United States v. Longerbeam ( 2016 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Pxain¢irr,
V° crim. No. 08-0017 (TFH)
KENNETH LoN<;ERBEAM,
Defendant.
MEMoRANDUM oPINIoN
Pending before the Court is defendant Kenneth Longerbeam’s Renewed l\/lotion for
'l``ermination of Supervised Release [ECF No. 22]. On February 20, 2()08, defendant pled guilty
to one count of interstate travel to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. On l\/lay 22, 2008, the
Court sentenced defendant to 36 months of imprisonment, with a recommendation to the Bureau
of Prisons that defendant be placed in the 500 hour substance abuse treatment program, followed
by lO years of supervised release, which included terms requiring defendant to, inter alz'a,
register with the state sex offender registry in the state where defendant resides or works, worl<
regularly at a lawful occupation, and participate in sex offender treatment. By Order of August
4, Z()l 5, the Court denied defendant’s previous motion for termination of supervised release and
granted defendant leave to re-file within one year. in his renewed motion, defendant requests
that the Court terminate his supervised release because "[h]e has complied with all conditions of
his sentence and has successfully been on supervised release for nearly six years." l\/Iot. at 2.
'l``he government has filed an opposition [ECF No. 23]. Additionally, the U.S. Probation Office
has filed a response recommending that the Court deny defendant’s second motion for early
termination [ECF No. 24]. Upon consideration of defendant’s motion, the government’s
opposition, the Probation Office’s response, and the entire record herein, the motion will be
denied.
l\/Iotions to terminate a defendant’s term of supervised release are governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(l), which provides that
[t]he court may, after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(3)(1)» (H)(Z)(B)» ('¢1)(2)(€)» CH)(Z)(D)» (a)(‘i), (3)(5)» ('¢1)(6), and
(a)(”/')[,] terminate a tenn of supervised release and discharge the
defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of
supervised release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation, if it
is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant released and the interest of justice[.]
l8 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(l); see Unilea’ Sl'ales v. Mczlhz's-Garcz'ner, 783 F.3d l286, 1288 (D.C. Cir.
2()15) (concluding that "a district court must consider the specified § 3553(a) factors before
denying a motion for early termination of supervised release").l While section 3583(e)(l) does
‘ 'l``he specified § 3553(a) factors are:
(l) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence im osed. . .
P
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established form
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines_[or] . . .
not specify when early termination is "warranted by the conduct of the defendant released," the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has acknowledged that, per
the Second Circuit’s decision in Uniled Sliates v. Lusis‘z'er, 104 F.3d 32, 32 (2d Cir. 1996),
"‘ [o]ccasionally, changed circumstances~for instance, exceptionally good behavior by the
defendant or a downward turn in the defendant’s ability to pay a fine or restitution imposed as
conditions of release--will render a previously imposed term or condition of release either too
harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve the general punishment goals of section 3553(a)[,]"’
such that a defendant may be entitled to termination of supervised release under § 3583(@)(1).
_Mczlhz'.s'-Gczrdner, 783 F.3d at 1289-9(). However, as the undersigned explained in Unz’l‘ea' Sl’al'es
v. Elhe)"z'dge, 999 F. Supp. 2d l92 (D.D.C. 20l3):
[D]istrict courts applying Lussz``er to § 3583(e)(l) petitions have
found that even perfect compliance with conditions of release does
not qualify as "exceptionally good behavior" warranting early
termination. These courts have noted that "[m]odel prison conduct
and full compliance with the terms of supervised release is what is
expected of a person under the nnagnifying glass of supervised
release and does not warrant early termination." Unz``lecz’ Sl'al‘e.s v.
McKay, 352 F. Supp. 2d 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 20()5). In Unz‘led$z'ales
v. Mecz’ina, the court found that though defendant’s "post-
incarceration conduct is apparently unblemished, this alone cannot
be sufficient reason to terminate the supervised release since, if it
(B) in the case ofa violation of probation or supervised release, the
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Coinmission . . . ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . [;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
were, the exception would swallow the rule." l7 F. Supp. 2d 245,
247 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Tlierefore, a defendant must show something
"of an unusual or extraordinary nature" in addition to full
cornpliance. Iv]nil'ea' Sl‘al‘es v. Caruso, 241 F. Supp. 2d 466, 469
(D.N.J. 2003).
999 F. Supp. 2d at l96.
Here, in support of his motion, defendant emphasizes that he has, for approximately six
years, complied with the terms of his supervised release, including by completing sex offender
therapy, complying with sex offender registration requirements in the state of l\/laryland where he
works and lives, and niaintaining stable employment and financial independence l\/lot, l-Z.
De'fendant also notes that he has attended bi~weel552 U.S. 38, 49-5()
(2007) (noting that "the district judge should . . . consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to
determine whether they support the sentence"). The Court has weighed these factors again in
light of defendant’s above-noted conduct. However, while the Court commends defendant for
his law~abiding conduct and personal successes, such activities are expected of a person on
supervised release and do not amount to "exceptionally good behavior” or "soinethiiig of an
unusual or extraordinary nature in addition to full compliance." See Mczthz``s-Gczrdner and
li``lherz``dge, both suprcz. ln sum, the Court concludes that "the conduct of the defendant released
and the interest ofjustice" do not warrant termination of defendant’s supervised release. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(l).
Accordingly, defendant’s Renewed Motion for Terrnination of Supervised Release [ECF
No. 22] will be}or:i‘\'-:'d. An appropriate order will accompany this opinion.
Jtliy&,zoie
Thomas F. Hogan '
Senior United States Dist ge