Barroca v. Samuels ( 2018 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT BARROCA, :
:
Plaintiff, :
v. : Civil Action No. 13-1286 (RBW)
:
HUGH HURWITZ, 1 et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, which the Court
grants for reasons discussed below.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Robert Barroca (“the Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, asserts in his Complaint (“Compl.”)
various constitutional violations. The Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, was detained at the United
States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana from October 2005 through April 2011. Compl. at 3 ¶
1. He is serving a 240-month prison sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in June 2005. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 2; Plaintiff’s Opposition to the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 6. The conviction and
sentence were subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Barroca, 310 F. App’x
69, 70 (9th Cir. 2008). The Plaintiff’s Petitions for en banc review by the Ninth Circuit and for
certiorari in the Supreme Court were denied on October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009,
1
The current Acting Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Hugh Hurwitz, is automatically substituted as Defendant in
his official capacity for his predecessor pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
1
respectively. United States v. Barroca, Nos. 98-10275, 05-10462 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2008);
Barroca, 310 F. App’x at 70, cert. denied, Barroca v. United States, 555 U.S. 1202 (2009).
The crux of the Plaintiff’s Complaint relates to his frustrations with the implementation of
the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (“TRULINCS”) by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”). See Compl. at 4 ¶ 4. He alleges that TRULINCS prevented him from timely
filing his §2255 Habeas Petition (“Habeas Petition”). See id. He further alleges that TRULINCS,
which requires inmates, with limited exceptions, “to place a TRULINCS-generated mailing label
on all outgoing postal mail,” did not provide adequate space to include the full address of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California. See id., Program Statement P5265.13, Trust
Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS) – Electronic Messaging (2/19/2009), Sec.
4.c., Plaintiff’s Exhibit (“Pl’s Ex.”) A. Consequently, the Plaintiff instead mailed the Petition to
his sister, so that she could then mail it to the Court. Compl. at 6 ¶ 11. As a result, the Plaintiff’s
Habeas Petition was filed approximately six weeks late. See Order Dismissing the Petitioner’s
Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 With Prejudice (“Ord. Denying
Hab. Pet.”), United States v. Barroca, No. CR 94-0470 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). In dismissing
the Plaintiff’s Habeas Petition, Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the Northern District of California,
stated the following:
Standing in the way of [Barroca’s] claim for relief under
section 2255 is the one-year statute of limitations . . . . Barroca was
required to file his petition within one year after his judgment of
conviction became final. 28 USC § 2255(f)(1). A judgment of
conviction becomes final upon denial of a petition for certiorari . . .
Barroca’s judgment of conviction became final when the
Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition on February 23, 2009.
Barroca did not sign the instant § 2255 petition until March 22, 2010
and the petition was not filed with this court until April 6, 2010. Doc
#782. Under either the date of filing or the date of his signature,
Barroca’s petition is untimely pursuant to 28 USC § 2255(f)(1) . . .
2
As it plainly appears from the record before the court that
Barroca is not entitled to relief on his untimely petition, the petition
is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings.
Id. at 3–4.
The Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations and to Vacate Judgment.
See Motion and Request for Statutory and Equitable Tolling of AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations
and Motion to Vacate (“Mot. to Toll”), United States v. Barroca, No. CR 94-0470 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
13, 2010). The Plaintiff’s Motion was dismissed. See Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Motion for
Wirt of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ¶ 2255 With Prejudice, Denying Certificate of
Appealability (“Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll”), United States v. Barroca, No. CR 94-0470 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 20, 2011). With respect to the mailing labels, the court found that
. . . the alleged inability to fit the Court’s mailing address on
the TRULINCS labels cannot serve as a basis for statutory tolling.
Although Petitioner claims that the mailing address of the Court did
not fit on the labels used by the TRULINCS program, the evidence
establishes that the Court’s mailing address did, in fact, fit on
TRULINCS labels.[] Further, Petitioner’s contention is belied by
the fact that he was able to successfully file three separate pleadings
with other districts in December 2009, at least two of which were
served on parties using mailing addresses as long or longer than that
of this Court.
Id. at 8 (footnote and citation omitted).
Next, the Plaintiff sought relief by way of a Motion Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). See Motion for Relief from Judgment; Newly Discovered Evidence pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1)–(4); Request for Indicative Ruling Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1; Request for Evidentiary
Hearing (“Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling”), United States v. Barroca, No. CR 94-
0470 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012). This Motion was also denied, and with respect to the TRULINCS
issue, the court held:
3
In the previous motion to toll, [the Government]
provided a declaration of a prison employee familiar with the
TRULINCS system who stated that the address for the Court
could indeed fit on the four lines generally allowed by the
system, and that in addition, the system allowed addresses
with up to six lines through the use of “Re:” and
“Comments” lines . . . . The employee also stated that he
had spoken with Petitioner about his problem and suggested
abbreviating the Court’s address if he was having
difficulties, but that to his knowledge Petitioner never
attempted to do so . . . .
Additionally, even if he were precluded from sending
the filing to this Court, Petitioner does not provide the date
he mailed the petition to his sister (whether it was sent within
the limitations period), or explain why it took 37 days for the
petition to reach her, and for her to mail it to this Court. He
has not established entitlement to tolling for the entire 37 day
period.
See Order Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and for an Indicative Ruling
(“Ord. Denying Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling”) at 2–4, Barroca v. United States,
No. CR 94-0470 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013). The Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied. See Order Denying the Petitioner’s Request for an Indicative Ruling, Request to
Amend or Supplement Petition, and Motion for Relief from Judgment (“Ord. Denying Mot. to
Alter & Amend”), Barroca v. United States, No. CR 94-0470 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013), ECF No.
890. In relevant part, the court reasoned:
Petitioner . . . takes issue with this Court’s holding that he
offered no evidence to contradict the December 20, 2011 finding
that this Court’s address fit on the TRULINCS labels, and that the
TRULINCS system thus did not prevent him from filing his habeas
petition within the statute of limitations. Docket No. 889 at 7.
Petitioner offers no new evidence or argument on this front, but
merely repeats arguments he raised in his previous motion. See
Docket No. 882. He argues, for example, that no one ever showed
him how to abbreviate the Court’s address to fit on a TRULINCS
label. However, as noted in this Court’s previous order, the two
abbreviations included in the government’s example label (“Attn:”
and “CA”) are in general use, and it is not clear why Petitioner
4
would specifically need someone to instruct him on how to use such
abbreviations.[] See Docket No. 886 at 3. In any event, Petitioner
raises no new point on this issue . . .
The only new information Petitioner offers in his motion
only undermines his argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling.
After concluding that he was not able to mail his habeas petition
using the TRULINCS labels, Petitioner ultimately filed his petition
by mailing it to his sister and having her send it to the court. In the
January 11, 2013 order, this Court noted that Petitioner had not
stated that he mailed the petition to his sister within the limitations
period, nor did he explain why it took until 37 days after the
limitations period for the petition to reach the Court. Docket No.
886 at 3-4. Petitioner now clarifies that he mailed his habeas petition
to his sister after the statute of limitations had already run because
he had been trying to obtain an exemption from the requirement that
prisoners use the TRULINCS system . . . He does not explain why,
knowing that the deadline for his petition was approaching, he
waited until after the deadline passed to mail his petition to his sister,
thus ensuring that it would not be timely filed.
Id. at 3–5 (footnote omitted).
The Plaintiff has now filed the current action, alleging violations of his constitutional
rights. See Compl. at 1. He demands a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary
damages totaling $20 million. See id. at 9–11. The Plaintiff relies on Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as support for his allegations.
Id. at 1. He sues (1) Charles E. Samuels, Jr., (2) Thomas R. Kane, (3) Harley G. Lappin, (4) Judi
Simon Garrett, and (5) John & Jane Doe Policymakers. Id. at 2–3. The Plaintiff is alleging that
BOP officials, both known and unknown to him, are liable due to their presumed involvement in
the development of the TRULINCS system. See id. at 6–7. He further alleges that these
Defendants failed to properly train BOP staff to instruct him as to how to properly use the
TRULINCS labelling system. See id. at 7–8, Pl’s Ex. A. Although the targets of this action are
new, the core of the Plaintiff’s argument is the same. He again alleges that TRULINCS is “either
not capable of or does not provide enough word, letter, and number space to enter” the full and
5
proper address of the sentencing court, which in turn, prevented him from timely filing his Habeas
Petition. See id. at 4 ¶ 4.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants implemented TRULINCS at USP Terre Haute in
January 2010, mere weeks before the February 27, 2010 deadline for filing his § 2255 Petition.
Id. at 4 ¶ 3. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants “knew or should have known that their
[p]olicy,” id. at 4 ¶ 5 (referring to Program Statement 5265.13), “would cause/is causing harm,”
id. at 5 ¶ 5, specifically by “deny[ing] him access to the courts,” id. at 5 ¶ 6. Due to this denial of
access, the Plaintiff alleges that he “was not allowed to mail his § 2255 [P]etition directly to the
district court.” Id. at 6 ¶ 10. Instead, the Plaintiff mailed the Habeas Petition to his sister, who
filed the Petition on his behalf, albeit “. . . 37 days late past AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Id.
at 6 ¶ 11 (emphasis in original).
The Plaintiff filed this action on July 23, 2013 2 and alleges three constitutional claims. 3
See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1, 6–9. In response to the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Defendants have
2
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff failed to file his Complaint within the statute of limitations
period applicable to this case. See Defs.’ Mem at 17–18. A defendant may raise a statute of
limitations affirmative defense by way of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “when the facts that give rise to
the defense are clear from the face of the complaint.” Smith–Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155
F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “[B]ecause statute of limitations issues often depend on contested
questions of fact, dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-
barred.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. Mileski,
662 F.2d 65, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The Court does not find that the Defendant has provided
sufficient factual information at this stage to support a statute of limitations dismissal under
12(b)(6), and therefore, the Court declines to dismiss on this ground.
3
In his Opposition, the Plaintiff includes two footnotes, in which he discusses two potential
additional claims, namely (1) an Administrative Procedures Act claim seeking injunctive relief,
and (2) an additional claim for policymaking liability as it relates to potential future difficulties
using TRULINCS to communicate with his family. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 nn.1&2. At this juncture
the Plaintiff has not properly requested leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). These additional
potential claims were not part of the original Complaint, and therefore, the Defendants would have
no notice upon which they could respond to these new potential claims. The Court also finds that
(continued . . . )
6
moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 12 §§ (b)(1) and
(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mem at 1. The claims asserted by the Plaintiff are the following.
Claim One: Policymaker Liability
First, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants “personally and officially commit[ted]
unconstitutional and tortious acts” when they “formulated, drafted[,] created, adopted, established
and implemented” the TRULINCS mandatory outgoing mailing label requirement for all inmates,”
which prevented him from timely filing his § 2255 petition, thereby denying him access to the
courts. See Compl. at 6–7.
Claim Two: Supervisory Liability
Second, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants “failed to and are currently failing to
supervise, train, and/or instruct subordinate(s) and staff in the drafting, creation, formulation,
establishment, and implementation of [the TRULINCS] policy to include any instructions for
inmates (written or oral) how to use TRULINCS . . . to place or add any address on a mailing label
or provide any exception/exemption for legal mail to the courts.” Id. at 7–8. The Plaintiff alleges
that the training by these Defendants was so “… clearly deficient” that violation of his
“…constitutional rights is/was inevitable.” Id. at 8 ¶ 3.
Claim Three: Violation of Due Process
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that he was denied access to the courts, because of the
mandatory labeling policy. See id. at 8–9. In turn, he contends that the imposition of such
( . . . continued) these potential claims fail to state claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), as the
Plaintiff’s potential additional claims do not appear ripe based on the present allegations.
Specifically, the Plaintiff has not stated that he has suffered “actual injury,” only that there is
“potential” for injury. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 nn.1&2; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356
(1996). Therefore, the Court concludes that no additional claims outside those in the original
Complaint have been properly asserted in this case.
7
restrictions infringed upon his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 8 ¶ 4.
II. DISCUSSION
A. VENUE
The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint based on improper venue or, in the
alternative, request that the case be transferred to one of two other district courts. Defs.’ Mem. at
12–13. The Defendants rely primarily on Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d. 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
arguing that because the Plaintiff was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California and was designated to serve his sentence at penitentiaries in California and
Indiana, the venue in this District is improper. See Defs.’ Mem. at 12–13. The Defendants discuss
the convenience and availability of discovery materials and witnesses as the bases for transfer. See
id. at 13. They also argue that the Plaintiff’s claims relate specifically to his inability to timely file
his Habeas Petition, which occurred during his confinement in Terre Haute, Indiana. See id.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district where it might have been brought. The Defendants have moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(b), to transfer this action. While a defendant’s choice of forum is a consideration when
deciding a §1404(a) motion, a defendant is not ordinarily entitled to the same deference as the
plaintiff. See Mahoney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2008). Because the
Plaintiff opposes transfer, the Defendants must establish that the added convenience and justice of
litigating this case in their chosen forum overcomes the slight deference given to the Plaintiff's
choice. See id. (explaining that deciding “choice of forum” is a balancing test). Further, at this
stage, the Court must accept the Plaintiff's factual allegations regarding venue as true and draws
all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the Plaintiff's favor. See Pendleton v. Mukasey,
8
552 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 274,
276–77 (D.D.C. 2002)).
District courts have discretion to adjudicate the issue of transfer according to an
“individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Here,
the Plaintiff’s allegation that TRULINCS policymaking occurred in the District of Columbia
creates a sufficient nexus between the District of Columbia and the alleged tortious conduct. See
Compl. at 4–7. Furthermore, the Defendants have not offered any evidence to controvert their
residency in the District of Columbia, and have generally failed to provide any other factual
support that this venue is improper aside from a paltry level of potential inconvenience. See Defs.’
Mem. at 12–13. Accordingly the Defendants’ request to transfer is denied.
B. SOVERIGN IMMUNITY & OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS
The Defendants contend that the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprives this Court of
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 7–8. Specifically, the Defendants posit that they are immune
from the Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages for actions performed in their official capacities.
See Defs.’ Mem at 7–9. A lawsuit against a government official in his or her official capacity
“generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent,” such that “an official [ ] capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (internal citations
omitted). The United States possesses sovereign immunity from suit against itself or one of its
agencies for money damages, except to the extent that it expressly consents to suit. Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953). Such consent, moreover, must be clear and unequivocal.
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (citation omitted). Thus, a waiver of sovereign
9
immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and [it cannot] be implied.” Lane v.
Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations omitted).
The Plaintiff here has not established that the government has expressly consented to
damages suits for constitutional violations. Such waiver is required in a damages suit, regardless
of whether such actions are brought against a government agency directly or against the officials
in their official capacity. Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 103 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence
of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
Such consent may not be implied, but must be “unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1992) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Absent
an explicit waiver, the Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claims for damages against any federal
government official sued in his or her official capacity. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Clark, 750 F.2d at 102–03; Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098,
1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Meyer v. Reno, 911 F. Supp. 11, 18 (D.D.C. 1996).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages as a result of any conduct
performed by the Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed. See Ranger v. Tenet, 274
F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003).
C. INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY CLAIMS
1. Personal Jurisdiction
The Plaintiff has also sued all Defendants in their individual capacities. See Compl. at 3–
8. The Defendants move to dismiss those claims under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(4) for insufficient process, and under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient
service of process. See Defs.’ Mem. at 9-12.
10
The United States Marshals Service submitted returns of service to the Clerk of Court for
Defendants Samuels, Lappin, Kane, and Garrett. See Return of Service/Affidavit of Summons and
Complaint (Oct. 1, 2013), ECF No. 5. Garrett signed for her summons. See ECF No. 5 at 4. An
unknown individual signed for the summonses intended for Samuels, Lappin, and Kane, and each
bore a stamp stating, “[a]ccepted on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Prisons or other named official
in his/her official capacity only.” See ECF No. 5 at 1–3. Service must be made on the Defendants
sued as individuals in compliance with Rule 4(e) and all subsections, which has not occurred for
Defendants Samuels, Lappin, and Kane. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia Government, 108
F.3d 366, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Only Defendant Garrett has been properly served personally to date, see ECF No. 5 at 4,
and the Plaintiff has failed to timely file a request for additional time to effectuate service on the
remaining unserved Defendants, see Defs.’ Mem. at 12 ¶ 2. While this Court has discretion to
allow additional time for service, it need not reach that issue in this case because the claims against
the Defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
2. Failure to State a Bivens Claim
The Plaintiff relies on Bivens as the legal basis for his individual capacity claims. See
Compl. at 1 ¶ 1; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 1 ¶ 1.
Policymaking Liability
The Plaintiff first makes a “policymaking” liability claim, alleging that the Defendants are
liable based on their assumptive personal involvement in creating Program Statement 5265.13,
and subsequently, instituting the TRULINCS system on February 19, 2009. See Compl. at 6–7;
see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 43–55. In order to state a claim against a government official for
individual liability for “infringements resulting from the establishment of unconstitutional
11
policies,” a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the official (1) established a policy (2) that was
unconstitutional and (3) caused the plaintiff to be injured.” Weise v. Jenkins, 796 F. Supp. 2d 188,
197 (D.D.C. 2011).
The Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any particularized facts to establish the specific
role, if any, the Defendants respectively had in creating the TRULINCS policy. See Compl. at 7–
8; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 43–44, 48–49. The Plaintiff falsely assumes that, because an individual
held a certain position within the BOP, that such individual then automatically incurs
policymaking liability. See Weise, 796 F. Supp. at 200; see Compl. at 6–7; Pl.’s Opp’n at 48–49.
Further, the Plaintiff must establish that the Defendants acted with something more than mere
negligence. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329–330 (1986). Allegations of participation or
actual knowledge and acquiescence must be made with appropriate particularity. See Cameron v.
Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of the
claim, he has failed to allege how the Defendants’ conduct exceeded mere negligence. In fact, the
Plaintiff has not pleaded with sufficient particularity that ordinary negligence was committed by
the Defendants, having failed to show that Defendants participated in creating TRULINCS’
labelling format. See Compl. at 6-7; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 43-55. The Plaintiff has, therefore,
failed to state a claim against any of the Defendants under the policymaking theory of liability.
Supervisory Liability
The Plaintiff concomitantly makes a claim for supervisory liability, and more specifically,
failure to supervise and/or train. See Compl. at 7-8; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 43-55. “The party
seeking to impose liability [on this theory] must demonstrate that the official had an obligation to
supervise or train the wrongdoer in the manner alleged, that the duty was breached, and that this
12
breach was a proximate cause of the injury.” Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1260 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). Again, more than mere negligence is required to forge the affirmative link necessary
“between the constitutional infringement and the supervisor's conduct.” See Shaw v. District of
Columbia, 690 F. Supp. 2d 43, 61 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The duty
to supervise is triggered by proof that, absent effective supervision, harm was not merely
foreseeable, but was highly likely, given the circumstances of the case. Haynesworth, 820 F. Supp.
2d at 1261; Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that
supervisory liability is triggered only when it is clear that “some deprivation of rights will
inevitably result”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Int'l Action Ctr. v.
United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that liability will attach where the
supervisor “know[s] about the conduct and facilitate[s] it, approve[s] it, condone[s] it, or turn[s] a
blind eye for fear of what they might see”).
Supervisory liability under Bivens requires evidence of actual or constructive knowledge
that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury; a plaintiff must also prove that a supervisor's response to such knowledge
was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the practices. Int’l
Action Cntr., 365 F.3d at 28 (explaining that the supervisor must “know about the conduct and
facilitate it”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. United States, 642 F. Supp.
2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009); Burke v. Lappin, 821 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2011).
Further, liability “is triggered only when a supervisor fails to provide more stringent
training in the wake of a history of past transgressions by the agency or provides training ‘so clearly
deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction.’”
Elkins, 690 F.3d at 566 (emphasis in original) (quoting Int'l Action Ctr., 365 F.3d at 27); see also
13
Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Merely being [the alleged wrongdoer's]
supervisor was not enough to attach liability.”).
The Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for supervisory liability against
the Defendants. See Cameron, 983 F.2d at 258 (noting that the plaintiff “provided no factual
allegations whatsoever to support his claim.”). In fact, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts
connecting these Defendants to the day-to-day operation of TRULINCS at Terre Haute. See
Thomas v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 2d 154, 157–58 (D.D.C. 2011). Instead, the Plaintiff
implausibly presumes that each Defendant was responsible for the supervision and training of each
and every subordinate at every prison throughout the country, including the facility where he was
detained when he sought to pursue post-conviction relief. See Compl. at 7–8; see also Pl.’s Opp’n
at 2, 43–55. The Plaintiff relies on the baseless presumption that the Defendants would have been
personally informed of the various administrative grievances that he filed with BOP, therefore,
providing the Defendants with requisite notice of the Plaintiff’s alleged TRULINCS hardships.
See id.The Plaintiff has plainly failed to state a claim for supervisory liability against any of the
Defendants. He has not alleged any reasonable basis that these Defendants were even aware of
his perceived hardships, much less that they engaged in a pattern of dangerous willful indifference.
See Compl. at 7–8; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 43–55. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to support
his claims under the theory of supervisory liability.
3. Qualified Immunity
The Defendants also move to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mem at
18–24. Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally protected from
liability for civil damages, and thus entitled to qualified immunity. This immunity is applicable
14
when the challenged “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity mitigates the “. . . social costs
[of] the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, the Plaintiff is again required to allege
facts sufficient to establish a plausible basis for finding that the Defendants, through their own
actions, knowingly violated the Constitution or a particular statute. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986). (“[T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
640 (1987)); see also Simpkins, 108 F.3d at 369 (explaining that a plaintiff must allege that the
official “was personally involved in the illegal conduct”).
Here, the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to find that these Defendants
personally participated in the alleged wrongdoing. No facts are presented to show that these
Defendants knowingly violated the Plaintiff’s statutory and/or Constitutional rights, which is fatal
to his claim against them. The Plaintiff’s reliance on bald conclusory statements that the
Defendants knew or should have known that their policy was causing him harm is insufficient. See
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18; see also Compl. at 6-9. His allegations are devoid of information
establishing the Defendants’ personal involvement as to his claims, apart from their hypothetical
distantly supervisory roles. See id. The Plaintiff relies on conclusory statements that the
Defendants “. . . knew or should have known that their [p]olicy would cause/is causing harm.”
Compl. at 5 ¶ 1; see also id. at 6–9. Such “bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
15
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18.
The Complaint is also devoid of any facts indicating that the Defendants personally
violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. See Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d
610, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Harlow 457 U.S. at 819); see also Compl. at 6–9. Moreover, the
Plaintiff’s Opposition also fails to offer any further elucidating information in this regard. See
generally Pl.’s Opp’n. Therefore, the Defendants are protected from suit by the Plaintiff under the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
4. Due Process Violation Claim
The Plaintiff broadly alleges that the Defendants violated his due process rights by blocking
his access to the court(s) by creating Program Statement 5265.13, and in conjunction with
instituting TRULINCS. See Compl. at 8–9, Pl’s Ex. A; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 44–45. However,
governments may impose limits on a prisoner’s liberty interests that are protected by the Due
Process Clause, “[b]ut these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which,
while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the
Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995). For example, changes “in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in
conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation), and the denial of privileges [are]
matters which every prisoner can anticipate are contemplated by his original sentence to prison –
are necessarily functions of prison management that must be left to the broad discretion of prison
administrators to enable them to manage the prisons safely and efficiently.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946
16
F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454 (1989)).
The TRULINCS system allows prisoners to correspond with individuals who are not
confined both electronically and by mail. The stated program objectives are (1) “[t]o provide
inmates with alternative means of written communication with the public,” (2) to provide the BOP
with an efficient and secure method of monitoring said communications, and (3) to reduce the
opportunities for contraband or illegal drugs to be filtered into facilities through mail. See Pl.’s
Ex. A at 1. Generally, an inmate must “. . . place a TRULINCS-generated mailing label on all
outgoing postal mail,” and if he fails to do so, “. . . the mail is returned to the inmate for proper
preparation.” Id. at 5; see also Program Statement P5265.14, Correspondence (Apr. 5, 2011) at 7
(“[A]ll outgoing mail, for institutions with a TRULINCS-generated mailing label system, must
utilize these mailing labels on all outgoing correspondence, in accordance with the Program
Statement Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS)—Electronic Messaging.”)
(emphasis removed).
The Plaintiff is not the first federal prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of Program
Statement 5265.13. See, e.g., Lineberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 923 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293–
94 (D.D.C. 2013). The Plaintiff has provided no basis and no authority to demonstrate that
required use of the TRULINCS-generated mailing label violates his due process rights. See
Compl. at 8–9. While “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution,” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84) (1987)), the “very object of imprisonment
is confinement,” id. at 130, and an inmate necessarily surrenders “[m]any of the rights and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens,” Id. at 131. Many federal districts, including other members
17
of this Court, have recognized that there are clear and legitimate penological objectives associated
with TRULINCS and its relevant program statement(s). See, e.g., Lineberry, 923 F. Supp. 2d at
293–94; see also Parisi v. Lappin, No. 10–40030–GAO, 2011 WL 1045016, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar.
18, 2011); Russell v. Whitehead, DKC-09-3007, 2010 WL 2367370 (D. Md. June 9, 2010); Jones
v. Daniels, No. 10–88–GFVT, 2010 WL 2228355, at *2–*3 (E.D. Ky. June 2, 2010);
The challenges that have been asserted against the BOP’s mailing system have been found
not to constitute a violation of any clearly established constitutional right, and more specifically,
fail to constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. See Compl. at 8–9; see also Pl.’s Opp’n
at 2, 43–55. Therefore, even if the Defendants were not shielded by the doctrine of qualified
immunity, the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a violation of his rights under the
Constitution. See id. Not only are the requirements of TRULINCS constitutional, but additionally,
the Northern District of California previously found that there was sufficient space for the Plaintiff
to have fit the court’s address on the mailing label, and that this could have been accomplished by
using commonly accepted abbreviations. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 8.
D. RES JUDICATA & COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (ALL CLAIMS)
The Defendants also raise the defense of res judicata as ground for dismissing the
complaint. Defs.’ Mem. at 14–17. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitious litigation
involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear
Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The doctrine contains two theoretical components,
which may operate together or separately, more specifically, claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s case
should be dismissed under both theories, see Defs.’ Mem. at 14–17, and the Court agrees that both
theories are applicable to the instant matter.
18
1. Claim Preclusion
The Plaintiff’s current case is completely derived from his alleged inability to fit a court
address on the TRULINCS mailing label due to the space provided, and perceived lack of
instruction by Terra Haute prison personnel regarding how to place an address on the labels. See
Compl. at 3–6. The Plaintiff argues again that he was unable to timely mail and file his Habeas
Petition with the Northern District of California, resulting in denial of the petition, and therefore,
violated his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Compl. at 4–6; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4, 7. These claims have
already been thoroughly adjudicated. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 8; see also Ord. Denying
Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter &
Amend at 3–5.
The Plaintiff maintains that the current action is not claim precluded because his current
claims “. . . were not raised in [his] habeas proceeding or in his equitable/statutory procedural
motion, i.e., his Motion and Request for Statutory and Equitable Tolling of AEDPA’s Statute of
Limitations & Motion to Vacate.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 32. The Court disagrees. The Plaintiff raised
his lack of access to the courts in his Motion and Request for Statutory and Equitable Tolling of
AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and to Vacate Judgment. See Mot. to Toll & Vacate at 10–11.
The Plaintiff requested tolling the statute of limitations, and additionally requested that the
Northern District of California vacate the judgment dismissing his Habeas Petition. See id. at 8 –
12. The Plaintiff’s Motion addressed the facts and the law pertinent to what is now being requested
from this Court. See id. In response, the Northern District of California found directly and
dispositively the following: “[a]lthough Petitioner claims that the mailing address of the Court did
not fit on the labels used by the TRULINCS program, the evidence establishes that the Court’s
mailing address did, in fact, fit on the TRULINCS labels.” See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 8.
19
A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating claims that “were or could have been raised in that action.” Sheppard v. District of
Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug
Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “Whether two cases implicate the same cause of
action turns on whether they share the same ‘nucleus of facts.’ ” Drake, 291 F.3d at 66 (quoting
Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). To determine whether two cases share
the same nucleus of facts, courts must consider “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin,
or motivation[;] whether they form a convenient trial unit[;] and whether their treatment as a unit
conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Stanton v. District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Northern District of California addressed the same claims regarding the TRULINCS system
as those raised in this case, and even assuming that it did not, the Plaintiff had ample opportunity
to raise them. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 8; see also Ord. Denying Mot. for Relief from
Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend at 3–5.
In his Opposition, the Plaintiff insinuates that he only sought procedural relief regarding
TRULINCS by way of his Motion to Toll & Vacate. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 33. However, the Plaintiff
actually raised substantive claims regarding the TRULINCS labels, not once, but on three different
occasions. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll & Vacate at 8; see also Ord. Denying Mot. for Relief
from Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend at 3–5. The
fact that his claims were previously before a court through motions rather than by lawsuit, is of no
consequence. See, e.g., Lewandowski v. Property Clerk, 209 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2002).
The Northern District of California examined the arguments and facts submitted by the Plaintiff
20
and the government, as well as a substantial amount of testimony and other evidence. That court
found against the Plaintiff, explaining:
Petitioner also takes issue with this Court’s holding that he offered
no evidence to contradict the December 20, 2011 finding that this court’s
address fit on the TRULINCS labels, and that the TRULINCS system thus
did not prevent him from filing his habeas petition within the statute of
limitations. Docket No. 889 at 7. Petitioner offers no new evidence or
argument on this front, but merely repeats arguments he raised in his
previous motion. See Docket No. 882. He argues, for example, that no
one ever showed him how to abbreviate the Court’s address to fit on a
TRULINCS label. However, as noted in this Court’s previous order, the
two abbreviations included in the government’s example label (“Attn:”
and “CA”) are in general use, and it is not clear why Petitioner would
specifically need someone to instruct him to use such abbreviations. In any
event, Petitioner raises on new point on this issue.
Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend at 3–4. The current claims inarguably arise from the same
nucleus of facts as the claims before the Northern District of California, while on consideration of
the Plaintiff's three post-habeas motions. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 8; see also Ord. Denying
Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter &
Amend at 3–5.
The fact that Plaintiff is seeking relief against new parties is of no consequence, as the
Defendants named in this case are in privity with the government. See Wilson v. Fullwood, 772 F.
Supp. 2d 246, 263 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he government, its officers, and its agencies are regarded
as being in privity for [claim-preclusive] purposes.”) (alterations in original); see also Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–3 (1940). Additionally, it is of no consequence
that the Plaintiff has asserted his claims in this case under the banner of different causes of action.
See Compl. at 6–8. Preclusive effect may be triggered and applied from claims litigated in a habeas
matter to those styled as a § 1983 or Bivens case. McIntyre v. Fulwood, 892 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215–
16 (D.D.C. 2012); Christian v. McHugh, 847 F. Supp. 2d 68, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2012); Wilson, 772
21
F. Supp. 2d at 262; Nuckols v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 578 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82–83 (D.D.C.
2008).
In this matter, the Plaintiff simply raises the same claims against different parties and for
different relief. Compare Compl. at 6–9, with Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 48, and Ord. Denying
Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4, and Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend
at 3–7. “This is precisely what is barred by res judicata.” Apotex, 393 F.3d at 217-18 (emphasis
in original). “[T]he parties to a suit and their privies are bound by a final judgment and may not
relitigate any ground for relief which they already have had an opportunity to litigate even if they
chose not to exploit that opportunity—whether the initial judgment was erroneous or not.”
Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). “[T]he facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence operate to
constitute the cause of action, not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies.” Page, 729 F.2d at
820 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claims are barred. See id.
2. Issue Preclusion
In their Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants also rely on the theory of issue preclusion.
Defs.’ Mem. at 14–17. “[I]ssue preclusion prevents the re-litigation of any issue that was raised
and decided in a prior action.” Ficken v. Golden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 21, 32 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). An issue is precluded if
the same issue . . . being raised [was] . . . contested by the parties
and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case, the issue
[was] . . . actually and necessarily determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction in that prior case[,] [and] . . . preclusion . . .
must not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first
determination.
22
Martin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Yamaha Corp. of Am.
v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Unfairness may occur where “the party to
be bound lacked an incentive to litigate in the first trial.” Otherson v U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 711
F.2d 267, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 333 (1971)). Additionally, “[i]n determining whether issue preclusion exists, a court may
take judicial notice of all relevant facts [that] are shown by the court’s own records, as well as
public records from other proceedings.” Budik v. Ashley, 36 F. Supp. 3d 132, 142 (D.D.C. 2014)
(Walton, J.) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The issue preclusion
analysis does not call for this Court’s review of the merits of the prior determination. See Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Bodman, 449 F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
The Plaintiff has already raised the same issues regarding his disfavor with the TRULINCS
system. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll & Vacate at 8; see also Ord. Denying Mot. for Relief from
Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend at 3–5. He has
repeatedly and exhaustively asserted that the Northern District of California’s court address would
not fit on a mailing label and, each time, the court found that said issues were meritless. Id. The
Plaintiff cannot now exploit the fact that his Habeas Petition and post-habeas motions were filed
under different federal statutes than the statute under which he now seeks to proceed. Hardison,
655 F.2d at 1288; Truesdale v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 657 F. Supp. 2d 219, 223–4 (D.D.C. 2009).
Further, as with claim preclusion, privity exists between officers of the same government; thus, a
judgment in a suit “between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in
relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government.” Nuckols,
578 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310
U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940)).
23
The Northern District of California addressed all of the following conclusively in the
several opinions it issued, concluding that: (1) the Plaintiff offered no evidence to contradict the
proof offered by the government that the TRULINCS label could be used and the address could
have been abbreviated, or why additional instruction to do so was required or expected, (2) the
Plaintiff provided no evidence as to why any abbreviation would render the address of the Court
unintelligible or undeliverable, (3) the Plaintiff failed to explain why it took an extraordinary
amount of time to mail his Habeas Petition to his sister, and (4) the Plaintiff failed to articulate
why he felt obliged to wait until his administrative complaints were exhausted before attempting
to abbreviate the court’s address. See Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll at 8; see also Ord. Denying Mot.
for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend
at 3–5. Simply put, if this Court proceeded to address the issues asserted in the instant Complaint,
that would amount to the relitigation of these same issues. Therefore, the Plaintiff is foreclosed
from litigating the issues anew.
E. DECLARATORY & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; however, he lacks standing to do so.
Compl. at 9; Pl.’s Opp’n at 55–57. To pursue a claim for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff
must have standing based on an “injury or threat of injury” that is “[both] real and immediate, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95–96 (1983) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Past exposure to conduct will not suffice to support
standing to pursue future injunctive relief. Id. at 96 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 49–
-96 (1974)). “[S]tanding to seek the injunction requested depend[s] on whether he [is] likely to
suffer future injury” from the challenged action. Id. at 105.
24
A preliminary injunction “. . . is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when
the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Chaplaincy of
Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, the court “must
examine whether (1) there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits, (2) [the]
plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted, (3) an injunction will
substantially injure the other party, and (4) the public interest will be furthered by the injunction.”
Majhor v. Kempthorne, 518 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232 (2007) (internal question marks omitted)
(quoting Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann, 480 F.3d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). A movant must
demonstrate at least “some injury for a preliminary injunction to issue for ‘the basis of injunctive
relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm.’ ” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel
Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (internal quotations omitted). “A movant's failure to show any
irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the
other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Plaintiff fails to satisfy any of the aforementioned prerequisites for injunctive relief.
He alleges that he is in danger of future imminent injury from continued implementation of the
TRULINCS policy based on the possibility that he may, at some point, be denied access to family,
friends, attorneys, courts, and others. Compl. at 9–10; Pl.’s Opp’n at 56. The Plaintiff is basing
this assumption on the alleged prior difficulties he expressed in mailing his Habeas Petition. See
Compl. at 6. This potential falls short as a basis for relief, as it constitutes prior alleged exposure
to harm. See id. Such an allegation is too speculative to support standing. See City of Los Angeles,
461 U.S. at 109.
25
The Plaintiff also fails to explain why he is in imminent danger of such potential adversity,
notwithstanding the findings of the Northern District of California that any such adversity was
self-inflicted. See Compl. at 9–10; see also Pl’s Opp’n at 56; Ord. Denying Mot. to Toll & Vacate
at 8; Ord. Denying Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying
Mot. to Alter & Amend at 3–5. Further, the Plaintiff does not contend that he has had any logistical
problems in mailing documents to his sister, and there has been no suggestion of any hardship in
his ability to mail multiple documents to this Court. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from
Judgment; Newly Discovered Evidence Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(h)(1)–(4). Therefore, the
Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits, and he will not face irreparable harm if such relief
is denied. His request may, however, substantially injure the government, as the TRULINCS
system was implemented to allow prisoners safe and controlled external communication. See
Majhor, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33. Carving out individual exceptions without any compelling
basis may prove a danger to TRULINCS’s successful implementation. See generally Pl.’ Ex. A.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed as to all claims and all Defendants.
The Plaintiff’s Habeas Petition was denied by the Northern District of California for untimeliness.
See Ord. Denying Hab. Pet. at 3. The Northern District of California subsequently examined the
facts, evidence, arguments, and circumstances regarding the Plaintiff’s late-filing, and whether any
alleged encumbrances caused by the TRULINCS labeling system contributed to this situation. The
Northern District addressed these claims and issues on three occasions, and the Plaintiff had ample
opportunity to raise additional theories and evidence during those proceedings. See Ord. Denying
Mot. to Toll & Vacate at 8; see also Ord. Denying Mot. for Relief from Judgment & Indic. Ruling
at 2–4; see also Ord. Denying Mot. to Alter & Amend at 3–5.
26
The underlying crux of the instant matter is the Plaintiff’s apparent dissatisfaction with the
determinations made the Northern District of California regarding his collateral attacks on his
conviction and sentencing, as evidenced by the Plaintiff’s focus on these issues in his Opposition
to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 35–38. The Plaintiff repeatedly
argues that the Northern District was “mistaken,” “incorrect,” and that it made any number of
errors. See id. at 37 ¶¶ 2, 3. Having exhausted his avenues for relief from the Northern District of
California, the Plaintiff is merely attempting to have this Court reconsider the decisions rendered
by that court. This Court cannot do it because it lacks jurisdiction to review the propriety of the
judgments issued by the Northern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (scope of
jurisdiction for all district courts); Cobb v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 3d 61, 65 (D.D.C. 2015);
United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[A]s a district court is a trial level
court in the federal judicial system[,] [i]t generally lacks appellate jurisdiction over other judicial
bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”) (citations omitted).
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that the Defendants are entitled to
dismissal of all claims. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and this case is dismissed.
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
_________/s/______________
REGGIE B. WALTON
Date: September 28, 2018 United States District Judge
27