Greggs v. Autism Speaks, Inc. , 987 F. Supp. 2d 48 ( 2013 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    SIMONE GREGGS,                                   :
    :
    Plaintiff,                                :       Civil Action No.:      13-cv-1001 (RC)
    :
    v.                                        :       Re Document No.:       3
    :
    AUTISM SPEAKS,                                   :
    :
    Defendant.                                :
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
    I. INTRODUCTION
    This litigation arises out of an employment discrimination and contract dispute between
    the plaintiff, currently proceeding pro se, and her former employer. At the time of filing the
    complaint, Allison M. Black-McIver was on record as counsel for the plaintiff. Since then
    plaintiff has terminated Ms. Black-McIver as her counsel due to a disagreement over Ms. Black-
    McIver’s work in Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff now moves for an appointment of counsel. Because
    the plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated her need for court-appointed counsel, the Court
    will deny the motion without prejudice.
    II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    On July 1, 2013, Simone Greggs (plaintiff) filed a complaint against her former
    employer, Autism Speaks (defendant), alleging race discrimination under 
    42 U.S.C. §1981
    ,
    failure to accommodate and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and breach of
    contract under D.C. law. See Compl., ECF No.1. Allison Black-McIver was counsel of record for
    Plaintiff at the time the complaint was filed. Ms. Greggs alleges that she had to borrow money
    from a family member to pay for Ms. Black-McIver’s initial services. See Pl’s Mot. Appt.
    Counsel, ECF No. 3. Ms. Greggs terminated her relationship with Ms. Black-McIver on
    September 8, 2013, alleging that Ms. Black-McIver was untimely and uncommunicative. Pl’s.
    Mot. Appt. Counsel, ECF No. 3. Ms. Greggs now seeks court-appointed counsel, alleging in her
    single-page motion that she “can’t find anyone who will take” her case and that she is an
    unemployed, full-time student at the University of Maryland University College. 
    Id.
    III. COURT APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
    A. Legal Standard
    A civil plaintiff is not guaranteed counsel. See Gaviria v. Reynolds, 
    476 F.3d 940
    , 943
    (D.C. Cir. 2007). However, federal courts are authorized by statute to “request an attorney to
    represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(1) (2006); accord Willis v.
    FBI, 
    274 F.3d 531
    , 532 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In determining whether it is appropriate to appoint
    counsel to a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis,1 courts in this district consider the
    following factors:
    (i) the nature and complexity of the action;
    (ii) the potential merit of the pro se party’s claims;
    (iii) the demonstrated inability of the pro se party to retain counsel by other
    means; and
    (iv) the degree to which the interests of justice will be served by appointment of
    counsel, including the benefit the Court may derive from the assistance of the
    appointed counsel.
    D.D.C. Civ. R. 83.11(b)(3); Gaviria, 
    476 F.3d at
    943 (citing Rule 83.11 as “the appropriate
    metric for evaluating appointment of counsel”).
    1
    The Court notes that Plaintiff has not moved to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    .
    2
    In cases involving the causes of action Plaintiff asserts here, courts consider a slightly
    different set of factors: “(1) the ability of the plaintiff to afford an attorney; (2) the merits of the
    plaintiff’s case; (3) the efforts of the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (4) the capacity of the
    plaintiff to present the case adequately without aid of counsel.” Poindexter v. FBI, 
    737 F.2d 1173
    , 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 
    626 F. Supp. 2d 11
    , 16 (D.D.C. 2009) (Title VII); Sconion v. Thomas, 
    603 F. Supp. 66
    , 68 (D.D.C. 1984)
    (Title VII and Rehabilitation Act). The D.C. Circuit has noted that our “local rule differs only
    slightly from the Poindexter factors . . . .” Willis, 
    274 F.3d at 533
    . Because Plaintiff is currently
    proceeding pro se, the Court will construe her filings more liberally than it would the formal
    pleadings or legal briefs drafted by lawyers. See Thompson v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 
    850 F. Supp. 2d 269
    , 273 (D.D.C. 2012).
    B. Analysis
    Plaintiff’s single-page motion gives the Court very little information from which to
    evaluate whether Plaintiff should be appointed counsel. The motion states that Plaintiff has paid
    her previous counsel, Allison M. Black-McIver, all the money that she had, totaling $2900. Pl.’s
    Mot. Appt. Counsel, ECF No. 3. Plaintiff further states that she is “unable to find anyone who
    will take [her] case” and is currently an unemployed full-time student at the University of
    Maryland University College. These facts provide the Court with an insufficient basis to assess
    whether Plaintiff is able to afford counsel through other means, such as temporary income,
    savings, or by entering into a contingency arrangement. Although “a court should not insist that a
    plaintiff be destitute,” Poindexter, 
    737 F.2d at 1186
    , a party seeking court-appointed counsel in a
    civil matter should present at least some evidence of financial need aside from the lack of a
    permanent job. Moreover, Plaintiff was able to afford the assistance of counsel to at least draft
    3
    the complaint. And at this early stage of the litigation, the Court has no way of assessing the
    merits of the plaintiff’s case.
    Plaintiff’s brief also fails to describe the extent of her efforts (if any) to secure counsel.
    While Plaintiff’s motion implies that she has tried and failed to obtain counsel, “the plaintiff’s
    showing of diligence requires more than ‘pass[ing] the matter over with . . . casual
    comment . . . .’” Poindexter, 
    737 F.2d at 1188
     (first and second alterations in original) (quoting
    Arnold v. Speedgrip Chuck, Inc., 
    524 F. Supp. 679
    , 682 (N.D. Ind. 1981)). The Court simply
    cannot assess Plaintiff’s efforts without more information such as, for example, her number of
    contacts with potential counsel.
    Finally, based on the filings she has made with the Court so far, Plaintiff appears capable
    of representing her interests without the assistance of counsel. The complaint appears as though
    it were drafted with the assistance of counsel and sets forth a cogent narrative of Plaintiff’s
    allegations. Moreover, this case—which involves a fairly straightforward set of employment
    discrimination and contract claims—does not appear to involve any complex testimony, difficult
    legal issues, or unsettled law to such a degree that lawyering skills would be required at this
    juncture. See id. at 1189. The Court notes that plaintiff is a student at a well-known university
    and, as such, is likely capable of adequately setting forth her position without the aid of counsel.
    On balance, the Court does not find it appropriate to appoint counsel at this time.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to
    appoint counsel. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
    contemporaneously issued.
    4
    Dated: October 22, 2013       RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
    United States District Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2013-1001

Citation Numbers: 987 F. Supp. 2d 48, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152665, 2013 WL 5754963

Judges: Judge Rudolph Contreras

Filed Date: 10/22/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2024