Ross v. Georgetown University ( 2019 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    GREGORY ROSS,                       )
    )
    Plaintiff,      )
    )
    v.                            )                Civil Action No. 18-0671 (ABJ)
    )
    GEORGETOWN                          )
    UNIVERSITY, et al.,                 )
    )
    Defendants.     )
    ____________________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Gregory Ross is a member of the Georgetown University Police Department
    (“GUPD”). Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 10] ¶ 2. He claims that his employer, Georgetown University,
    and his supervisor, Captain Glenette M. Hilton, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
    
    42 U.S.C. § 2000
    (e) et seq. (2012), and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) of 1977, 
    D.C. Code § 2-1402.11
    , when they allegedly discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile
    work environment. 
    Id. ¶ 1
    .
    Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that (1) plaintiff failed to
    state a timely claim under both Title VII and the DCHRA; (2) he failed to exhaust his
    administrative remedies under Title VII; (3) he failed to make the requisite election of remedies
    under the DCHRA; and (4) he failed to sufficiently plead a hostile work environment claim under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 12] (“Defs.’ Mot.”);
    Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt. # 12-1] (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 5–11. Defendants
    also argue that the claims against Captain Hilton should be dismissed entirely because they are
    barred or otherwise without foundation. Defs.’ Mem. at 11–14.
    The Court will grant the motion in part and remand the remainder of the case to the D.C.
    Superior Court. Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
    environment will be dismissed because they are untimely and fail to state a claim. Since the federal
    claims will be dismissed, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state
    law claim, and it will be remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff Gregory Ross began working at Georgetown University on November 6, 1996 as
    a Patrol Officer with the University’s Police Department. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. In 2009, he was
    promoted to Patrol Sergeant. 
    Id. ¶ 9
    .
    In 2012, GUPD hired Captain Glenette Hilton, who became plaintiff’s supervisor. Am.
    Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts that the department then increased its emphasis on racial profiling,
    “particularly of African Americans.” 
    Id. ¶ 11
    . Plaintiff refused to participate in this practice, and
    he asserts that his refusal “has resulted in continued negative performance reviews and reprimands,
    creating a hostile work environment for him.” 
    Id. ¶ 12
    . The complaint recounts a number of
    incidents that plaintiff alleges were animated by racial discrimination and retaliation:
    1.    On March 2, 2012, plaintiff “was involved in an accident involving a
    university vehicle while exiting a University parking lot,” and while it was
    only a “minor scrape,” and he immediately reported it, “he was nevertheless
    reprimanded.” Am. Compl. ¶ 13. He notes that other officers involved in
    similar accidents were not similarly reprimanded. 
    Id. ¶ 14
    .
    2.    On October 24, 2012, plaintiff “was suspended for one (1) day without pay
    for insubordination” because he allegedly worked overtime without
    authorization on October 7, 2012. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. The suspension was
    overturned, and on January 23, 2013, his related pay was restored. 
    Id. 3
    .    On August 18, 2014, plaintiff was involved in apprehending a bicycle thief.
    The other officers involved received recognition for the arrest, but he did
    not. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.
    2
    4.   In September 2014, plaintiff refused to arrest three young African American
    men who were sitting outside one of the University’s libraries. Am. Compl.
    ¶ 18. Someone had made a report concerning the men, and plaintiff
    responded to the scene, but when he arrived, “he observed no indication of
    wrongdoing,” and he took no action because, according to plaintiff, he
    lacked probable cause. 
    Id.
     On November 24, 2014, plaintiff was suspended
    for three days as a result of his inaction. 
    Id. ¶ 19
    . He claims that Captain
    Hilton reprimanded him, stating: “You knew what they were. You grew up
    in D.C. They should have been arrested.” 
    Id. ¶ 20
    .
    5.   On January 8, 2015, plaintiff supervised a team of officers making an arrest,
    but he did not receive recognition for it. Am. Compl. ¶ 21.
    6.   On March 15, 2015, during that year’s NCAA Men’s Basketball Annual
    Tournament Selection Sunday, an African-American man was “apparently
    attempting, uninvited, to speak with Coach John Thompson III.” Am.
    Compl. ¶ 22. GUPD was called, and according to plaintiff, the event
    coordinator instructed the officers not to arrest the man. 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 23–24.
    Plaintiff “assessed the situation, and assigned one of his Officers to monitor
    the individual.” 
    Id.
     He then left the scene to resume his campus patrol. 
    Id.
    At some point, the same individual renewed his unwelcome attempts to
    contact Coach Thompson, and the assigned officer escorted him to the
    police station where he was issued a “Banning Order.” 
    Id. ¶ 25
    . On May
    27, 2015, plaintiff was demoted to Special Police Officer by Chief of Police
    Jay Gruber, on the recommendation of Captain Hilton, for “poor work
    performance and failure to adhere to operational guidelines” because he
    failed to stay at the event and arrest the man. 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 28–31. Plaintiff asserts
    he was following “a written policy of de-escalation.” 
    Id. ¶ 28
    .
    7.   On January 20, 2016, Captain Hilton allowed the University’s SafeRide
    program to continue operating despite a snow storm, and when plaintiff’s
    vehicle slid down the road into another car, he was blamed for the accident.
    Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–34.
    3
    On December 1, 2015, 1 plaintiff submitted an “Intake Questionnaire” to the D.C. Office of
    Human Rights (“DCOHR”) alleging that the University had subjected him to discrimination and
    retaliation on the basis of his race. Am. Compl. ¶ 37; Intake Questionnaire, Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mem.
    of P. & A. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt. # 15-1]. On May 19, 2016, a Charge of Discrimination
    was filed with the DCOHR. See Charge of Discrimination, Ex. A to Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt. # 12-2]
    (“Disc. Charge”). The face of the charge indicates that it was cross-filed with the EEOC. 
    Id.
    On January 29, 2018, plaintiff initiated a civil action in the Superior Court of D.C. against
    Georgetown University, Captain Hilton, University President John J. DeGioia, and Chief of Police
    Jay Gruber for violations of Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act. See Notice of Removal
    [Dkt. # 1] (“Removal Notice”) at 1. Defendants removed the action to this Court on March 23,
    2018 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1441
    (a). 
    Id.
     at 2–3. On April
    26, 2018, plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting the same claims against Georgetown
    University and Captain Hilton (collectively, “defendants”); the parties stipulated to the dismissal
    of the other two defendants on May 4, 2018. See generally Am. Compl.; Stipulation of Dismissal
    [Dkt. # 11].
    On May 10, 2018, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. See Defs.’ Mot.; Defs.’
    Mem. Plaintiff opposed the motion on June 11, 2018, see Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp. to Defs.’
    1       In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff states that he submitted the Intake Questionnaire on
    December 11, 2015. Am. Compl. ¶ 37. But in his Memorandum Responding to the Court’s March
    25 Minute Order, plaintiff states he filed the Intake Questionnaire on December 1, 2015. See Mem.
    Responding to Court’s March 25 Order [Dkt. # 19] (“Pl.’s Resp.”) at 1. Whether it was December
    1 or December 11 does not make a difference to the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims. The date of
    the handwritten Intake Questionnaire is difficult to decipher, but it appears to indicate that it was
    filed on December 1, 2015, and so the Court will use this date. See Intake Questionnaire, Ex. 2 to
    Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt. # 15-1] at 2.
    4
    Mot. [Dkt. # 15] (“Pl.’s Mem.”), and defendants replied on June 22, 2018. See Defs.’ Reply to
    Pl.’s Mem. [Dkt. # 17] (“Defs.’ Reply”).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
    matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). In Iqbal,
    the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the
    tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
    to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    . And “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a
    plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” 
    Id. at 679
    , citing Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 556
    .
    A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    . “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
    a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 
    Id.
     A pleading must offer more than
    “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” 
    id.,
    quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    , and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
    supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 
    Id.
    In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “treat the complaint’s
    factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived
    from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
    216 F.3d 1111
    , 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
    (internal citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States, 
    617 F.2d 605
    , 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
    see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 
    642 F.3d 1137
    , 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v.
    Principi, 
    394 F.3d 970
    , 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss, a
    5
    court must construe a complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,
    
    16 F.3d 1271
    , 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the court need not accept inferences drawn by
    the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the
    court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Id.; see also Browning v. Clinton, 
    292 F.3d 235
    , 242
    (D.C. Cir. 2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may
    ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or
    incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters about which the Court may take judicial
    notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 
    226 F. Supp. 2d 191
    , 196 (D.D.C. 2002), citing EEOC v. St.
    Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 
    117 F.3d 621
    , 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
    ANALYSIS
    I.   Title VII Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
    A. Timeliness
    Title VII requires the “person aggrieved” to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days
    after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, but this period is extended to 300 days
    if the person “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
    5(e)(1). Because plaintiff filed an Intake Questionnaire with the DCOHR, thereby instituting
    proceedings with a local agency, he had 300 days from the time of the alleged violation to file his
    charge. Am. Compl. ¶ 37; Intake Questionnaire.
    Plaintiff seems to argue that the statute of limitations applicable to his Title VII claims is
    one year because the DCHRA provides a one-year statute of limitations. See Pl.’s Mem. at 2
    (arguing that the defense’s claim that the complaint is “time-barred under Title VII is irrelevant
    because he filed under the [DCHRA] which provides a one-year deadline”). Plaintiff is correct
    that the DCHRA establishes a one-year limitations period, see 
    D.C. Code § 2-1403.16
    (a), but the
    6
    statute of limitations set forth in the D.C. Code does not apply to Title VII claims. EEOC v.
    Commercial Office Prods. Co., 
    486 U.S. 107
    , 123 (1988) (“[S]tate time limits for filing
    discrimination claims do not determine the applicable federal time limit.”); see Said v. Nat’l R.R.
    Passenger Corp., 
    317 F. Supp. 3d 304
    , 319 (D.D.C. 2018) (filing a complaint with the DCOHR
    did not render plaintiff’s Title VII claims timely). Thus, 300 days is the correct time period to
    apply to plaintiff’s Title VII claims.
    Defendant argues that the claims brought under Title VII are time-barred because the
    complaint does not allege that any unlawful employment practices occurred within 300 days of
    May 19, 2016, the date plaintiff filed a document entitled “Charge of Discrimination” with the
    D.C. agency. See Disc. Charge. Plaintiff asserts that the date he submitted the original Intake
    Questionnaire to the DCOHR – December 1, 2015 – should control instead. See Pl.’s Mem. at 2–
    3.
    To file a complaint with the DCOHR, all one needs to do is fill out and submit the Intake
    Questionnaire. See “File a Discrimination Complaint,” DCOHR, https://ohr.dc.gov/service/file-
    discrimination-complaint (last accessed May 29, 2019).             The description of the Intake
    Questionnaire states: “Submitting this complaint questionnaire does not constitute the formal filing
    of a discrimination charge, but it serves to preserve all rights under the statute of limitations.” See
    Intake Questionnaire, Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mem. [Dkt. # 15-1] (“Intake Questionnaire Description”).
    Under the “Acknowledgement” section of the Intake Questionnaire, a complainant has the option
    to check a box that states: “I want to file a charge of discrimination, and I authorize OHR to
    investigate the discrimination I described above.” Intake Questionnaire at 2. But, plaintiff did not
    check that box on his Intake Questionnaire. See 
    id.
    7
    The DCOHR and the EEOC have a work-sharing agreement, which means that “[c]harges
    received by one agency under the agreement shall be deemed received by the other agency.”
    Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 
    514 F.3d 1365
    , 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2008), citing 
    29 C.F.R. § 1626.10
    (c) (regulations applicable to the ADEA); see 
    29 C.F.R. § 1601.13
    (a)(4)(ii)(A) (“Where
    the document on its face constitutes a charge . . . the charge is deemed to be filed with the [EEOC]
    upon receipt of the document. Such filing is timely if the charge is received within 300 days from
    the date of the alleged violation.”). The “charge” plaintiff filed with the DCOHR specifically
    states that it is being cross-filed with the EEOC. See Disc. Charge at 2 (indicating that the charge
    was “presented to” the EEOC).
    Plaintiff maintains that the Intake Questionnaire he submitted on December 1, 2015
    qualifies as a “charge” that was cross-filed with the EEOC for purposes of the statute of limitations.
    See Pl.’s Resp. at 1. But the D.C. Circuit has found that an “Intake Questionnaire is not a Charge
    of discrimination.” Dyson v. District of Columbia, 
    710 F.3d 415
    , 418 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In that
    case, the plaintiff filed an Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC alleging sexual harassment claims
    under both the DCHRA and Title VII. 
    Id.
     A charge of discrimination was filed months later,
    beyond the time period set forth in Title VII. The Court reasoned that because the Intake
    Questionnaire expressly warned claimants that a charge must be filed with the EEOC within the
    time limits imposed by law, that the filing of the questionnaire did not toll the statute of limitations.
    
    Id.
    While in the Dyson case, the Intake Questionnaire was filed first with the EEOC, and here
    it was filed first with the DCOHR, the DCOHR Intake Questionnaire states on its face that it “does
    not constitute the formal filing of a discrimination charge.” See Intake Questionnaire Description;
    see       also        “Employment           Intake       Questionnaire          Form,”        DCOHR,
    8
    https://ohr.dc.gov/page/employment-intake-questionnaire-form (last accessed May 29, 2019).
    And on December 1, plaintiff did not check the box on the Intake Questionnaire with which he
    could have stated: “I want to file a charge of discrimination.” 
    Id.
     Instead, plaintiff filed a separate
    document, entitled “Charge of Discrimination,” more than five months later, on May 19, 2016.
    See Disc. Charge. at 2. This document does state that it was simultaneously filed with the EEOC,
    and that there, it was assigned case number 10C-2016-00435. 
    Id.
     Indeed, the case number itself
    is indication that as far as the federal agency was concerned, the charge was not filed in 2015,
    since it is labeled with the year 2016. 2
    Plaintiff points out that the DCOHR Intake Questionnaire states that it preserves all rights
    under the statute of limitations. Pl.’s Mem. at 3. And the District’s form does have that effect in
    connection with claims brought under D.C. law. In order for the DCHRA claims to be timely, a
    plaintiff need only file a “complaint” with the DCOHR “within [one] year of the occurrence of the
    unlawful discriminatory practice, or the discovery thereof,” 
    D.C. Code § 2
    –1403.04(a), and an
    Intake Questionnaire qualifies as a “complaint.” See “File a Discrimination Complaint,” DCOHR,
    https://ohr.dc.gov/service/file-discrimination-complaint (last accessed May 29, 2019) (instructing
    that “[t]o file a complaint with the [DCOHR],” a person must “simply complete an intake
    questionnaire and submit it to [the DCOHR]”). But, as the D.C. Circuit explained in Dyson, that
    2       While the Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination are not attached to his
    complaint, the Court concludes that they have been incorporated by reference since each is
    “referred to in the complaint and [is] integral to [plaintiff’s] claim.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v.
    Graham, 
    798 F.3d 1119
    , 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Exhibits so incorporated are considered part of
    the pleadings and may be considered by the Court on a motion to dismiss without converting the
    motion into a motion for summary judgment. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
    9
    does not mean that the Intake Questionnaire qualifies as a Charge of Discrimination that was cross-
    filed with the EEOC on that date. 3 See 710 F.3d at 418.
    Thus, the Court finds that the “Charge” was filed on May 19, 2016, and that only
    allegations based on discriminatory acts that occurred 300 days prior to that date are timely for the
    purposes of the Title VII claims. Defendant only alleges one act that occurred within this time
    period: that on January 20, 2016, he was blamed for an accident involving a university vehicle.
    See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–34. For the reasons stated in the next section, this incident does not qualify
    as an adverse action for purposes of Title VII.
    Plaintiff also seems to suggest that all of the acts he identifies are related and connected
    events, and so they cannot be time-barred since the last act occurred within 300 days of the filing
    of the questionnaire. See Pl.’s Mem. at 4–5. But each of the actions asserted by plaintiff is a
    3        On June 15, 2016, the DCOHR issued a “Notice of Charge of Discrimination and
    Mandatory Mediation.” See Notice of Charge of Discrimination and Mandatory Mediation, Ex. 3
    to Pl.’s Resp. [Dkt. # 19-1] (“Notice of Charge”). It states:
    A timely charge of discrimination was received on 12/11/2015 and has been filed
    with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (OHR) by the above named
    Complainant against the above named Respondent.
    Id. at 1. In a footnote to that paragraph, it states:
    Pursuant to DCMR Title IV §§ 705.2 and 705.4, OHR considers the date of a
    complainant’s initial written contact with OHR to determine timeliness. This case
    may have been transferred from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission (US EEOC) to OHR for investigation pursuant to a work sharing
    agreement between the agencies.
    Id. at n.1. This Notice was issued on June 15, 2016 – after the Charge of Discrimination had been
    filed – so it was technically correct. Id. While at first blush, this document appears to muddy the
    waters with respect to the chronology in this case, the Court believes that the date in the Notice
    was erroneous and that it does not suffice to alter the nature or legal significance of the
    questionnaire that was filed in December. The face of the questionnaire explicitly states that it is
    not a charge. And, when the DCOHR issued its Notice on June 15, it attached the May 19, 2016
    Charge of Discrimination, not the questionnaire. Id.
    10
    discrete act. See, e.g., Arnold v. Jewell, 
    6 F. Supp. 3d 101
    , 110 (D.D.C. 2013) (suspension is a
    discrete act); Rattigan v. Gonzales, 
    503 F. Supp. 2d 56
    , 81–84 (D.D.C. 2007) (transfer is a discrete
    act). To the extent that plaintiff relies on these acts to support his claim for retaliation or
    discrimination, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are
    related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    , 113 (2002).
    The Supreme Court set out the applicable principles in the Morgan opinion:
    Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges
    alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the [prescribed
    statutory] time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The
    existence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowledge of their
    occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about
    related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and
    charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the
    statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence
    in support of a timely claim.
    
    Id.
     The Supreme Court specifically rejected the concept of a “continuing violations doctrine” with
    regard to discriminatory or retaliatory acts. 4 
    Id.
     Thus, the Court cannot consider actions outside
    the applicable time period, even if they are related to those occurring within the time period, for
    discrimination or retaliation claims. And the sole allegation that is timely fails to state a claim.
    B. Failure to State a Claim
    Plaintiff alleges that on January 20, 2016, he was unfairly blamed for an accident involving
    a university vehicle, and he attributes this event to his employer’s ongoing discriminatory and
    retaliatory bias.   Defendant argues that “non-recognition, reprimand, and blame without
    4        This principle does not apply to hostile work environment claims as explained in more
    detail in Section II below.
    11
    consequences” are not adverse actions sufficient to form the basis of a discrimination claim or a
    retaliation claim. Defs.’ Mem. at 6 n.5. The Court agrees.
    To qualify as an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim, an action must be
    “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
    with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.”
    Douglas v. Donovan, 
    559 F.3d 549
    , 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009).            An employee must experience
    materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such
    that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm. 
    Id.
    For retaliation claims, the term “adverse action” has a broader meaning. In that context,
    actions giving rise to claims are “not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
    conditions of employment,” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
    548 U.S. 53
    , 64 (2006),
    but they may include any harm that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making
    or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 
    Id. at 68
    ; see Baird v. Snowbarger, 
    744 F. Supp. 2d 279
    , 290–91, 292 (D.D.C. 2010).
    “Blame” for an accident, without any additional consequences, does not rise to the level of
    objectively tangible harm for either discrimination or retaliation. See Baloch v. Kempthorne, 
    550 F.3d 1191
    , 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (a letter of reprimand, without tangible consequences, was not
    materially adverse and thus could not serve as the basis of a retaliation claim), citing Weber v.
    Battista, 
    494 F.3d 179
    , 185–86 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (evaluations were “adverse actions insofar as they
    resulted in her losing a financial award or an award of leave”). And, to the extent the assignment
    of blame was based upon a disagreement over how the events unfolded, “disagreements do not
    qualify as adverse actions for purposes of retaliation claims.” 
    Id.,
     citing Burlington N., 
    548 U.S. at 68
    . Plaintiff has not asserted that, other than the “investigation” itself, Am. Compl. ¶ 35, he
    12
    suffered any tangible consequences for receiving the blame for the January 2016 accident. And
    an investigation into an employee’s conduct, without more, is not an adverse employment action
    that will support a Title VII retaliation or discrimination claim. Ginger v. District of Columbia,
    
    477 F. Supp. 2d 41
    , 53 (D.D.C. 2007) (collecting cases).
    Thus, because plaintiff has asserted no actionable adverse acts within the applicable statute
    of limitations, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII claims of retaliation and discrimination.
    II.   Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim
    A. Timeliness
    Plaintiff asserts that because he refused to take part in racial profiling, he was subjected to
    a hostile work environment. Am. Compl. ¶ 40. He contends that the suspensions, demotions, lack
    of recognition, blame, and reprimands all contributed to create this hostile work environment. 5 
    Id.
    Defendants argue that the hostile work environment claim, like the discrimination and retaliation
    claims, is untimely because no act that is “part of the same actionable hostile environment claim”
    falls within the 300-day time period. Defs.’ Mem. at 7, citing Morgan, 
    536 U.S. at
    120–21.
    “Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature
    involves repeated conduct.” Morgan, 
    536 U.S. at 115
    , citing 1 Barbara Lindemann & Paul
    Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 348–49 (3d ed. 1996) (“The repeated nature of the
    harassment or its intensity constitutes evidence that management knew or should have known of
    5       Plaintiffs may plead alternative theories of harm that might stem from the same allegedly
    harmful conduct. Baird v. Gotbaum (Baird I), 
    662 F.3d 1246
    , 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that
    a court cannot “dismiss a hostile work environment claim merely because it contains discrete acts
    that the plaintiff claims (correctly or incorrectly) are actionable on their own”).
    13
    its existence.”). A hostile work environment cannot be said to occur on any particular day. 
    Id.
    “Such claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” 
    Id.
    Morgan explained that if one incident occurred within the applicable statute of limitations,
    then incidents that occurred outside this period, as long as they are sufficiently related to the
    incident within the time period, “may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining
    liability.” Id. at 117.
    But this principle is not unlimited. The D.C. Circuit stated, in an opinion that is binding
    on this Court:
    The Morgan principle is not, however, an open sesame to recovery for time-
    barred violations. Both incidents barred by the statute of limitations and ones
    not barred can qualify as “part of the same actionable hostile environment
    claim” only if they are adequately linked into a coherent hostile environment
    claim—if, for example, they “involve[ ] the same type of employment
    actions, occur[ ] relatively frequently, and [are] perpetrated by the same
    managers.
    Baird I, 
    662 F.3d at 1251
    , quoting Morgan, 
    536 U.S. at
    120–21. The Court has further explained
    that where a time-barred incident “had no relation to the [timely-filed] acts . . . or for some other
    reason, such as certain intervening action by the employer, was no longer part of the same hostile
    environment claim,” such an incident need not be considered. 
    Id. at 118
     (internal quotations
    omitted). And it has cited Wilkie v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    638 F.3d 944
    , 951 (8th Cir.
    2011), for the proposition that a court should examine the “nature, frequency, and severity” of the
    time-barred incidents to determine whether they are adequately linked, and Wheaton v. N. Oakland
    Med. Ctr., 
    130 Fed. Appx. 773
    , 787 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted), for the proposition that
    Morgan requires an inquiry into whether incidents “occurring outside the statutory period
    are sufficiently related to those incidents occurring within the statutory period as to form one
    continuous hostile work environment.” Baird I, 
    662 F.3d at 1251
     (emphasis in original).
    14
    Because one event falls within the applicable statute of limitations – the January 2016
    accident – the Court must determine whether the alleged incidents that occurred prior to that date
    are sufficiently linked by examining the type of actions asserted, the frequency with which they
    occurred, and whether they were perpetrated by the same person. “That does not mean that it will
    always be necessary for the component-acts comprising a hostile work environment to be identical
    or to take the same form; however, there must be a ‘common thread’ among them.” Mason v.
    Geithner, 
    811 F. Supp. 2d 128
    , 178 (D.D.C. 2011); see Baird v. Gotbaum (Baird II), 
    792 F.3d 166
    ,
    171 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that the incidents asserted “had little to do with each other” because
    they “span[ned] eight years and involv[ed] different people doing different things in different
    contexts” and plaintiff made “no serious attempt to tie them together”).
    Plaintiff connects a series of unfortunate events to his refusal to participate in the racial
    profiling policy as of 2012. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff asserts that in 2012, he was reprimanded
    for being involved in an accident using a university vehicle, and that Captain Hilton suspended
    him for one day for allegedly working overtime without authorization. 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 13–15. Two years
    later, in 2014, he was not recognized for his participation in an arrest although others were
    recognized, and he was suspended on a different occasion that year for three days for deciding not
    to arrest other individuals. 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 16–20. In 2015, he did not receive recognition for making an
    arrest, and he was demoted by Chief of Police Gruber upon Captain Hilton’s recommendation. 
    Id.
    ¶¶ 21–29. Finally, in 2016, he was blamed for losing control of a car during a snow storm. 
    Id.
    ¶¶ 32–34. Plaintiff asserts that Captain Hilton was behind all of these incidents, and the incidents
    were of similar types – lack of recognitions, reprimands, and suspensions. But, the incidents
    occurred relatively infrequently – there were only seven events over a span of four years – and the
    plaintiff only manages to characterize them as events of a similar type by lumping three types of
    15
    events of a markedly different nature into a single category. While plaintiff may have been equally
    chagrined by all of these instances, in which, in his view, he was treated unfairly, that broad
    similarity is not enough to make an occasion when he was not recognized for good police work
    similar in type to an occasion when his control of an automobile was called into question. And
    that lack of recognition happened only one other time, four years before.
    So, applying the guidance that has been supplied by the D.C. Circuit, the Court cannot
    conclude that the Morgan principle applies in this case. But even if, viewed in the light most
    favorable to plaintiff, the acts asserted in his complaint could “collectively constitute one unlawful
    employment practice” since they all demeaned the plaintiff in some way, the claim fails for other
    reasons.
    B. Failure to State a Claim
    Under Morgan, the “acts giving rise to a hostile work environment claim must collectively
    meet the independent requirements of that claim (i.e., be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive . . .’).”
    Baird I, 
    662 F.3d at 1252
    .
    In the employment discrimination context, a work environment is considered hostile when
    it is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
    pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
    environment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 75
    , 78 (1998), quoting Harris
    v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    , 21 (1993); see Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 
    712 F.3d 572
    ,
    577 (D.C. Cir. 2013). A court should consider “all the circumstances, including the frequency of
    the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
    mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
    performance.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
    524 U.S. 775
    , 787–88 (1998); see Baloch, 
    550 F.3d at 1201
    . The complained of conduct must be “extreme” to constitute “a change in the terms
    16
    and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 
    524 U.S. at 788
    . Assessment of a hostile work
    environment claim has both subjective and objective components: the complainant must perceive
    the environment to be abusive, and the environment must be objectively hostile or abusive. See
    Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    , 21–22 (1993).
    At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiff need only plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted
    as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 
    129 S. Ct. at 1949
    , quoting
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    . Accepting all of plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the Court still
    finds that he has not alleged conduct that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to state a plausible
    hostile work environment claim.
    First, “[a]lthough [plaintiff] has offered a theory to link together the acts comprising [his]
    claim, the acts span a period of several years and were relatively infrequent.” Laughlin v. Holder,
    
    923 F. Supp. 2d 204
    , 220 (D.D.C. 2013). There were two years between the first suspension and
    the second suspension, and six months between the second suspension and the demotion. Also,
    the first suspension was overturned three months after it occurred, and his related pay was restored.
    Am. Compl. ¶ 15. These acts are more correctly described as isolated incidents than as pervasive
    conduct that might plausibly have created a hostile condition. See McCain v. CCA of Tennessee,
    Inc., 
    254 F. Supp. 2d 115
    , 121 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[A]lleged harassment is generally not held to be
    sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment where it is limited to isolated
    incidents.”).
    Second, the reprimands and lack of recognition are not so “severe” or “offensive” to rise
    to a hostile work environment. See Burlington N., 
    548 U.S. at 68
     (“personality conflicts . . . are
    not actionable” under Title VII); Baloch, 
    550 F.3d at 1201
     (finding that allegations of insult, public
    humiliation, and verbal clashes, along with the sporadic nature of the conflicts, did not rise to the
    17
    level necessary to support a hostile work environment claim). Seven incidents over four years,
    two of which were simply verbal reprimands and two that involved only an absence of recognition,
    do not constitute an “abusive” environment.
    “[P]laintiff may not combine discrete acts to form a hostile work environment claim
    without meeting the required hostile work environment standard.” Baird I, 
    662 F.3d at 1252
    .
    Here, plaintiff has not stated a claim for hostile work environment because the incidents he relays,
    taken together, are not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Because the Court finds that plaintiff has
    failed to state a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, the Court need not address
    defendants’ other arguments and will dismiss the claim.
    III.   Plaintiff’s DCHRA Claims and Jurisdiction
    Only plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, discrimination, and hostile work environment under
    the DCHRA remain. “[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
    the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that . . . form part of
    the same case or controversy . . . .” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (a). The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
    is within a court’s discretion, Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 
    409 F.3d 414
    , 423 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and a
    district court may decline to maintain such jurisdiction where it has “dismissed all claims over
    which it has original jurisdiction.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3). In deciding whether to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction in the absence of a federal claim, a court balances consideration
    of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
    484 U.S. 343
    , 350 n.7 (1988). “Typically, if all federal law claims have been dismissed, the factors
    counsel against exercising supplemental jurisdiction.” Trimble v. District of Columbia, 
    779 F. Supp. 2d 54
    , 60 (D.D.C. 2011) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over District of
    Columbia statutory and common law claims after dismissal of civil rights claim brought under 42
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1983
    ); see Hillware v. Snyder, 
    151 F. Supp. 3d 154
    , 158 (D.D.C. 2015) (declining to
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over DCHRA claims after dismissal of claims brought under
    Title VII);.
    Here, with the dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII claims, no claim remains over which the
    Court has original jurisdiction. And the Court finds that the balance of the factors weighs against
    exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining District of Columbia law claims.
    Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction over plaintiff’s DCHRA claims, and
    it need not reach the other arguments raised in defendants’ motion to dismiss.
    CONCLUSION
    Because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII, it will grant
    defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII claims against both
    defendants. And because the dismissal of the federal claims divests this Court of jurisdiction, it
    will remand the case and the remainder of defendants’ motion to dismiss to the Superior Court of
    the District of Columbia for further proceedings.
    A separate order will issue.
    SO ORDERED.
    AMY BERMAN JACKSON
    United States District Judge
    DATE: June 12, 2019
    19