Jenkins v. U.S. Department of Justice ( 2014 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    RICARDO C. JENKINS,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                          Case No. 1:14-cv-00660 (CRC)
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Ricardo Jenkins has petitioned this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, contending that the
    Parole Commission should not have re-incarcerated him due to failed drug tests while he was on
    supervised release. The United States opposes the Petition. It argues that Jenkins’ incarceration
    and current supervised release are legal and that Jenkins has failed to exhaust administrative
    remedies. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny the petition.
    I.      Background
    Jenkins pled guilty to attempted distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), and on
    April 28, 2011, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia sentenced him to 20-month term of
    incarceration followed by a two-year term of supervised release. Pet. ¶¶ 1–4; See United States’
    Opp’n to Habeas Pet. (“Gov’t Opp’n”), Ex. A (Sentence Monitoring and Computation Data as of
    03-05-2012) at 1. Jenkins was released from custody on May 8, 2012. See 
    id., Ex. B
    (Warrant
    Application dated September 16, 2013) at 1. On September 16, 2013, the United States Parole
    Commission (“Parole Commission”) issued a warrant for Jenkins’s arrest on charges that he had
    violated certain conditions of his supervised release. 
    Id., Ex. B
    (Warrant Application) at 1–2.
    First, Jenkins was said to have used dangerous and habit forming drugs. According to his
    community supervision officer, “[b]etween 5/8/12 and 8/21/13, [Jenkins] submitted 99 urine
    specimens which tested positive for: Cocaine, Opiates and Marijuana.” 
    Id. at 1.
    Second, Jenkins
    allegedly failed to submit to drug testing on 14 occasions. 
    Id. at 2.
    Third, Jenkins allegedly failed
    to complete a drug treatment program at the Central Union Mission. 
    Id. Fourth, Jenkins
    failed to
    comply with requirements of the Andromeda Drug Aftercare program, by twice submitting urine
    specimens that tested positive for cocaine. 
    Id. The warrant
    was executed on October 3, 2013, and
    Jenkins was returned to custody. 
    Id., Ex. B
    (United States Marshal’s Return to United States Parole
    Commission).
    Based on Jenkins’s admissions, a hearing officer found probable cause that Jenkins
    committed the violations, except as to the charge that Jenkins failed to complete a drug treatment
    program at Central Union Mission. 
    Id., Ex. D
    (D.C. Probable Cause Hearing Digest dated October
    11, 2013) at 2–3. In lieu of a revocation hearing before the Parole Commission, Jenkins applied to
    participate in the Short-Term Intervention for Success (“SIS”) program. 
    Id., Ex. E
    (Short
    Intervention for Success Application dated October 21, 2013). SIS is a pilot program focusing
    primarily on drug intervention over re-incarceration for drug-related violations of supervised
    release. See 
    id. By applying
    for SIS, Jenkins “accept[ed] responsibility for the violations of
    supervision alleged against [him],” and understood that the Parole Commission would impose a
    sentence of no more than eight months incarceration and an additional period of supervised release
    within the maximum authorized term for the underlying offense. 
    Id. at 1.
    He also acknowledged
    that the Parole Commission would revoke supervision and issue a Notice of Action setting forth the
    new sentence, which he could not appeal. 
    Id. at 2.
    However, if Jenkins “believe[d] that the [Parole]
    Commission has (1) erred in determining [his] release date; [or] (2) included special conditions of
    supervision that are not supported by [his] background,” [Jenkins] could “request that the [Parole]
    Commission amend its decision.” 
    Id. After approving
    Jenkins’s SIS application, the Parole Commission revoked his supervised
    2
    release, directed that he “serve a new term of incarceration of three months from October 3, 2013,
    the date the warrant was executed,” and imposed “an additional term of supervised release of 57
    months” after his release from incarceration. 
    Id., Ex. F
    (Notice of Action dated October 25, 2013)
    at 1. It also set the following Special Drug and Alcohol Aftercare Condition:
    [Jenkins shall] participate, as instructed by [his] Supervision Officer,
    in an approved inpatient or outpatient program for the treatment of
    narcotic addition or drug and alcohol dependency. The treatment
    program may include testing and examination to determine whether
    [he has] reverted to the use of drugs. [Jenkins] shall abstain from the
    use of alcohol and all other intoxicants during and after the course of
    treatment. If so instructed by a Bureau of Prisons institutional
    employee or [his] Supervision Officer, [Jenkins] shall reside in and
    participate in a program of[] the Re-Entry and Sanctions Center until
    discharged by the Center Director.
    
    Id., Ex. F
    at 1. 1
    II.      Analysis
    In applying for SIS, Jenkins agreed that he “cannot appeal the decision provided in the
    Notice of Action.” Yet Jenkins’ habeas petition does precisely that: He argues that the Parole
    Commission’s Notice of Action was excessive. Pet. ¶ 8. 2 Jenkins says he should not have received
    any additional time of incarceration or supervised release, but instead should have been kept in an
    inpatient program. 
    Id. He also
    contends that the Parole Commission's decision did not take into
    account his use of prescribed pain medication after surgery and his occasional use of “cocaine
    instead of the narcotic that was in [his] pain medication.” 
    Id. 1 Even
    though Jenkins is not incarcerated, he is deemed “in custody” as long as he remains on
    supervised release. See Judd v. Gonzales, No. 13-1504, 
    2013 WL 5615049
    , at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Oct.
    15, 2013); Banks v. Gonzales, 
    496 F. Supp. 2d 146
    , 149 (D.D.C. 2007).
    2
    Jenkins mentions having been incarcerated for five years and three months. Pet. ¶ 8. But
    combining his initial sentence and his SIS Notice of Action sentence amounts to one year and
    eleven months of incarceration. See Gov’t Opp’n Ex A, F.
    3
    Ordinarily, an individual on supervised release who seeks to challenge the Parole
    Commission’s decision must submit an appeal to the National Appeals Board. 28 C.F.R. §§
    2.105(g); 2.26. Failure to do so precludes bringing a habeas petition to challenge the Parole
    Commission’s decision. Fuller v. Rich, 
    11 F.3d 61
    , 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A prisoner challenging a
    Parole Commission decision is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking
    habeas relief.”); King v. Hasty, 
    154 F. Supp. 2d 396
    , 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A petitioner must
    exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus relief,
    including in the parole context.”). Jenkins, however, does not claim to have filed an appeal and
    would likely have been precluded from doing so because of his waiver. Jenkins may not sidestep
    his waiver of the right to appeal the merits of the Parole Commission’s decision by bringing this
    habeas action instead. See Ath v. Chertoff, 227 F. App’x 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
    habeas petition of immigration detainee, “waiver of the right to [administrative] appeal is a failure
    to exhaust administrative remedies” (internal quotation omitted)). Theodoropoulos v. INA, 
    358 F.3d 162
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). Even to the extent Jenkins could have invoked the exceptions
    to waiver in the SIS application, see Gov’t Opp’n Ex. E (SIS Application) (excusing exhaustion
    waiver for claims that the Commission “(1) erred in determining [petitioner’s] release date; (2)
    included special conditions of supervision that are not supported by [petitioner’s] background or (3)
    has erred in applying the rules regarding forfeiture of time on parole”), Jenkins must still properly
    invoke that appeal mechanism before proceeding to federal court through a habeas petition.
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
    ORDERED that [1] Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. It is
    further
    ORDERED that [2] the Court’s Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED. It is further
    4
    ORDERED that the petition and this civil action are DISMISSED.
    This is a final, appealable Order
    SO ORDERED.
    CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
    United States District Judge
    Date:    November 5, 2014
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2014-0660

Judges: Judge Christopher R. Cooper

Filed Date: 11/6/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2014