Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran ( 2019 )


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  • UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    TIMOTHY KARCHER, et al.,
    Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 16-232 (CKK)
    Vv.
    ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (September 10, 2019)
    In its Order and Memorandum Opinion dated August 26, 2019, ECF Nos. 93 & 94, the
    Court granted default judgment against Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran as to numerous
    claims brought by Plaintiffs either injured in seven “bellwether” attacks or representing
    individuals killed in those attacks brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
    (“FSIA”). The Court, however, excepted from its judgment the claims of Evan Kirby, Marvin
    Thornsberry, and Johnny Washburn on the basis that Plaintiffs had not provided sufficient
    evidence for the Court to evaluate their claims. See Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 95, at 56
    n.31, 66 n.33, 77, 88-89.
    Plaintiffs have now provided additional evidence as to these three individuals, who
    Plaintiffs allege were harmed in the January 20, 2007 attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination
    Center (“PJCC”) in Karbala, Iraq. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ [99] Additional Evidence
    Relating to the January 20, 2007 Karbala Attack, the exhibits attached thereto, the relevant legal
    authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT default judgment against Iran as
    to the claims of Plaintiffs Evan Kirby, Marvin Thornsberry, and Johnny Washburn. For damages
    determinations, the Court has referred the bellwether Plaintiffs’ claims to Special Master Alan L.
    Balaran, who shall prepare a report and recommendation to the Court as outlined in the [102]
    Order and Administrative Plan.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The Court has previously detailed the background of this suit and specifically the January
    20, 2007 attack on the PJCC in Karbala. Rather than reiterate every detail, the Court
    incorporates and makes a part of this Memorandum Opinion its prior Memorandum Opinion
    dated August 26, 2019. The Court will also outline its findings of fact and law that are relevant
    to the three Plaintiffs discussed below.
    Of the seven bellwether attacks, the January 20, 2007 attack on the PJCC was the only
    one not involving explosively formed penetrator weapons attributed to Iran. Aug. 26, 2019
    Mem. Op., ECF No. 95, at 54. In addition to analyzing the evidence put forward by Plaintiffs
    related to this attack, the Court also took judicial notice of certain findings by Judge Randolph
    Moss in a different case about the same January 20, 2007 attack on the PJCC. See id; Nov. 28,
    2018 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 66, at 1-4 (citing Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    320 F. Supp. 3d 48
     (D.D.C. 2018) (Moss, J.)). The Court focused its analysis on the “expert report and
    testimony of Michael Pregent, who considered ‘a number of sources in preparing his report,
    including the military’s reports of the Karbala attack as it unfolded, the U.S. Army’s formal AR
    15-6 Investigation after the attack, recent testimony in another case by the AR 15-6 investigating
    officer, and a variety of other documentation.” Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 95, at 55. In
    addition, the Court examined the Karbala AR 15-6 report itself. Jd.; see also U.S. Army Report
    Pursuant to AR 15-6, PX-96.
    “The PJCC in Karbala was an Iraqi compound where U.S. forces collaborated with Iraqi
    civil authorities, including police, to strengthen governance of the Karbala Province in central
    Iraq.” Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 95, at 56. The Court found that Plaintiff Johnny
    Washburn was present at Karbala on January 20, 2007. Jd. That evening, at around 6:00 PM,
    six SUVs disguised to look like American security contractor trucks, through either their
    disguised appearance or coordination with the Iraqi Police manning the checkpoints, were
    permitted to pass the checkpoints and approach the PJCC facility. Jd. at 56-57. The SUVs were
    able to push open the metal gate to the compound. /d. at 57.
    Once inside the facility, one group of assailants attacked the command room where Mr.
    Washburn, other Plaintiffs, and other U.S. Troops were located. /d. at 58. One of the attackers
    dressed in an older Army Battle Dress Uniform began shooting into the room, only to be stopped
    by an American soldier trying to push the door closed. Jd. at 58. The assailant kept shooting and
    threw a grenade into the room, which Plaintiff Johnathan Millican jumped on top of as it
    detonated. Jd. The blast killed him. Jd.
    While the assault on the command room was occurring, four U.S. servicemembers were
    handcuffed and loaded into the SUVs. Jd. at 59. As the assailants began to withdraw, they
    “increased their rate of fire” and tossed a grenade into the PJCC building, which “‘blew the
    doors in the hallway off their hinges,”” injuring one soldier in the command room. /d. (quoting
    Pregent Rep. at 23). The assailants also used explosive devices to disable Humvees in and
    outside of the courtyard. Jd. at 59-60. At the same time as assailants attacked the main building,
    other assailants fired at the U.S. barracks next door, preventing soldiers there from aiding the’
    troops in the main building or those handcuffed in the courtyard. Jd. at 60. A unit of U.S.
    soldiers positioned themselves on PJCC’s roof, but the assailants had already completed the
    assault and the explosion knocked the soldiers back and obscured their version. Jd. Meanwhile,
    assailants were also firing at the back of the facility. Jd. After the assailants left the facility, they
    continued along a route used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and passed through
    several checkpoints. Jd. After the checkpoint at Mahawil, the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police began
    pursuing the assailants’ SUVs. 
    Id. at 60-61
    . Once the assailants realized that they could not
    escape with the hostages, they abandoned most of their equipment and vehicles, and then fatally
    wounded or killed all the hostages. /d. at 61.
    The Court attributed this attack to Iran based on numerous grounds. F or one, Asa’ib Ahl
    al-Haq (“AAH”), “a Special Group supported by the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and
    spearheaded by Qais nad Layth Khazali,” repeatedly claimed responsibility for the attack in
    various ways. Jd. at 61-62 (citing also Judge Moss’s opinion finding same). Second, the Court
    credited Mr. Pregent’s report and testimony, which found that AAH’s “claim of responsibility
    was credible.” Jd. at 62. Third, the Court noted the collusion between the Iraqi Police working
    at the PJCC and the assault team, which was “further evidence that the operation was planned by
    an experienced team under the direction of [Iran-backed] Hezbollah and the [Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force}.” Jd. at 62-63. Fourth, a senior Hezbollah commander
    involved with AAH was captured in a raid and later admitted to having a “significant operational
    planning role” in the Karbala attack; the raid also uncovered evidence tying the group to the
    Karbala attack. Jd. at 63-64 (quoting Pregent Rep. at 35). Fifth, the operational leader of the
    Karbala attack was trained by Hezbollah in Iran at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods
    Force’s direction. /d at 64. For these and other reasons, the Court found that there was
    sufficient evidence to attribute the attack to Iran. Jd. at 65-66.
    In its August 26, 2019 Memorandum Opinion, the Court further found that it had subject-
    matter jurisdiction over the suit and personal jurisdiction over Iran. Jd. at 66. As for subject-
    matter jurisdiction, the Court concluded that FSIA’s terrorism exception to foreign sovereign
    immunity applied to the various attacks, including the Karbala attack. Jd. at 73-76; see also
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (laying out terrorism exception). The Court subsequently found that
    Plaintiffs, except for those Plaintiffs whose claims are discussed in this Memorandum Opinion,
    established their entitlement to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), which “creates a cause of
    action for the same conduct that gives rise to subject-matter jurisdiction under the terrorism
    exception to sovereign immunity.” Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 95, at 77 (citing cases),
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, a party “must apply to the court for a default
    judgment” when the party’s claims are not for “‘a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain
    by computation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The court then has discretion as to whether to enter a
    default judgment. Hanley-Wood LLC v. Hanley Wood LLC, 
    783 F. Supp. 2d 147
    , 150 (D.D.C.
    2011) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 
    636 F.2d 831
    , 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A plaintiff seeking default
    judgment must persuade the trial court that it has subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over
    the defendant. Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic, 
    167 F. Supp. 3d 22
    , 33 (D.D.C. 2016).
    Furthermore, under the FSJA, the Court cannot enter default judgment against a foreign
    state “unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
    court.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1608
    (e). The Court has discretion to “determine precisely how much and
    what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide.” Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic
    of Korea, 
    774 F.3d 1044
    , 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “Uncontroverted factual allegations that are
    supported by admissible evidence are taken as true.” Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 33.
    Ill. ANALYSIS
    The FSIA creates a cause of action “for personal injury or death caused by acts described
    in subsection (a)(1) of that foreign state, or of an official, employee, or agent of that foreign
    state, for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under this section for
    money damages,” in suits brought by four categories of individuals, including “member[s] of the
    armed forces” or their legal representatives. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). In other words, it “creates a
    cause of action for the same conduct that gives rise to subject-matter jurisdiction under the
    terrorism exception to sovereign immunity.” Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 95, at 77.
    As the Court previously found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the other
    Plaintiffs’ claims, including the claims related to the Karbala attack, the only analyses remaining
    to determine liability for Mr. Kirby’s and Mr. Thornsberry’s claims are (1) whether they were
    U.S. servicemembers at the time of the attack and (2) whether they were injured as a result of the
    attack. As the Court previously found that Mr. Washburn was a U.S. servicemember, it need
    only examine whether he was injured as a result of the attack. See id. at 77-78. The below
    analysis draws upon Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 to the Declaration of Andrew Schlanger, which were
    sealed pursuant to the Court’s Minute Order dated September 9, 2019. Accordingly, the Court
    has redacted some of this information and is issuing both sealed and redacted public versions of
    this Memorandum Opinion.
    A. Johnny Washburn
    For Mr. Washburn, Plaintiffs have provided enough evidence to show that he was injured
    asa result of the Karbala attack. [a
    Pe Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
    have sufficiently demonstrated liability as to Mr. Washburn.
    B. Evan Kirby
    So too have Plaintiffs demonstrated that Mr. Kirby was a U.S. servicemember and that he
    was injured as a result of the Karbala attack. Enno Roehl een
    This is
    sufficient to demonstrate liability as to Mr. Kirby.
    C, Marvin Thornsberry
    Plaintiffs have likewise provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Thornsberry
    was a U.S. servicemember and was injured as a result of the Karbala attack. Eee
    And based on the announcement of his receipt of the Combat Action Badge on May 24, 2007, he
    was a “key element in the security of the Solder’s barracks during the attack,” and helped “hold
    off the insurgents from entering the barracks” while “the insurgents were using multiple
    grenades and satchel charges.” Schlanger Decl., Ex. 1, at 2. These grenades were being thrown
    “within 10-15 meters from P{rivate] F[irst] C[lass] Thornsberry.” Jd. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
    have sufficiently shown liability as to Mr. Thornsberry.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, in an exercise of its discretion the Court shall GRANT default
    judgment against Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran as to the claims of Mr. Washburn, Mr.
    Kirby, and Mr. Thornsberry. Plaintiffs have not provided extensive evidence as to the injuries
    sustained by Mr. Washburn, Mr. Kirby, and Mr. Thornsberry, and the Court expects Plaintiffs to
    provide that evidence to Special Master Balaran as part of the damages proceedings.
    Dated: September 10, 2019
    /s/
    COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
    United States District Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2016-0232

Judges: Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly

Filed Date: 9/11/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/11/2019