Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund v. Miami Valley Masonry, Inc. ( 2018 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRICKLAYERS & TROWEL TRADES
INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 17-0381 (DLF)
v.
MIAMI VALLEY MASONRY, INC.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment by Default. Dkt. 8. For
the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are fiduciaries of two benefit plans: the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades
International Pension Fund and the International Masonry Institute. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, Dkt. 1.
Both plans are multiemployer employee-benefit plans organized under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), (2), (37). The plans provide
retirement, disability, death, and other benefits to individuals who work in the construction
industry as bricklayers or as similar tradesmen. Pls.’ App. at 002, Dkt. 8-3. Defendant Miami
Valley is an Ohio corporation and an “employer in an industry affecting commerce” as defined
by ERISA. Compl. ¶ 3; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(5), (11), (12). Under its collective bargaining
agreements and ERISA, Miami Valley is required to make contributions to the benefit plans
based on the number of hours worked by its employees in covered employment. Compl. ¶¶ 7–9.
In this action, Plaintiffs seek a judgment of $50,714.14 based on allegations that Miami Valley
failed to make required contributions. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7, 15–25. Plaintiffs also seek equitable relief,
namely orders directing Miami Valley to submit to an audit and comply with its contractual and
statutory obligations. Id. ¶¶ 26–35.
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action on March 3, 2017. Id. Miami Valley was duly
served with the complaint and summons on March 6, 2017. Aff. of Service, Dkt. 3; Proof of
Service, Dkt. 3-1. On the same day, Plantiffs’ counsel emailed a copy of the complaint to Miami
Valley’s Treasurer. App. at 028, 037–040. Because Miami Valley did not answer or otherwise
respond to the complaint within the time period allotted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12,
Plaintiffs requested an entry of default. Dkt. 4. Plaintiffs also mailed a copy of their request to
Miami Valley. Dkt. 4-2. The Clerk of the Court entered default on April 4, 2017, Dkt. 5, and
served a copy of the default entry on Miami Valley, Dkt. 7. On April 19, 2017, Plaintiffs moved
this Court to enter a default judgment against Miami Valley under Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 8. The case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on
December 4, 2017.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empower a federal district court to enter a
default judgment against a defendant who fails to defend its case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2);
Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 375 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980). While
federal policy generally favors resolving disputes on their merits, default judgments are
appropriate “when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive
party.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. First, the plaintiff must request that
the Clerk of Court enter default against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend. Fed.
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Rawle Civ. P. 55(a). The Clerk’s default entry establishes the defaulting defendant’s liability for the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. Boland v. Providence Constr. Corp., 304 F.R.D. 31,
35 (D.D.C. 2014). Second, if the plaintiff’s claim is not for a “sum certain,” the plaintiff must
apply to the court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). At that point, the plaintiff “must
prove his entitlement to the relief requested using detailed affidavits or documentary evidence on
which the court may rely.” Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 103
(D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
When ruling on a motion for default judgment, a court “is required to make an
independent determination of the sum to be awarded.” Fanning v. Permanent Sol. Indus., Inc.,
257 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). In that inquiry, the court has
“considerable latitude.” Ventura, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (quotation marks omitted). The court
may conduct a hearing to determine damages, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), but the court is not
required to do so “as long as it ensures that there is a basis for the damages specified in the
default judgment,” Ventura, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Due to the Clerk’s default entry in this case, Miami Valley is deemed liable for the well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint, including the allegation that Miami Valley failed to make
timely contributions to the benefit plans. Providence Constr., 304 F.R.D. at 35. With liability
established, the Court must independently determine the amount owed by Miami Valley to the
Plaintiffs and whether equitable relief is appropriate.
Miami Valley’s obligations are set forth in a number of agreements: its collective
bargaining agreements with Bricklayers Local Union No. 22 Ohio, a Memorandum of
Understanding between the benefit plans and Miami Valley, and the benefit plans’ trust
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agreement and collection procedures. Compl. ¶¶ 7–9, 12–14; App. 002–003. These agreements
obligate Miami Valley to pay (1) contributions based on the number of hours worked by
employees in covered employment; (2) interest on unpaid contributions at a rate of 15% per
annum; (3) the higher of either an additional interest payment on unpaid contributions at a rate of
15% per annum, or liquidated damages calculated as 20% of the total contributions owed; and
(4) related attorney’s fees and costs. Id. If an employer like Miami Valley does not comply with
such agreements, Section 502 of ERISA directs courts to award the amounts owed. See 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g) (stating that, if judgment is entered in favor of a benefit plan, the court shall
award unpaid contributions, interest at the rate set by the plan, liquidated damages, and
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs).
Miami Valley disregarded its obligations, so Plaintiffs now seek to recover the amounts
owed. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 21; Pls.’ Mem. at 2, 15, Dkt. 8-1. In support of their motion for default
judgment, Plaintiffs have submitted (1) the declaration of David F. Stupar, the Executive
Director of the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund and an authorized
representative of the International Masonry Institute, see App. at 001–026; and (2) the
declaration of R. Richard Hopp, counsel for the Plaintiffs, see id. at 027–040. The declarations
and their accompanying exhibits set forth the Plaintiffs’ calculations with specificity. Stupar’s
declaration details the contributions, interest, and court costs owed by Miami Valley. Id. at 003–
005. Hopp’s declaration details attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 027–028. In particular, the
declarations and the entire record establish that Miami Valley owes the following amounts
totaling $50,741.14:
• $20,234.98 for unpaid contributions to the benefit plans from January 2016 through
June 2016, id. at 003, 021;
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• $15,610.08 for unpaid contributions to the benefit plans from July 2016 through
January 2017, id. at 003;
• $1,984.01 for interest on the unpaid contributions, id. at 003, 021, 026;
• $6,525.57 for liquidated damages, id.; and
• $6,386.50 for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, id. at 004–005, 027–028.
Therefore, pursuant to the agreements between the parties and Section 502 of ERISA, the Court
concludes that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a monetary judgment of $50,741.14.
Plaintiffs also seek equitable relief, namely orders directing Miami Valley to (1) comply
with its obligations to report and contribute in the future; and (2) submit to an audit of its payroll
records. Compl. ¶¶ 26–35. Section 502 authorizes a district court to award “such other legal or
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E). “This provision
allows the court to construct appropriate remedies which may include an injunction requiring a
defendant to permit, and cooperate with, an audit of its books and records.” Carpenters Lab.-
Mgmt. Pension Fund v. Freeman-Carder LLC, 498 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Equitable relief is often awarded when the defendant “has
demonstrated no willingness to comply with either its contractual or statutory obligations or to
participate in the judicial process.” Serv. Emps. Int’l Nat’l Indus. Pension Fund v. Tandem Dev.
Grp., LLC, No. 16-cv-2524, 2017 WL 3530358, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2017); Fanning v.
Warner Ctr., L.P., 999 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (D.D.C. 2013); Int’l Painters & Allied Trades
Indus. Pension Fund v. Zak Architectural Metal & Glass, LLC, 635 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C.
2009).
Here, Miami Valley has repeatedly disregarded its obligations to submit timely reports
and pay monthly contributions to the benefit plans. See Compl. ¶ 28; App. 021. Further, as
demonstrated throughout this action, Miami Valley appears unwilling to participate in the
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judicial process. The Court therefore concludes that equitable relief is appropriate in this case.
See Boland v. Smith & Rogers Constr. Ltd., 201 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing
cases in which “courts have awarded injunctions requiring an employer to comply with its
obligations under ERISA and collective bargaining agreements” and “directing the defendant to
permit, and cooperate with, an audit of its books and records”). Thus, pursuant to the Court’s
discretionary authority under Section 502 of ERISA, the Court will grant the equitable relief
requested by Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment by
Default. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
________________________
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
Date: January 25, 2018
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