Webb v. United States Veterans Initiative ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Stanley Webb, :
:
Plaintiff, :
v. : Civil Action No. 18-2931 (CKK)
:
United States :
Veterans Initiative et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has sued two private, non-profit organizations -- United States
Veterans Initiative (“U.S. VETS”) and The Community Partnership -- for discrimination in
violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. He also sues under the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq., and the District of
Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq. Am. Compl. at 2,
5 [Dkt. # 9]. U.S. VETS has moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am.Compl. [Dkt. # 14]. Plaintiff has
opposed the motion [Dkt. ## 21, 26], and U.S. VETS has replied [Dkt. # 19].
Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons explained below, the
Court finds that plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to sue under the FHA. Therefore, it will
dismiss the federal claim and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Organizational Structure and Services Rendered
U.S. VETS states that it “is the nation’s largest non-profit provider of comprehensive
services to homeless and at-risk veterans.” Mem. at 3. 1 It contracts with The Community
Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, which in turn “coordinates the District of
Columbia’s Continuum of Care” for citizens in need. 2 Id., n.2. Housing and programmatic
services are funded by “federal government grants” from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) for permanent housing; the Veterans Administration for
transitional housing; and the Department of Labor for work force programs. Mem. at 3, n.3.
This action arose from plaintiff’s participation in the Permanent Supportive Housing Program
(“SHP”) administered by U.S. VETS. Id. at 3-4; see also Am. Compl. at 3. “Through leasing
funds, . . . U.S. VETS makes housing affordable for program participants.” Mem. at 5. It “does
not manage or own properties or apartment buildings” in the District but rather “enters into lease
agreements directly with the landlord or management company to rent apartments for occupancy
use by its veterans.” Id. During the relevant time period, U.S. Vets had housing “arrangements”
for SHP participants at two locations in the District. Id. at 5-6.
1
The Court will cite the actual page numbers of Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 14 at ECF pp. 4-35]. For all other
documents, the Court will cite the page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.
2
The record does not show that a summons has been issued for The Community Partnership. In
in forma pauperis proceedings such as this, however, the Court is required to dismiss a complaint
“at any time” it determines that the complaint, among other enumerated grounds, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has not alleged that The
Community Partnership committed any wrongdoing; instead, he “alleges” that it “is the contractor
and coordinates, manages and has oversight” of U.S. Vets. Am. Compl. at 3 ¶ 12. That descriptive
statement does not amount to a claim. Accordingly, the complaint against defendant Community
Partnership is hereby dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2
According to U.S. VETS, plaintiff is a veteran who has been enrolled in the SHP for
more than eight years. He resided “in a shared 2-bedroom unit” located on Atlantic Street in the
District’s southeast quadrant from 2010 until January 2016. Mem. at 6; see also Def.’s Ex. B,
Feb. 12, 2018 Letter of Determination, No Probable Cause Finding (“Feb. 12th Dec.”) [Dkt. # 14-
2]. When plaintiff’s roommate moved out in late 2015, plaintiff lived alone “for a short time”
until in January 2016 U.S. VETS terminated the “property lease with the landlord because of
ongoing maintenance problems and housing code violations.” Mem. at 7. U.S. VETS had “to
move a dozen veterans,” including plaintiff who “[u]ltimately . . . was relocated to 2613 Douglas
Place, S.E. . . . in the Manor Village Apartment complex . . . where he lived in a 2-bedroom
apartment with a roommate.” Id. (citing Am. Compl. at 3; Orig. Compl. ¶¶ 8-10, 12).
On May 25, 2017, plaintiff filed a gender discrimination charge with HUD, claiming that
U.S. VETS had discriminated when it failed to offer him “his own apartment unit, while a female
client did not have to share an apartment unit.” Feb. 12th Dec. at 1, 6. On June 14, 2017, HUD
referred the matter to the D.C. Office of Human Rights (“OHR”), having “determined that the
fair housing law” enforced by OHR “is substantially equivalent to the [FHA]” and that OHR
“has the authority to address housing discrimination complaints within the area where
[plaintiff’s] complaint arose.” Def.’s Ex. A, June 14, 2017 Acceptance Letter (citing 42 U.S.C. §
3610(f)) [Dkt. # 14-1 at 10-11]. Following an investigation and an exhaustive analysis, OHR
issued the foregoing no probable cause determination. Notably, it found that the female to whom
plaintiff compared himself “was in a different program,” which unlike the SHP, “allow[ed] for
single occupancy.” Feb. 12th Dec. at 3. On June 22, 2018, OHR denied plaintiff’s request for
reconsideration and advised him of his right to file a Petition for Review in D.C. Superior Court,
within three years from the date of service of the decision. Def.’s Ex. C [Dkt. # 14-3]. Plaintiff
filed suit in this Court on December 13, 2018.
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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations and Claims
In the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. On October 8, 2010, U.S.
VETS “execute[d] a rental agreement for exclusive rights for apartment #301 at 425 Atlantic
Street, SE.” Am. Compl. at 3 ¶ 1. Pursuant to the terms of the lease “under DHS,” plaintiff’s
rent was “zero.” Id. In June 2012 while plaintiff was away, U.S. VETS “removed [his] personal
property” from the apartment without his consent and placed it in “apartment # 302 without a
valid lease agreement.” Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff “occupied apartment # 302 for four and a half years
without a valid rental agreement.” Id. ¶ 5. On “January 20th, 2017, U.S. VETS entered
Apartment 302 “and removed [plaintiff’s] belongings when he was not home and without his
consent.” Id. ¶ 7. It “took” the belongings “to 2613 Douglass Pl SE #203 without [plaintiff’s]
consent and without him being present.” 3 Id. ¶ 8. On January 30, 2017, U.S. VETS “appeared
at the apartment . . . and presented [plaintiff] with a blank lease” that he “refused to sign[.]” Id.
¶ 9. Plaintiff was given “an ultimatum” to sign and date the lease or “take his belongings and go
live in the streets.” Id. Allegedly, U.S. VETS “altered” the lease to make it appear as though
plaintiff “had agreed to the terms and conditions of their rental agreement and the program called
SHP.” Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff has not clearly delineated his claims. He demands an unspecified award of
monetary damages for “breach of contract” and at least “$50,000 for each violation” of the FHA.
Am. Compl. at 5.
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Based on plaintiff’s account, he was relocated to the Douglas property in January 2017 which
was the year after U.S. Vets had supposedly terminated the Atlantic Street lease. This seems at
first blush to be typographical error. According to U.S. VETS, however, several “clients,”
including plaintiff, had in fact “refused to move” to “substitute housing,” which caused it
“additional expenses in terminating the lease,” Mem. at 7, and “plaintiff was the last occupant to
move,” id. at 8.
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
A party may move under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To survive such a motion, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over its claims. Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir.
2007). In determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may “consider the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground
Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350 (3d ed.
2017) (noting the “wide array of cases from the four corners of the federal judicial system
involving the district court’s broad discretion to consider relevant and competent evidence on a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to resolve factual issues”). “Although a
court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),” the factual allegations in the complaint “will bear
closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to
state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“At the motion to dismiss stage, counseled complaints, as well as pro se complaints, are
to be construed with sufficient liberality to afford all possible inferences favorable to the pleader
on allegations of fact.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Despite the favorable inferences that a plaintiff receives on a motion to dismiss, it remains the
plaintiff's burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Am.
Farm Bureau v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000).
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B. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A party may move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A]
complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In considering such a motion, the Court accepts as true the
well-pleaded allegations in the operative complaint, but it does “not accept as true . . . the
plaintiff’s legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” Ralls Corp.
v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
C. Pro Se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), but still they must satisfy
the minimal requirement of alleging sufficient “factual matter” to permit a court “to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d
146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d
672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, when considering
a motion to dismiss, the court should read the pro se filings collectively. Therefore, the Court
will consider not only the facts alleged in the amended complaint, but also any facts alleged in
plaintiff’s opposition and supplemental opposition. See Brown, 789 F.3d at 152 (“a district court
errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, including filings
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responsive to a motion to dismiss”) (quoting Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
III. ANALYSIS
Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, this Court’s judicial power is limited to
adjudicating actual “cases” and “controversies.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). “In
an attempt to give meaning to Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the courts have
developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’ among which are standing[,]
ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.” Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v.
United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 750). These
doctrines incorporate both prudential elements, which “ ‘Congress is free to override,’ ” id.(quoting Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994)), and “‘core component[s]’” that are “‘essential and unchanging part[s] of
the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,’” id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding
of a case or controversy,” which “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a
lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016). A “showing of standing ‘is an essential and unchanging’ predicate to any
exercise of [federal court] jurisdiction,” Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)), such that “[t]he defect of standing is a defect in
subject matter jurisdiction,” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Although the parties have not briefed “the question of [p]laintiff’s standing . . ., ‘[i]t is
well established that a federal court cannot act in the absence of jurisdiction, . . . and that
jurisdictional issues’ including Article III standing ‘may be raised by the court sua sponte.’”
Jefferson v. Harris, 170 F. Supp. 3d 194, 220 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC,
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401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (alteration in original)). The “irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. First, “the plaintiff must
have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. Second,
“there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. Third, “it must
be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As discussed next, the
Court finds that plaintiff cannot satisfy the first requirement of standing.
In order to have “a defined and personal stake in the outcome of the litigation,” plaintiff
must show that he is “a proper plaintiff.” Fla. Audubon Soc., 94 F.3d at 663 (internal quotation
mark and citation omitted). Under the FHA, “[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil
action in an appropriate United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the
occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . . to obtain
appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice or breach.” 42 U.S.C. §
3613. An “[a]ggrieved person” is one who--(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i). A “‘[d]iscriminatory housing practice’
means an act that is unlawful under section 3604 [governing “the sale or rental of housing”],
3605 [governing “residential real estate-related transactions”], 3606 [governing “the provision of
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brokerage services”], or 3617 of this title.” 4 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f). “‘To rent’ includes to lease, to
sublease, to let and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not
owned by the occupant.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(e) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff acknowledges that at all relevant times, U.S. VETS “fully subsidized” his rent
“through its grant funding” and “executed” the leases for his apartment directly with the landlord
or property manager. Def.’s Mem. at 13-14 (citing Am. Compl. at 3; Compl. ¶ 3). Because
plaintiff is not a renter (actual or potential) as defined by the FHA, he cannot show that he is “a
proper plaintiff.” 5 Fla. Audubon Soc., 94 F.3d at 663. In sum, plaintiff has no “legally protected
interest” under the FHA and thus lacks Article III standing. 6
4
Section 3617 proscribes “[i]nterference, coercion, or intimidation” in one’s enjoyment of “any
right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606,” all having to do with the sale or
rental of housing.
5
Defendant has cited Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982), for the
proposition that “the sole requirement for standing to sue” under the FHA “is the Article III
minimum injury in fact.” Mem. at 17, n.11. Because that case addresses “standing to sue under §
812 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612,” governing enforcement actions by the United
States, and “injuries allegedly caused by racial steering practices,” Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S.
at 372, the Court does not find it directly applicable to this action brought by a “private person[ ]”
under § 3613. In any event, that “Congress intended standing under the Fair Housing Act to extend
to the full limits of Article III” answers the “prudential standing inquiry,” Spann v. Colonial Vill.,
Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990), but it does not relieve the Court of its obligation to consider
“core Article III standing.” Id. (citing Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 372).
6
Even if plaintiff has standing, his initial gender discrimination claim, see Compl. [Dkt. # 1],
assuming that it survives the amended complaint presenting no such claim, would fail as a matter
of law for two reasons. First, plaintiff is not an actual or potential renter or buyer, and while the
Supreme Court “has emphasized that the language of the [FHA] is ‘broad and inclusive,’ and must
be given a ‘generous construction,’ . . . the statutory language is clear that . . . the discrimination
[must have] occurr[ed] in connection with the ‘sale or rental of a dwelling[.]’” Abdus-Sabur v.
Hope Vill., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 3, 14 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Hunter ex rel. A. H. v. District of
Columbia, 64 F. Supp. 3d 158, 173 (D.D.C. 2014) (other citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
Second, plaintiff has not alleged an actual injury. He takes issue with the manner in which he was
relocated from one apartment to another and later to another apartment building, but he does not
dispute that U.S. VETS has never deprived him of a rent-free apartment in the eight years that he
has participated in its housing program. See Def.’s Mot. at 1; Mem. at 17-20. But for the
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the FHA
claim and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the D.C. statutory claims and any
common law claims. In addition, the complaint against The Community Partnership is dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
__________s/s__________________
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
DATE: December 17, 2019 United States District Judge
jurisdictional barrier, then, plaintiff’s FHA claim would not survive defendant’s motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
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