Seawright v. Postmaster General of the United States of Postal Service ( 2018 )


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  •                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    TERENCE T. SEAWRIGHT,             )
    )
    Plaintiff,      )
    )
    v.                      ) Civil Action No. 18-460 (EGS)
    )
    POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE         )
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE      )
    )
    Defendant.      )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    I. Introduction
    Pro se plaintiff Terence Seawright (“Mr. Seawright”) brings
    several claims against the Postmaster General of the United
    States Postal Service (“USPS”), including (but not limited to)
    fraud, false claims, defamation, false statements, and
    concealment. He alleges that several management-level USPS
    employees used his name without his knowledge or permission to
    terminate another employee. Pending before the Court is USPS’
    motion to dismiss Mr. Seawright’s complaint for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court has
    carefully considered USPS’ motion, Mr. Seawright’s response,
    USPS’ reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record
    herein. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it
    lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s claims and DISMISSES his
    complaint.
    1
    II. Background
    Mr. Seawright alleges that several USPS managers “submitted
    a statement using [his] name without his knowledge or
    permission, trying to use [him] to help management terminate
    [another USPS employee].” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1. 1 According to
    Mr. Seawright, this “false statement” affected him and caused
    “great hard ship [sic]” for the terminated USPS employee and his
    family. 
    Id. Without going
    into specifics, Mr. Seawright also
    alleges that this incident was “not the first time management
    has made false statements to financially inconvenience an
    employee,” as it was “also done to [him] without just cause.”
    
    Id. at 1-2.
    To support his allegations, Mr. Seawright includes
    USPS paperwork from February 2013, notifying him that he was to
    be “placed in an off duty (without pay) status,” and other
    documents resulting from that notification. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1.
    He also includes letters from other USPS employees confirming
    that Mr. Seawright’s name was used without his permission to
    terminate another employee. Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-1.
    Mr. Seawright brings several claims against USPS including:
    “fraud, knowingly and willfully, false claims, punitive damages,
    mental anguish, defamation of character, pain and suffering,
    1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
    Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
    filed document.
    2
    false statements as to future actions, false statements and
    venue, false statement, concealment, false statement,
    concealment-failure to disclose, malicious malice, perjury,
    misrepresent [sic], conspiracy, falsity, breach of contract.”
    
    Id. at 2.
    He seeks more than $350,000 in damages. 
    Id. In May
    2018, USPS moved to dismiss Mr. Seawright’s
    complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
    The motion is now ripe.
    III. Standard of Review
    A “pro se complaint is entitled to liberal
    construction.” Washington v. Geren, 
    675 F. Supp. 2d 26
    , 31
    (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520
    (1972)). However, “[a] federal district court may only hear a
    claim over which it has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore,
    a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) motion for
    dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court's
    jurisdiction.” Gregorio v. Hoover, 
    238 F. Supp. 3d 37
    , 44
    (D.D.C. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted). To survive
    a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of
    establishing that the court has jurisdiction by a preponderance
    of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    ,
    561 (1992). “Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court's ability to
    hear a particular claim, the court must scrutinize the
    plaintiff's allegations more closely . . . than it would under a
    3
    motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S.
    Capitol Police Bd., 
    826 F. Supp. 2d 59
    , 65 (D.D.C.
    2011)(internal citations omitted). In reviewing a motion to
    dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court “may consider
    materials outside the pleadings” in determining whether it has
    jurisdiction to hear the case. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v.
    FDA, 
    402 F.3d 1249
    , 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court must also
    accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint
    and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,
    but the court need not “accept inferences unsupported by the
    facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual
    allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 
    154 F. Supp. 2d 61
    , 64 (D.D.C.
    2001).
    IV. Analysis
    USPS argues that the Court lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s claims pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because Mr. Seawright failed to
    exhaust his administrative remedies and because the government
    has not waived sovereign immunity for the claims that Mr.
    Seawright brings. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 5 at 5-12. USPS also
    argues that Mr. Seawright’s claims should be dismissed because
    he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
    4
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 See 
    id. at 12-16.
    Mr. Seawright opposes the motion, arguing that he pled
    claims “for false statement, concealment, and fraud.” See Pl.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 4.
    USPS argues that the Court lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s claims because Mr. Seawright
    failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a claim
    under the Federal Tort Claim Act (“FTCA”). Def.’s Mot., ECF No.
    5 at 7-12. Indeed, Mr. Seawright brings tort claims against USPS
    and seeks money damages. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 (“seeking
    $350,000 in damages per person,” the $400 filing fee, and
    “damages assessed for all laws broken”). “Because plaintiff
    demands money damages from a federal government agency, he must
    proceed under the [FTCA], which operates as a waiver of the
    government’s sovereign immunity for certain tort
    claims.” Edwards v. U.S. Park Police, 
    251 F. Supp. 3d 109
    , 111
    (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Richards v. United States, 
    369 U.S. 1
    , 6
    (1962)).
    “The FTCA provides that an action shall not be instituted
    upon a claim against the United States for money damages unless
    the claimant has first exhausted [his] administrative
    2 Because the Court agrees that it lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s case, the Court need not
    evaluate this argument. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia,
    
    108 F.3d 366
    , 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
    5
    remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 US. 106, 107
    (1993)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Indeed, “[a] tort claim
    against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
    presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
    two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun
    within six months after the date of mailing . . . of notice of
    final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
    presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); see also Mittleman v. United
    States, 
    104 F.3d 410
    , 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(“[T]he FTCA requires
    that claims be presented to the agency in question . . . . [a]
    claim not so presented and filed is forever barred.”).
    To exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, “the
    claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
    [f]ederal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by
    the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.”
    28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “In this Circuit, a claim is considered
    adequately presented when a claimant provides the agency with
    ‘(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to
    enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-
    certain damages claim.’” Tookes v. United States, 
    811 F. Supp. 2d
    322, 331 (D.D.C. 2011)(quoting GAF Corp. v. United
    States, 
    818 F.2d 901
    , 905 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The rationale for
    this “jurisdictional prerequisite,” GAF 
    Corp., 818 F.2d at 904
    ,
    is that “[n]otice of an injury will enable the agency to
    6
    investigate and ascertain the strength of a claim; [and] the
    sum-certain statement of damages will enable it to determine
    whether settlement or negotiations to that end are
    desirable,” 
    id. at 919–20.
    The record establishes that Mr. Seawright did not meet his
    “minimal” burden to file an administrative FTCA claim. Tookes,
    
    811 F. Supp. 2d
    at 331 (“the FTCA only imposes on claimants the
    burden of providing notice, not the burden of substantiating
    claims”). USPS attaches a declaration from Ms. Kimberly Herbst,
    a supervising “Tort Claims Examiner/Adjudicator with the [USPS]
    National Tort Center.” Herbst Decl., ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 1. Ms. Herbst
    swears that she conducted a search of “all Postal Service Law
    Department records of administrative tort claims” and “all
    Postal Service tort claim coordinator database records of
    administrative tort claims” for evidence of an administrative
    claim filed by or on behalf of Mr. Seawright. 
    Id. ¶¶ 4,6.
    She
    found no such records. 
    Id. Because Mr.
    Seawright did not file an
    administrative FTCA claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his
    claims. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 
    108 F.3d 366
    , 371
    (D.C. Cir. 1997)(finding that the district court “lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction, or if not jurisdiction, the functional
    equivalent of it,” because the plaintiff had not exhausted his
    administrative remedies).
    7
    Mr. Seawright does not dispute that he did not file an FTCA
    claim. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 7. Instead, he
    contends that the Court has jurisdiction over his claims because
    his name was used without his permission. See 
    id. at 2-3.
    He
    states that he was unable to resolve his issues with the USPS
    and “that’s the reason [he] filed [his] claim in Federal Court.”
    
    Id. at 3.
    Accepting Mr. Seawright’s allegations as true, he
    nonetheless may not escape the jurisdictional prerequisite that
    he file an FTCA administrative claim before filing his claim in
    federal court. GAF 
    Corp., 818 F.2d at 904
    .
    Moreover, many of the claims raised in Mr. Seawright’s
    complaint are claims for which the FTCA expressly does not waive
    sovereign immunity. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) expressly
    exempts “any claim arising out of . . . libel, slander,
    misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
    rights.” Compare with Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 (listing claims
    related to USPS’ alleged deceit, including misrepresentation,
    defamation of character, and fraud). As Mr. Seawright himself
    notes, his claims arise out of deceit, defamation, and
    misrepresentation, as his name was used “without [his] knowledge
    or consent.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 2. Thus, his claims must
    dismissed, as “[c]laims that fall under one of the exceptions to
    the FTCA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
    8
    jurisdiction.” Edmonds v. United States, 
    436 F. Supp. 2d 28
    , 35
    (D.D.C. 2006).
    Finally, Mr. Seawright contends that his claim is a “qui
    tam action,” over which this Court has jurisdiction. Pl.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 3. However, Mr. Seawright has not followed
    the proper procedure for filing a qui tam action under 31 U.S.C.
    § 3730(b)(mandating that a private person bringing a qui tam
    suit must do so in the name of the government). Moreover, Mr.
    Seawright may not bring a qui tam action “based upon allegations
    or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an
    administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the
    Government is already a party.” 
    Id. § 3730(e).
    As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s
    claims and his arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
    V. Conclusion and Order
    Upon careful consideration of Mr. Seawright’s arguments and
    the applicable law, USPS’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED
    for the aforementioned reasons. Mr. Seawright’s case is
    DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety.
    This is a final, appealable Order.
    SO ORDERED.
    Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
    United States District Judge
    November 26, 2018
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