Sabre International Security v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SABRE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 11-806 (GK)
(sealed)
TORRES ADVANCED ENTERPRrSE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sabre International Security ("Sabre") has sued its former
business partner, Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC
("Torres") and three of its current and former officers, Jerry
Torres ("Jerry Torres"), Rebekah Dyer ("Dyer"), and Kathryn
Jones ("Jones") (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), for
breach of contract, tortious interference with business
relations, and conversion of property.
This matter is before the Court on the Individual
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. Nos. 377, 407,
and 408]. Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions [Dkt.
Nos. 384, 431, & 432] and Replies [Dkt. Nos. 404, 435, and 436],
and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth
below, Jones' Motion shall be granted, and the Motions of Dyer
and Jerry Torres shall be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
For purposes of the instant Motions, the facts can be
briefly stated. Sabre and Torres are private security
contractors providing security services to various entities
around the world, including the United States Government.
Individual Defendant Jerry Torres is Torres' Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") and sole shareholder. Individual Defendant Dyer
previously served as Torres' Vice President and Chief Operating
Officer ("COO") . She left the company in 2013. Individual
Defendant Jones previously served as Torres' Chief Financial
Officer ("CFO"). She left the company in January 2011.
1
The factual and procedural background in this case has been set
forth in great detail in the Court's Memorandum Opinions of
January 30, 2014 [Dkt. No. 288], June 16, 2014 [Dkt. No. 359],
and August 20, 2014 [Dkt. No. 373], and the Court's Memorandum
Order of August 21, 2014 [Dkt. No. 376]. See generally Sabre
Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, LLC, No. 11-806,
2014 WL 341071 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2014) ("Sabre tii"), appeal
dismissed, No. 14-7026, 2014 WL 1378771 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3,
2014); Sabre Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions,
LLC, No. 11-806, 2014 WL 3859164 (D.D.C. June 16, 2014) ("Sabre
IV"); Sabre Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, LLC,
No. 11-806, 2014 WL 4162236 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2014) ("Sabre VI").
Familiarity with these prior decisions is assumed. The facts in
this Memorandum Opinion are taken from the pleadings, the
parties' briefs, and the parties' Statements of Undisputed
Material Facts ("SOMFs") submitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule
7(h). The facts are undisputed unless otherwise stated.
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Between 2007 and 2010, Sabre and Torres partnered as prime
contractor and subcontractor to perform site-specific security
'
contracts for the United States Government at military
installations in Iraq. Each of these security contracts was
known as a "Task Order." The parties' relationship in competing
for and performing these Task Orders was governed by a series of
contracts, the most relevant of which is known as the "Teaming
Agreement."
On December 2, 2009, the Government awarded the Torres-
Sabre Team a Task Order at Joint Security Station ("JSS") Shield
in Iraq. This Task Order had a base period of performance of
one year - extending from January 1, 2010, through December 31,
2010 and two six-month option periods. The Government
exercised both options and subsequently modified the Task Order
to provide for an additional extension. As a result of these
extensions, the Team did not conclude its performance at JSS
Shield until March 31, 2012.
Under the Teaming Agreement, the parties agreed that Sabre
would provide "all Site materials, Site equipment, Site supplies
and Site life support required for performance" of each Task
Order and that, upon conclusion of each Task Order, Torres would
"release and return to Member's (Sabre['s]) possession and
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control all such equipment, supplies and facilities . . in the
same condition as originally provided, fair wear and tear
excepted." Teaming Agreement § 6.1(B) (1) [Dkt. No. 22-2].
Pursuant to this provision, Sabre provided the Team's "life
support area" ("LSA") equipment at JSS Shield.
The Court has already found in a separate Summary Judgment
Opinion [Dkt. No. 373] and for purposes of the present
Motions, it appears to be undisputed - that, upon the conclusion
of the JSS Shield Task Order, Torres did not return this
equipment to Sabre but instead sold it to a third party named
Mohammed Hussan for $150,000, and retained the proceeds. See
Jones' Mot. at 4-5; Dyer's Mot. at 6; J. Torres' Mot. at 4-7.
Sabre claims that the three Individual Defendants directed,
consented to, or otherwise participated in Torres' decision to
sell its property to Mr. Hussan. The Individual Defendants deny
any such involvement and claim that the decision to sell Sabre's
property was made, without their knowledge or consent, by Robert
Lewis, a Senior Program Manager working out of Torres' Virginia
headquarters who left Torres' employment in January 2013.
Dyer's Mot. at u-7, 8. 2
2
Sabre claims that Defendants never identified Lewis as a person
with information about this lawsuit. Pl.'s Opp'n to Dyer's Mot.
at 4 n. 3. Dyer counters that Defendants were not required to
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B. Procedural Background
On April 29, 2011, Sabre filed this lawsuit against Torres
for breach of contract and related torts. In October 2013,
Sabre filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") [Dkt. No. 242].
The FAC added seven new claims against Torres and the Individual
Defendants, including, as relevant here, a claim for conversion
of the life support equipment Sabre supplied at JSS Shield.
On January 30, 2014, the Court granted Torres' Motion to
Dismiss all of the new counts asserted in the FAC except for the
conversion claim. See generally Sabre III, 2014 WL 341071, at
*3-9. On August 20, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment to
Sabre against Torres on the conversion claim. See Mem. Op.,
dated Aug. 20, 2014 ("Summ. J. Op.") [Dkt. No. 373] . 3 On August
21, 2014, the Court granted judgment on the pleadings for the
supplement their interrogatory responses with such information
because Leggett testified about Lewis at his deposition
(although he did not identify him by name) . The Court shall not
address this dispute as it has not been squarely presented and
its resolution is unnecessary for purposes of the present
Motions.
3
In the same Opinion, the Court granted judgment in Torres'
favor on Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9, which asserted claims for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage, but declined to grant
judgment for either party on Sabre's breach of contract claims
in Counts 2 and 5, or its claim for tortious interference with
business relations in Count 10. See generally Summ. J. Op.
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Individual Defendants as to all Counts except the conversion
claim. Sabre VI, 2014 WL 4162236, at *2-5.
On August 22, 2014, Jones filed her Motion for Summary
Judgment on the conversion claim [ Dkt. No. 3 7 7] . On September
8, 2014, Sabre filed its Opposition [Dkt. No. 384]. On
September 12, 2014, Jones filed her Reply [Dkt. No. 404].
On September 18, 2014, Jerry Torres and Dyer filed their
Motions for Summary Judgment on the conversion claim [Dkt.
Nos. 407 and 408]. On October 6, 2014, Sabre filed its
Oppositions [Dkt. Nos. 431 and 432]. On October 17, 2014, Jerry
Torres and Dyer filed their Replies [Dkt. Nos. 435 and 436].
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Arrington v. United States, 473
F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006). "A dispute over a material fact
is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.'" Arrington,
473 F.3d at 333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
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u.s. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if it might affect
the outcome of the case under the substantive governing law.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
As the Supreme Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
"the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." 477 u.s. 317, 322 (1986). The Supreme Court has
further explained,
[w] hen the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48 and Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
However, the Supreme Court has also consistently emphasized
that, "at the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is
not . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
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matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 u.s. at 249. "Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts, are jury functions, not
those of a judge" deciding a motion for summary judgment. Id.
at 255.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000). Ultimately, the court must determine "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 251-52.
B. Standard Governing the Personal Liability of the
Individual Defendants
As the Court has recently held in Sabre VI, although
corporate officers are not automatically liable in their
personal capacity for torts committed by the corporation in
which they serve, they also "cannot avoid personal liability for
wrongs committed by the corporation with their knowledge and
with their consent or approval." 2014 WL 4162236, at *3 (citing
-8-
Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 821 (D.C. 1984)). Consequently,
to hold the Individual Defendants personally liable for Torres'
acts of conversion, Sabre must establish that each Individual
Defendant - acting with knowledge that the equipment at issue
belonged to Sabre "meaningfully participated" in Torres'
decisions not to return such equipment to Sabre at the
conclusion of the JSS Shield Task and to sell it instead. Sabre
VI, 2014 WL 4162236, at *3 (citing Lawlor v. Dist. of Columbia,
758 A.2d 964, 977 (D.C. 2000)).
"'Sufficient [meaningful] participation can exist when
there is an act or omission by the officer which logically leads
to the inference that he [or she] had a share in the wrongful
acts of the corporation which constitute the offense.'" Harvey
v. Mohammed, 841 F. Supp. 2d 164, 179 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
Lawlor, 7 58 A.2d at 977) . Where such evidence exists, "the
precise extent of an officer's "'participation in and
responsibility for the alleged [conversion is] a quintessential
question of fact'" that must be submitted to the jury. Sabre
VI, 2014 WL 4162236, at *3 (quoting Luna v. A.E. Eng'g Servs.,
LLC, 938 A.2d 744, 748 (D.C. 2007)). _ Conversely, if the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a reasonable jury to conclude
that each Individual Defendant "had a share of the wrongful
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acts," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 322
III. JONES' MOTION
Jones contends that summary judgment must be granted in her
favor because Torres' conversion of the life support equipment
did not take place until mid-2012, more than one year after her
employment with Torres ended. 4 She claims that this timeline
demonstrates that she could not have "meaningfully participated"
in Torres' tortious acts.
Sabre does not dispute that Jones' employment with Torres
ended in January 2011 or that the conversion of property did not
occur until approximately June 2012. See Pl.'s SOMF Id. (emphasis added). Sabre styled Count 19, however, as
a claim for "Fraud, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, [and] Unjust
Enrichment," not a claim for conversion, and the Court dismissed
that Count on the pleadings in Sabre VI. 2014 WL 4162236, at
*4. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity in Sabre's pleadings,
the parties have thus far generally proceeded on the assumption
that Count 18 is asserted against the Individual Defendants.
Consequently, the Court does the same.
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discussing this inquiry with other Torres personnel, Jerry
Torres wrote:
If this is another option period and NOT A CONTRACT
EXTENSION, THEN THE GOODS BELONG TO THE GOVERNEMNT
[sic] UNTIL SHIELD IS CLOSED.
Kathy [Jones] and Reb[ekah Dyer] - right?
Id.
Dyer responded:
Yes, this. is the exercise of option 1. Nothing can be
removed. The usg owns everything paid for under the
mob [ilization] clin per the FAR [Federal Acquisition
Regulations].
Id.
These emails, taken alone, simply could not lead a
'
I.
I
reasonable jury to conclude that its participants were engaged
in a scheme to convert Sabre's property. Neither Jerry Torres
nor Dyer denied that Sabre provided the equipment at issue, nor
did they suggest that, once the Task Order was completed, they
intended to assert Torres' ownership over such property. To the
contrary, in an earlier email in the same email string, Jerry
Torres wrote that "We may just want to do this ourselves and buy
the stuff from [Sabre] or buy all new stuff," id. (emphasis
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added), thereby expressly acknowledging Sabre's property rights
6
in the equipment.
Moreover, Jones had no role in this exchange of emails,
other than the fact that she was copied as a recipient. Her
passive receipt of emails stating the uncontroversial
proposition that life support equipment at Camp Shield could not
be removed "UNTIL SHIELD IS CLOSED" simply does not "logically
lead [] to the inference that [she] had a share" in, much less
"inspired," Torres' ultimate decision, more than a year and a
half later (and more than one year after she was no longer
employed by Torres) to sell Sabre's equipment to a third party.
Lawlor, 758 A.2d at 977.
As our Court of Appeals has repeatedly observed, "[t] he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff." Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir.
6
This comment appears to rBflect the fact that, in OctobBr 2010,
for reasons disputed by the parties and not at issue in the
pending Motions, Torres took over the life support services at
JSS Shield, which previously had been performed by Sabre. See
Decl. of Kevin Robinson, dated Feb. 17, 2014 ("Robinson DBcl.
I") !! 17-18 [Dkt. No. 432-15].
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2011) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252) . 7 Because the
November 28, 2010, email is Sabre's only evidence that Jones was
personally involved in the conversion of property at Camp
Shield, 8 and because that email could not lead a reasonable jury
to find Jones personally liable for Torres' acts of conversion,
there is no genuine issue for trial. 9
Consequently, Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment shall be
granted.
7
Sabre repeatedly quotes the Court's statement in Sabre VI that
"the precise extent of an officer's 'participation in and
responsibility for'" Torres' conversion is "a quintessential
question of fact[.]" Pl.'s Opp'n at 1. However, Sabre
conveniently omits the remainder of the Court's sentence, which
is that such "question [ s] of fact cannot be answered at
the pleading stage." Sabre VI, 2014 WL 4162236, at *3 (emphasis
added) . As is well established, the standard of proof for
judgment on the pleadings is considerably different than the
standard of proof at summary judgment.
8
Sabre has also presented an April 26, 2012, email from Sabre's
Head of Operations, Kevin Robinson, to Torres' Iraq Country
Manager, Alfred Leggett, stating that, "[t] here has never been
one comment made over the past 2 years and 6 months where Torres
have [sic] claimed ownership of Sabre TWISS stores and
equipment." Pl.'s Opp'n Ex 9 [Dkt. No. 384-9]. This email
refutes, rather than supports, Sabre's claim of a long-running
"scheme" to convert it equipment. Therefore, it too could not
lead a reasonable jury to find in Sabre's favor.
9
For the same reason, there is no evidence on which a jury could
reasonably find that Jones "aided and abetted" Torres'
conversion, as Sabre alleges in the alternative.
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IV. DYER'S MOTION
Dyer argues that summary judgment must be granted in her
favor on the conversion claim because "[t]here is simply nothing
in the record which a jury could rely on" to find that she
meaningfully participated in Torres' conversion of property.
Reply at 4 [Dkt. No. 436]. The Court disagrees.
First, unlike Jones, it is undisputed that Dyer was still
employed as Torres' Vice President one of its two highest
officers - when Torres sold Sabre's equipment to Mr. Hussan in
2012. Furthermore, Dyer testified that, as Vice President, she
was intimately involved in oversight of the TWISS program. See
Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 6 (deposition tr. of Rebekah Dyer) at 99:11-14
(Q: Is the vice president typically on the phone with the other
party . . discuss[ing] pricing? A: "At Torres, yes, you are.
I do everything.").
Second, Leggett testified that, upon the completion of a
Task Order (a process the parties refer to as "demobilization"),
Dyer was generally one of the three people who instructed him as
to whether equipment located at the Task Order site belonged to
Sabre or Torres, so as to enable him to return any equipment
belonging to Sabre. See Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 16 (deposition tr. of
Alfred Leggett) at 288:3-21) [Dkt. No. 432-16]. Dyer argues
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that this testimony pertains to a Task Order at First Operating
Base Husayniyah, not JSS Shield. The deposition excerpt cited,
however, does not make reference to any specific Task Order. In
any event, the fact that Dyer advised Leggett regarding the
ownership of equipment at one Task Order site may support an
inference that she did so at other Task Order sites as well,
including the one at JSS Shield.
Third, the November 28, 2010, emails discussed above in
connection with Jones' Motion further demonstrate that
disposition of Sabre's equipment at the conclusion of a Task
Order site was precisely the type of matter in which Dyer was
directly involved. Moreover, the first email in that set
which was forwarded to Dyer for her input, and to which she
responded is an email from Sabre asking for a "plan of
demobilization" given that the "Life Support Units have been
purchased by Sabre [and] we would have to send in a
workforce to start dismantling [them for] removal to Basra."
Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 10 [Dkt. No. 432-10]. This is evidence that
Dyer knew specifically that Sabre claimed ownership of the life
support equipment at JSS Shield.
Fourth and finally, Sabre's Head of Operations, Kevin
Robinson, has submitted a Declaratio-n stating that he visited
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the JSS Shield site in May 2012 and demanded the return of
Sabre's equipment, to which Leggett responded that he had
instructions from Torres' "corporate headquarters" not to return
any equipment that was not registered as Sabre's with the Iraqi
Ministry of Interior ("MOI"). See generally Decl. of Kevin
Robinson, dated Oct. 4, 2014 ("Robinson Decl. II") `` 7-9 [Dkt.
No. 432-17]. Again, based on Dyer's high level position and
past involvement in such matters, a jury could reasonably infer
that she took part in this instruction from "corporate
headquarters. " 10
Based on all of this evidence, a reasonable jury could find
that Dyer consented to, approved of, or otherwise "meaningfully
participated" in the events giving rise to Torres' conversion of
10
Dyer objects that this Declaration is "double-hearsay and
inadmissible." See Def. 's Reply to Pl.'s Rebuttal SOMF ~ H ( 14) .
To survive summary judgment, however, Sabre need only produce
evidence that is "capable of being converted into admissible
evidence." Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). The statements in Robinson's
Declaration are capable of being converted into admissible, non-
hearsay, evidence when he testifies at trial, as Sabre has
indicated that he will do. See Pl.'s SOMF in Opp'n to J. Torres
Mot. ~ 17 [Dkt. No. 431-27]. Consequently, Dyer is incorrect
that the Declaration must be disregarded for purposes of summary
judgment.
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property. Sabre VI, 2014 WL 4162236, at *3. 11 Therefore, Dyer's
Motion for Summary Judgment shall be denied.
V. JERRY TORRES' MOTION
Last, Jerry Torres argues that summary judgment must be
granted in his favor on the conversion claim. Like Dyer, he has
submitted a Declaration stating that he did not "participate
in," "consent to," or "approve of" the sale of property at JSS
Shield. Mot. Ex. A (Decl. of Jerry Torres) ~ 2-3 [Dkt. No. 408-
3] . He argues that there "is not a single fact in the record"
that contradicts these facts. Mot. at 5.
Jerry Torres' Motion shall be denied for largely the same
reasons stated above in connection with Dyer's Motion. First,
he was the highest officer at Torres and had intimate
involvement in the TWISS program, including oversight of the JSS
Shield Task Order. See Mot., Ex. C (deposition tr. of Jerry
Torres) at 49:19-50:16 (testifying that he visited the Shield
11
Dyer has submitted a Declaration stating that the decision to
sell Sabre's equipment at JSS Shield was made by former Torres
Senior Program Manager Robert Lewis, and that she neither
"directed" nor "discussed" that decision. See generally Decl.
of Rebekah Dyer `` 3-7. Even if a jury believed these
statements, Dyer's Declaration does not foreclose the
possibility that she had a role in the conversion. It refers
only to the sale of the property to Mr. Hussan and is completely
silent as to her involvement in any prior decisions regarding
who owned the property and/or whether to return it to Sabre.
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Task Order site and had general knowledge regarding the
equipment supplied there) .
Second, Leggett testified that Jerry Torres was, along with
Dyer, one of the three individuals who instructed him regarding
the ownership of the Team's onsi te equipment at the conclusion
of a Task Order. See Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 16 (deposition tr. of
Alfred Leggett) at 288:3-21 [Dkt. No. 432-16]. Third, as
discussed above, the November 28, 2010, emails - on which Jerry
Torres was copied and to which he responded - demonstrate both
that he knew Sabre claimed ownership of the JSS Shield equipment
and that responding to such a claim was the type of matter in
which he was generally involved. Fourth, Kevin Robinson,
Sabre's Head of Operations, attested in his October 4, 2014,
Declaration that, when he asked Leggett to identify which
individual at "corporate headquarters" told him not to return
Sabre's equipment, Leggett specifically identified Jerry Torres.
Jerry Torres points to Leggett's deposition testimony, in
which Leggett stated that Torres' Operations Manager, rather
than Jerry Torres, told him that the property belonged to
Torres. See Mot. Ex. B (deposition tr. of Leggett) at 292:7-19
[Dkt. No. 408-4]. Even if Leggett's testimony is inconsistent
with Robinson's October 4, 2014, Declaration, that fact would
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not warrant summary judgment. As our Court of Appeals has
repeatedly emphasized:
'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge at summary judgment.' Thus, [the court must]
not 'determine the truth of the matter,' but instead
decide only 'whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.'
Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). Because Sabre
has presented evidence that Jerry Torres was directly involved
in the events related to the conversion claim, there is a
genuine issue for trial, despite the fact that contrary evidence
also exists.
Finally, Jerry Torres claims that Robinson's October 4,
2014, Declaration is inconsistent with his February 17, 2014,
Declaration and should therefore be disregarded under the "sham
affidavit rule." Def.' s Reply at 7. This rule "precludes a
party from creating an issue of material fact by contradicting
prior sworn testimony unless the 'shifting party can offer
persuasive reasons for believing the supposed correction' is
more accurate than the prior testimony." Galvin v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Our Court of Appeals has made clear,
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however, that " [ i] f the supplemental affidavit does not
contradict but instead clarifies the prior sworn statement, then
it is usually considered admissible." Id. (citations omitted).
Robinson's October 4 Declaration shall not be disregarded
because it is not inconsistent with his February 17 Declaration.
In the later Declaration, Robinson attested that "[o]n or about
Tuesday, 15 May 2012, I went to Joint Security Station (JSS)
Shield to assess what of Sabre's property Torres was
required to return to Sabre" and observed that "[m] ost of the
facilities of the Sabre camp . . were gone. " Robinson Decl.
II Id. In
the earlier Declaration, Robinson attested that he learned in
May 2012, that "Torres had sold the LSA and other equipment"
without Sabre's consent but, "[s]ince Sabre had not been allowed
on the site, I never saw the condition of this equipment."
Robinson Decl. I