reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national
    security[,]” including information pertaining to “intelligence activities (including covert
    action) [and] intelligence sources or methods, . . . foreign relations or foreign activities
    25
    of the United States, . . . [or] vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
    infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national
    security[.]” E.O. 13,526 § 1.4(c), (d), (g). Thus, if information that is responsive to a
    FOIA request fits into any of the eight categories, and if an original classifying
    authority has designated the information classified based on that authority’s
    determination that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be
    expected to result in damage to the national security, the information has properly been
    deemed “classified” and the government can invoke Exemption 1 to withhold the
    information from disclosure under the FOIA. See Larson v. Dep’t of State, 
    565 F.3d 857
    , 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (in evaluating whether material is properly classified, a court
    must “accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the . . . classified
    status of the disputed record”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    In this case, the invocation of Exemption 1 is proper, because the government
    has both pointed to an applicable Executive Order and established through its
    declarations that the withheld material is properly classified under the Order’s terms.
    1.      The Remaining SARS Challenges Concern Information That Has
    Properly Been Deemed Classified
    EPIC challenges the government’s withholding of information in the SARs that
    pertains to summaries of FISC legal opinions, descriptions of the scope of the FISC’s
    jurisdiction, and discussions of process improvements on Exemption 1 grounds, because
    in EPIC’s view, such information cannot properly be deemed classified. (See Pl.’s Mot.
    at 16–18.) This Court disagrees. Notwithstanding the fact that the challenged SARs
    redactions concern legal opinions and descriptions, it is clear that they nevertheless
    satisfy the criteria for classification set forth in Executive Order 13,256.
    26
    First of all, the challenged SARs information indisputably satisfies the first and
    second criteria of Executive Order 13,256. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 707. Hardy and
    Sherman each declares that he has the requisite classification authority (see Hardy
    Suppl. Decl. ¶ 2; Decl. of Alan J. Sherman (“Sherman Decl.”), ECF No. 22-6, ¶ 2), and
    there is no dispute that United States Government has control of the withheld material
    (see Hardy Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11; Sherman Decl. ¶ 2).
    The challenged SARs information also constitutes “intelligence sources and
    methods” within the meaning of section 1.4 of Executive Order 13,256, and thus,
    satisfies the third criterion. Section 1.4(c) of Executive Order 13,526 provides that
    information can be deemed classified when “it pertains to . . . intelligence activities
    (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology[,]” E.O.
    15,526 § 1.4(c) (emphasis added), and both Sherman and Hardy declare that the
    redacted portions of the SARs satisfy this requirement. (See Hardy Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11
    (declaring that FBI information in the SARs “is exempt from disclosure pursuant to
    E.O. 13526, §1.4, category (c) intelligence activities (including covert action),
    intelligence sources and methods, or cryptology”); Sherman Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3 (“I have
    determined that the NSA information at issue in this case concerns. . . intelligence
    sources, methods, vulnerabilities and capabilities, and foreign activities of the United
    States (citing E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d), (g)).) In this regard, the redacted declarations do
    appear largely conclusory, but the unredacted versions of their statements provide
    additional detail in support of this contention, and as noted, the national security-related
    opinion of qualified government officials is entitled to substantial deference in the
    classification realm. See 
    Larson, 565 F.3d at 864
    .
    27
    EPIC appears to concede that, insofar as the withheld materials concern pen
    registers, “a pen register is a ‘method’ of intelligence gathering” (Pl.’s Mot. at 16), but
    it maintains that the “particular interpretation of the FISA pen register provision by the
    FISC is not itself a ‘source’ or ‘method’ of intelligence gathering, but a legal judgment”
    (Pl.’s Mot. at 17 (emphasis added).) This argument misses the mark entirely. The
    relevant question is not the nature of the withheld information (here, a decision of the
    FISC and any derivative discussion contained in the SARs), or whether the requested
    material constitutes a protected form of information in and of itself, but instead whether
    the withheld information “pertains to” an intelligence source or method. E.O. 15,526
    § 1.4(c) (emphasis added); see also ACLU v. CIA, 
    109 F. Supp. 3d 220
    , 236 (D.D.C.
    2015) (“Thus, a legal analysis need not constitute an intelligence activity, source, or
    method by itself to warrant protection so long as it pertains to an intelligence activity,
    source, or method.”), aff’d sub nom., ACLU v. DOJ, 640 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
    N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 
    915 F. Supp. 2d 508
    , 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding “no reason
    why legal analysis cannot be classified pursuant to E.O. 13526 if it pertains to matters
    that are themselves classified”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 
    756 F.3d 100
    (2d Cir. 2014). And this Court’s in camera review of the identified SARs
    withholdings reveals that the withheld material not only broadly pertains to intelligence
    sources and methods, as both Sherman and Hardy declare, but also (1) reveals details
    about specific surveillance techniques in the context of summaries of FISC decisions
    and legal analysis (see Document 124 at 3-4; Document 125 at 3–5, 50–52; Document
    126 at 56–60; Document 127 at 58–61); (2) discusses particular strengths, weaknesses,
    and/or potential changes in FISC processes (see Document 125, Page 59); (3) describes
    28
    the scope of the FISC’s jurisdiction as it relates to specific intelligence sources and
    methods (see Document 124 at 47, 50); and provides specific, non-public, factual
    information regarding NSA signals intelligence methods (see Document 129, at 51).
    The fourth and final criterion of E.O. 13,256 requires a classification authority to
    both determine “that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be
    expected to result in damage to the national security” and articulate such damage, E.O.
    13,526, § 1.1(a), and this Court finds that Sherman and Hardy have made sufficient
    efforts in this regard. Notably, such an authority’s assessment of the harm to national
    security “need only be both ‘plausible’ and ‘logical’ to justify the invocation of a FOIA
    exemption in the national security context[,]” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    628 F.3d 612
    , 624 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Wolf v. CIA, 
    473 F.3d 370
    , 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)),
    and the D.C. Circuit has clarified that:
    “[i]f an agency’s statements supporting exemption contain reasonable
    specificity of detail as to demonstrate that the withheld information
    logically falls within the claimed exemption and evidence in the record
    does not suggest otherwise, . . . the [district] court should not conduct
    a more detailed inquiry to test the agency’s judgment and expertise or
    to evaluate whether the court agrees with the agency’s opinions.”
    Larson v. Dep’t of State, 
    565 F.3d 857
    , 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    Without even considering the declarations, it is eminently logical that publicly
    disclosing the strengths, weaknesses, and/or changes in the FISC’s own processes, or
    the limits of the FISC’s jurisdiction, presents a risk that potential targets will alter their
    behavior to account for the disclosed practices and/or limitations. See, e.g., Sack v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    823 F.3d 687
    , 695 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that the agency
    properly withheld reports regarding the use of polygraphs for the purpose of
    background investigations, when revealing information “pertaining to the strengths of
    29
    polygraphs, their weaknesses, or anything else [] would create at least a risk that
    subversive individuals will be armed with advanced knowledge of the procedures used
    by the United States to screen applicants for sensitive employment positions and
    security clearances”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Adding to this the
    Court’s review of the classified versions of the Hardy and Sherman Supplemental
    Declarations, the Court notes that the unredacted declarations contain detailed and
    logical explanations of the plausible harm that might flow from revealing to potential
    targets the details about the surveillance methods and techniques that are discussed in
    the challenged records (see Classified Hardy Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 30–31, 34–36, 39, 43;
    Classified Sherman Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 9-11), which is all that criterion four requires.
    EPIC’s only response is to point to the USA FREEDOM ACT, Pub. L. 114-23,
    129 Stat. 268 (see Pl.’s Mot. at 11), which is a statute that requires the Director of
    National Intelligence to “make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each
    [] decision, order, or opinion” of the FISC “that includes a significant construction or
    interpretation of any provision of law[,]” 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a), but this invocation falls
    far short of rebutting the reasoned assessments that Hardy and Sherman have made.
    That is, even if Congress has determined that FISC opinions should generally be made
    public, as EPIC argues, that this is not an iron-clad statutory mandate, for the statute
    also establishes that the Director of National Intelligence can waive this disclosure
    requirement if he or she determines that waiver “is necessary to protect the national
    security of the United States or properly classified intelligence sources or methods[.]”
    50 U.S.C. § 1872(c). What is more, the FREEDOM ACT was enacted in June 2015—
    well after the reports at issue here were created—and there is nothing to indicate that
    30
    Congress intended the statute to apply retroactively to prior FISC decisions. Cf.
    Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 
    548 U.S. 30
    , 37 (2006) (“[I]t has become a rule of
    general application that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such
    construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication.”) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Thus, based on its review of both the unredacted SARs and the classified
    declarations, this Court finds that the government has established that the material it
    redacted from the SARs is properly classified, see E.O. 13,256, and therefore can be
    withheld under Exemption 1.
    2.     The Westlaw Printouts Can Be Withheld Under Exemption 1,
    Notwithstanding The Fact That This Particular Information Is
    Otherwise Publicly Available
    The Court has conducted the same four-factor classification analysis with respect
    to the Westlaw printouts that are attached to the brief submitted to the FISC. As with
    the SARs, there is no question that (1) the government relies upon an Executive order
    that permits it to classify national security information, see 
    id., thereby satisfying
    the
    first factor; (2) Hardy has the requisite classification authority and the government
    controls the material (see Hardy Suppl. Decl. ¶ 2), which satisfies prong two; and (3)
    the printouts pertain to the FBI’s intelligence methods and activities (see Pl.’s Mot. at
    17), which satisfies the third prong of the applicable framework.
    The parties’ dispute thus centers around the risks of harm associated with
    disclosure of these printout outs, which are otherwise publicly available on Westlaw.
    EPIC maintains that the Westlaw printouts cannot themselves be withheld under
    Exemption 1 because their public status dispels any risk of harm from disclosure in this
    matter. (See 
    id. (“The DOJ’s
    argument that publicly available Westlaw printouts are
    31
    also exempt from disclosure reveals the absurdity of the agency’s position.”).) The
    government acknowledges that the Westlaw printouts may appear “otherwise
    innocuous[,]” (see Def.’s Opp’n at 13), but it insists that the printouts must be
    evaluated in the context in which they exist for the purpose of the instant FOIA
    request—i.e., as attachments to a classified brief submitted to the FISC—and, when so
    viewed, the printouts may properly be withheld as classified (see id.). In this regard,
    the government’s core contention is that, “when read or viewed within the context of
    other available documents and information,” even seemingly innocuous, publicly
    available information can “reveal highly sensitive information to sophisticated
    adversaries, such as critical details about important investigative methods and
    techniques used by the FBI in national security investigations.” (2d Decl. of David M.
    Hardy, ECF No. 24, ¶ 37; Mot. Hr’g. Tr. at 29 (“That the MPD here in D.C. may use a
    pen register trap and trace or some more specific technique under its authority under
    criminal law to apprehend drug dealers or whoever else here in D.C. is not the same as
    the FBI acknowledging or confirming that the FBI or the U.S. intelligence community
    or otherwise uses this authority to interdict or apprehend terrorists[.]”).)
    In this Court’s view, the government has the better of this argument. Indeed, the
    Executive order that governs classification of information expressly contemplates a
    situation in which otherwise unclassified materials may nevertheless be deemed
    classified depending on the context in which they are retrieved—it states that
    “[c]ompilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be
    classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship
    that: (1) meets the standards for classification under this order, and (2) is not otherwise
    32
    revealed in the individual items of information.” E.O. 13,526 § 1.7(e). Furthermore,
    the D.C. Circuit has long held that, in the context of reviewing classification of
    information, courts must keep in mind that “[e]ach individual piece of intelligence
    information, much like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits
    of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.”
    Halperin v. CIA, 
    629 F.2d 144
    , 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec.
    Studies v. DOJ, 
    331 F.3d 918
    , 929 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the government
    properly invoked a FOIA exemption to withhold a list of all of the individuals detained
    in its post-September 11 terrorism investigation, even where some names had already
    been publicly disclosed, because the compiled list “could be of great use to al Qaeda in
    plotting future terrorist attacks or intimidating witnesses in the present investigation”);
    Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army, 
    684 F.2d 99
    , 104–105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding
    classification of compilation of information on army combat units even though
    individual pieces of information were not classified). It is also clear beyond cavil that
    “[t]hings that d[o] not make sense to the District Judge would make all too much sense
    to a foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation’s
    intelligence-gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources
    and methods.” United States v. Yunis, 
    867 F.2d 617
    , 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
    Mindful of the deference it must afford to the government in this context, see
    Ctr. for Nat’l. Sec. 
    Studies, 331 F.3d at 929
    , this Court finds that the government’s
    explanation of the harm that might result from release of the Westlaw printouts, and
    how such a disclosure could reveal national security information that is not evident
    from looking at the documents in isolation, is reasonable and sufficient to support its
    33
    invocation of Exemption 1. (See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 30 (“[R]eleasing these Westlaw
    printouts in this context even without the memo to which they were attached . . . would
    confirm to adversaries of the United States that there was a significant legal
    interpretation by the FISA court at a certain time involving the specific uses of FISA
    PR/TT authority that are nonpublic.”).) In this regard, the Court accepts the
    government’s assertion that the Westlaw printouts and the main brief to which they are
    attached are rightfully construed as a single document, and that disclosure of the
    attachments would elucidate the substance of the main (undeniably classified)
    document, such that the government is entitled to withhold the attachments themselves.
    
    Mobley, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 73
    (CIA properly withheld documents where, because of the
    nature of the documents, “revealing even small portions of the documents would tend to
    reveal the specific information the CIA is seeking to protect.” (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted)). Cf. Charles v. Office of the Armed Forces Med. Exam’r, 979 F.
    Supp. 2d 35, 45–46 (D.D.C. 2013) (where disclosure of any portion of draft document
    would reveal agency’s protected editorial process, entire document was exempt from
    disclosure and no portions were reasonably segrable).
    C.     No Reasonably Segregable Information Exists In The Withheld
    Documents
    To the extent that EPIC’s argument regarding the government’s withholding of
    the Westlaw printouts can be cast as a general segregability contention (see Pl.’s Mot.
    at 24), the argument misunderstands the unseverable relationship between the classified
    FISC brief and its attachments, and thus fails for the reasons explained in Part III.B.2
    above. EPIC’s more pointed assertion that at least some portion of the Westlaw
    printouts themselves should have been released on segregability grounds (see Pl.’s
    34
    Opp’n at 18 (arguing that “it is implausible that entire legal opinions would be devoid
    of reasonably segregable material”)) is also misguided, because release of any portion
    of a Westlaw document carries with it the reasonable risk that anyone with access to
    public electronic databases such as Lexis and Westlaw could proceed to search for the
    released language and thereby locate a full copy of the document the government seeks
    to protect. 5
    As for the SARS, this Court has conducted a careful in camera review of the
    information that the government has withheld as well as its classified supplemental
    declarations, and it finds that the government has satisfied its obligation “of
    demonstrating that no reasonably segregable material exists in the withheld
    documents[.]” 
    Barouch, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 56
    . Stated simply, the SARS redactions are
    narrowly tailored, and the Court agrees with the government that it is not possible for
    any additional information to be released without disclosing the very information that
    the government seeks to protect. See 
    Mobley, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 73
    .
    D.       The Government Must Explain Certain Challenged Redactions That
    Are Not Adequately Addressed In The Supplemental Submissions
    All that said, this Court’s in camera review revealed certain inconsistencies in
    the redactions that the government must address. First, the government appears to have
    mistakenly labeled certain material as not being within the Remaining Challenges
    identified in EPIC II, when it appears to fall within the categories of information that
    5
    EPIC’s own brief provides an example of just how such reverse-search-engineering is done. (See
    Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–8 & n.3 (noting that EPIC was able to determine which unnamed district court case the
    government was discussing in a memorandum submitted to the FISC where that case was the only one
    “according to a Westlaw search, that includes the same language quoted in the NSD’s Verified
    Memorandum of Law”).) Thus, because release of any portion of the case printouts would disclose the
    exact information that DOJ seeks to protect, no reasonably segregable material exists in the withheld
    documents. 
    Barouch, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 56
    ; 
    Mobley, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 73
    .
    35
    are still in dispute. (See, e.g., pages 53–54 of Document 124, under the heading “Other
    Legal Interpretations under FISA by the FISC”; page 56 of Document 124, under the
    heading “FISA Process Improvements”; and page 69 of Document 127, under the
    heading “FISA Process Improvements.”) Based on its review of the unredacted text, the
    Court believes that this material may in fact be within the Remaining Challenges, and
    therefore, the government must either explain why the Court’s reading is incorrect, or
    submit a supplemental declaration that provides an explanation for why the information
    is exempt from disclosure.
    Second, the government has labeled at least one footnote as outside the
    Remaining Challenges even though the footnote pertains to text that the government
    admits is within the Remaining Challenges. (See Document 126, page 57.) The Court
    will require the government to explain this discrepancy in its supplemental submission,
    and if the government agrees that the material is within the Remaining Challenges, it
    must provide a declaration that addresses the text of the footnote and why it is exempt
    from disclosure.
    Third, and finally, on page 59 of Document 127, there is a notation that material
    is “within the remaining challenged withholdings,” even though no redactions appear on
    the page, and the government will therefore be required to explain the notation that it
    has made on this page.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    After careful consideration of the parties’ briefings and DOJ’s ex parte and
    classified submissions, and as set forth in the accompanying Order, the Court upholds
    the government’s general invocations of Exemptions 1 and 3 to withhold the remaining
    36
    items at issue in this lawsuit. Therefore, as set forth in its Order of September 30,
    2017, DOJ’s motion for summary judgment has been GRANTED IN PART AND
    DENIED IN PART and EPIC’s motion for summary judgment has been DENIED
    without prejudice with respect to the withholding addressed in the supplemental
    declarations.
    The Court will provide the government with one final opportunity to support the
    withholdings outlined above in Section III.D, and it will require supplemental
    submissions as outlined in the Order that accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    DATE: November 7, 2017                    Ketanji Brown Jackson
    KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
    United States District Judge
    37