Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran ( 2018 )


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  •                                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    TODD AKINS, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    Civil Action No. 17-675 (BAH)
    v.
    Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell
    ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Over twenty years ago, on June 25, 1996, the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi
    Arabia, which housed military personnel from the United States and other allied forces, was
    bombed, causing extensive damage to the buildings, killing dozens of people, including nineteen
    American service members, and injuring many more. Compl. at 3 & ¶ 28, ECF No. 1. Among
    the injured are fifteen of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit, who, as members of the armed forces
    “survived the blast.” Id. at 3. The plaintiffs also include twenty-three of the survivors’
    “immediate family members,” and one family member of another service member, who was
    injured in the attack but is not a plaintiff. Id.1 The plaintiffs allege that the defendants Islamic
    Republic of Iran (“Iran”) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) “caused and
    facilitated the terrorist attack at the Khobar Towers,” id. ¶ 31, and seek damages under the
    Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (“FSIA”) terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Despite
    multiple efforts to effectuate service, the defendants have not entered appearances nor defended
    1
    An additional plaintiff, Christopher Galletto, who had been stationed at Khobar Towers as a member of the
    U.S. Armed Forces but was on leave in Germany at the time of the attack, Pls.’ Notice of Filing Supporting Decls.,
    Attach 1, Decl. of Christopher Galletto (“Galletto Decl.”) (June 27, 2018) ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No. 26-2 at 9, has asserted
    claims that are dismissed for the reasons discussed infra at notes 11 and 12.
    1
    against this action. The plaintiffs now seek entry of default judgment against both defendants.
    Pls.’ Mot. for Default J. as to Liability (“Pls.’ Liability Mot.”), ECF No. 22; Pls.’ Mot. for
    Default J. as to Damages (“Pls.’ Damages Mot.”), ECF No. 25. For the reasons detailed below,
    the plaintiffs’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.2
    I.      BACKGROUND
    “[T]he history of litigation” in this Court “stemming from the bombing of Khobar
    Towers . . . is extensive.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d 163
    , 167 (D.D.C.
    2010) (Lamberth, J.) (citing Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d 40
    , 46–51 (D.D.C.
    2006) (Lamberth, J.) and Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    466 F. Supp. 2d 229
    , 248
    (D.D.C. 2006) (“Heiser I”) (Lamberth, J.)). The plaintiffs correctly point out that in “two of
    those prior decisions, the Court heard extensive evidence, including expert testimony, and held
    that the same two Defendants” named in the instant suit “were liable, jointly and severally, for
    the same June 25, 1996, terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers at issue here.” Pls.’ Mem. Supp.
    Pls.’ Liability Mot. (“Pls.’ Liability Mem.”) at 8, ECF No. 22-1. In view of this prior litigation,
    the plaintiffs request that this Court “take judicial notice of prior findings of fact and supporting
    evidence imposing liability under Section 1605A (and its predecessor, Section 1605(a)(7)) on
    Iran and IRGC for providing material support and resources to the terrorists who attacked the
    Khobar Towers complex on June 25, 1996.” Pls.’ Liability Mem. at 10.
    Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to take judicial notice, on its
    own or at the request of a party, of adjudicative facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute
    because” they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
    reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(a)–(c). “ʻ[A]djudicative facts are simply the facts
    2
    The plaintiffs have requested appointment of a special master to hear the plaintiffs’ damage claims, Pls.’
    Mem. Supp. Pls.’ Liability Mot. at 16, ECF No. 22-1, which request is denied as unnecessary.
    2
    of the particular case’ while ‘legislative facts . . . are those which have relevance to legal
    reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by
    a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.’” NOW, Wash., D.C. Chapter v. Soc.
    Sec. Admin. of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    736 F.2d 727
    , 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
    (Robinson, J., concurring) (quoting Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 201(a)). Rule
    201 has been applied frequently in this jurisdiction for courts to take notice of, and rely on, facts
    found in earlier proceedings, “without necessitating the formality of having that evidence
    reproduced,” Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 
    882 F. Supp. 2d 23
    , 31 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
    Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    811 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 7 (D.D.C. 2011)), “even when those
    proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge,” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 
    249 F. Supp. 3d 186
    , 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    664 F. Supp. 2d 43
    , 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Relying on the pleadings and the . . . findings of other judges in this
    jurisdiction.”)). In this way, rather than require litigants to present such evidence anew in each
    lawsuit stemming from the same terrorist attack, courts have “determined that the proper
    approach is one ‘that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence
    presented in earlier litigation . . . without necessitating the formality of having that evidence
    reproduced,’” so that “courts may reach their own independent findings of fact” predicated “on
    judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases.” Anderson v. The Islamic Republic
    of Iran, 
    753 F. Supp. 2d 68
    , 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 172
    ); see also Foley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding same “approach
    appropriate” and “tak[ing] judicial notice of the requested findings”); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic
    of Iran, 
    879 F. Supp. 2d 44
    , 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (finding courts permitted “in
    subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation” (quoting
    3
    Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 163
    )); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    873 F. Supp. 2d 232
    , 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (taking “judicial notice of the evidence presented in the
    earlier cases”).
    Thus, the factual evidence developed in other cases involving the same conduct by the
    same defendants is admissible and may be relied upon in this case. At the same time, the judicial
    findings derived from those facts are not dispositive here since courts must “reach their own,
    independent findings of fact in the cases before them.” Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 172
    .
    Persuaded that this common-sense approach is both efficient and sufficiently protective of the
    absent defendants’ interests, this Court will adopt it and grant the plaintiffs’ request to take
    judicial notice of the evidence presented in Heiser I and Blais, as well as supplemental evidence
    provided by the plaintiffs. The evidence regarding the terrorist attack at issue is summarized
    first, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.
    A.   THE KHOBAR TOWERS ATTACK
    “The Khobar Towers was a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed
    the coalition forces charged with monitoring compliance with U.N. security council resolutions.”
    Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d at 47
    . On June 25, 1996, a 5,000-pound truck bomb was detonated
    outside the Khobar Towers complex, and the resulting blast “sheared off the entire face of the
    Khobar Towers complex and shattered windows up to a half mile away.” Compl. at 3. “The
    explosion killed dozens of persons including nineteen American servicemen,” and “[h]undreds of
    others were injured and burned.” Id. ¶ 28. “The investigation determined that the force of the
    explosion was the equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT,” which was, according to the
    Department of Defense, “the largest non-nuclear explosion ever up to that time.” Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d at
    47–48.
    4
    B.     IRAN AND IRGC’S ROLE
    “Iran is a foreign state and has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to
    section 69(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (
    50 U.S.C.A. § 2405
    (j)) continuously
    since January 19, 1984.” Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d at 47
     (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
    Compl. ¶ 20. The “IRGC has been described by expert testimony as ‘a nontraditional
    instrumentality of Iran’ that acts as ‘the military arm of a kind of shadow government answering
    directly to the Ayatollah and the mullahs who hold power in Iran.’” Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 173
     (quoting Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d at 47
    ). “[W]ith its own separate ministry, [it] has evolved
    into one of the most powerful organizations within Iran,” and “functions as an intelligence
    organization.” Compl. ¶ 22.
    The Khobar Towers bombing “was carried out by individuals recruited principally by a
    senior official of the IRGC, Brigadier General Ahmed Sharifi. Sharifi, who was the operational
    commander, planned the operation and recruited individuals for the operation at the Iranian
    embassy in Damascus, Syria.” Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d at 48
    . The truck bomb itself “was
    assembled at a terrorist base in the Bekaa Valley which was jointly operated by the IRGC and by
    the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah,” and the attack “was approved by Ayatollah
    Khameini, the Supreme leader of Iran at the time.” 
    Id.
    Under the “day to day oversight” of Dale Watson, then the deputy counterterrorism chief
    of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the FBI, led by then-director Louis Freeh,
    “conducted a massive and thorough investigation of the attack, using over 250 agents.” 
    Id.
     That
    investigation led to a June 21, 2001, indictment against “13 identified members of the pro-Iran
    Saudi Hezb[o]llah organization,” which indictment “frequently refers to direction and assistance
    from Iranian government officials” in the plot to bomb the Khobar Towers. Heiser I, 
    466 F.
                                  5
    Supp. 2d at 252. The FBI also interviewed “six admitted members of the Saudi Hezbollah
    organization, who were arrested by the Saudis shortly after the bombing” and “admitted to the
    FBI their complicity in the attack . . . and admitted that senior officials in the Iranian government
    provided them with funding, planning, training, sponsorship, and travel necessary to carry out
    the attack on the Khobar Towers.” Id. at 253. Those Saudi Hezbollah members provided
    information about “how each was recruited and trained by the Iranian government,” and stated
    that Iran and the IRGC had “collectively” selected the target for the attack, and that “the actual
    preparation and carrying out of the attack was done by the IRGC.” Id. One “told the FBI that
    IRGC gave the six individuals a large amount of money for the specific purpose of planning and
    executing the Khobar Towers bombing.” Id. Importantly, “there was a great deal of cross-
    corroboration among the individuals’ stories, even when each was interviewed by the FBI
    separately,” and “in many instances the FBI was able to corroborate independently the
    statements made by the six individuals.” Id. at 261–62. On the basis of the FBI’s investigation,
    former Director Freeh “has publicly and unequivocally stated his firm conclusion . . . that Iran
    was responsible for planning and supporting the Khobar Towers attack,” and Watson concurred
    “that there was Iran [] and IRGC involvement in the bombing.” Id. at 253.
    Dr. Patrick Clawson has provided expert testimony, “based on his involvement on a
    Commission investigating the bombing, his top-secret security clearance, his discussions with
    Saudi officials, as well as his academic research on the subject,” that the Saudi Hezbollah
    organization was formed by Iran, and received military training from the IRGC. Id. Clawson
    concluded “that the government of Iran, [its Ministry of Information and Security], and IRGC
    were responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing, and that Saudi Hezbollah carried out the
    attack under their direction.” Id.; see also id. at 260–64 (describing and finding credible expert
    6
    testimony regarding Iran and IRGC’s involvement in the Khobar Towers attack). Clawson’s
    conclusion about Iran’s direct involvement in the Khobar Towers bombing is shared by Dr.
    Bruce Tefft, “one of the founding members of the CIA’s counterterrorism bureau,” who has
    testified that, based “on publicly available sources that were not inconsistent with classified
    information known to him from his time at the CIA and from his security clearances since that
    time,” the Khobar Towers bombing “wouldn’t have happened without Iranian support.” Blais,
    
    459 F. Supp. 2d at
    48–49.
    C.       THE INSTANT PLAINTIFFS
    The plaintiffs in this action are U.S. nationals and include: (1) fifteen U.S. Armed Forces
    members, who were present at the Khobar Towers at the time of the bombing and “suffered
    physical and psychological injuries,” Compl. ¶ 38; (2) twenty-three of their immediate family
    members; and (3) one family member of a service member survivor of the bombing who is not
    himself a plaintiff in this case. Each plaintiff and, where applicable, their family members, is
    described below.3
    1.       Todd Akins
    At the time of the attack, plaintiff Todd Akins, an F-15 avionics specialist serving a tour
    at Dhahran Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia, lived in the Khobar Towers complex. Pls.’ Damages
    Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Todd Akins (“Akins Decl.”) (June 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 1.4 While
    preparing for his night shift, he was “thrown across the room and against the concrete wall about
    15 or 20 feet away from where [he] had been sitting.” Id. ¶ 4. Though Akins was “dazed and
    3
    Each plaintiff submitted two declarations, one in support of the motion as to liability and the other in
    support of the motion as to damages, with the latter declarations generally providing more comprehensive
    information. Consequently, the declarations submitted with the plaintiffs’ motion as to damages are cited.
    4
    Plaintiff Todd Akins submitted his declaration dated with only a month and year, as did three other
    plaintiffs, George C. Anthony, Andrew P. Blank, and Jerry Timothy Sasser, Jr. on behalf of the estate of Jason Allen
    Sasser.
    7
    confused,” he helped his roommate out of their apartment and down the stairs to a “triage area.”
    Id. There, Akins “had some pieces of glass removed from parts of [his] body,” including his
    chin, head, back, knee, and calf, “and got some initial stitches.” Id. Akins also suffered injuries
    to his “back and knee from when [he] was thrown against the wall,” and believes he sustained a
    concussion as well. Id. ¶ 5. These injuries “still cause [him] a lot of pain on a day-to-day basis,”
    and his “activities are limited,” but “[t]he psychological impact may have been greater.” Id. ¶¶
    6–7. Akins “suffered severe emotional distress . . . as a result of the terrorist attack,” and has
    been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and “rated as 70 percent disabled”
    by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Id. ¶¶ 6, 8; see id., Ex. B, VA, Baltimore
    Regional Office, Letter to Todd Akins, ECF No. 25-2 at 7–8.
    2.      George C. Anthony
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff George C. Anthony, was “serving with the 58th Fighter
    Squadron” and on “a tour of duty at the Air Force base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,” where he
    lived in the Khobar Towers complex. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of George C.
    Anthony (“Anthony Decl.”) (June 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 14. While “walking out of [his]
    bedroom,” Anthony “felt an immense blast that lifted [him] up and blew [him] back some 20 or
    30 feet” where he “landed against a wall.” Id. ¶ 4. After being helped out of the room by one of
    his roommates, Anthony jumped from a first-floor balcony “to get away from the building,” and
    was “guided to a triage area” where Anthony was treated for a dislocated left shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 5–
    6. Upon his return to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, Anthony was told that his shoulder
    required surgery in order to reattach some of his muscles, and that shoulder “still often hurts.”
    Id. ¶ 7. One of Anthony’s suitemates had been killed in the attack, and Anthony and his wife
    “spent a lot of time together” with the suitemate’s widow “trying to help her get through her
    8
    grief.” Id. ¶ 8. He “found that it was difficult to process what had happened and to come to
    grips with the fact that so many of [his] friends died,” and believes that his inability “to process
    his emotions” about the attack was “a big reason” for his 2006 divorce. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Anthony left
    the Air Force in 2011, and received an 80 percent disability rating, owing in part to his PTSD
    and lingering left shoulder issues. Id. ¶ 10; id., Ex. A, Disabilities Rating, ECF No. 25-2 at 17.
    Anthony also suffers from “survivors’ guilt, wondering how and why [he] survived when so
    many did not.” Id. ¶ 11.
    3.      Frank David Sills III
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Frank David Sills III “was an F-15 aircraft mechanic and
    crew chief” with the 58th Fighter Squadron, and was deployed to Dhahran Air Force Base and
    housed at the Khobar Towers complex. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Frank David
    Sills III (“Sills Decl.”) (June 25, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 18. Sills was cleaning up his
    suite in preparation for his departure the next day and, as he walked past his bathroom, the bomb
    “blew in everything from the bathroom, including porcelain from the bathtub, and hit [him] all
    over [his] left side.” Id. ¶ 4. He was “thrown against the wall” and knew “immediately” that he
    “was bleeding profusely from the head,” which he attempted to staunch with a pillow. Id. ¶ 5.
    As Sills attempted to make his way out of the building, he “realized that [his] left leg wasn’t
    working properly” and was carried to the infirmary. Id. He was “evacuated to a local Saudi
    hospital by ambulance,” and ultimately “taken to a U.S. military hospital in Ramstein,”
    Germany, for further treatment. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. He sustained “a substantial amount of damage to
    [his] left calf where [he] lost some tissue and muscle,” requiring six months of recovery before
    he was able to walk without crutches. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Sills also required “several [] reconstructive
    surgeries to [his] face.” Id. ¶ 10. He remained in the Air Force until 2014, and in 2015 was rated
    9
    60 percent disabled. Id. ¶ 11; id., Ex. A, VA Letter to Frank Sills (Feb. 4, 2015), ECF No. 25-2
    at 21. Sills suffers from “a generalized anxiety disorder” and “severe panic attacks and chronic
    sleep impairment,” as well as survivors’ guilt—“the sadness and grief of knowing that twelve of
    [his] close friends and co-workers never returned.” Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
    4.      Kevin James Hurst
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Kevin James Hurst was a weapons load crew member with
    the 58th Fighter Squadron on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he “was housed at
    [] Khobar Towers.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Kevin James Hurst (“Hurst Decl.”)
    (June 28, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 78. The bomb detonated while Hurst was asleep, and he
    “found [him]self elevated above [his] bed,” as “[g]lass and pieces of rubble began raining
    down.” Id. ¶ 4. With cuts from broken glass on his feet, he and a suitemate carried another
    suitemate downstairs and ultimately to a triage area. Id. ¶ 5. Hurst spent the next several hours
    trying in vain to find “certain of [his] friends,” only “learn[ing] later the reason why [he] didn’t
    see them—they had been killed in the blast and the collapse of [the] building.” Id. ¶ 6. Since the
    bombing, he has been diagnosed with “bulging and protruding discs” causing lower back pain,
    and has “sought and received psychological counseling” for “symptoms of PTSD,” including
    being “irritable . . . and more quick to anger.” Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
    5.      Nicholas L. MacKenzie
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Nicholas L. MacKenzie was an aircraft maintenance crew
    chief in the 34th Fighter Squadron on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was
    housed in Khobar Towers. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Nicholas L. MacKenzie
    (“MacKenzie Decl.”) (June 25, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 93. He was asleep when the bomb
    detonated, and “was woken up by a flash of light, which was followed immediately by a loud
    10
    boom and a blast that sent [his] bed, with [him] in it, crashing against the wall of [his] room.” Id.
    ¶ 4. He and his suitemates, who each “suffered some injuries but were mobile,” “checked for
    injured servicemen on the floor below” and carried a badly-injured fellow airman “down six
    flights of stairs to the triage area.” Id. ¶ 5. MacKenzie also received treatment at the triage area,
    and “was later told [he] would be eligible for a Purple Heart but [he] declined because [he] knew
    there were many more seriously wounded airmen.” Id. ¶ 6. He remained at Khobar Towers for a
    “harrowing” two and a half months, before leaving the Air Force in 1997 and “bounc[ing]
    around in several jobs, none lasting very long.” Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Though MacKenzie has, for
    “personal reasons,” “declined to seek or receive treatment for PTSD, and therefore ha[s] no
    formal diagnosis,” he has “many PTSD symptoms,” including “startl[ing] easily” and “anger
    management issues.” Id. ¶ 9. He has “tried to suppress or minimize” the “physical injuries and
    psychological wounds from the terrorist attack at the Khobar Towers,” but “know[s] that [his]
    life was never the same after.” Id. ¶ 10.
    6.      Jason Porter Remar
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Jason Porter Remar was an aircraft maintenance crew chief in
    the 58th Fighter Squadron on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed in
    Khobar Towers. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Jason Porter Remar (“Remar Decl.”)
    (June 28, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 96. He was “walking in [a] parking lot not far away” from
    where the bomb detonated, and “felt a rumble and saw a cloud of dust and gravel approaching”
    and “tried to run in the opposite direction, but it caught up to [him], knocked [him] down, and
    carried [him] along the ground for about 15 or 20 feet.” Id. ¶ 4. Remar sought treatment at the
    triage area for his “numerous cuts and abrasions,” and does not “remember anything immediately
    after that but [he] later woke up in a nearby Saudi hospital.” Id. ¶¶ 4–6. “Although . . . not . . .
    11
    hurt too bad, [he] stayed there to stay with [his] friends who were,” and over the following days
    “learned the names of [his] friends who were either very badly hurt or killed,” which “was very
    painful.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Remar remained in the Air Force, but “was not the same person” and
    “struggled with major depression” for which he “was prescribed medication” that he still takes.
    Id. ¶ 8. While he “ha[s] learned to try to cope with what happened in [his] own way,” and
    “tr[ies] not to think about” the attack, he “largely” attributes his depression to the bombing. Id.
    ¶¶ 8–9.
    7.      Charles Blank and Four Family Members
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Charles Blank was serving his third tour of duty at the
    Dhahran Air Force Base as a member of the 34th Fighter Squadron, and was in his living room
    with three suitemates at the time of the bombing. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Charles
    Blank (“Charles Blank Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 23. “The entire wall
    came crashing in,” and Blank had to be helped out from under “the frame of the glass door”
    before “crawl[ing] into the hallway.” Id. ¶ 4. He and his suitemates “checked each other’s
    injuries,” at which point Blank noticed “a puddle of blood under” him, which “seemed to be
    from [his] legs.” Id. ¶ 6. Before seeking medical help for himself, Blank “check[ed] for injured
    airmen” in a nearby suite, and “saw another pilot who was squirting blood from his neck.” Id. ¶
    7. While trying to find aid, he assisted others in carrying other injured airmen, including at least
    one who died while Blank was helping to carry him to triage. Id. Blank ultimately required 22
    stitches in his leg, and, for nearly ten years, he and his wife “were still picking and pulling pieces
    of glass out of [his] legs as they gradually worked their way to the skin surface.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 14.
    He remained in the Air Force before joining the Air National Guard, but still experiences
    12
    flashbacks to the Khobar Towers bombing, which are triggered by news of “new terrorist
    attack[s],” or by movie “scenes of explosions and flying glass.” Id. ¶¶ 15–18.
    Four of Blank’s family members are plaintiffs in this lawsuit: his wife, Linda Kay Blank,
    son, and two siblings. Blank’s wife had not yet heard the news of the bombing when she
    received “a phone call from [Blank] letting [her] know he was alive. [She] was shaken” but
    Blank was unable to “talk for long,” and she did not hear from him again for “a[ ]long time.”
    Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Linda Kay Blank (“Linda Blank Decl.”) (June 28, 2018)
    ¶¶ 3–4, 6, ECF No. 25-2 at 31. The “days immediately after the explosion were very difficult,”
    as she heard from other spouses that her husband “was hurt and that it was serious,” and she
    “worried that he might be badly hurt but had been trying to minimize that or just spare” her in his
    phone call. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. As a result of the attack, Linda Blank decided to “quit [her] job so that
    [she] could stay home with” the couple’s son, because “in case anything happened to either of
    [them], [they] didn’t want [him] to grow up without really knowing either parent.” Id. ¶ 8. In
    addition to helping “pull pieces of glass from Charles’[s] body for years after the attack,” Linda
    has “gone through everything with him” emotionally as well, even once reading the “diary where
    [Charles] wrote down much of what happened . . . . It was truly horrifying to read. [She] realized
    that he was able to write some things that were too hard to talk about.” Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
    Nathan Blank is Blank’s son, and, “[a]lthough [he] was very young at the time of the
    attack, [he] suffered emotional distress and mental anguish throughout [his] childhood because
    of the devastating effect the attack had on [his] father, [his] mother, and [his] whole family.”
    Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Nathan Blank (“Nathan Blank Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶
    3, 5, ECF No. 25-2 at 34. “The effect this terrorist attack has had on [him] will be everlasting.
    13
    [Nathan Blank] grew up seeing [his] father’s scars and . . . witness[ing] the anguish he has when
    retelling the events of that day.” Id. ¶ 6.
    Deborah Millrany is Blank’s sister, and at the time of the Khobar Towers attack “was
    working at an airline counter where [she] could see the news on television, and saw some of the
    reports coming in of an explosion at the Khobar Towers residential complex.” Pls.’ Damages
    Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Deborah Millrany (“Millrany Decl.”) (June 27, 2018) ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No.
    25-2 at 36. Knowing that her brother “was stationed in Saudi Arabia [she] became very
    concerned that he may have been caught in that explosion,” which concern increased when she
    “called his wife Linda and could not initially get through.” Id. ¶ 4. Millrany “was fiercely
    protective of” her brother growing up, and they “remained close in adult life.” Id. ¶ 5. She notes
    that Blank “became quieter” after returning from Saudi Arabia, and “know[s] he kept a lot in and
    never wanted to talk about the details of what he experienced. He was almost apologetic about
    receiving a Purple Heart because he said that there were a lot of airmen who were much more
    seriously hurt than he was.” Id. ¶ 6.
    Andrew P. Blank is Blank’s brother, and was “always very close” with Blank, who
    “taught [Andrew] how to ride a bike and to play hockey, which [they] played together for over
    20 years.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Andrew P. Blank (“Andrew Blank Decl.”)
    (June 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 29. After initially hearing about the bombing, Andrew Blank
    “did not hear that [Blank] was injured but OK for about twelve hours after that initial phone
    call,” and the wait “was agonizing” as he “saw the rubble and destruction” on the news, along
    with “reports of deaths and serious injuries.” Id. ¶ 5. The two brothers “had a close bond” and
    Andrew Blank’s “fears for his [brother’s] safety and survival were profound. Although [he] was
    relieved when [he] eventually heard that [Blank] had survived,” the experience “caused
    14
    [Andrew] considerable emotional distress. Id. ¶ 6. When Blank returned home, Andrew Blank
    “could tell that the experience had changed him. He became less open, less optimistic,
    somewhat withdrawn and a harder person in general. To this day he doesn’t want to talk about
    what happened there, and doesn’t want the Purple Heart he was awarded for his injuries to be
    displayed in his house,” all of which has made Andrew “sad” and “sorry to see the effect” the
    attack had on Blank. Id. ¶ 7.
    8.     John Gaydos and Three Family Members
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff John Gaydos was an avionics maintenance specialist in the
    Air Force serving a rotation at the Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed at the Khobar
    Towers complex. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of John Gaydos (“John Gaydos Decl.”)
    (June 19, 2018) ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No. 25-2 at 38. He was on a couch in his suite’s common area
    when he heard a rumble, and then “experienced a huge blast wave.” Id. ¶ 6. Gaydos was helped
    out of the building by one of his suitemates, and remembers putting his hand to his ear and
    feeling “nothing but blood,” and experiencing “tunnel vision,” but does not “remember much
    else after that” but knows he “was helped/carried to medical assistance.” Id. ¶ 8. While
    receiving “emergency medical care in a triage area that had been set up on a bus,” Gaydos “lost
    consciousness but [] remember[s] waking up more than once to notice that [he] was receiving
    CPR,” and “[o]ne of the medics kept talking to [him] to try [to] make sure that [he] did not lose
    consciousness again.” Id. ¶ 9. He was “taken to a small infirmary nearby,” where he “saw
    several body bags,” and observed a “female Captain with one eye hanging out of its socket. She
    asked one of the medics if it could be saved. He said no, and she calmly proceeded to cut it off
    with ordinary scissors, asked to have it bandaged, and then proceeded to help others.” Id.
    Gaydos was then evacuated to a nearby hospital, and then to a military hospital in Germany,
    15
    where he received surgical treatment for injuries that “included broken bones in [his] skull and
    left elbow; a severed nerve and ulnar artery damage in [his] left arm; extensive shrapnel wounds
    to [his] face, arms, and legs, where the glass from the shattered sliding glass doors hit [his]
    body.” Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
    Gaydos was hospitalized after returning to the United States, and “received additional
    medical treatment,” but still “suffer[s] substantial pain in [his] legs and arms almost every single
    day.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Gaydos “cannot walk any significant distances and cannot stand still for any
    length of time. [His] left arm has lost much of its mobility and function, and [his] left hand has
    lost feeling.” Id. ¶ 12. Those physical symptoms, however, “are minor compared to the mental
    and emotional after-effects of the terrorist attack.” Id. ¶ 13. Gaydos has “had a hard time
    finding or retaining employment,” and has “constant recurring nightmares and flashbacks,” even
    injuring his wife while flailing during a nightmare. Id. In 2008, he was evaluated as “‘exhibiting
    severe symptoms associated with posttraumatic stress disorder’ and [his] ‘related major
    depressive disorder and panic disorder,’” id. ¶ 14; see id., Ex. A, Psychological Evaluation of
    John Gaydos by Phoebe A McLeod, PhD (Mar. 8, 2008), ECF No. 25-2 at 43–45, and was rated
    as 80 percent disabled, id., Ex. B, VA Rating Decision (Sep. 23, 2015), ECF No. 25-2 at 47.
    Gaydos “continue[s] to have flashbacks,” “nightmares,” and “difficulty sleeping,” but has
    “started to receive therapy” and regularly “attend[s] a PTSD support group.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
    Through this treatment, he has become more aware of the ways in which his PTSD symptoms—
    “irritability, shortness of temper, and sometimes abusive behavior”—have “adversely affected”
    his family and “been a great burden to them.” Id. ¶ 17.
    Three of Gaydos’s family members are plaintiffs in this lawsuit: his wife, Barbara
    Gaydos, son, and daughter. Gaydos’s wife was at home with their two children when her father
    16
    called to tell her “that something had happened at the Khobar Towers complex.” Pls.’ Damages
    Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Barbara Gaydos (“Barbara Gaydos Decl.”) (June 19, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF
    No. 25-2 at 50. She “learned that there had been a bomb blast and that not all the members of
    [Gaydos’s] unit had been accounted for,” but “heard nothing about [him] for two full days,”
    during which time she “did not know if he was alive or dead, or whether he was badly injured.”
    Id. ¶ 5. After Gaydos came home, Barbara observed “changes in John” in addition to “his
    obvious and extensive physical injuries, which required him to use a wheel chair for several
    months.” Id. ¶ 7. Though Gaydos “had been a very physical, outgoing, and outdoorsy young
    man, enjoying social interactions and outdoors activities,” upon “his return, he did not want to go
    anywhere and became more guarded and distant,” was “often . . . hunkered down in bed, even
    during the middle of the day.” Id. ¶ 8. “John also suffered from disordered sleep and
    nightmares,” and Barbara Gaydos believes that she sustained a concussion when, during a
    nightmare, Gaydos “accidentally hit [her] in the head while he was flailing about.” Id. ¶ 9. She
    has “no doubt that John’s PTSD caused by the terrorist bombing ha[s] caused a serious strain on
    [their] marriage and adversely affected [their] family life,” including inflicting “considerable
    emotional distress” on her and their children, who “seem to have suffered secondary or indirect
    PTSD.” Id. ¶ 13.
    Ethan Gaydos is John and Barbara Gaydos’s son, and was “about two and a half years
    old” at the time of the bombing and does not “have a clear recollection of learning” about it,
    though he does “recall a vague sense that things were not right and that [his] mother was upset.”
    Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Ethan Gaydos (“Ethan Gaydos Decl.”) (June 22, 2018) ¶¶
    3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 53. As Ethan Gaydos grew up, he “became aware that [his father] was
    troubled by [] demons,” and “[i]t was not unusual to be woken up in the middle of the night by
    17
    hearing [him] shouting during one of his nightmares.” Id. ¶ 5. “In general, [his] father was
    distant and uninvolved,” though “at times he would get angry at [Ethan] and shout at [him],
    although he would alter apologize. Because of his injuries and physical limitations, he was not
    able to play with [Ethan] the way a lot of other dads did.” Id. ¶ 6. Ethan Gaydos has “no doubt
    that [his] emotional development and growth were adversely affected by the PTSD that affected
    [his] father after the terrorist attack. Although [he] was very young at the time of the attack, [he]
    suffered severe emotional distress and mental anguish throughout [his] childhood because of the
    devastating after-effects the attack had on” his parents and their “whole family.” Id. ¶ 8. The
    emotional distress of the attack itself continued “throughout [his] childhood and to this day,” and
    “[t]he psychological after-effects of the attack were even more difficult,” as his “whole family
    has been deeply and adversely affected” by Gaydos’s “physical and psychological limitations
    and deficits.” Id. ¶ 9.
    Elizabeth Gaydos is John and Barbara Gaydos’s daughter, and, like her brother, Ethan,
    she “was very young at the time of the attack and do[es] not remember what happened around
    that time.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Elizabeth Gaydos (“Elizabeth Gaydos Decl.”)
    (June 22, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 56. “The attack caused [her] mother to experience
    severe emotional distress when it happened, and caused [her] family great emotional distress not
    only when it happened, but also throughout [her] childhood and to this day. The serious injuries
    suffered by [Gaydos] limited his ability to participate in our family life and to be the same person
    he was before the attack. The psychological after-effects of the attack were even more difficult
    for” the family. Id. ¶ 8. Growing up, Elizabeth Gaydos “became aware that it was very difficult
    to try to get any attention from [her] father, and that [her] mother also had little time for [her].
    [She] felt neglected and started to engage in self-harming behaviors,” and received “anger and
    18
    blame” from her parents rather than “support or sympathy.” Id. ¶ 4. Elizabeth Gaydos also
    “seem[s] to have picked up some ‘secondary’ symptoms of [her] dad’s PTSD,” as both have
    similar “large startle[d] reaction[s]” when, for example, a plate is dropped at a restaurant. Id. ¶ 5.
    9.       Matthew G. Spicer and Three Family Members
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Matthew G. Spicer was an “F15 avionics technician assigned
    to the 58th Fighter Squadron” serving a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base. Pls.’ Damages
    Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Matthew G. Spicer (“Matthew Spicer Decl.”) (June 25, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF
    No. 25-2 at 58. That evening, he “shared a smoke with [his] good friend Peter Morgera,” who
    was killed in the bombing, before returning to his suite. Id. ¶ 4. The blast occurred while Spicer
    was sitting on a couch, and he “remember[s] a shaking like an earthquake and a feeling like
    thunder was going through [him], and that it became dark all of a sudden,” and he was struck in
    his legs by fragments of the suite’s glass doors as they blew in. Id. ¶ 5. Believing they had been
    hit by a missile, and thinking more might follow, he and his suitemates “shelter[ed] in place for a
    while” before going downstairs to the triage area that had been “set up where the dining area
    was,” and Spicer noticed some of his “friends being carried out . . . in very bad shape, screaming
    in pain.” Id. ¶ 6.5 After receiving “some first aid for [his] leg wounds,” Spicer remained at
    Dhahran “for several more days” before traveling back to the United States, and during that time
    he “helped load the caskets of [his] comrades who did not” survive “for their final journey back
    to Dover Air Force base.” Id. ¶ 7. Spicer “often think[s]” of those who died in the bombing, and
    “sometimes ha[s] ‘flashbacks’” where he “suddenly re-live[s] some of the sights and sounds of
    that day,” and states that he also “sometimes become[s] randomly emotional.” Id. ¶ 9. “For
    personal reasons,” he “do[es] not want to go to the VA for any sort of psychological evaluation
    5
    One of those friends was Cielito Valencia, the lead plaintiff in Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d 1
     (D.D.C. 2010).
    19
    or treatment” and therefore does not have any formal PTSD diagnosis, but instead “‘self-
    medicate[s]’ with alcohol,” though he does receive “a lot of help and emotional support” from
    his brother, and has been able to speak to friends about “these experiences and their after-
    effects.” 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 9–10.
    Three of Spicer’s family members are plaintiffs in this lawsuit: his ex-wife, Cathy Eunha
    Kim Spicer-Lindsy, son, and brother. Spicer-Lindsy was married to Matthew Spicer at the time
    of the attack on Khobar Towers, and “was living on base housing with [their] infant son.” Pls.’
    Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Cathy Eunha Kim Spicer-Lindsy (“Cathy Spicer-Lindsy
    Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 61. After hearing about the bombing of Khobar
    Towers, she “became very anxious and distraught,” “suffer[ing] severe emotional distress and
    mental anguish,” and remembers “as sheer torture” the time during which she waited to find out
    that Spicer “had survived and was not seriously injured.” 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 4–5, 8. When he returned,
    however, “he was a changed man. He had become moody and withdrawn [and] awoke at night
    with bad dreams and night sweats.” Id. ¶ 6. Spicer-Lindsy “thought he just needed some time to
    process what had happened, but things did not improve with time,” and Spicer “became abusive
    toward [her], both verbally and otherwise.” Id. Although they “had not had any real problems in
    [their] marriage before” the bombing, their marriage “deteriorated” after, due to “problems” with
    “Matthew’s mental state . . . caused by the bombing and its after-effects,” and the two separated
    in 1999 before divorcing in 2005. Id. ¶¶ 6–7; see also id. ¶ 9.
    Cathy Spicer-Lindsy also submitted a declaration on behalf of her and Spicer’s son,
    Christian William Spicer, “who has autism and is not verbal,” and for whom Spicer-Lindsy
    serves as guardian. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Christian William Spicer (“Spicer-
    20
    Lindsy for Christian Spicer Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶ 2, ECF No. 25-2 at 66.6 Christian Spicer
    “was too young to understand what was happening” after the bombing, but “he suffered from the
    after-effects.” Id. ¶ 5. “Although he had been a good father, and tried to continue, Matthew
    ended up largely exiting Christian’s life around the 4th grade. After [their] separation and
    divorce, Matthew’s attempts to reach out to Christian were few and far between,” and Spicer-
    Lindsy “believe[s] Christian suffered significant harm from the lack of his father’s attention, care
    and concern.” Id. ¶ 6.
    Christopher G. Spicer is Spicer’s brother, and on the day of the attack he “received a
    phone call from [his] aunt telling [him] that something had happened at [] Khobar Towers,” but
    that “she did not know what had happened” to Spicer. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of
    Christopher G. Spicer (“Christopher Spicer Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 64.
    He was “immediately very worried and anxious” while awaiting news about Spicer, and his
    “fears concerning his survival and safety were intense,” causing him “great emotional distress.”
    Id. ¶¶ 4, 8. When Spicer returned, Christopher Spicer observed that “he had been through a lot”
    and “seemed like a different person,” and “sensed some psychological scars” in addition to the
    “physical scars on [his brother’s] legs.” Id. ¶ 5. Spicer “was withdrawn and moody at times,”
    and “was also emotionally distant.” Id. ¶ 6. After Spicer and Cathy Spicer-Lindsy divorced,
    6
    The two declarations submitted by, and on behalf of, Christian Spicer contain discrepancies about his
    abilities and knowledge. Compare Spicer-Lindsy for Christian Spicer Decl. ¶ 5 (“Christian was too young to
    understand what was happening.”), with Pls.’ Liability Mot., Attach. 2, Decl. of Christian William Spicer (Feb.
    2018) ¶ 5, ECF No 22-2 at 15 (“I suffered severe emotional distress and mental anguish when I first heard news of
    the attack and of the many deaths and casualties there because I knew that my father was serving there. I saw the
    pictures of the rubble and the destruction after the terrorist attack as reported on television news.”); compare Spicer-
    Lindsy for Christian Spicer Decl. ¶ 2 (stating that Christian Spicer “has autism and is not verbal”), with Pls.’
    Liability Mot., Attach. 2, Decl. of Christian William Spicer (Feb. 2018) ¶ 1 (attesting that he was “competent to
    testify about the facts personally known to” him). Despite these discrepancies, the Court relies on the declaration
    submitted by Christian Spicer’s mother on his behalf, see Spicer-Lindsy for Christian Spicer Decl. ¶ 2 (“I am the
    guardian for my son Christian William Spicer, who has autism and is not verbal. I am authorized to make this
    Declaration on his behalf.”), finding that this “evidence [is] satisfactory to the [C]ourt,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (e), given
    that Christian Spicer is “disabled,” Compl. ¶ 14.
    21
    Spicer “came to live with” Christopher Spicer, who “was glad to be able to help him during this
    difficult time.” 
    Id.
     The brothers are eleven months apart in age, and “had always been very
    close,” so “it hurt [Christopher] to see the changes and difficulties [Matthew] went through as a
    result of the Khobar Towers bombing,” and Spicer’s “psychological trauma . . . became a burden
    and problem for [their] whole family.” 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 7–8.
    10.      Jerry Timothy Sasser, Jr. and Three Family Members
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Jerry Timothy Sasser, Jr. “was just hours from finishing [his]
    first tour of duty and was getting ready to go home” from the Dhahran Air Force Base, where he
    “was present at the Khobar Towers” complex. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Jerry
    Timothy Sasser, Jr. (“Jerry Sasser Jr. Decl.”) (June 26, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 68. While
    returning to his room, he “stopped briefly at the room” of three fellow airmen, but declined their
    invitation to join their card game. Id. ¶ 4. All three were killed in the blast. Id.7 Sasser “was
    [on a] phone call home . . . when all the lights went out and [he] heard what sounded like a train,
    a sonic boom, and an earthquake all at once,” and he lost consciousness. Id. ¶ 5. “When [he]
    came to, it appeared that [he] had been thrown forcibly against the wall,” and his “vision was
    grayed out and [he] couldn’t hear anything.” Id. Once his senses returned, Sasser “spent several
    hours assisting the wounded and trying to find survivors,” going “back into the building several
    times until it became clear that there were no additional survivors.” Id. ¶ 6. Even though he
    “knew there would be no more,” he felt he “had to lie to friends who were still hoping to find
    additional survivors.” Id. While he ignored his own injuries at first, Sasser had sustained
    “numerous cuts, abrasions, and contusions,” “many fragments of glass were embedded in [his]
    body,” and, as a result of “being thrown against the wall by the blast, he also “had herniated and
    7
    One of those three was Joseph Rimkus, whose father was the plaintiff in Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 167
    .
    22
    ruptured discs in [his] back, which have required several major surgeries.” Id. ¶ 7. Sasser
    remains “in constant pain from these injuries,” and “take[s] pain medications every day to
    manage the pain,” but “[t]he psychological after effects have been even more devastating.” Id.
    ¶¶ 8–9.
    Sasser is “rated as 100 percent disabled” by the VA, and has “received and continue[s] to
    receive treatment for traumatic brain injury, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression.” Id. ¶
    9; id. Ex. A, Letter from VA to Jerry Timothy Sasser re Disability Rating (Apr. 24, 2017), ECF
    No. 25-2 at 72. These psychological effects have caused Sasser’s family relationships to
    “deteriorate[],” and he “couldn’t keep a job,” “picked fights with strangers at bars,” and “started
    doing drugs, smoking, and drinking heavily.” Id. ¶ 10. “Although [he] eventually sought and
    received some therapy, [his] family relationships were damaged almost beyond repair,” and his
    “first marriage ended in divorce.” Id. ¶ 11. Sasser is now “happily remarried,” but worries that
    he “subject[s] [his] wife to [his] own personal demons,” noting that she “has seen [him] in a ball
    of tears, hiding from fireworks,” and “deliver[ing] a tear-filled speech, honoring [his] friends
    who lost their lives.” Id. ¶ 12. He “suffered severe emotional distress in addition to [his]
    physical injuries as a result of the terrorist attack”—“trauma” that “is a nightmare that no 20-year
    old kid should ever have to endure. It ruined [his] life.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14.
    Two of Sasser’s family members are plaintiffs in this lawsuit: his parents as well as his
    brother’s estate. Jerry Timothy Sasser, Sr. is Sasser’s father, and learned about the Khobar
    Towers attack from the evening news, and “at about the same time” he “received a call from” his
    son “letting us know that he had survived.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Jerry
    Timothy Sasser, Sr. (“Jerry Sasser Sr. Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 73.
    “When Jerry returned,” however, Sasser, Sr. “realized he was not the same active and outgoing
    23
    young man he had been. He was withdrawn and apathetic. He had used to come to see us
    frequently but now he did not and even avoided contact with us. He did not return phone calls.”
    Id. ¶ 5. Sasser, Sr. saw that his son “was not taking steps to get treatment or help” and worried
    that “he was throwing his life away,” until “[f]inally [he] . . . insisted [Sasser] get some
    professional help” or else Sasser, Sr. “would stop helping him as well.” Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Though
    “gradually [Sasser has] improved somewhat,” he has “never [been] the same,” causing Sasser,
    Sr. “considerable grief and anguish,” noting that he “felt we had lost a loving and vital family
    member” due to Sasser’s “continuing physical and psychological issues.” Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
    Deborah Homs is Jerry Timothy Sasser, Jr.’s mother, and learned about the Khobar
    Towers attack from the evening news, but the “news had not really registered with” her when she
    “received a phone call” from Sasser saying that he had survived. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2,
    Decl. of Deborah Homs (“Homs Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 77. Her
    happiness that Sasser “was ok” was tempered by the knowledge that “he must have gone through
    a lot, and [she] felt bad for him and his fellow airmen when [she] saw the devastation on tv,” and
    she “suffered severe emotional distress when” she “saw pictures of the rubble and devastation on
    television news reports.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. “When Jerry returned, he was not at all the same person.
    He was in bad shape” and “distanced himself from his family.” Id. ¶ 5. Though he “has
    gradually improved,” “[i]t has broken [Homs’s] heart to see what happened to him.” Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
    She “feel[s] [she] lost the happy, optimistic young man [who] had been so involved with his
    family, his community, and his Church.” Id. ¶ 8.
    Kimberly Watters Sasser is the widow of Jerry’s younger brother, Jason Allen Sasser,
    and a declaration on Jason’s behalf has been submitted by Sasser. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2,
    Decl. of Jerry T. Sasser, Jr. on Behalf of the Estate of His Deceased Brother, Jason Allen Sasser
    24
    (“Jason Sasser Decl.”) (June 2018) ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 25-2 at 75; see Motion to Substitute Party,
    ECF No. 28; Minute Order (July 24, 2018).8 The brothers “often played together as kids and
    were very close,” and Jason “looked up to” Sasser, but “[t]hat all changed when [Sasser] came
    home after the Khobar Towers attack.” Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Sasser “just shut down emotionally and
    Jason very much missed having [an] involved older brother,” and “soon turned to drugs and
    alcohol to numb the pain of losing [Jerry’s] affection.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Jason Sasser “became
    rebellious and often blamed [his brother] for his life because [Jerry] left him behind,” and “was
    in so much pain over the loss of his big brother emotionally.” Id. ¶ 7. Before Jason Sasser’s
    death, the brothers had “just recently started growing closer” after more than 20 years of
    emotional distance. Id. ¶ 7.
    11.      Gregory Eric Leinenbach and One Family Member
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Gregory Eric Leinenbach was a member of the 58th Fighter
    Squadron on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed in Khobar Towers.
    Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Gregory Eric Leinenbach (“Leinenbach Decl.”) (June 19,
    2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 81. He was asleep when the bomb detonated, and “was woken up
    by a loud blast, and flying debris.” Id. ¶ 6. Though his way out of his room was “blocked by
    toppled furniture and debris,” Leinenbach was able to evacuate with help from his suitemates,
    and made his way to a “triage facility, where [he] received initial first aid for [his] wounds,”
    which included cuts on his legs from “pieces of glass [that] were embedded in them.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
    “The rest of that night was a blur,” and over the following days he “received word on who the
    fatalities were,” including several of Leinenbach’s friends, which “affected [him] deeply.” Id. ¶¶
    8
    Jason Sasser “died in a tragic accident on April 1st, 2018,” Jason Sasser Decl. ¶ 3, and his wife, Kimberly
    Watters Sasser, in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate of Jason Allen Sasser, has been substituted as
    named party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a), see Minute Order (July 24, 2018).
    25
    8–9. Upon his return to the United States, he received additional medical treatment, “including
    removal of more pieces of glass embedded in [his] legs and stitches to repair the wounds,” and
    pieces of glass continued to surface for “many months after” as well. Id. ¶ 10.
    After leaving the Air Force in 2003, Leinenbach had “difficulty sleeping, difficulty
    concentrating, . . . and had some trouble with relationships with [his] co-workers,” and “found it
    difficult to maintain employment for any significant amount of time,” and has been unemployed
    since 2011. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15. At his wife’s urging, he sought help from the VA, where he was
    diagnosed with PTSD and has “received therapy, counseling, and medication.” Id. ¶ 13. He is
    rated “50 percent disabled” by the VA. Id. Leinenbach “suffered severe emotional distress . . .
    as a result of the 1996 terrorist attack,” which “haunt[s] [him] to this day.” Id. ¶ 16. He is
    “afraid of crowds and avoid[s] them, [] startle[s] easily, and sleep[s] badly, with frequent and
    recurring nightmares,” and “anger[s] easily,” all of which “have had a persistent negative affect
    on [his] life and [his] relationships within [his] family.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
    Plaintiff Joy Leinenbach is Gregory Leinenbach’s wife, and was at work when she
    received a phone call from her father-in-law telling her that there had been an explosion at
    Khobar Towers, but no specific “information about Greg.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl.
    of Joy Leinenbach (“Joy Leinenbach Decl.”) (June 19, 2018) ¶¶ 3, 6, ECF No. 25-2 at 87. She
    “was immediately gripped by tremendous anxiety and emotional distress,” and “worried” that
    her husband, to whom she “was very close,” had been “severely injured or killed,” and did not
    learn until “about a day and a half” later that he “was injured but ok”—a wait that was “sheer
    agony for [her].” Id. ¶ 7. Joy Leinenbach “sensed very quickly that [her husband] was changed”
    after he returned home, and he “grew more distant with time, and became more easily irritated
    and angered,” including with their children. Id. ¶ 8. He still “has trouble sleeping and has
    26
    frequent nightmares,” and his “anxiety causes [Joy Leinenbach] to have anxiety” as well, and
    both have experienced “continued emotional distress and anguish” due to “Gregory’s PTSD.”
    Id. ¶ 9.
    12.    Eric Dale Ziegler and One Family Member
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Eric Dale Ziegler was an aircraft maintenance crew chief in
    the 58th Fighter Squadron on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed in
    Khobar Towers. Pls.’ Notice of Filing Supporting Decls., Attach 1, Decl. of Eric Dale Ziegler
    (“Ziegler Decl.”) (June 30, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 26-2 at 1. At the time of the bombing, he
    “was sitting on [his] bed,” but the force of the blast sent him “across the room.” Id. ¶ 4.
    “[W]hen [he] came to, [he] was crawling to try to get out,” though he “couldn’t walk[,] and
    could barely see.” Id. ¶ 6. A friend “helped carry” Ziegler out of his suite, and they “tried to
    help” one of Ziegler’s suitemates as well, “but he was too badly injured to be moved,” and
    Ziegler “held him and stayed with him until he died.” Id. Ziegler was the only one of his
    suitemates to survive the attack. Id. ¶ 4. He was taken to a triage area, and then to a series of
    hospitals before “[e]ventually [he] was airlifted back to” the United States, where he received
    treatment for “deep cuts and abrasions to [his] face, scalp, and right eye, right upper arm, right
    knee and back,” as well as “nerve damage” and “a broken neck which required surgery.” Id. ¶¶
    7–9. Ziegler has “also undergone two major back surgeries and two major right knee surgeries
    including a total knee replacement,” and still takes “pain medications daily” for “pain in [his] left
    arm with diminished use and feeling, and also intermittent pain in both legs with some
    diminished use and feeling.” Id. ¶¶ 9–10. “The psychological after-effects were even more
    devastating,” as he recalls his suitemate “dying in [his] arms,” and “the sight of [his other] suite
    mates lying dead in the living room.” Id. ¶ 11. Ziegler “still ha[s] nightmares,” is “hypervigilant
    27
    and ha[s] had anger issues.” Id. ¶ 11. After being “diagnosed as having suffered Traumatic
    Brain Injury” and with PTSD, he is “rated as 100 percent disabled by the VA.” Id. ¶ 12; see id.
    Ex. A, Letter from VA to Eric Ziegler re VA Benefits (Mar. 25, 2016), ECF No. 26-2 at 5.
    Plaintiff Nancy Kilfoyle was married to Eric Ziegler at the time of the Khobar Towers
    attack and learned of the attack from several messages on her answering machine, including one
    “from the Air Force letting [her] know that there had been a bombing [] but that they did not
    have any information yet about Eric.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Nancy Kilfoyle
    (“Kilfoyle Decl.”) (June 27, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 90. She “was frightened and anxious
    about what might have happened to” him until receiving a call from Ziegler later that day saying
    that he was injured and “being taken care of in a hospital.” Id. ¶ 4. Kilfoyle noticed that after
    Ziegler returned, he “became a different person” and “was now moody and withdrawn.” Id. ¶ 5.
    “One time [she] asked him why he no longer seemed to have any close friends, and he said,
    ‘because they die.’” Id. She also noted that “[h]is temper was shorter and much more
    unpredictable,” causing her to feel she “had to walk on eggshells to avoid any explosive
    outbursts,” and despite seeking “help from a marriage counselor, [they] grew apart,” ultimately
    divorcing in 2007. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Kilfoyle is “certain that the changes in Eric and the after-effects
    of the bombing at the Khobar Towers were the principal reason we couldn’t work things out.”
    Id. ¶ 7. Due to those after-effects, she experienced “many years” of “continuing emotional
    distress and anguish.” Id. ¶ 9.
    13.     Thomas R. Lawrence and Four Family Members
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Thomas R. Lawrence was an Air Force avionics specialist on
    a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed in Khobar Towers. Pls.’
    Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Thomas R. Lawrence (“Thomas Lawrence Decl.”) (June 27,
    28
    2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 98. He was asleep at the time of the bombing, and “was thrown out
    of bed and shaken up” by the blast, but does not detail any physical injury. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. After
    making his way downstairs amid “chaos and confusion,” Lawrence “was taken to a triage area . .
    . where [he] saw many very badly wounded Airmen, some on stretchers.” Id. ¶¶ 5–6. He
    remained at Dhahran “for almost three more months”—which were “excruciating” due to “fear
    of a repeat attack”—and during that time he “helped the FBI” investigators “sift through rubble
    and collect blood-stained articles of clothing, pictures, clocks, and personal effects,” and “search
    areas with blood splattered on the walls and floors.” Id. ¶ 7. After returning to the United States,
    Lawrence’s “life was never the same,” and he “still ha[s] flashbacks and [] difficulty with things
    that bring back those memories,” including giving a presentation on the Khobar Towers attack to
    classmates at the Airman Leadership School, when he “was overcome by emotion and had to
    leave the room.” Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Though he has “tried to stuff everything down related to [his]
    experience” at Khobar Towers, he is still “often on edge” and “occasionally ha[s] nightmares and
    flashbacks,” as well as “anxiety” and being “quick to anger.” Id. ¶ 11. In 2008, Lawrence
    “sought and received psychological support” and was “diagnosed with a form of PTSD called
    ‘Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety.’” Id. ¶ 11; see id. Ex. A, Clinical Psychologist Progress
    Notes for Thomas Russell Lawrence (July 28, 2008), ECF No. 25-2 at 103. Nonetheless, he
    “know[s] that [he is] not nearly the same person [he] was before the attack,” and is “more
    difficult to get along with for [his] wife and family.” Id. ¶ 12.
    Four of Lawrence’s family members are plaintiffs in this lawsuit: his wife, Robyn
    Elizabeth Lawrence, parents, and sister. Lawrence’s wife learned of the Khobar Towers attack
    when she “came home from attending court [and] had 16 messages on [her] voice mail,” the first
    of which “asked if [she] knew whether Thomas was dead or alive.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach
    29
    2, Decl. of Robyn Elizabeth Lawrence (“Robyn Lawrence Decl.”) (June 27, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF
    No. 25-2 at 104. Although “the second message was from [her] husband and he said that he was
    basically ok,” she was “[n]onethless . . . very upset, in part because [she] didn’t know whether he
    may have been trying to minimize his injuries,” and she “cried, . . . hyperventilated, and [] asked
    a friend to sleep over with” her. Id. ¶ 4. Robyn Lawrence became “even more upset when [she]
    saw some of the news coverage of what had happened at the Khobar towers” and “imagined
    what Thomas must have gone through,” while “fear[ing] that . . . another attack” might occur.
    Id. ¶ 5. She returned to work after several days, but asked her “boss to make sure the cable news
    was not on while [she] was working . . . because it caused [her] continued distress.” Id. ¶ 6.
    Robyn Lawrence states that she “was especially fearful because [she] had already lost both [her]
    parents when [she] was just seven years old,” and “feared that [she] might now lose Thomas as
    well.” Id. Though Lawrence had been “optimistic and enjoyed joking around,” when he
    returned he “seemed distant and moody at times. He was irritable and his temper was much
    shorter.” Id. ¶ 7. The two were not “able to discuss anything related to” the attack for “many
    years,” and Robyn Lawrence “[e]ventually [] convinced Thomas to seek professional help” for
    his PTSD. Id. ¶ 7. She “believe[s] that [she] also ha[s] some degree of PTSD,” and that having
    lost her parents “at seven made [her] more susceptible to it.” Id. ¶ 8.
    Kimi Lawrence is Lawrence’s mother, and learned of the Khobar Towers attack from a
    radio news bulletin “that there had been a truck bomb explosion at the Khobar Towers,” and
    immediately “felt like [her] world had fallen out from under” her. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2,
    Decl. of Kimi Lawrence (“Kimi Lawrence Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 107.
    She “began to cry” and “became even more worried and distraught” after seeing “some of the
    images of destruction and rubble on tv,” and it was “several [] hours” until she learned from
    30
    Robyn Lawrence that her son had survived. Id. ¶¶4–5. Kimi Lawrence experienced nausea and
    “felt terrible anxiety” as Lawrence remained in Dhahran for several months and she “knew he
    was still in the danger zone, and it was a long time before [she] could see him again and hug him
    and count his fingers and toes.” Id. ¶ 7. Though she “knew that Tom would not be the same
    person” after the bombing, she “was surprised how much he changed when he came back,” both
    “in his face and his behavior.” Id. ¶ 8. The “change in Tom” caused Kimi Lawrence to feel
    “helpless and depressed. [They] had always been very close—[she] was eighteen when Tom
    was born, and in a sense [they] had grown up together,” and so it “was difficult for [her] to see
    the change in” him. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. The “experience [her] son went through deeply and adversely
    affected all of . . . his immediate family, and some of the after-effects of that terrible day still
    linger with all of” them. Id. ¶ 11.
    Bruce Russell Lawrence is Thomas’s father, and learned of the Khobar Towers attack in
    a phone call from Kimi Lawrence. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Bruce Russell
    Lawrence (“Bruce Lawrence Decl.”) (June 28, 2018) ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 25-2 at 110. “Although
    [he] was about 750 miles away, [he] drove back home all the way that day and night because
    [he] wanted to be back with [his] wife and daughter as soon as possible,” and “realized that [he]
    had to be strong for [his] wife and daughter.” Id. ¶¶ 4–5. Bruce Lawrence remained “worried
    and fearful” while his son “stay[ed] in the danger zone for several more months,” and was then
    “dismayed when [he] saw the changes in Tom when he returned.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Lawrence “was
    more withdrawn and cautious,” and Bruce Lawrence saw “him hit the dirt and dive under a
    trailer when there [were] fireworks nearby.” Id. ¶ 7. His “whole family was affected and had to
    adjust to the new reality of how Tom had changed,” and Bruce Lawrence “was always angry
    31
    about what happened and about how ineffective the investigation and pursuit of the terrorists
    seemed to be.” Id.
    Andrea Jo Grimson is Lawrence’s sister, and was eleven years old at the time of the
    Khobar Towers attack. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Andrea Jo Grimson (“Grimson
    Decl.”) (June 27, 2018) ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 25-2 at 112. When her parents told her about the
    bombing, she “was shocked,” and, after seeing coverage of the attack on TV, she “became scared
    [she] may never see [Lawrence] again because [she] thought there may be another attack like
    that.” Id. ¶ 4. Grimson “was very close to [her] brother,” and “missed him terribly when he left
    to join the Air Force,” “sometimes [going] to his room and cr[ying] because he was not there.”
    Id. Her brother’s experience affected her in other ways as well. She was at school during the
    September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, and became “angry with [her]
    classmates and yelled at them for not taking it seriously enough,” believing “they did not
    understand the severity of such attacks the way [she] did,” and Grimson “had to leave school
    early that day.” Id. ¶ 6. That reaction underscored the effect of Lawrence’s experience, and she
    was “diagnosed with anxiety and depression issues and ha[s] been on medication since [she] was
    16,” while also having “to help out with [her] mom who became very depressed and anxious.”
    Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Grimson also found that Lawrence “clearly was not the same after he returned,” as he
    “became overly cautious and overly protective, especially with” her, and she “missed and
    mourned the optimistic and active young man who had been [her] brother.” Id. ¶ 7. Lawrence’s
    “experience at the Khobar Towers adversely affected all of . . . his immediate family, and some
    of the after-effects of that terrible day still linger.” Id. ¶ 9.
    32
    14.     Tracy Matthew Winter and One Family Member
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Tracy Matthew Winter was a maintenance crew chief in the
    58th Fighter Squadron on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed in
    Khobar Towers. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Tracy Matthew Winter (“Winter Decl.”)
    (June 22, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 114. He was “exiting the kitchen area of [the] building . . .
    when [he] was thrown on the floor by [the] blast,” and was struck by “many pieces of flying
    glass,” which caused bleeding requiring “eleven stitches” along with “additional treatment”
    when he returned to the United States. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. Winter subsequently left the Air Force “but
    had a hard time holding a job,” and was ultimately “imprisoned for two years for trafficking in
    drugs. In prison [he] spoke with a psychiatrist who helped [him] realize for the first time that
    [he] was having trouble processing what had happened to [him] in the attack.” Id. ¶ 6. He has
    been “diagnosed with PTSD and tinnitus and [is] rated as 70 percent disabled.” Id. ¶ 8; see id.
    Ex. A, VA Rating Decision (Apr. 20, 2012), ECF No. 25-2 at 117–18. Winter’s “life has
    stabilized considerably” since his incarceration, but he “still ha[s] recurring nightmares that wake
    up [his] wife because [he] cr[ies] out in [his] sleep,” including nightmares where he “tr[ies] to
    scream but no sound comes out, or tr[ies] to shoot a gun but the bullets just roll out.” Id. ¶ 7.
    Plaintiff Angela Rose is Winter’s mother, and learned of the Khobar Towers attack from
    her car radio. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Angela Rose (“Rose Decl.”) (June 28,
    2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-2 at 119. Her “heart was racing and [she] turned around and headed
    home” where she “turned on the tv news and saw the horrific images of what had happened” and
    “was extremely distressed and distraught, not knowing if [her] son was alive or dead” until
    “[m]any hours later.” Id. ¶¶ 4–5. When Winter returned to the United States, “he was changed,”
    and the “sparkle in his eyes was gone. He slept on the floor with a gun next to him.” Id. ¶ 6.
    33
    Rose “was close to [her] son and loved him very much,” and she “suffered severe emotional
    distress when [she] heard of the attack and saw pictures” in news reports, and “know[s] it hurt
    him deeply.” Id. ¶¶ 8–9. In addition to Winter’s “continuing psychological issues,” their “whole
    family has been adversely affected to this day” by the bombing. Id. ¶ 10.
    15.      Alan Jeffrey Wade and Three Family Members
    On June 25, 1996, plaintiff Alan Jeffrey Wade was a Senior Airman, Power Production
    Specialist, on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was housed in Khobar Towers.
    Pls.’ Notice of Filing Supporting Decl., Attach 1, Decl. of Alan Jeffrey Wade (“Wade Decl.”)
    (July 5, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 27-1 at 1. When the attack hit, he “was thrown against a concrete
    wall” and “suffered severe injuries to [his] back, arms, and right hand.” Id. ¶ 4. The back injury
    “required major lumbar disc surgery,” and Wade still has “considerable pain in [his] lower back
    and in [his] right hand,” but he “also suffered severe emotional distress” as what he “experienced
    and saw on that day has never left” him. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. He “saw many close friends and co-workers
    lying in the rubble and did what [he] could to help bring them to safety,” for which efforts he
    was awarded The Air Force Commendation Medal, in addition to a Purple Heart for his own
    injuries. Id. ¶ 5.9 Wade “suffered considerable pain and significant after-effects, both physical
    and psychological, as a result of being a victim of the terrorist attack that day,” and has “received
    treatment for [PTSD], Major Depressive Disorder, suicide attempts, and survivors’ guilt
    9
    The Air Force Commendation Medal citation states:
    Airman Wade was present during the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers . . . . Within seconds following the
    blast, Airman Wade started to search for wounded and other survivors . . . . With total disregard for his
    personal safety, he helped comb the entire building in an attempt to account for all of the building’s 130
    occupants. Demonstrating outstanding calm and sense of purpose, he . . . ensure[d] that wounds were treated
    promptly. He served on a team fabricating stretchers from broken doors and ensured that casualties were
    safely evacuated from the building. He helped transport wounded to the casualty collection point for
    additional treatment. His conduct during the evening of 25 June 1996 directly saved the lives of at least six
    persons.
    Wade Decl., Ex. A, Air Force Commendation Medal Awarded to Senior Airman Alan J. Wade (Dec. 2, 1996), ECF
    No. 27-1 at 4–5.
    34
    syndrome, but [that] list just touches the surface.” Id. ¶¶ 7–8. He has also “been unable to hold
    steady employment” and has “difficulty maintaining relationships with [his] family,” who “were
    all very close to” him and who he knows are “deeply concerned about” him. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.
    Three of Wade’s family members are plaintiffs in this lawsuit: his parents, and his
    brother. Bonnie C. Wade is Wade’s mother, and “learned of the bomb attack on the television
    national news,” which she and her husband watched “with increasing horror and fear as reports
    came in of the building collapse and destruction of the living quarters.” Pls.’ Damages Mot.,
    Attach 2, Decl. of Bonnie C. Wade (“Bonnie Wade Decl.”) (June 23, 2018) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 25-
    2 at 121. The phone number for an information line “was so overloaded [she] could not get
    through,” and Bonnie Wade waited “about seven hours” before learning that Wade had survived,
    during which time her “anxiety about [her] son grew severe,” her “heart was racing and skipping
    beats,” her “[b]reathing was rapid and labored,” and she “felt like all energy had drained out of”
    her. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. After Wade returned, however, she immediately “noticed some significant
    changes” to the “carefree and happy young man” who had left for Saudi Arabia: he “isolated
    himself from family members; he had anger management problems; [and] he had a hard time
    maintaining any employment.” Id. ¶ 7. Bonnie Wade “worried about him a lot,” even “driv[ing]
    to his house to check on him” if she had been unable to “contact him for a long time.” Id. In one
    instance, she and her husband “used [their] key to enter because [her son] didn’t respond to the
    doorbell, and he became very angry and threatened” them. Id. Although Wade has received
    treatment, Bonnie Wade “would like to think that he is being helped but [she is] not sure,” and—
    given that “there is no complete cure for PTSD,” and that she is “not sure [her son] takes” his
    prescribed medications—she “worr[ies] about Alan every day,” to the extent that she “ha[s]
    trouble sleeping because [she] reprocess[es] all [her] worries and concerns about Alan.” Id. ¶¶
    35
    8–9. She is also concerned “about what will happen to Alan after” she and her husband, who
    “are in [their] late seventies,” “are no longer able to assist him.” Id. ¶ 10. Bonnie Wade states
    that the Khobar Towers attack “has deeply and adversely affected” Wade as well as “the lives of
    all those who love him, including” her. Id. ¶ 11.
    Thomas H. Wade is Wade’s father, and “learned of the attack on the television news,”
    when he and his wife “saw the pictures of the devastation and the rubble that was left of one of
    the Khobar Towers buildings.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Thomas H. Wade
    (“Thomas Wade Decl.”) (June 23, 2018) ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 25-2 at 126. He “was very worried”
    and “feared that [his] son was critically injured or worse, but [he] tried to keep hope alive
    because [his] wife was in a panic state.” Id. ¶ 4. After being unable to get through to the Air
    Force’s hotline number, Thomas Wade “finally heard from Alan” about seven hours after first
    learning about the bombing. Id. ¶ 5. “After Alan returned to the United States he was awarded a
    Purple Heart” but “refused to attend the presentation ceremony.” Id. ¶ 6. It “became obvious
    that he had emotional issues,” and that “the carefree, optimistic young man who had left for
    Saudi Arabia was no longer the same.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. “He withdrew from his family and isolated
    himself. Alan was a talented and smart person,” but “the after-effects of his experience in Saudi
    Arabia were undermining him and eating away at his ability to keep employment or maintain
    relationships, even with his family who loved and tried to help him.” Id. ¶ 7. Wade’s “condition
    has deteriorated” in the last year, and he “has required further hospitalization and psychiatric
    care,” and Thomas and Bonnie Wade “worry about [their] son” and “continue to try to help him
    in any way [they] can.” Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
    Michael Kevin Wade is Wade’s brother, and the two “were close growing up and stayed
    in close touch even after [Wade] enlisted in the Air Force.” Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl.
    36
    of Michael Kevin Wade (“Michael Wade Decl.”) (June 23, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 124.
    Michael Wade learned of the Khobar Towers attack when, returning home from work, he “turned
    on the tv and saw the destruction and rubble,” and he “was very anxious and terrified that [his]
    brother may have been killed in the blast.” Id. ¶ 5. He could not get through to the Air Force
    information hotline, and so “checked frequently with [his] parents” until finally at “2 am [he]
    heard from” his father that his brother was alive. Id. ¶ 6. Despite his “relie[f],” he “still got
    almost no sleep that night.” Id. After Wade’s return, Michael Wade saw “the devastating impact
    the terrorist attack had on his life,” as Wade “frequently lost his temper, and had trouble holding
    any jobs.” Id. ¶ 7. The effect grew “worse” over time, and Wade “frequently sent . . . bizarre
    and delusional emails,” and was “suspicious of [his family’s] motives when [they] tried to help
    him.” Id. ¶ 8. Michael Wade is “sad and distressed” that he “may never again be able to
    experience the warm and close relationship [he] had with Alan.” Id. ¶ 9.
    16.     Richard M. Williams
    Plaintiff Richard M. Williams is the father of Kevin S. Williams, who, on June 25, 1996,
    was an Air Force Accounting Officer on a tour of duty at Dhahran Air Force Base, where he was
    housed in Khobar Towers. Pls.’ Damages Mot., Attach 2, Decl. of Richard M. Williams
    (“Williams Decl.”) (June 27, 2018) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2 at 128. When the bomb detonated, Kevin
    Williams “was sitting in the window well of his room, and was blown across the room and
    against the wall . . . by the force of the blast,” causing “injuries to his head and body” for which
    he “was awarded a Purple Heart.” Id. ¶ 4. Williams learned of the attack from Kevin Williams’s
    mother, and was “shocked and dismayed to see pictures of the rubble and devastation” when he
    “turn[ed] on the television news.” Id. ¶ 5. He “was extremely anxious, not knowing whether
    Kevin had survived or suffered serious injury,” and did not receive any news “for about 48
    37
    hours,” during which time he, his wife, and younger son “became nervous wrecks” and Williams
    “suffered great mental anguish and emotional distress.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7, 10. Williams “heard from
    one of Kevin’s close friends . . . that he had seen footage on the cable news of Kevin being
    evacuated on a stretcher” and that “Kevin was moving and was clearly alive,” before finally
    “hear[ing] from Kevin himself . . . that, although he had been wounded, he would be ok.” Id. ¶
    7. He and his son “have always been very close,” and Williams “moved to be near him after he
    joined the Air Force, and [they] would get together on holidays and often at other times . . . even
    when he was later stationed at more distant locations,” but he “know[s] that [his son] sometimes
    experiences flashbacks and is saddened when he thinks about what happened at the Khobar
    Towers.” Id. ¶ 9. Though he is “very proud” of his son’s Air Force career, he “know[s] that
    Kevin’s life and [his] own were never the same after that attack.” Id. ¶ 10.
    D.      PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendants on April 17, 2017. See Compl.
    The defendants were properly served in accordance with the FSIA, which provides the procedure
    for completing service upon a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state. See Return
    of Service, ECF No. 19; see also infra Part III.B (detailing service on defendants). The Clerk
    entered default against the defendants on January 22, 2018. Entry of Default, ECF No. 21. The
    plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant motions for default judgment as to liability and for
    damages. See Pls.’ Liability Mot.; Pls.’ Damages Mot. In response to the Court’s June 15, 2018,
    Minute Order, the plaintiffs “elect[ed] to submit documentary evidence to the Court” rather than
    present evidence at an evidentiary hearing. Pls.’ Notice of Election to Submit Documentary
    Evidence, ECF No. 24.
    38
    II.    LEGAL STANDARD
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a court may consider entering a default
    judgment when a party applies for that relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). “[S]trong policies
    favor resolution of disputes on their merits,” and therefore, “‘[t]he default judgment must
    normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an
    essentially unresponsive party.’” Jackson v. Beech, 
    636 F.2d 831
    , 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting
    H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 
    432 F.2d 689
    , 691 (D.C. Cir.
    1970)).
    Notwithstanding its appropriateness in some circumstances, “entry of a default judgment
    is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 
    417 F.3d 1
    , 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Thus,
    the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a federal court of its “affirmative obligation”
    to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. James Madison Ltd. by
    Hecht v. Ludwig, 
    82 F.3d 1085
    , 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Additionally, “a court should satisfy
    itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent defendant,” but
    “[i]n the absence of an evidentiary hearing, although the plaintiffs retain ‘the burden of proving
    personal jurisdiction, they can satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing.’” Mwani, 
    417 F.3d at
    6–7 (quoting Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 
    949 F.2d 415
    , 424 (D.C. Cir.
    1991)) (alteration adopted). In doing so, “they may rest their argument on their pleadings,
    bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.” Id. at 7.
    Finally, when default judgment is sought under the FSIA, a claimant must “establish[] his
    claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (e). “This
    provides foreign sovereigns a special protection akin to that assured the federal government by
    FED. R. CIV. P. 55(e),” which has been renumbered by the 2007 amendment to Rule 55(d). Jerez
    39
    v. Republic of Cuba, 
    775 F.3d 419
    , 423 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 26
    (1976) (stating that § 1608(e) establishes “the same requirement applicable to default judgments
    against the U.S. Government under rule 55(e), F.R. Civ. P.”). While the “FSIA leaves it to the
    court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide,
    requiring only that it be ‘satisfactory to the court,’” courts must be mindful that Congress enacted
    Section 1605A, FSIA’s terrorism exception, and Section 1608(e) with the “aim[] to prevent state
    sponsors of terrorism—entities particularly unlikely to submit to this country’s laws—from
    escaping liability for their sins.” Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
    774 F.3d 1044
    , 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (e)).
    With this objective in mind, the D.C. Circuit has instructed that “courts have the
    authority—indeed, we think, the obligation—to ‘adjust evidentiary requirements to . . . differing
    situations.’” Id. at 1048 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 
    641 F.2d 934
    , 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981))
    (alteration adopted). Courts must draw their “findings of fact and conclusions of law from
    admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 
    Id. at 1049
     (quoting
    Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 
    146 F. Supp. 2d 19
    , 21 n.1 (D.D.C. 2001)). “In a FSIA default
    proceeding, a factual finding is not deemed clearly erroneous if ‘there is an adequate basis in the
    record for inferring that the district court . . . was satisfied with the evidence submitted.’” Owens
    v. Republic of Sudan, 
    864 F.3d 751
    , 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Commercial Bank of Kuwait
    v. Rafidain Bank, 
    15 F.3d 238
    , 242 (2d Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). Uncontroverted
    factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are taken as true. Roth v. Islamic
    Republic of Iran, 
    78 F. Supp. 3d 379
    , 386 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Courts may rely on uncontroverted
    factual allegations that are supported by affidavits.” (citing Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 171
    ));
    Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 
    580 F. Supp. 2d 53
    , 63 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 
    646 F.3d 1
     (D.C.
    40
    Cir. 2011) (quoting Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    510 F. Supp. 2d 101
    , 103
    (D.D.C. 2007)); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (authorizing court to “consider the fact
    undisputed for purposes of the motion” when adverse party “fails to properly address another
    party’s assertion of fact”).
    Finally, the D.C. Circuit “review[s] the District Court’s FSIA damages awards for abuse
    of discretion,” and its “review of findings underlying a default judgment in a FSIA case of this
    sort is ‘lenient.’” Fraenkel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, et al., 
    892 F.3d 348
    , 356 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Owens, 864 F.3d at 785).
    III.    DISCUSSION
    A default judgment may be entered when (1) the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction
    over the claims, (2) personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over the defendants, (3) the
    plaintiffs have presented satisfactory evidence to establish their claims against the defendants,
    and (4) the plaintiffs have satisfactorily proven that they are entitled to the monetary damages
    they seek. Each of these requirements is addressed seriatim below.
    A.      SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE FSIA
    This Court may exercise “original jurisdiction” over a foreign state “without regard to
    amount in controversy” in “nonjury civil action[s]” seeking “relief in personam with respect to
    which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605–1607 of this title or
    under any applicable international agreement.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (a). As the plaintiffs seek in
    personam relief, the remaining question is whether the defendants are entitled to immunity under
    the FSIA or another international agreement.
    Foreign governments are generally immunized from lawsuits brought against them in the
    United States unless an FSIA exception applies. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1604
    ; Mohammadi v. Islamic
    41
    Republic of Iran, 
    782 F.3d 9
    , 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs invoke jurisdiction under
    § 1605A of the FSIA, which provides that “[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the
    jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money
    damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act
    of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
    support or resources for such an act . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). The plaintiffs must prove
    four elements to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under this exception: (1) “the foreign
    country was designated a ‘state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the act,’” Mohammadi, 782
    F.3d at 14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)); (2) “the ‘claimant or the victim was’ a
    ‘national of the United States’ at that time,” id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)); (3) “in
    a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought,
    the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim,” 28
    U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii); and (4) the plaintiff seeks monetary damages “for personal injury
    or death caused by ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
    provision of material support or resources for such an act,’ if ‘engaged in by an official,
    employee, or agent’ of a foreign country,” Mohammadi, 782 F.3d at 14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
    1605A(a)(1)). The plaintiffs have satisfactorily proven the applicable elements here.10
    With respect to the first element, Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by
    the U.S. Department of State since 1984, and, consequently, retained this designation at the time
    of the Khobar Towers bombing. See Compl. ¶ 20; see also Anderson, 
    753 F. Supp. 2d at 76
    (“Iran . . . has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism . . . since January 19, 1984.” (internal
    10
    Although this suit falls beyond the ten-year statute of limitations for actions brought under the FSIA’s
    terrorism exception established at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b), the “limitation period in § 1605A(b) is not jurisdictional,”
    and the defendants have “forfeited [their] affirmative defense . . . by failing to raise it in” this Court. Owens, 864
    F.3d at 804.
    42
    quotation marks omitted)). The IRGC, as “a military organization and a branch of the Islamic
    Republic of Iran,” Compl. ¶ 22, is included within the FSIA’s definition of a “foreign state” as
    encompassing “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality” thereof,
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1603
    (a); see Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at 180
     (finding that the IRGC “constitute[s]
    [an] integral part[] of Iran’s political structure, and thus constitute[s] a foreign state for [FSIA]
    purposes”). Consequently, the plaintiffs have satisfied the first element as to both defendants.
    As to the second element, the plaintiffs have averred in sworn declarations that they were
    United States citizens at the time of the attack. See Akins Decl. ¶ 2 (attesting to the declarant’s
    United States citizenship); Anthony Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Sills Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Hurst Decl. ¶ 2
    (same); MacKenzie Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Remar Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Charles Blank Decl. ¶ 2 (same);
    Linda Blank Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Nathan Blank Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Millrany Decl. ¶ 2 (same);
    Andrew Blank Decl. ¶ 2 (same); John Gaydos Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Barbara Gaydos Decl. ¶ 2
    (same); Ethan Gaydos Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Elizabeth Gaydos Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Matthew Spicer
    Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Cathy Spicer-Lindsy Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Spicer-Lindsy for Christian Spicer Decl.
    ¶ 2 (same); Christopher Spicer Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Jerry Sasser Jr. Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Jerry Sasser
    Sr. Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Homs Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Pls.’ Liability Mot, Ex. A, Decl. of Jason Allen
    Sasser (Dec. 21, 2017) ¶ 2, ECF No. 22-2 at 31 (same); Leinenbach Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Joy
    Leinenbach Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Ziegler Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Kilfoyle Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Thomas
    Lawrence Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Robyn Lawrence Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Kimi Lawrence Decl. ¶ 2 (same);
    Bruce Lawrence Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Grimson Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Winter Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Rose
    Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Wade Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Bonnie Wade Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Thomas Wade Decl. ¶
    2 (same); Michael Wade Decl. ¶ 2 (same); Williams Decl. ¶ 2 (same). Thus, the second element
    is firmly established.
    43
    The plaintiffs in this case need not satisfy the third element because the attack took place
    in Saudi Arabia, not Iran, and thus the statutory requirement of “afford[ing] the foreign state a
    reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim” before bringing this action does not apply. 28
    U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii).
    Finally, the evidence presented in Blais and Heiser, of which the Court has taken judicial
    notice, is sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs’ claimed damages “for personal injury . . . that
    was caused by an . . . extrajudicial killing” at the Khobar Towers for which the defendants
    provided “material support or resources.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). The plaintiffs explain the
    history of Iran and IRGC’s support of Hezbollah, Compl. ¶¶ 24–27, and the expert testimony in
    the Blais and Heiser litigation, described above, based on the FBI’s extensive investigation of the
    bombing, proves that the defendants “organized and sponsored” the Khobar Towers attack,
    Heiser I, 
    466 F. Supp. 2d at 262
    . In other words, the evidence shows that the defendants’ actions
    were a “substantial factor in the sequence of events that led to the plaintiff[s’] injur[ies],” and
    that those injuries were “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence of the
    defendant[s’] conduct.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 794 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In addition, the Khobar Towers bombing carried out by Saudi Hezbollah, which killed 19
    American service members and caused the “personal injur[ies]” suffered by the plaintiffs, was
    manifestly an extrajudicial killing for which the defendants provided material support, and for
    which the defendants can be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. See Owens, 864 F.3d at 778
    (“[T]he plain meaning of § 1605A(a) grants . . . jurisdiction over claims against designated state
    sponsors of terrorism that materially support extrajudicial killings committed by nonstate
    actors.”). “[E]xtrajudicial killing” has the “meaning given . . . in section 3 of the Torture Victim
    Protection Act of 1991,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7), which, in turn, defines this term to mean “a
    44
    deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
    court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
    peoples,” Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 
    106 Stat. 73
    , 73 (1992) (codified at 
    28 U.S.C. § 1350
     note
    § 3(a)). No “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
    recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” could have authorized the truck bomb that
    “sheared off the face of Building 131 . . . and reduced most of it to rubble.” Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d at 48
    . Thus, the evidence presented in Blais and Heiser demonstrates that the plaintiffs’
    claims arise from an extrajudicial killing for which the defendants provided material support.
    Accordingly, the defendants do not enjoy foreign sovereign immunity from the instant
    suit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, and subject-matter jurisdiction may be properly exercised
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (a).
    B.      PERSONAL JURISDICTION
    The Court next examines whether effective service has been made, as required by 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (b), which governs personal jurisdiction over foreign states. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1330
    (b) (providing that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim
    for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction . . . where service has been made under
    section 1608 of this title”). Service may be effected under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
     in one of four ways:
    (1) by “special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state,” (2) “in
    accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents,” or, if
    the first two options are not applicable, (3) by “sending a copy of the summons and complaint
    and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign
    state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk
    of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned,” or, if
    45
    service cannot be made under the third option, (4) by requesting the Clerk of the Court to send
    the aforementioned package to “the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to
    the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one
    copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of
    the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (a).
    “The defendants have neither made a special arrangement for service with the plaintiffs
    nor entered into any international convention governing service,” Braun v. Islamic Republic of
    Iran, 
    228 F. Supp. 3d 64
    , 78 (D.D.C. 2017); Pls.’ Liability Mem. at 4–5, leaving only the latter
    two forms of service available here. The plaintiffs used both. The necessary papers were sent by
    certified mail to Iran, via its ministry of foreign affairs, Certificate of Mailing (May 11, 2017),
    ECF No. 12, and to the IRGC, Certificate of Mailing (May 26, 2017), ECF No. 14, consistent
    with 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (a)(3). The necessary papers were also transmitted via diplomatic
    channels, Return Serv./Aff., ECF No. 19, consistent with 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (a)(4).
    Accordingly, the plaintiffs have established that service was properly effected against the
    defendants and, thus, personal jurisdiction is properly exercised.
    C.      THE DEFENDANTS’ LIABILITY
    All the plaintiffs bring a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) for intentional infliction of
    emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 43–48 (Count III). In addition, the fifteen service member
    plaintiffs who were present at the bombing site bring a claim for assault and battery, id. ¶¶ 36–42
    (Count II), seeking compensatory damages for “personal injury, mental anguish, pain and
    suffering, loss of companionship and society, loss of consortium, pecuniary loss[,] . . . loss of
    income,” id. ¶ 33, the twenty-four family member plaintiffs bring a claim for loss of solatium, id.
    46
    ¶¶ 50–51 (Count IV), and all thirty-nine plaintiffs seek “punitive damages” as well, id. ¶ 56
    (Count V). Section 1605A(c) provides a federal private right of action against designated state
    sponsors of terrorism for enumerated categories of persons, including “a national of the United
    States” or her “legal representative,” for “personal injury or death caused by . . . that foreign state
    . . . for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction . . . for money damages.”
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Successful plaintiffs may recover damages that “include economic
    damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” Id.
    Section 1605A(c) provides a private right of action, but no guidance on the substantive
    bases for liability to determine plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages. Consequently, courts “may
    rely on well-established statements of common law, found in state reporters, the Restatement of
    Torts, and other respected treatises, in determining damages under § 1605A(c).” Fraenkel, 892
    F.3d at 353; see Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d 20
    , 24 (D.D.C.
    2009) (“Heiser II”) (applying “general principles of tort law,” such as the Restatement (Second)
    of Torts, to determine liability); see also Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 399 (citing Oveissi, 879 F.
    Supp. 2d at 54); Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    75 F. Supp. 3d 311
    , 335 (D.D.C. 2014). The
    availability of these claims for each plaintiff is discussed in detail below.
    1.      Service Member Victims
    The fifteen plaintiffs who were members of the U.S. Armed Forces injured in the Khobar
    Towers bombing—Todd Akins, George C. Anthony, Charles Blank, John Gaydos, Kevin James
    Hurst, Thomas R. Lawrence, Gregory Eric Leinenbach, Nicholas L. MacKenzie, Jason Porter
    Remar, Jerry Timothy Sasser, Frank David Sills III, Matthew G. Spicer, Alan Jeffrey Wade,
    Tracy Matthew Winter, and Eric Dale Ziegler—were each United States citizens at the time of
    47
    the attack and, therefore, are expressly covered by, and entitled to bring claims under, Section
    1605A(c).
    a.      Assault and Battery
    The defendants are liable for assault on each of the fifteen service members present at
    Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, if, when the defendants provided material support and
    resources for the attack, they acted “intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with . . . or
    an imminent apprehension of such a contact” with those attacked, and those attacked were
    “thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (AM.
    LAW INST. 1977). The attack and other similar acts are intended to cause harm or, at least, fear
    of such harm among those targeted. Indeed, “terrorism” is defined to mean “the use of violent
    acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal.” Terrorism,
    Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism
    (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). The defendants are liable for battery if, when they provided material
    support and resources for the attack, they acted “intending to cause a harmful or offensive
    contact . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact” with those attacked, and “a harmful
    contact with [those attacked] directly or indirectly results.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
    13. “Harmful contact” has occurred where “any physical impairment of the condition of
    another’s body, or physical pain or illness” results. Id. § 15.
    Each of the fifteen plaintiffs injured in the Khobar Towers bombing has, through their
    sworn declarations, demonstrated the physical and psychological impact of the bombing. See
    Akins Decl. ¶¶ 4–9; Anthony Decl. ¶¶ 4–11; Sills Decl. ¶¶ 4–12; Hurst Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; MacKenzie
    Decl. ¶¶ 4–10; Remar Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Charles Blank Decl. ¶¶ 4–18; John Gaydos Decl. ¶¶ 6–17;
    Matthew Spicer Decl. ¶¶ 5–9; Jerry Sasser Decl. ¶¶ 5–15; Leinenbach Decl. ¶¶ 6–16; Ziegler
    48
    Decl. ¶¶ 4–13; Thomas Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 4–11; Winter Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Wade Decl. ¶¶ 4–8.
    Accordingly, the defendants are liable for assault and battery to these fifteen plaintiffs.11
    b.       Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
    The defendants are liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if they, “by
    extreme and outrageous conduct[,] intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress
    to” the plaintiffs. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1); see also Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at
    400 (quoting Heiser II, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d at 26
    ). Where the claimants were not the direct recipient
    of the “extreme and outrageous conduct,” the Restatement permits recovery if (1) they are
    members of a victim’s immediate family and (2) they are present at the time, or “the defendants’
    conduct is sufficiently outrageous and intended to inflict severe emotional harm upon a person
    [who] is not present.” Heiser II, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d at
    26–27 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, The LAW OF
    TORTS § 307, at 834 (2000)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. l (leaving
    “open the possibility of situations in which presence at the time may not be required”).
    The defendants engaged in conduct that is extreme and outrageous by providing material
    support and resources to a known terrorist organization. See, e.g., Valore v. Islamic Republic of
    Iran, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d 52
    , 77 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Acts of terrorism are by their very definition
    extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest degree of emotional distress.” (quoting
    Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    667 F. Supp. 2d 8
    , 22 (D.D.C. 2009))). The fifteen plaintiff
    service members present at Khobar Towers suffered the repercussions of the extreme and
    outrageous conduct. The service members’ declarations demonstrate that the Khobar Towers
    attack caused extreme emotional distress, and seven of these plaintiffs have been formally
    11
    Christopher Galletto was not present at Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, and his declaration does not
    describe any fear or “imminent apprehension” as a result of the bombing. See Galletto Decl. Accordingly, the
    defendants are not liable to Galletto for assault and battery.
    49
    diagnosed with PTSD. See Akins Decl. ¶ 6 (noting PTSD diagnosis); Anthony Decl., Ex. A,
    Disabilities Rating (noting PTSD diagnosis); Sills Decl. ¶¶ 11–12; Hurst Decl. ¶ 8; MacKenzie
    Decl. ¶¶ 9–10; Remar Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Charles Blank Decl. ¶¶ 17–18; John Gaydos Decl., Ex. A,
    Psychological Evaluation of John Gaydos (noting “severe symptoms associated with” PTSD);
    Matthew Spicer Decl. ¶¶ 9–10; Jerry Sasser Decl. ¶¶ 9–15; Leinenbach Decl. ¶ 13 (noting PTSD
    diagnosis); Ziegler Decl., Ex. A, Letter from VA to Eric Ziegler re VA Benefits (noting PTSD
    diagnosis); Thomas Lawrence Decl. ¶ 11 (noting diagnosis of “a form of PTSD called
    ‘Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety’”); Winter Decl. ¶ 8 (noting PTSD diagnosis); Wade Decl.
    ¶¶ 5–8. Accordingly, the defendants are liable to the fifteen plaintiffs injured at the Khobar
    Towers bombing for intentional infliction of emotional distress.12
    2.        Victims’ Family Members
    The twenty-four plaintiffs who are immediate family members of service members
    injured at the Khobar Towers bombing—Andrew P. Blank, Linda Kay Blank, Nathan Blank,
    Barbara Gaydos, Ethan Gaydos, Elizabeth Gaydos, Andrea Jo Grimson, Robyn Elizabeth
    12
    Christopher Galletto was not present at the Khobar Towers at the time of the attack, and the defendants are
    therefore not liable to him for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Khobar Towers bombing was a
    terrorist bombing, and “the intent to create maximum emotional impact, particularly on third parties, is terrorism’s
    raison d’etre.” Heiser II, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d at 27
     (internal quotation marks omitted). Galletto clearly felt that impact.
    See Galletto Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9 (averring that he “felt a tremendous sense of grief and loss” after the attack, and has
    “never come to grips with the loss of three of [his] closest friends on that terrible day”). “As much as we
    sympathize with [his] claims, we have no authority to stretch the law beyond its clear bounds to satisfy our sense of
    justice.” Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    315 F.3d 325
    , 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). Heiser II
    held that “to collect for intentional infliction of emotional distress in cases such as this one, the plaintiff need not be
    present at the place of outrageous conduct, but must be a member of the victim’s immediate family,” or, with “a
    slight stretching of the immediate-family requirement,” step-parents of the victim. 
    659 F. Supp. 2d at 27, 29
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Owens, 864 F.3d at 810 & n.6 (noting that “[s]everal district courts have
    applied” the immediate family exception to the presence requirement “to claims for emotional distress under the
    federal cause of action in the new FSIA terrorism exception.”). Stretching the immediate family exception to the
    presence requirement to encompass a member of the same squadron who was absent at the time of the attack and
    was “good friends” with victims of the attack, Galletto Decl. ¶ 4, is not supported by the Restatement or by Circuit
    precedent, or by any decisions by other Judges of this Court, cf., e.g., Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 400 (“The ‘immediate
    family’ requirement is strictly construed in FSIA cases.”). Accordingly, the defendants are not liable to Galletto for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since Galletto may not recover against the defendants on either theory of
    liability—assault and battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress—his claim must be dismissed.
    50
    Lawrence, Bruce Russell Lawrence, Kimi Lawrence, Joy Leinenbach, Deborah Millraney, Jerry
    Timothy Sasser, Sr., Jason Allen Sasser, Deborah Homs, Cathy Eunha Kim Spicer Lindsy,
    Christian William Spicer, Christopher G. Spicer, Bonnie C. Wade, Michael Kevin Wade,
    Thomas H. Wade, Richard M. Williams, Angela Rose, and Nancy Kilfoyle—were each United
    States citizens at the time of the attack and, therefore, are expressly covered by, and entitled to
    bring claims under, Section 1605A(c).
    Each of these twenty-four plaintiffs is an immediate family member of a service member
    injured in the Khobar Towers bombing, but none was present at the time of the attack. In this
    case, however, the defendants’ conduct in materially supporting Saudi Hezbollah was
    “sufficiently outrageous and intended to inflict severe emotional harm upon a person who is not
    present,” such that a victim’s family members need not have been present to recover for their
    emotional distress. Heiser II, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d at 27
     (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
    § 307, at 834); see also Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 401; Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 336–37; Wyatt v.
    Syrian Arab Republic, 
    908 F. Supp. 2d 216
    , 231 (D.D.C. 2012).13 Consequently, the defendants
    13
    The D.C. Circuit, in 2017, certified to the D.C. Court of Appeals the question of whether, in an action
    “arising from a terrorist attack that killed or injured a family member,” a foreign national plaintiff asserting a claim
    under D.C. law for intentional infliction emotional distress must “have been present at the scene of the attack in
    order to state a claim,” Owens, 864 F.3d at 812, but this does not preclude recovery on such claim here. As noted
    above, the U.S. citizen plaintiffs in this action do not rely on D.C. law, but rather the private right of action
    established by § 1605A(c), for which courts “may rely on well-established statements of common law, found in state
    reporters, the Restatement of Torts, and other respected treatises, in determining damages.” Fraenkel, 92 F.3d at
    353; see also Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d. at 28 (stating that claims for damages under § 1605A(c) are “consider[ed] .
    . . in light of traditional state-adopted principles of tort law and the construction given them by federal judges in
    similar cases, rather than—as was the practice under the old pass-through approach—simply the explicit
    requirements of the relevant state law”). Indeed, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged in Owens that § 1605A(c)
    “provided a uniform source of federal law through which plaintiffs could seek recovery against a foreign sovereign.”
    Owens, 864 F.3d at 765; see also id. at 809 (“[I]n most cases brought under the new terrorism exception, the
    plaintiff need not rely upon state tort law . . . . U.S. nationals will continue to sue under § 1605A(c) and benefit from
    its consistent application.”). Thus, the certified question related to awards under D.C. law to “foreign family
    member plaintiffs,” id. at 809, not U.S. citizen plaintiffs. This distinction is reflected in the D.C. Circuit’s 2018
    Fraenkel decision, which, while affirming that “a claim for solatium [i]s nearly indistinguishable from a claim for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress,” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 357 (citing Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    87 F. Supp. 3d 93
    , 115 (D.D.C. 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted), did not take issue, as a matter of law,
    with the propriety of awarding solatium damages to family members of the victim of terrorist actions when those
    family members were not present at the site of the victim’s kidnapping and murder, see id. at 352.
    51
    are liable to these twenty-four plaintiffs—Andrew P. Blank, Linda Kay Blank, Nathan Blank,
    Barbara Gaydos, Ethan Gaydos, Elizabeth Gaydos, Andrea Jo Grimson, Robyn Elizabeth
    Lawrence, Bruce Russell Lawrence, Kimi Lawrence, Joy Leinenbach, Deborah Millraney, Jerry
    Timothy Sasser, Sr., Jason Allen Sasser, Deborah Homs, Cathy Eunha Kim Spicer Lindsy,
    Christian William Spicer, Christopher G. Spicer, Bonnie C. Wade, Michael Kevin Wade,
    Thomas H. Wade, Richard M. Williams, Angela Rose, and Nancy Kilfoyle—for intentional
    infliction of emotional distress caused by their extreme and outrageous conduct in materially
    supporting the Khobar Towers attack.
    Accordingly, the plaintiffs have established the defendants’ liability to the plaintiffs
    under the federal private right of action against state sponsors of terrorism, 28 U.S.C. §
    1605A(c), for the torts of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
    damages allowable to the plaintiffs are discussed next.
    D.       DAMAGES
    The plaintiffs in this case seek to recover economic, pain and suffering, solatium, and
    punitive damages to compensate for their own losses and to punish the defendants for their role
    in the Khobar Towers bombing.14 The damages to which each plaintiff is entitled are described
    below.
    1. Legal Standard for Damages under Section 1605A(c)
    Congress, in creating a private right of action in Section 1605A(c) for victims of state-
    sponsored terrorism, also provided, in the same subsection, that such foreign states are liable for
    14
    Damages recoverable for the plaintiffs’ claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from
    harms suffered by their immediate family members will be discussed as claims for solatium damages. See, e.g.,
    Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 357 (citing Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 115, for the proposition that “a claim for solatium [i]s
    nearly indistinguishable from a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)); Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 85
     (“Under the FSIA, a solatium claim is indistinguishable from an
    [intentional infliction of emotional distress] claim.”).
    52
    money damages, including “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive
    damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). “Upon obtaining a default judgment, successful plaintiffs
    may recover damages by proving ‘that the projected consequences are reasonably certain (i.e.,
    more likely than not) to occur, and must prove the amount of damages by a reasonable
    estimate.’” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353 (quoting Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 
    328 F.3d 680
    , 684 (D.C.
    Cir. 2003)); see also Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (“To obtain damages against a non-immune
    foreign state under the FSIA, a plaintiff must prove that the consequences of the foreign state’s
    conduct were reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not) to occur, and must prove the amount
    of damages by a reasonable estimate consistent with this [Circuit]’s application of the American
    rule on damages.” (quoting Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    370 F. Supp. 2d 105
    , 115–16
    (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration in original))); Kim v. Democratic
    People’s Republic of Korea, 
    87 F. Supp. 3d 286
    , 289 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Hill, 
    328 F.3d at 681
    ). In determining the “reasonable estimate,” courts may look to expert testimony and prior
    awards for comparable injury. Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    845 F. Supp. 2d 204
    , 214
    (D.D.C. 2012); Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    574 F. Supp. 2d 15
    , 29 (D.D.C. 2008).
    The evidence presented in Blais and Heiser I, of which this Court has taken judicial
    notice and reviewed supra in Part I.B, has satisfactorily shown that the plaintiffs’ injuries were
    reasonably certain and were actually the intended consequences of the defendants’ material
    support of Saudi Hezbollah. Consequently, the defendants’ conduct in supporting Saudi
    Hezbollah was likely, and intended, to result in injury and death and to devastate the families of
    the victims. Having concluded that the plaintiffs have proven that “the consequences of the
    foreign state’s conduct were ‘reasonably certain’ . . . to occur,” Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402, the
    53
    reasonable awards as to each plaintiff for economic loss, pain and suffering, solatium, and
    punitive damages will be determined next.
    2. Economic Losses and Medical Expenses
    The fifteen plaintiff service members to whom the defendants are liable for assault and
    battery seek to recover for “medical expenses” and “economic losses.” Compl. ¶ 42. “Unlike
    damages for pain and suffering, lost earnings are not hard to quantify, and the Court will not
    excuse plaintiffs’ failure to support the claim for lost earnings with competent evidence.”
    Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    77 F. Supp. 3d 57
    , 71 (D.D.C. 2015). The plaintiffs in this
    case have provided no evidence supporting any such recovery. Cf. Hill, 
    328 F.3d at 684
     (“[A]
    plaintiff may recover damages for past economic losses if such losses are reasonably proved.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, they have “failed to meet the minimum
    evidentiary threshold supporting their respective claims for economic damages,” and no
    economic damages may be awarded. Kaplan v. Hezbollah, 
    213 F. Supp. 3d 27
    , 41 (D.D.C.
    2016). Similarly, the plaintiffs have submitted no evidence as to their medical expenses, so no
    medical expenses damages may be awarded either. Cf. Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    529 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 20 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[P]laintiffs, through their own testimony, have reasonably
    proven the costs incurred as a result of past medical expenses.”); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic
    of Iran, 
    281 F. Supp. 2d 258
    , 275 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[Plaintiff] has also requested damages for his
    past medical expenses and has ‘reasonably proven’ these expenses through the testimony of his
    mother.”).
    3. Pain and Suffering
    As discussed above, the defendants are liable to the fifteen service members injured in
    the Khobar Towers bombing—Todd Akins, George C. Anthony, Charles Blank, John Gaydos,
    54
    Kevin James Hurst, Thomas R. Lawrence, Gregory Eric Leinenbach, Nicholas L. MacKenzie,
    Jason Porter Remar, Jerry Timothy Sasser, Frank David Sills III, Matthew G. Spicer, Alan
    Jeffrey Wade, Tracy Matthew Winter, and Eric Dale Ziegler—for battery, assault, and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, but in view of the bar on multiple recoveries, the
    plaintiffs may only recover damages reflecting the single harm underlying these three torts. See
    EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 
    534 U.S. 279
    , 297 (2002) (“[I]t ‘goes without saying that the courts
    can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.’” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v.
    EEOC, 
    446 U.S. 318
    , 333 (1980))); Medina v. District of Columbia, 
    643 F.3d 323
    , 326 (D.C.
    Cir. 2011) (“[A] party ‘cannot recover the same damages twice, even though the recovery is
    based on two different theories.’” (quoting Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 
    970 F.2d 16
    , 34 (5th
    Cir. 1992))); Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 77
     (“The Court notes that these plaintiffs who have
    claimed assault, battery, and IIED may recover under only one of any such theories, as multiple
    recovery is prohibited.”). The plaintiffs contend in their “uncontroverted . . . affidavits,” Roth,
    78 F. Supp. 3d at 386, that they experienced significant physical and psychological injuries as a
    result of the attack. “[W]hen assessing damages for surviving victims of terrorist hostilities,” the
    “baseline assumption” is that “‘persons suffering injuries in terrorist attacks are entitled to $5
    million in damages.’” Kaplan, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (quoting Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    882 F. Supp. 2d 7
    , 12 (D.D.C. 2012)). This baseline may be moderated either upward or
    downward. An upward departure would be warranted “in the presence of ‘severe instances of
    physical and psychological pain, such as where victims suffered relatively more numerous and
    severe injuries, were rendered quadriplegic, including partially lost vision and hearing, or were
    mistaken for dead,’ or downward in the face of ‘minor shrapnel injuries or minor injury from
    small-arms fire.’” 
    Id.
     at 35–36 (quoting Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 84
    ) (citation omitted and
    55
    alteration adopted). In the case of “victims who ‘suffered severe emotional injury without
    physical injury, this Court has typically awarded the victim $1.5 million.’” Id. at 36 (quoting
    Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 49).
    Review of the plaintiffs’ “uncontroverted factual allegations” in their affidavits, Roth, 78
    F. Supp. 3d at 386, and, where available, exhibits, demonstrates that nine plaintiffs—Todd
    Akins, George C. Anthony, Charles Blank, John Gaydos, Gregory Eric Leinenbach, Jerry
    Timothy Sasser, Frank David Sills III, Alan Jeffrey Wade, and Eric Dale Ziegler—each suffered
    the types of “severe physical injuries, such as compound fractures, serious flesh wounds, and
    scars from shrapnel, as well as lasting and severe psychological pain,” Khaliq v. Republic of
    Sudan, 
    33 F. Supp. 3d 29
    , 33 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Owens, 
    864 F.3d 751
    , that warrant
    the baseline $5 million award. Accordingly, the nine plaintiffs—Todd Akins, George C.
    Anthony, Charles Blank, John Gaydos, Gregory Eric Leinenbach, Jerry Timothy Sasser, Frank
    David Sills III, Alan Jeffrey Wade, and Eric Dale Ziegler—are each entitled to an award of
    $5,000,000 for their pain and suffering as survivors of the bombing.
    With respect to five service member plaintiffs—James Hurst, Nicholas L. MacKenzie,
    Jason Porter Remar, Matthew G. Spicer, and Tracy Matthew Winter—who, according to their
    “uncontroverted factual allegations,” Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 386, “suffer[ed] severe emotional
    injury accompanied by relatively minor physical injuries,” “downward departures to a range of
    $1.5 to $3 million are warranted,” Khaliq, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 33. Hurst’s physical injuries were
    limited to cuts on his feet from broken glass, for which he was treated the day after the attack,
    and he has “bulging and protruding discs” that he “believe[s] may have been caused at least in
    part by the blast.” Hurst Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, 7. MacKenzie’s physical injuries were similarly limited
    to cuts from broken glass, for which he “received first aid.” MacKenzie Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. Remar
    56
    sustained “numerous cuts and abrasions” when the force of the blast “carried [him] along the
    ground for about 15 or 20 feet,” and, after seeking treatment, “woke up in a nearby Saudi
    hospital” where “they did not think [he] was hurt too bad.” Remar Decl. ¶¶ 4–6. Spicer
    describes having “received some first aid for my leg wounds.” Spicer Decl. ¶ 7. Winter
    “received eleven stitches” for cuts from “pieces of flying glass,” as well as “additional
    treatment” after returning to the United States. Winter Decl. ¶¶ 4–6. Hurst, MacKenzie, Remar,
    Spicer, and Winter have averred that they have experienced serious psychological after-effects
    from the attack. See Hurst Decl. ¶¶ 7–8; MacKenzie Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9–10; Remar Decl. ¶¶ 7–9;
    Spicer Decl. ¶¶ 9–10; Winter Decl. ¶¶ 6–8.
    “When calculating damages amounts, ‘the Court must take pains to ensure that
    individuals with similar injuries receive similar awards.’” Khaliq, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 33 (quoting
    Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    515 F. Supp. 2d 25
    , 54 (D.D.C. 2007)). Following Braun,
    228 F. Supp. 3d at 84 (awarding $2.5 million for “physical and psychological injuries” where
    victim’s physical injuries were “more akin to minor injuries from shrapnel or small-arms fire”),
    James Hurst, Nicholas L. MacKenzie, Jason Porter Remar, Matthew G. Spicer, and Tracy
    Matthew Winter are each entitled to an award of $2,500,000 for their pain and suffering as
    survivors of the bombing.
    As described supra Part I.C.13, plaintiff Thomas R. Lawrence suffered “severe emotional
    injury without physical injury,” for which “this Court has typically awarded the victim $1.5
    million.” Kaplan, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (quoting Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 49).
    Accordingly, he is entitled to an award of $1,500,000 for his pain and suffering as a survivor of
    the Khobar Towers attack.
    57
    4. Solatium
    The twenty-four family members of service members injured in the Khobar Towers
    bombing—Andrew P. Blank, Linda Kay Blank, Nathan Blank, Barbara Gaydos, Ethan Gaydos,
    Elizabeth Gaydos, Andrea Jo Grimson, Robyn Elizabeth Lawrence, Bruce Russell Lawrence,
    Kimi Lawrence, Joy Leinenbach, Deborah Millraney, Jerry Timothy Sasser, Sr., Jason Allen
    Sasser, Deborah Homs, Cathy Eunha Kim Spicer-Lindsy, Christian William Spicer, Christopher
    G. Spicer, Bonnie C. Wade, Michael Kevin Wade, Thomas H. Wade, Richard M. Williams,
    Angela Rose, and Nancy Kilfoyle—seek solatium damages to compensate for the emotional
    distress they experienced as family members of victims of the attack. Compl. ¶¶ 50–52.
    “District Court judges have discretion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (e) to grant solatium awards based
    on the particular facts of each case, subject to abuse-of-discretion review for errors of law,
    clearly erroneous factual findings, and faulty reasoning.” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 351. Citing
    Judge Lamberth’s “seminal opinion explaining the origins and particulars of solatium damages”
    in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the D.C. Circuit has explained that “‘[s]olatium is
    traditionally a compensatory damage which belongs to the individual heir personally for injury to
    the feelings and loss of decedent’s comfort and society,’” and was an award that “‘began as a
    remedy for the loss of a spouse or a parent,’” but is now understood to include the loss of a child
    or a sibling as well. Id. at 356 (quoting Flatow, 
    999 F. Supp. 1
    , 29 (D.D.C. 1998)). Solatium is
    not, however, reserved for those who have suffered the death of a loved one: “in the context of
    distress resulting from injury to loved ones—rather than death—courts have applied a framework
    where ‘awards are valued at half of the awards to family members of the deceased.’” Wultz v.
    Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    864 F. Supp. 2d 24
    , 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Oveissi
    v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    768 F. Supp. 2d 16
    , 26 n.10 (D.D.C. 2011) (Lamberth, J.)); see also
    58
    Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 85
     (Lamberth, J.) (“Relatives of surviving servicemen received
    awards valued at half of the awards to family members of the deceased.”); Heiser I, 
    466 F. Supp. 2d at 269
     (Lamberth, J.) (“[F]amilies of victims who have died are typically awarded greater
    damages than families of victims who remain alive.” (quoting Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    425 F. Supp. 2d 56
    , 75 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.))); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    154 F. Supp. 2d 27
    , 38 (D.D.C. 2001) (Lamberth, J.), aff’d sub nom. Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    315 F.3d 325
     (D.C. Cir. 2003) (awarding a lower sum where the victim “returned alive”).
    “Mental anguish, bereavement and grief resulting from” an immediate family member’s
    death or injury “constitutes the preponderant element of a claim for solatium.” Fraenkel, 892
    F.3d at 356–57 (quoting Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 30) (alteration adopted); see also Baker v.
    Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 
    775 F. Supp. 2d 48
    , 83 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A claim of
    solatium seeks compensation for the ‘mental anguish, bereavement and grief that those with a
    close personal relationship to a decedent experience as a result of the decedent’s death, as well as
    the harm caused by the loss of the decedent, society and comfort.’” (quoting Belkin, 
    667 F. Supp. 2d at 22
    )). In determining the appropriate amount to compensate victims’ family members for
    emotional distress, “the Court may look to prior decisions awarding damages . . . for solatium.”
    Acosta, 
    574 F. Supp. 2d at 29
    . Solatium damages, by their nature, are “unquantifiable,” Moradi,
    77 F. Supp. 3d at 72, and, therefore, this Court has developed a commonly accepted standardized
    framework, known as the Heiser damages framework, for solatium damages. Heiser I, 
    466 F. Supp. 2d at 269
    ; see Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 403 (noting the “framework has been adopted by
    other courts as an appropriate measure of solatium damages for the family members of victims of
    state-sponsored terror” (citing Valore, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 85
    )). Though the Heiser framework is
    not mandatory, Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 361 (“District Court judges invariably must exercise
    59
    discretion in determining damages awards under the FSIA. There is no statutory basis for
    concluding that district courts must award solatium damages in the amounts that Heiser found
    commonly granted.”), it is adopted here in the interest of consistency, especially given that
    Heiser also stemmed from the Khobar Towers bombing.
    As a baseline, the Heiser framework awards “spouses of deceased victims . . .
    approximately $8 million, while parents and children received $5 million and siblings received
    $2.5 million.” Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 15 (D.D.C. 2010). As
    noted, “families of victims who have died are typically awarded greater damages than families of
    victims who remain alive.” Heiser I, 
    466 F. Supp. 2d at 269
     (quoting Haim, 
    425 F. Supp. 2d at 75
    ). Accordingly, “in the context of distress resulting from injury to loved ones—rather than
    death—courts have applied a framework where ‘awards are valued at half of the awards to
    family members of the deceased,’” i.e., $2,500,000 to parents of surviving victims, Wultz, 864 F.
    Supp. 2d at 39 (citing authorities), and “[c]hildren of a surviving victim receive $1.5 million on
    average,” Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    71 F. Supp. 3d 23
    , 28 (D.D.C. 2014).
    These numbers serve only as a baseline from which the Court may deviate in order to
    compensate for specific circumstances. See Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 362 (“While past solatium
    awards from comparable cases are appropriate sources of guidance for district courts, different
    plaintiffs (even under FSIA) will prove different facts that may well (and should) result in
    different damage awards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Factors militating in favor of an
    award enhancement generally fall into one of three categories: “evidence establishing an
    especially close relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, particularly in comparison to the
    normal interactions to be expected given the familial relationship; medical proof of severe pain,
    grief or suffering on behalf of the claimant; and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack
    60
    which made the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing.” Oveissi, 
    768 F. Supp. 2d at
    26–
    27. “Decisions to deviate from the starting points provided by the Heiser framework are
    committed to the discretion of the particular court in each case . . . .” 
    Id. at 26
    .
    The twenty-four plaintiff family members have each suffered from seeing the effects of
    the Khobar Towers bombing on their loved ones. In light of the Heiser framework, the damages
    awards for plaintiff spouses are addressed first, followed by parents and children, and then
    siblings.
    a.       Spouses
    Linda Kay Blank, Barbara Gaydos, Cathy Eunha Kim Spicer-Lindsy, Joy Leinenbach,
    Nancy Kilfoyle, and Robyn Elizabeth Lawrence were each married to a plaintiff service member
    at the time of the attack. As described above, each has averred to their fear for their spouses’
    physical well-being in the immediate aftermath of the attack as they waited for information on
    the status of their spouses, and the emotional toll of the psychological after-effects of the attack
    once their spouses returned home. See Linda Blank Decl. ¶¶ 4–11; Barbara Gaydos Decl. ¶¶ 4–
    13; Cathy Spicer-Lindsy Decl. ¶¶ 4–9; Joy Leinenbach Decl. ¶¶ 6–9; Kilfoyle Decl. ¶¶ 4–9;
    Robyn Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 4–8. Though Blank, Gaydos, Leinenbach, and Lawrence remain
    married to their spouses, and Kilfoyle and Spicer-Lindsy have since divorced, each has, in their
    own way, experienced the Khobar Towers bombing and its effect on their family as a life-
    changing event. “[L]ike many” spouses of the victims of terrorist attacks, they have “suffered
    through an unimaginable ordeal,” but their affidavits do not present a “basis to warrant a
    deviation from th[e] standard award.” Valencia, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d at 16
    .15 Accordingly, Linda
    15
    Divorce does not warrant a downward deviation, particularly where the after-effects of the attack were a
    primary cause of the divorce. See Spencer, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 28–29 (holding that, despite divorce, “[t]he Court need
    not depart from its usual solatium damages framework as to spouses, however, because evidence . . . indicated that
    [the couple] were married at the time of the bombing and remained married until 2005, [the victim’s spouse]
    61
    Kay Blank, Barbara Gaydos, Joy Leinenbach, and Nancy Kilfoyle are each entitled to an award
    of $4,000,000. A “proportional[]” downward deviation from the Heiser framework is
    appropriate where “a proposed solatium award would exceed the pain and suffering award
    received by a surviving victim.” Spencer, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 28. Accordingly, Cathy Eunha Kim
    Spicer-Lindsy, whose ex-husband was awarded $2,500,000, is entitled to an award of eighty
    percent that amount, or $2,000,000, and Robyn Elizabeth Lawrence, whose husband was
    awarded $1,500,000, is entitled to an award of eighty percent that amount, or $1,200,000.
    b.       Parents
    Jerry Timothy Sasser, Sr., Deborah Homs, Kimi Lawrence, Bruce Russell Lawrence,
    Angela Rose, Bonnie C. Wade, Thomas H. Wade, and Richard M. Williams are each parents of
    service members who were stationed at the Khobar Towers at the time of the bombing. Each has
    described their fear for their respective children upon learning about the attack, and the ongoing
    struggle of witnessing, and helping their children cope with, the psychological after-effects of the
    attack. See Jerry Sasser Sr. Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Homs Decl. ¶¶ 4–9; Kimi Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 4–10;
    Bruce Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Rose Decl. ¶¶ 4–10; Bonnie Wade Decl. ¶¶ 4–10; Thomas Wade
    Decl. ¶¶ 4–9; Williams Decl. ¶¶ 5–10. The harm suffered by each of these plaintiffs is consistent
    with that suffered by many parents of victims of terrorism. Valencia, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d at 16
    .
    Jerry Timothy Sasser, Sr., Deborah Homs, Bonnie C. Wade, Thomas H. Wade, and Richard M.
    Williams are each entitled to an award of $2,500,000. Applying the proportional downward
    departure as described in Spencer, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 28, Angela Rose is entitled to an award of
    suffered compensable emotional trauma as a result of the attack, and at least one witness attributed the dissolution of
    their marriage to the after effects of the attack”); Daliberti, 
    146 F. Supp. 2d at 26
     (awarding the same amount in
    solatium damages to spouses of terror victims irrespective of whether the spouses had divorced or separated). But
    see Baker, 
    775 F. Supp. 2d at 84
     (Facciola, M.J.) (“I do not believe I can award [a spouse] the same amount,
    however, that would be awarded had the marriage not ended in divorce.”).
    62
    $1,250,000, and Kimi Lawrence and Bruce Russell Lawrence are entitled to an award of
    $750,000—half the awards for their respective sons.
    c.      Children
    Nathan Blank, Ethan Gaydos, Elizabeth Gaydos, and Christian William Spicer are each
    children of plaintiff service members who were injured in the Khobar Towers attack. Although
    each was very young at the time of the bombing, each suffered emotional distress and other
    adverse effects of the impact of the bombing on their respective fathers as they were growing up.
    See Nathan Blank Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Ethan Gaydos Decl. ¶¶ 5–9; Elizabeth Gaydos Decl. ¶¶ 4–8;
    Spicer-Lindsy for Christian Spicer Decl. ¶¶ 5–7. The harm suffered by each of these plaintiffs is
    consistent with that suffered by many children of victims of terrorism, Valencia, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d at 16
    , and, accordingly, Nathan Blank, Ethan Gaydos, and Elizabeth Gaydos are each entitled to
    an award of $1,500,000. Applying the proportional downward departure as described in
    Spencer, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 28, Christian William Spicer is entitled to an award of $750,000, or
    thirty percent of the amount awarded to his father.
    d.      Siblings
    Andrew P. Blank, Deborah Millraney, Andrea Jo Grimson, Christopher G. Spicer, and
    Michael Kevin Wade are, and Jason Allen Sasser, whose estate is represented by Kimberly
    Watters Sasser, was, each siblings of plaintiff service members who were injured by the Khobar
    Towers bombing. Each has described the emotional distress they experienced when they first
    learned of the bombing and the struggle of witnessing the psychological after-effects of the
    attack on their respective brothers. See Andrew Blank Decl. ¶¶ 5–7; Millrany Decl. ¶¶ 4–5;
    Christopher Spicer Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Grimson Decl. ¶¶ 4–7; Michael Wade Decl. ¶¶ 5–9; Jason
    Sasser Decl. ¶¶ 6–7. The harm suffered by each of these plaintiffs is consistent with that
    63
    suffered by many siblings of victims of terrorism. Valencia, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d at 16
    . Andrew P.
    Blank, Deborah Millraney, Michael Kevin Wade, and the estate of Jason Allen Sasser are each
    entitled to an award of $1,250,000. Applying the proportional downward departure as described
    in Spencer, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 28, Christopher G. Spicer is entitled to an award of $625,000 and
    Andrea Jo Grimson is entitled to an award of $375,000, or one-quarter the amounts awarded to
    their respective brothers.
    5. Punitive Damages
    The plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages of at least $500 million, Compl. ¶ 56, is
    barred by controlling precedent. Punitive damages are awarded not to compensate the victims,
    but to “punish outrageous behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the future.” Kim, 87 F.
    Supp. 3d at 290 (quoting Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    907 F. Supp. 2d 93
    , 105 (D.D.C.
    2012)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1). Such punitive damages have been
    awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) in prior cases against the defendants for their role in the
    Khobar Towers attack. See, e.g., Rimkus, 
    750 F. Supp. 2d at
    184–85; Heiser II, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d at
    29–31. In Owens, however, the D.C. Circuit vacated an award of punitive damages against
    Sudan for its role in a 1998 terrorist attack, holding that “the FSIA terrorism exception does not
    retroactively authorize the imposition of punitive damages against a sovereign for conduct
    occurring before the passage of § 1605A” in 2008. 864 F.3d at 812; see also id. at 818 (“[A]
    plaintiff proceeding under either state or federal law cannot recover punitive damages for
    conduct occurring prior to the enactment of § 1605A.”). As in Owens, where the conduct at
    issue occurred in 1998, the 1996 Khobar Towers attack preceded the 2008 enactment of §
    1605A. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages.
    6. Pre-Judgment Interest
    64
    The plaintiffs also request an award of pre-judgment interest on the compensatory
    damage awards. Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Pls.’ Damages Mot. (“Pls.’ Damages Mem.”) at 5–6, ECF
    No. 25-1. “[W]hether pre-judgment interest is to be awarded is subject to the discretion of the
    court and equitable considerations.” Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., 
    127 F.3d 43
    , 54 (D.C. Cir.
    1997) (quoting Motion Picture Ass’n of Amer., Inc. v. Oman, 
    969 F.2d 1154
    , 1157 (D.C. Cir.
    1992) (alteration adopted)). “Prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation,”
    West Virginia v. United States, 
    479 U.S. 305
    , 310 (1987), and “is often necessary for full
    compensation,” Oman, 
    969 F.2d at 1157
    , where the plaintiff experiences a “delay in payment
    resulting from the litigation,” Oldham, 
    127 F.3d at 54
    .
    The twenty-four family member plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest on
    their solatium damages. When denying pre-judgment interest on solatium damages in Oveissi,
    Judge Lamberth explained that “[i]n adopting the Heiser framework, this Court determined that
    the values set by that scale represent the appropriate level of compensation, regardless of the
    timing of the attack.” 
    768 F. Supp. 2d at
    30 n.12; see also Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic,
    
    167 F. Supp. 3d 22
    , 54 (D.D.C. 2016) (noting solatium damages “do not typically require
    prejudgment interest because they are ‘designed to be fully compensatory’” (quoting Wyatt, 908
    F. Supp. 2d at 232)). As in that case, where “the Court s[aw] no reason to deviate from its
    standard practice” and award such interest on solatium damages, Oveissi, 
    768 F. Supp. 2d at
    30
    n.12, the instant plaintiffs, who urged the adoption of the Heiser framework for solatium
    damages, Pls.’ Damages Mem. at 2–5, have not provided any reason why awards under that
    framework are insufficient to provide “complete compensation,” West Virginia, 
    479 U.S. at 310
    .
    For similar reasons, pre-judgment interest is also denied to the fifteen service member
    plaintiffs. The plaintiffs do not suggest that awards under the Heiser framework are insufficient
    65
    such that prejudgment interest is necessary. See Pls.’ Damages Mem. at 2–6. Moreover, their
    awards compensate for harm, particularly psychological, that is ongoing, rather than, for
    example, a “taking or detention of land, chattels or other subjects of property,” RESTATEMENT
    (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913(1), from a one-off event. Additionally, according to the Restatement,
    pre-judgment interest “is not allowed upon an amount found due for bodily harm, [or] for
    emotional distress.” Id. § 913(2). The plaintiffs cite Reed for the proposition that “courts in this
    Circuit have awarded prejudgment interest in cases where plaintiffs were delayed in recovering
    compensation for their injuries—including, specifically, where such injuries were the result of
    targeted attacks perpetrated by foreign defendants,” Reed, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (quoting Pugh
    v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
    530 F. Supp. 2d 216
    , 263 (D.D.C. 2008)); see also
    Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 
    71 F. Supp. 3d 252
    , 261 (D.D.C. 2014); Estate of Doe v. Islamic
    Republic of Iran, 
    943 F. Supp. 2d 180
    , 184 n.1 (D.D.C. 2013), but Reed also noted that courts
    “must take pains to ensure that individuals with similar injuries receive similar awards,” 845 F.
    Supp. 2d at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although pre-judgment interest has been
    awarded in other FSIA suits, pre-judgment interest has not been awarded to service member
    plaintiffs in other suits arising from the Khobar Towers bombing. See Valencia, 
    774 F. Supp. 2d 1
    ; Heiser II, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d 20
    ; Heiser I, 
    466 F. Supp. 2d 229
    ; Blais, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d 40
    .
    Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, and in the interest of consistency, pre-judgment
    interest will not be awarded to the fifteen service member plaintiffs.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons outlined above, the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is granted in
    part and denied in part. Due to their support for Saudi Hezbollah’s bombing of the Khobar
    Towers on June 25, 1996, both defendants are jointly and severally liable for the pain and
    66
    suffering inflicted on the fifteen plaintiff service members present at Khobar Towers at the time
    of the bombing and the emotional distress inflicted on the twenty-four plaintiff family members.
    While the claims of plaintiff service member Christopher Galletto are dismissed, the remaining
    plaintiffs are awarded monetary damages in the following amounts:
    •   Service member plaintiffs Todd Akins, George C. Anthony, Charles Blank, John Gaydos,
    Gregory Eric Leinenbach, Jerry Timothy Sasser, Frank David Sills III, Alan Jeffrey Wade,
    and Eric Dale Ziegler, who each suffered both severe physical and emotional injury, are each
    entitled to $5,000,000 in pain and suffering damages;
    •   Service member plaintiffs James Hurst, Nicholas L. MacKenzie, Jason Porter Remar,
    Matthew G. Spicer, and Tracy Matthew Winter, who each suffered less severe physical and
    emotional injury, are each entitled to $2,500,000 in pain and suffering damages;
    •   Service member plaintiff Thomas R. Lawrence, who suffered emotional injury, is entitled to
    $1,500,000 in pain and suffering damages;
    •   Plaintiff spouses Linda Kay Blank, Barbara Gaydos, Joy Leinenbach, and Nancy Kilfoyle are
    each entitled to $4,000,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff spouse Cathy Eunha Kim Spicer-Lindsy is entitled to $2,000,000 in solatium
    damages;
    •   Plaintiff spouse Robyn Elizabeth Lawrence is entitled to $1,200,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff parents Jerry Timothy Sasser, Sr., Deborah Homs, Bonnie C. Wade, Thomas H.
    Wade, Richard M. Williams are each entitled to $2,500,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff parent Angela Rose is entitled to $1,250,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff parents Kimi Lawrence and Bruce Russell Lawrence are each entitled to $750,000 in
    solatium damages;
    67
    •   Plaintiff children Nathan Blank, Ethan Gaydos, and Elizabeth Gaydos are each entitled to
    $1,500,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff child Christian William Spicer is entitled to $750,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff siblings Andrew P. Blank, Deborah Millraney, Michael Kevin Wade, and the estate
    of Jason Allen Sasser, represented by Kimberly Watters Sasser, are each entitled to
    $1,250,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff sibling Christopher G. Spicer is entitled to $625,000 in solatium damages;
    •   Plaintiff sibling Andrea Jo Grimson is entitled to $375,000 in solatium damages.
    Thus, the total damages award is $104,700,000.
    An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    Date: September 10, 2018
    __________________________
    BERYL A. HOWELL
    Chief Judge
    68
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2017-0675

Judges: Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

Filed Date: 9/10/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2018

Authorities (37)

Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya , 775 F. Supp. 2d 48 ( 2011 )

Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 ( 2003 )

Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 459 F. Supp. 2d 40 ( 2006 )

Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 ( 2009 )

Pugh v. SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBRYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA , 530 F. Supp. 2d 216 ( 2008 )

Anderson v. the Islamic Republic of Iran , 753 F. Supp. 2d 68 ( 2010 )

Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 700 F. Supp. 2d 52 ( 2010 )

Jenco, Douglas J. v. Islam Repub Iran , 315 F.3d 325 ( 2003 )

Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq , 146 F. Supp. 2d 19 ( 2001 )

Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic , 646 F.3d 1 ( 2011 )

General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Equal ... , 100 S. Ct. 1698 ( 1980 )

Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. v. Ralph Oman , 969 F.2d 1154 ( 1992 )

Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 370 F. Supp. 2d 105 ( 2005 )

Hill v. Republic of Iraq , 328 F.3d 680 ( 2003 )

Mwani, Odilla Mutaka v. Bin Ladin, Usama , 417 F.3d 1 ( 2005 )

Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 ( 2006 )

Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 750 F. Supp. 2d 163 ( 2010 )

Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 425 F. Supp. 2d 56 ( 2006 )

West Virginia v. United States , 107 S. Ct. 702 ( 1987 )

Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 774 F. Supp. 2d 1 ( 2010 )

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