Byrd v. Metropolitan Police Department, Dc ( 2016 )


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  •                                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    DONETTA BYRD,                                                 )
    )
    Plaintiff,                          )
    )
    v.                                                    )       Civil Action No. 15-2076 (EGS)
    )
    METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,                               )
    )
    Defendant.                          )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 4]. 1 For the
    reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the motion.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The one-page handwritten complaint [ECF No. 1], while short on facts, clearly pertains to
    plaintiff’s encounter with unidentified Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers on
    February 9, 2014. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that police “knock[ed] and dragged [her]
    down,” and that she was taken by ambulance to the Washington Hospital Center for treatment of
    “a lot of swellen [sic] knees etc.” Id. As compensation for the resulting physical injuries, “aches
    and pains,” plaintiff demands damages of $999,999,999.999. Id.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
    Defendant first moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction. “Because [p]laintiff’s complaint fails to allege any facts [to]
    1
    The Court construes plaintiff’s “Appeal Order/Show Cause/Reconsideration Order” [ECF No. 7] as her opposition
    to defendant’s motion to dismiss. It fails to address the legal arguments set forth in defendant’s motion, however,
    and instead merely “ask[s] the Court to rule in favor of Donetta Byrd[.]” Id.
    1
    indicate that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claim,” Def.’s Mem. at 2-3,
    defendant contends that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety, id. at 3.
    “Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “[i]t is to be presumed that
    a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A plaintiff therefore bears the initial burden of
    establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
    over her claim. See id.; see Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Homeland Sec., 
    527 F. Supp. 2d 101
    , 104 (D.D.C. 2007). In deciding a motion brought under
    Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings” and it must “accept all
    of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food &
    Drug Admin., 
    402 F.3d 1249
    , 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted).
    Federal question jurisdiction, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , exists if plaintiff shows that her
    claim arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. See Arbaugh v. Y&H
    Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 513 (2006) (“A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she
    pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States.”). Here,
    plaintiff does not identify a constitutional or statutory basis for her claims, and it is not apparent
    that this action arises under the United States Constitution or federal law.
    Diversity jurisdiction, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    , is shown where both the matter in
    controversy exceeds $75,000, and the suit is between citizens of different states. See Price v.
    Phoenix Home Life Ins. Co., 
    44 F. Supp. 2d 28
    , 32 (D.D.C.) (“Diversity of citizenship requires
    complete diversity in which no opposing parties may be citizens of the same state.”), aff’d sub
    nom. Price v. Phoenix Home Life Mut., 
    203 F.3d 53
     (D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, although plaintiff
    2
    demands damages far in excess of $75,000 threshold, all of the parties appear to reside or
    conduct business in the District of Columbia.
    B. Failure to State a Claim
    Alternatively, defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
    on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
    Def.’s Mem. at 3-4.
    A plaintiff’s complaint need only provide a “short and plain statement of [her] claim
    showing that [she] is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that ‘“give[s] the defendant fair
    notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    , 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007)).
    “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint[.]” Browning v. Clinton, 
    292 F.3d 235
    , 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
    complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    ). In other words, it “must ‘plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Patton Boggs LLP
    v. Chevron Corp., 
    683 F.3d 397
    , 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    )). “[W]here
    the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
    misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not shown -- that the pleader is entitled to
    relief.” Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 679
     (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (brackets and internal quotation
    marks removed). For purposes of this discussion, the Court construes plaintiff’s complaint
    liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972), and presumes that its few factual
    allegations are true, see Gray v. Poole, 
    275 F.3d 1113
    , 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
    3
    Plaintiff alleges that police “knocked and dragged [her] down,” Compl. at 1, yet the
    complaint sets forth no other facts about the encounter. As defendant notes, see Def.’s Mem. at
    4, the circumstances of the encounter are unclear. If, for example, the police were arresting
    plaintiff, “[t]here are plausible scenarios in which [police] could permissibly ‘knock and drag’ an
    individual, such as while performing a lawful arrest.” 
    Id.
     Alternatively, if plaintiff “is alleging
    that MPD officers intentionally assaulted or battered her,” defendant might raise a different
    defense. See 
    id.
     As drafted, plaintiff’s complaint neither alleges sufficient facts to state a
    plausible claim, nor gives defendant fair notice of the claims against it.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint.
    Even if plaintiff had established subject matter jurisdiction, the Court finds that the complaint
    fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to
    dismiss will be granted. An Order is issued separately.
    Signed:         EMMET G. SULLIVAN
    United States District Judge
    Dated:          June 13, 2016
    4