Wallace v. US Senate Select Committee on Ethics ( 2014 )


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  • UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    FILED
    NOV 1 7 2014
    Stephen P. Wallace, ) Clerk, U.S. District and
    ) Bankruptcy Courts
    Plaintiff, )
    ) Case: 1:14-cv-O1931
    v. ) Assigned To : Unassigned
    U s s t s 1 tC 'tt i SSS'gn‘ Date: 11/17/2014
    . . enae eec omml ee escription. Pr _ .
    on Ethics et al., ) 0 se Gen' C'V”
    )
    Defendants. )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiff s pro se complaint and
    application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant plaintiff’ 5 application and
    dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
    (requiring the court to dismiss an action “at any time” it determines that subject matter
    jurisdiction is wanting).
    Plaintiff is a resident of Aurora, Illinois, who purports to be a “Private Attorney General”
    suing on behalf of himself and “all US Tax Payers adversely affected by covert Civil Rights and
    RICO violations perpetrated Under Color of Law[.]” Compl. at 1. Plaintiff sues the Senate
    Ethics Committee and “John Does 1-7 not yet named.” Compl. Caption. He seeks a preliminary
    injunction “on US. Senator James Inofe’s pending Candidacy for the upcoming November 4th
    2014, Mid-Term Election” and an order for the Committee to hold a “formal hearing, with
    Subpoenas issued,” on an unspecified topic. Compl. at 4. The former claim premised on Senator
    Inofe’s candidacy is dismissed as moot.
    Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal government is subject to suit only
    upon consent, which must be clear and unequivocal. United States v. Mitchell, 445 US. 535, 538
    (1980) (citation omitted); see Lane v. Pena, 518 US. 187, 192 (1996) (the United States may be
    sued only upon consent “unequivocally expressed in statutory text[.]”); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 2671
     (including the legislative branch in the definition of “Federal agency” for purposes of tort
    claim liability). “Congress [has] not waive[d] the United States' sovereign immunity for suits for
    treble damages under the RICO Act.” Abou-Hussein v. Mabus, 
    953 F. Supp. 2d 251
    , 263
    (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Norris v. Dep’t ofDefense, No. 96—5326, 
    1997 WL 362495
    , at *1 (DC.
    Cir. May 5, 1997)). In addition, the civil rights statute plaintiff invokes, 42 U.S.C. 1983, creates
    a private cause of action against state actors for constitutional violations and, therefore, does not
    apply to the federal defendant named here. Hence, any claim plaintiff purports to bring under the
    Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1961
     et seq., and
    § 1983 is foreclosed by sovereign immunity.
    Because of the separation of powers doctrine, this Court cannot order the Senate Ethics
    Committee to hold a hearing. The US. Constitution provides that [a]11 legislative Powers herein
    granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
    House of Representatives.” US. Const, art. I, § 1. It is “a basic principle of our constitutional
    scheme that one branch of the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of
    another.” Loving v. United States, 517 US. 748, 757 (1996); see Clinton v. Jones, 520 US. 681,
    701 (1997) (“We have recognized that ‘[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself . .
    . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance
    of its constitutional duties”) (quoting Loving, 517 US. at 757). Hence, this claim, too, is
    foreclosed.
    In addition to the foregoing reasons for dismissal, the law is clear that “federal courts are
    without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are “so attenuated
    and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’ ” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 US. 528, 536—7
    (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 US. 561, 579 (1904)); accord
    Tooley v. Napolitano, 
    586 F.3d 1006
    , 1009 (DC. Cir. 2009) (“A complaint may be dismissed on
    jurisdictional grounds when it “is ‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable
    for decision”) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 
    39 F.3d 328
    , 330 (DC. Cir. 1994)). The instant complaint
    satisfies this standard as well. Hence, this case will be dismissed with prejudice. A separate
    Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    United tates District Judge
    DATE: November E 2014
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2014-1931

Judges: Judge Rudolph Contreras

Filed Date: 11/17/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2014