United States v. Logan ( 2018 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
v. )
) Crim. Nos. 12-59-17(EGS)
Jonathan Logan ) 13-248 (EGS)
)
Defendant. )
)
_________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2013, Jonathan McCoy Logan pleaded guilty to drug and
gun related offenses in two criminal cases, and was sentenced to
an agreed-upon 147 months of incarceration pursuant to a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) plea. Several months after he was sentenced, the
government informed Mr. Logan that a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) Special Agent who was involved in the
execution of the search warrant attendant to his arrest had
tampered with evidence in other criminal cases. Mr. Logan now
moves to vacate his convictions and sentences under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 based on: (1) the information provided about that FBI
agent; and (2) an alleged technical error in his sentencing.
For the reasons that follow, Mr. Logan’s motions to vacate
his convictions and sentences are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In September of 2010 the FBI began investigating a network
of drug trafficking that stretched from Maryland to Washington
D.C. 1 See Factual Proffer (“Proffer”), ECF No. 461 at 1. 2 As a
result of its investigation, which included extensive physical
and electronic surveillance, the FBI identified several
individuals who would later be indicted on various drug
conspiracy charges. Id. at 1–2.
One of those indicted individuals was Jonathon McCoy Logan.
The investigation revealed that, on several occasions, from at
least September 2010 to October 21, 2011, Mr. Logan sold cocaine
to another indicted individual, Kelvin Heyward. Id. at 2–3.
Wire-tapped calls between the two showed that they would
coordinate these sales of cocaine at public locations. Id. at 3.
These calls captured the details of specific drug transactions,
as well as how the transactions were generally conducted. Id.The transactions came to an end on October 21, 2011, when
Mr. Logan was arrested during a drug deal. Id. at 5–6. The deal
commenced when Mr. Logan called another customer, Archie Kinney,
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number
of the filed document.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, docket citations in this Memorandum
Opinion are to Criminal Action No. 12-59.
2
to set up a meeting later that day. Id. at 5. At approximately
4:25 pm, Mr. Logan pulled into a shopping center parking lot in
Capitol Heights, Maryland and Mr. Kinney entered the parking lot
shortly after. Id. at 6. The two men parked their vehicles
adjacent to each other. Id. Mr. Logan next entered Mr. Kinney’s
car and sold him narcotics. Id. After the sale, Mr. Logan exited
Mr. Kinney’s car and began to back out of the parking lot. Id.At that point, Prince George’s County Police Department officers
arrived on the scene and arrested Mr. Logan. Id. The officers
then searched Mr. Logan as a result of the arrest and uncovered
a .32 semi-automatic handgun along with over $14,000. Id. The
officers next searched Mr. Logan’s vehicle finding $4,000 and
several plastic bags containing cocaine. Id. at 6–7.
Mr. Logan was charged in two separate criminal cases based
on: (1) the evidence accumulated during the investigation; and
(2) the evidence seized during the October 21, 2011 arrest. The
surveillance evidence gave rise to the indictment filed on March
8, 2012, charging Mr. Logan with one Count of Conspiracy to
Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute 5 Kilograms or
More of Cocaine and 280 Grams or More of Cocaine Base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(c). See
Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 12. The October 2011 arrest, and
subsequent car search, gave rise to an August 2013 indictment in
Maryland, later transferred to this district, which charged Mr.
3
Logan with, among other things, Conspiracy to Distribute and
Possession with Intent to Distribute 500 Grams or More of
Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(C); and Using and Carrying a Firearm During and in
Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). See Criminal Action No. 13-248, Indictment, ECF No. 1-1. 3
Mr. Logan was arrested at his place of business, the All-
In-One Stop in Clinton, Maryland, following the filing of the
March 8, 2012 superseding indictment. See Arrest Warrant
Returned Executed, ECF No. 34. That same day, a team of FBI
agents executed a search warrant at the All-In-One Stop; the
presence of one agent, Special Agent (“SA”) Matthew Lowry, is
relevant to Mr. Logan’s collateral attack on his plea and
sentence.
According to the United States Attorney’s Office for the
District of Columbia (“USAO-DC”), the investigation that
resulted in Mr. Logan’s indictment was conducted by the FBI’s
Safe Streets Task Force. Notice, ECF No. 563 at 1. SA Lowry was
assigned to a different task force -- the Cross-Border Task
3 As Mr. Logan points out, not all briefings were filed in both
cases. The Section 2255 motion and government’s opposition were
filed in both cases and are identical. Mr. Logan’s Reply was
filed only in Criminal Action No. 12-59, and the supplement was
filed only in Criminal Action No. 13-248. The government’s
opposition to the supplement, and Mr. Logan’s reply thereto were
filed only in Criminal Action No. 13-248.
4
Force (“CBTF”)--but he “provided some assistance to the overall
investigation at the time of the ‘take-down’ in March 2012.” Id.Specifically, SA Lowry participated in the execution of the
search warrant at the All-In-One Stop which led to the seizure
of several items. 4 Criminal Action No. 13-248, Gov’t. Response to
Def. Ltr. to Court, ECF No. 18 at 1–2. According to the USAO-DC,
SA Lowry was not listed on the chain-of-custody for any of the
items seized from the All-In-One Stop. Id. at 2.
On October 1, 2014 the FBI informed USAO-DC that “Special
Agent Lowry may have engaged in misconduct by tampering with
evidence . . . includ[ing] tampering with narcotics and firearm
evidence seized during investigations.” Notice, ECF No. 563 at
1–2. USAO-DC soon after informed the Court that a criminal
investigation was being conducted into SA Lowry’s misconduct.
Id. USAO-DC explained that it was recused from the FBI
investigation, but that it believed that SA Lowry’s misconduct
would not have an impact on the defendants in the case because
“of [SA Lowry’s] limited role in the overall investigation.” Id.
at 2.
4 The evidence seized during this search included several bags of
marijuana, a digital scale, and a plastic bag with white powder
found to consist of quinine hydrochloride by the DEA lab. See
Criminal Action No. 13-248, Gov’t. Response to Def. Ltr. to
Court, ECF No. 18 at 1–2. Notably, cocaine was not recovered
from the All-In-One Stop.
5
The FBI’s investigation into SA Lowry’s misconduct was
prompted by the discovery of SA Lowry under the influence of
drugs in an FBI vehicle on September 29, 2014. The investigation
revealed that SA Lowry began to remove FBI drug evidence in
“late 2013.” See Criminal Action No. 13-248, Mem. Of
Investigation, ECF No. 40-1 at 20. 5 He admitted to “taking a
small amount of [narcotics] prior to packaging and processing
the evidence” in an unrelated case. Id. SA Lowry admitted to
using drugs from “late 2013 when he began, through September 29,
2014, when he was found [under the influence] in his FBI-issued
vehicle.” Id. SA Lowry was charged with, among other things,
possession of heroin. See Criminal Action No. 15-34, Judgment in
a Criminal Case (“Judgment”), ECF No. 30. He pleaded guilty to
the charges and was sentenced to 36 months of incarceration. Id.B. Procedural History
On August 29, 2013, over a year before SA Lowry’s
misconduct came to light, Mr. Logan pleaded guilty before this
Court to two drug conspiracy offenses and to one gun-related
offense. One of the drug conspiracy offenses was in connection
with the narcotics he sold Mr. Heyward for which he was indicted
in Criminal Action No. 12-59, and the other was in connection to
the drugs recovered from his car during his October arrest which
5 The Memorandum of Investigation is attached as an exhibit to
Petitioner’s motion. See ECF No. 40-1 at 20–25.
6
led to the indictment in Criminal Action No. 13-248. See
Proffer, ECF No. 461. The third offense was for using and
carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, also in
connection to his October arrest. See Criminal Action No. 13-
248, Proffer, ECF No. 3 at 6. The parties agreed to a 147-month
term of incarceration pursuant to an 11(c)(1)(C) plea. See
Addendum to Plea Agreement, ECF No. 527 at 1. On April 17, 2014,
this Court sentenced Mr. Logan to a concurrent sentence of 87
months on the two conspiracy drug offenses, and a consecutive
sentence of 60 months for the firearm offense for a total of 147
months consistent with the agreed-upon sentence. See Sentencing
Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 627 at 35.
In November 2014 the government disclosed to Mr. Logan
the information about SA Lowry’s alleged wrongdoing. Notice, ECF
No. 563 at 1. The Court then directed the government to file
status reports regularly with the Court with updates on the
status of the government’s investigation into Mr. Lowry’s
alleged misconduct. Minute Order of November 13, 2014. The
government explained SA Lowry’s role in Mr. Logan’s case as
follows:
[G]overnment counsel understands that Agent Lowry’s
involvement in the investigation . . . involved
assisting in a large-scale "takedown" on March 12, 2012,
specifically the execution of one search warrant on
March 12, 2012, in Clinton, Maryland. Agent Lowry
participated along with a team of other FBI agents in
executing a search warrant at defendant Jonathan Logan's
7
business location. . . . Agent Lowry was not listed on
the chain-of-custody for any of the items seized from
this location.
Criminal Action No. 13-248, Gov’t. Response to Def. Ltr. to
Court, ECF No. 18 at 1–2. The government also made clear that
the only event in which SA Lowry participated in Mr. Logan’s
case--the execution of the search warrant on March 12, 2012--
occurred five months after October 21, 2011, which was the
ending date of the drug conspiracy with which Mr. Logan was
charged. Id. Similarly, the proffer of facts explained that the
gun seizure occurred during the October 21, 2011 arrest, several
months before SA Lowry’s involvement in the case. See Proffer,
ECF No. 461 at 6.
The government maintained this position for the remainder
of the case. During the guilty plea of a co-defendant, Timon
Sandidge, the government reiterated the minimal role that SA
Lowry had in the investigation in this case and reiterated the
fact that it would not use the evidence recovered during the
search of Mr. Logan’s place of business at trial. See H’rg Tr.,
ECF No. 626 at 6. Mr. Sandidge ultimately pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to a total of 72 months incarceration. See Judgment,
ECF No. 595 at 3.
Mr. Logan, pro se, filed the pending motions to vacate his
convictions and sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing
that SA Lowry’s misconduct entitled him to relief under the
8
statute. See Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613. After the government
filed its Opposition, ECF No. 643, Mr. Logan filed a
supplemental pleading, this time with the assistance of counsel,
making an additional argument that there was a technical error
in the calculation of Mr. Logan’s sentence, see Criminal Action
No. 13-248, Pet’r’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 40 at 3. The government
filed an opposition to the supplemental pleading, Criminal
Action No. 13–248, ECF No. 44, to which Mr. Logan filed a reply,
Criminal Action No. 13–248, ECF No. 45. The motions are now ripe
for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A prisoner who was sentenced by a federal court may move
the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence if the prisoner believes “that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A Section 2255 motion may be
denied when it “offer[s] only bald legal conclusions with no
supporting factual allegations.” Mitchell v. United States, 841
F. Supp. 2d 322, 328 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted). In
addition, “conclusory arguments may be summarily dismissed by
the Court.” United States v. Geraldo, 523 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22
9
(D.D.C. 2007) (citing United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619,
626 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
III. ANALYSIS
Mr. Logan makes a series of claims based on the role of SA
Lowry in his case. His original petition, filed September 18,
2015, raises four issues which he argues affected his decision
to plead guilty: (1) SA Lowry’s alleged admission that he
tampered with evidence during the search of Mr. Logan’s business
address; (2) the lack of procedural safeguards to protect the
evidence recovered by the CBTF during his October 2011
arrest;(3) the government’s failure to disclose Mr. Lowry’s
illegal actions in violation of its Brady obligations; and (4)
the DEA test results in connection with the search of his place
of business which allegedly show Mr. Lowry tampered with
evidence during the search. See Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613. Mr.
Logan supplemented the petition more than two years later, on
February 6, 2018, to add an additional issue based on an alleged
error in the calculation of his sentence. See Criminal Action
No. 13-248, Pet’r’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 40 at 3–5.
A. Evidentiary Hearing
As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes that no
evidentiary hearing is necessary. An evidentiary hearing on a
habeas matter is not required when “the motion and the files and
records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
10
entitled to no relief . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Appellate
courts generally respect a district court's decision not to hold
a hearing when the judge deciding the motion also presided over
the initial trial. United States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 437
(D.C. Cir. 2005). This is because a complete and uncontroverted
evidentiary record, Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,
494 (1962), coupled with the judge's recollection of the events
at issue, enable a summary ruling. Id. at 495; United States v.
Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Indeed, only
where the Section 2255 motion “raises ‘detailed and specific’
factual allegations whose resolution requires information
outside of the record or the judge's ‘personal knowledge or
recollection’ must a hearing be held.” Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1031(quoting Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 495).
Having presided over Mr. Logan’s guilty plea and
sentencing, this Court is intimately familiar with the facts and
history of the case. With no material facts in dispute, the
parties' briefs and the entire case record conclusively
demonstrate both that Mr. Logan is entitled to no relief and
that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. The Court
therefore proceeds to the merits of Mr. Logan’s claims.
B. Motion to Reopen Guilty Plea
Although Mr. Logan’s pro se motion is not entirely clear,
his first two grounds for relief--that his guilty plea would
11
have been different if he knew about SA Lowry’s misconduct--are
properly construed as an attack on the validity of his guilty
plea. Once a defendant who pleads guilty has been sentenced,
permission to withdraw the plea will be granted only “in those
‘extraordinary cases’ when the court determines that a manifest
injustice would result from allowing the plea to stand.” United
States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Moreover, “[t]o have a plea set aside on a [S]ection 2255
petition, the petitioner must show that the plea proceeding was
tainted by a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v.
Weaver, 265 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
With regard to the first ground, Mr. Logan claims that
“[u]pon information and belief, Special Agent Lowry admitted to
the F.B.I. that he was involved in the theft [or] misuse of
drugs seized in a search of [his] business address . . . and
[t]he [misconduct] affected both [his] decision[s] to enter
pleas of guilty . . . and to accept the sentencing guidelines
ranges agreed upon by the parties.” Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613 at
4. However, Mr. Logan fails to provide any factual support for
the claim that SA Lowry admitted to the FBI that he took drugs
during the March 2012 search. “Information and belief” without
12
some basis in fact is insufficient to support Mr. Logan’s
contention that the misconduct somehow affected his case.
In support of his claim, Mr. Logan repeatedly points to the
fact that an indictment in an unrelated criminal case was
dismissed because of SA Lowry’s involvement in executing a
search warrant. See Criminal Action No. 13-248, Pet’r’s Suppl.,
ECF No. 40-1 at 2 (citing United States v. Borges, 153 F. Supp.
3d 216 (D.D.C. 2015)). In Borges, the government moved to
dismiss an indictment against several defendants after admitting
that SA Lowry was “involved in executing search warrants that
yielded the most significant narcotics evidence recovered in
connection with [the] case” and that SA Lowry “played a
significant role in the execution of search warrants central to
the investigation.” Id. at 218 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Because of the importance of SA Lowry’s role,
and the significance of the evidence recovered during the
search, the court dismissed the indictment with prejudice. See
Borges, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 221.
The circumstances in this case are far different from those
at issue in Borges. First, the evidence recovered from the March
2012 search was not central to Mr. Logan’s case. Mr. Logan’s
statement of offense makes clear that the conspiracy to which he
pleaded guilty ended on October 21, 2011, several months before
the search of his place of employment occurred. Proffer, ECF No.
13
461 at 2–3. Critically, Mr. Logan swore under oath these facts
were true and was given an opportunity to correct any
misstatements or inaccuracies. 6 Second, Mr. Logan fails to point
to any evidence indicating that SA Lowry played a significant
role in the search or that he tampered with any evidence that
was the basis for Mr. Logan’s guilty plea. The government’s
several disclosures in this case state that SA Lowry was not
involved in the chain of custody for any evidence seized from
Mr. Logan’s place of business. Criminal Action No. 13-248,
Gov’t. Response to Def. Ltr. to Court, ECF No. 18 at 1–2.
Indeed, there was no cocaine recovered during that search and
Mr. Logan points to nothing in the multiple USAO-DC disclosures
to support his claim that SA Lowry in fact admitted to tampering
with evidence seized in his case.
Mr. Logan’s conclusory statements about SA Lowry’s role
during the search of his place of business cannot meet the high
standard that “the plea proceeding was tainted by a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a miscarriage of justice or
an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure.” Weaver, 265 F.3d at 1077 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Mr. Logan’s Section 2255
motion on this ground is DENIED.
6 Mr. Logan took that opportunity and corrected one sentence in
the proffer. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 643-1 at 24–26.
14
Mr. Logan’s second ground for relief contains similar
allegations but relates to the CBTF’s involvement in his October
21, 2012 arrest. Mr. Logan alleges, again, “[u]pon information
and belief” an FBI investigation into CBTF’s practices uncovered
the fact that there were “no safeguards for the integrity of the
drugs and weapon seized from [Mr. Logan] by the Cross-Border
Task Force” and therefore this evidence should not have been
entered into evidence or “played a part in the calculation of”
Mr. Logan’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Pet’r’s Mot., ECF
No. 613 at 5. Like the first ground, this argument fails because
Mr. Logan has not provided any factual support for this claim.
Because Mr. Logan has failed to support this conclusion with any
facts or citation to the record for support, this ground is
summarily DENIED. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d
619, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that summary denial of a
Section 2255 motion is appropriate when the underlying ground
for relief is speculative). 7
C. Brady Violation
Mr. Logan’s third ground for relief is that the “facts
surrounding the illegal acts when dealing with the chain of
7 Mr. Logan’s fourth ground for relief, that SA Lowry must have
tampered with evidence seized at his place of business because
the evidence consisted of a plastic bag with white powder found
to consist of quinine hydrochloride, Pet’r’s Mot., ECF. No. 613
at 11, is based on pure speculation, and therefore is also
summarily DENIED.
15
custody of confiscated items by FBI Special Agent Matthew Lowry”
is newly discovered evidence that should have been disclosed to
him. Pet’r’s Mot., ECF. No. 613 at 7. He further argues that at
“no time was [he] instructed as to what [SA Lowry] had done in
this case at bar.” Id. And therefore, there was a Brady
violation in this case. Pet’r’s Reply, ECF. No. 655 at 5.
A due process violation arising from the government's
knowing suppression of evidence entitles a defendant to relief
when “three components” are met: (1) The suppressed evidence is
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it provides impeachment material; (2) the government
suppresses the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) the defendant was prejudiced by the nondisclosure. See
United States v. Borda, 848 F.3d 1044, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2017) “To
satisfy the prejudice element, the evidence must be material.”
Id.(citations omitted).
Mr. Logan’s Brady claim fails because he cannot show that
the government either willfully or inadvertently suppressed
evidence against him. Mr. Logan is correct that the government
has an obligation to disclose material exculpatory and
impeachment evidence, and that this obligation extends to law
enforcement. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)
(stating “individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
16
government's behalf in the case, including the police”).
However, the government, including law enforcement, was not
aware of SA Lowry’s conduct during Mr. Logan’s plea or
sentencing. The government learned of SA Lowry’s conduct on
September 29, 2014, five months after Mr. Logan was sentenced,
when SA Lowry was discovered in his car. See Criminal Action No.
13-248, Mem. Of Investigation, ECF No. 40-1 at 20. USAO-DC,
which was recused from the investigation, was informed two days
later, on October 1, 2014, and alerted Mr. Logan of the
investigation into SA Lowry’s conduct on November 13, 2014 in
response to this Court’s Order. Notice, ECF No. 563 at 1. The
record shows that, under these circumstances, the government
provided Mr. Logan the information within a reasonable time of
receiving notice of the investigation from the FBI (i.e., 44
days), and provided the Court and parties with regular updates
about the investigation. See id. The record also shows that the
USAO-DC provided Mr. Logan with the same information given to
the co-defendants in his case. 8 See, e.g., Ltr. to Attorney for
Sandidge, ECF No. 643-1 at 40, 47–48.
8 Mr. Logan also argues that he is entitled to relief because Mr.
Sandidge received a significantly lesser sentence “as a direct
result of the facts surrounding the illegal acts” related to SA
Lowry’s conduct. Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613 at 7. The record
shows that both Mr. Logan and Mr. Sandidge were provided with
the same information and there is nothing in the record which
suggests Mr. Sandidge received any benefit in sentencing because
of SA Lowry’s actions.
17
Mr. Logan’s claims also fail because he cannot show that
the evidence he alleges was suppressed was material to his case.
SA Lowry began taking evidence in late 2013, around two years
after the October 2011 end date of the conspiracy Mr. Logan
swore he participated in during his factual proffer. See
Criminal Action No. 13-248, Mem. Of Investigation, ECF No. 40-1
at 20. Mr. Logan points to SA Lowry’s involvement in the search
of his business, but that search is not relevant to any of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty since it was conducted
several months after the time frame of the drug conspiracy. See
Proffer, ECF No. 461. Mr. Logan also points to CBTF’s
involvement in the evidence that was recovered during the
October 21, 2011 seizure, which formed the basis for the
firearms charge, but, again, he cites no evidence to support his
claim that the CBTF tampered with evidence and fails to provide
any evidence that SA Lowry was involved in that seizure. See
Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613 at 6 (citing CBTF’s destruction of
evidence as a basis for relief).
Mr. Logan has failed to show that the evidence he claims
entitles him to relief was either material to his case or
inadvertently or willfully suppressed by the government.
Accordingly, Mr. Logan’s Section 2255 motion on this ground is
DENIED.
18
D. Procedurally Barred Claim
Mr. Logan’s final claim is related to the calculation of
his Sentencing Guidelines range, despite the fact his sentence
was governed by a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
See Criminal Action No. 13-248, Pet’r’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 40
at 3–5. He raised this claim on February 6, 2018, over two years
after filing his original petition, in a supplement to his
Section 2255 petition. Id. That supplement states that “the pre-
sentence report incorrectly stated Logan . . . was on probation
at the time he committed the instant offense . . . giving him an
additional 2 points to his criminal history” under the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 3–4. Therefore, Mr. Logan argues,
he is entitled to new concurrent sentences consistent with a
Guidelines range of 78–97 months for the conspiracy drug
offenses followed by a 60-month consecutive sentence on the gun
offense. Id. at 5.
Motions to amend a Section 2255 motion are governed by Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States v.
Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Rule 15 prescribes
how civil pleadings may be amended and supplemented, and it
applies to § 2255 proceedings.”). Under the relevant provisions
of the statute, a defendant generally must file a Section 2255
motion within a year of “the date on which the facts supporting
19
the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4). 9
Amendments to Section 2255 motions are time-barred unless
they are “subsumed by the timely first motion pursuant to the
‘relation-back’ doctrine.” Hicks, 283 F.3d at 387. An amendment
is “permitted to relate back only when ‘the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading.’” See id. at 388 (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)). In this Circuit, a proposed amendment does
not relate back when it “makes claims or is based on occurrences
‘totally separate and distinct, in both time and type from those
raised in [the] original motion.” See Hicks, 283 F.3d at 388(citations omitted).
In his original motion, Mr. Logan argues that he is
entitled to relief based on the actions of SA Lowry and the
CBTF. See Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613. His claim of an error in
his sentence calculation is therefore based on occurrences
“totally separate and distinct, in both time and type” from
those raised in his original motion. See Hicks, 283 F.3d at 388.
9 The government points out that the one-year time period did not
begin to run in this case until November 2014, the date on which
the government disclosed the investigation into SA Lowry.
Therefore, Mr. Logan timely filed his original petition on
September 18, 2015.
20
Mr. Logan also argues that the Court should equitably toll the
one-year deadline but fails to point to any “extraordinary
circumstance[s]” which would allow the Court to do so. See
United States v. McDade, 699 F.3d 499, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(holding deadline was equitably tolled when defendant timely
advised counsel he wanted to raise claim four months in advance
of deadline and counsel failed to file in time).
The Court notes that even if Mr. Logan had timely filed his
supplement it would not be granted. In the case of a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that “includes a specific sentence,”
the Court may accept the agreement if the Court is satisfied
that the agreed upon sentence “is within the applicable
guideline range, or the agreed upon sentence departs from the
applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons.” U.S.S.G. §
6B1.2(c). If the court accepts the agreement, the
“recommendation or request binds the court.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(1)(C). In his plea agreement, Mr. Logan agreed that “a
sentence of [147 months] of incarceration . . . is the
appropriate sentence for the offenses to which [Mr. Logan]”
pleaded guilty. See Addendum to Plea Agreement, ECF No. 527 at
1. Even if Mr. Logan is correct that his applicable guideline
range should have been 138-157 months, because of a 2-point
reduction to his criminal history, the 147 months to which he
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agreed was within that range. 10 Because, even under his own
calculation, Mr. Logan agreed to a sentence that was within the
Guideline range there was no error in accepting the plea
agreement which governed the length of his sentence.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the supplemental motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For foregoing reasons, Mr. Logan’s motions to vacate his
convictions and sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are
DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District
October 25, 2018
10Mr. Logan’s argues that his Guidelines range for the drug
offenses should have been 78-97 months and does not take issue
with the 60-month consecutive sentence he received for the gun-
related offense. Thus, Mr. Logan argues that his actual
sentencing range should be from 138-157 months.
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