Dieng v. American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    YACINE DIENG
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    No. 18-cv-1220 (EGS)
    AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR
    RESEARCH IN THE BEHAVIORAL
    SCIENCES,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Yacine Dieng (“Ms. Dieng”) brings this action
    against Defendant American Institutes for Research in the
    Behavioral Sciences (“AIR”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights
    Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the District of Columbia’s
    Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2–1401.01 et seq.,
    arising out of the termination of her employment. Ms. Dieng, an
    African-American woman, alleges that her supervisors at AIR
    subjected her to discrimination, a hostile work environment, and
    retaliation on the basis of her race and gender. Pending before
    the Court is AIR’s motion to dismiss. Upon careful consideration
    of the motion, the opposition, the reply thereto, the applicable
    law, and the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
    DENIES IN PART AIR’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES
    WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Dieng’s hostile work environment and
    gender discrimination claims.
    I.   Background
    A. Factual Background
    The following facts reflect the allegations in the
    operative complaint and the documents incorporated by reference
    therein, which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of
    deciding this motion and construes in Ms. Dieng’s favor. See
    Baird v. Gotbaum, 
    792 F.3d 166
    , 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In
    February 2013, AIR hired Ms. Dieng, an African-American female,
    as a Senior Database Engineer in its “ORS Department.” Am.
    Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2 ¶ 5. 1 With more than 1,800 employees, 
    id. at 2
    ¶ 9, AIR is a non-profit organization with a mission to
    “conduct and apply the best behavioral and social sciences
    research and evaluation towards improving people’s lives[,]”
    Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-2 at 1. While working there, Ms. Dieng
    became an “expert at fixing bugs[.]” Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2
    ¶ 10. She often worked “every single day of the week including
    week nights and weekends[,] 
    id. at 5
    ¶ 29, and she was allowed
    to telecommute without prior approval from her supervisors, 
    id. at 4
    ¶ 22. AIR eventually promoted her to Lead Database Engineer
    II. 
    Id. at 2
    ¶ 5. On February 2, 2018, AIR terminated her
    employment as a result of “performance issues” and
    1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
    Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
    filed document.
    2
    “insubordination.” 
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 44.
    During her first year, Ms. Dieng was subjected to “abusive
    discriminatory behavior” by her Technical Project Manager and
    she reported that “abusive treatment” to her Staff Manager. 
    Id. at 6
    ¶ 38. Ms. Dieng was the only African-American female in a
    group within the ORS Department. 
    Id. at 2
    ¶ 12. According to Ms.
    Dieng, “upper management and the whole ORS department group”
    witnessed “[s]uch repeated abusive behavior,” including one
    incident where the Technical Project Manager “yelled on top of
    his lungs for [Ms. Dieng] to sit down and shut up in [the]
    middle of her presentation.” 
    Id. at 6
    -7 ¶ 38. The Technical
    Project Manager’s behavior “seem[ed] to have resolved itself in
    the later years.” 
    Id. at 6
    ¶ 38.
    In September 2015, however, “it became necessary for Ms.
    Dieng to seek assistance from Human Resources due to a workplace
    conflict which was created by her Project Manager’s . . .
    disrespectful and abusive behavior in front of her office co-
    workers.” 
    Id. at 2
    ¶ 11. Ms. Dieng’s Project Manager yelled at
    her, “demeaning and embarrassing her” during staff meetings. 
    Id. at 3
    ¶ 13. Ms. Dieng asserts that “[n]o one else was treated
    that way” and that “[s]he was the only person abusively
    reprimanded although others had made the exact same comment
    without receiving any verbal abuse.” 
    Id. At some
    point, Ms.
    Dieng decided to attend the staff meetings via telephone as she
    3
    waited for AIR to resolve the dispute. 
    Id. Ms. Dieng
    reported
    her “concerns about mistreatment to her Staff Manager, who
    refused to intervene and commanded her to start attending
    meetings physically again[.]” 
    Id. at 3
    ¶ 14.
    Ms. Dieng then informed the Human Resources department
    about her concerns, explaining that her Project Manager
    discriminated against her and treated her differently from
    “every other employee in the group” who were “either Caucasian
    or a co-national of the [Project Manager] (Indian descent)[.]”
    
    Id. at 3
    ¶ 16. In response, the Human Resources department told
    Ms. Dieng to “handle the conflict alone.” 
    Id. at 3
    ¶ 17. At some
    point, the Human Resources department facilitated a meeting with
    the Project Manager and Ms. Dieng. 
    Id. at 3
    ¶ 18. The Project
    Manager apologized to Ms. Dieng at that meeting. 
    Id. But the
    Project Manager’s apology did not end Ms. Dieng’s issues at AIR.
    See 
    id. at 3
    ¶ 19. According to Ms. Dieng, the apology was
    short-lived because the Project Manager became very hostile
    towards her and the Project Manager “started working very hard”
    to terminate her employment. 
    Id. Ms. Dieng
    alleges the following grievances: (1) the Project
    Manager ignored Ms. Dieng at staff meetings, 
    id. at 4
    ¶ 19;
    (2) the Staff Manager “constant[ly] question[ed]” her work and
    made “irrelevant probes,” 
    id. at 4
    ¶ 21; (3) the Staff Manager
    asserted false claims that her “code was buggy” based on a
    4
    report issued by the Project Manager, id.; (4) the Project
    Manager’s reports questioned “Ms. Dieng’s ongoing ad hoc
    telecommuting” during the summer of 2017, 
    id. at 4
    ¶ 22; (5) the
    Staff Manager required Ms. Dieng to seek prior approval from
    senior management before telecommuting while her team members
    telecommuted without prior approval, id.; (6) the Staff Manager
    “sternly reprimand[ed]” her for telecommuting after the Staff
    Manager verbally approved her request to do so, 
    id. at 5
    ¶ 26;
    (7) the Staff Manager labeled Ms. Dieng as insubordinate when
    she refused to follow an order generated by the Project Manager,
    
    id. at 5
    ¶ 27; (8) the Staff Manager “put in writing a blatant
    lie” in her performance evaluation—for the period of January 1,
    2016 to December 31, 2016—that she received “negative feedback”
    from her co-workers about her work product, 
    id. at 6
    ¶ 33, but
    the Staff Manager did “not lie on evaluations of similarly
    situated Caucasians/[the Project Manager’s] co-Nationals co-
    workers[,]” 
    id. at 6
    ¶ 34; and (9) neither the Project Manager
    nor the Staff Manager responded to Ms. Dieng’s repeated verbal
    and written requests to dispute the “false evaluation,” 
    id. at 6
    ¶ 35.
    Ms. Dieng also asserts the following allegations: (1) the
    Staff Manager raised “false performance issues” about Ms. Dieng
    at a meeting with her and Human Resources personnel, 
    id. at 6
    ¶
    37; (2) the Staff Manager accused Ms. Dieng of “not getting
    5
    along with the whole team,” 
    id. at 6
    ¶ 38; (3) the Staff Manager
    initially rejected Ms. Dieng’s request for a new laptop, but the
    Staff Manager later approved her request after “[o]ne of the
    [Project Manager’s] co-national co-workers” explained that Ms.
    Dieng needed a new laptop due to certain issues with the old
    one, 
    id. at 7
    ¶ 42; (4) the Senior Manager accused Ms. Dieng of
    “touching the production system without permission” in January
    2018 even though she had “followed the same procedure for the
    past [five] years by requesting permission from her [Project
    Manager],” 
    id. at 7
    ¶ 43; and (5) management revoked Ms. Dieng’s
    access to the production system even though none of her
    “Caucasian/[Project Manager’s] co-nationals co-workers” received
    the same treatment when they touched the production system, 
    id. at 8
    ¶ 43. AIR ultimately fired Ms. Dieng for insubordination
    and performance issues. 
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 44.
    Ms. Dieng asserts that AIR’s “prior mistreatment” and her
    termination were “because of her race and in retaliation for her
    complaints.” 
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 45. She also alleges that AIR’s
    mistreatment created a hostile work environment. 
    Id. After her
    termination in February 2018, Ms. Dieng filed a “timely
    complaint” with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission (“EEOC”). 
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 46. On February 22, 2018, the
    EEOC issued a notice of right to file suit. 
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 47.
    6
    B. Procedural History
    On May 24, 2018, Ms. Dieng filed this employment
    discrimination lawsuit, asserting Title VII and DCHRA claims
    against AIR. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5-6. AIR moved to dismiss
    the initial complaint on August 13, 2018, see generally Def.’s
    Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, and the Court denied without
    prejudice AIR’s motion after Ms. Dieng filed an Amended
    Complaint on September 4, 2018. See Min. Order of Sept. 6, 2018;
    see generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 8. 2 Ms. Dieng’s allegations
    against AIR fall into three categories: (1) AIR created a
    hostile work environment because of her race and gender in
    violation of Title VII and DCHRA; (2) AIR discriminated against
    her and terminated her because of her race and gender in
    violation of Title VII and DCHRA; and (3) AIR retaliated against
    her for engaging in protected activities in violation of Title
    VII and DCHRA. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 9-10. 3
    2 The Amended Complaint asserts the following six counts:
    (1) “Hostile Work Environment Created Against Plaintiff Because
    of Her Race and Gender” under Title VII; (2) “Hostile Work
    Environment Created Against Plaintiff Because of Her Race and
    Gender” under DCHRA; (3) “Termination Taken Against Plaintiff on
    the Basis of Race and Gender” under Title VII; (4) “Termination
    Action Taken Against Plaintiff on the Basis of Race and Gender”
    under DCHRA; (5) “Termination Action Taken Against Plaintiff on
    the Basis of Retaliation” under Title VII; and (6) “Termination
    Action Taken Against Plaintiff on the Basis of Retaliation”
    under DCHRA. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 9-10.
    3The Amended Complaint includes the word “Gender” in the
    headings for Counts I through IV. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 9.
    Ms. Dieng alleges that she is female. 
    Id. at 2
    ¶ 4; 2 ¶ 12. To
    7
    AIR filed its motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on
    September 18, 2018, see Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, Ms.
    Dieng filed her opposition brief on October 9, 2018, see Pl.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 11, and AIR filed its reply brief on October 16,
    2018, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12. The motion is ripe and ready
    for the Court’s adjudication. 4
    II.   Legal Standard
    A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
    v. Clinton, 
    292 F.3d 235
    , 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court will
    dismiss a claim if the complaint fails to plead “enough facts to
    state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
    the extent that Ms. Dieng seeks to assert claims based on
    gender, AIR argues that Ms. Dieng fails to include any factual
    allegations to support her hostile work environment and
    discrimination claims based on her gender. Def.’s Mem. in Supp.
    of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 9-1 at 17;
    see also Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 1-2 (citing LCvR 7(b)). By
    not responding to this argument in her opposition brief, see
    generally Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11, Ms. Dieng has conceded it.
    See Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 
    775 F.3d 425
    , 428 (D.C. Cir.
    2014) (“[Local Civil Rule 7(b)] is understood to mean that if a
    party files an opposition to a motion and therein addresses only
    some of the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the
    unaddressed arguments as conceded.” (citing Hopkins v. Women’s
    Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 
    284 F. Supp. 2d 15
    , 25
    (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004))).
    Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Dieng’s
    hostile work environment and discrimination claims based on her
    gender (Counts I, II, III, and IV).
    4 AIR requests an oral hearing on its motion to dismiss. See
    Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 at 1. The Court will not
    exercise its discretion to hold a hearing. See LCvR 7(f). The
    Court therefore DENIES AIR’s request for an oral hearing.
    8
    Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). A complaint
    must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
    that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    8(a)(2), “in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the
    . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if it
    “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
    ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
    ). A claim is facially plausible “when the
    plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
    [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.” 
    Id. A complaint
    alleging facts which are
    “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops
    short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
    entitlement to relief.’” 
    Id. (quoting Twombly,
    550 U.S. at 557).
    III. Analysis
    AIR advances three primary arguments for dismissal under
    Rule 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 9-1 at 8-17. First, Ms.
    Dieng has not stated a discrimination claim because she alleges
    no facts from which it can be inferred that race was a factor in
    AIR’s decision to terminate her. 
    Id. at 14-15.
    Next, Ms. Dieng
    fails to state a retaliation claim because the Project Manager’s
    9
    apology resolved the one arguable protected activity (i.e. her
    2015 complaint to AIR’s Human Resources department) and there
    are no allegations that the discriminatory acts were connected
    to the 2015 protected activity. 
    Id. at 15-17.
    Finally, Ms. Dieng
    fails to state a hostile work environment claim on the basis of
    her race because the alleged “isolated events” of hostility were
    not “racially charged,” “racially insensitive,” “severe,” or
    “pervasive” to constitute such a claim. 
    Id. at 10.
    The Court
    addresses each claim in turn. 5
    A. Discrimination Claims
    The Court first considers Ms. Dieng’s discrimination claims
    based on her race. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an
    employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to
    [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
    employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
    sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis
    added). Ms. Dieng must establish “two essential elements”:
    “(i) [she] suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of
    5 The Court will analyze Ms. Dieng’s Title VII and DCHRA claims
    together because the legal standards for both statutes are
    substantively the same. See, e.g., Burley v. Nat’l Passenger
    Rail Corp., 
    801 F.3d 290
    , 296 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (recognizing that
    the analysis is the same for Title VII and DCHRA claims and that
    “Title VII claims and DCHRA claims thus rise and fall
    together”); Williams v. District of Columbia, 
    317 F. Supp. 3d 195
    , 199 (D.D.C. 2018) (Sullivan, J.) (applying the same
    analysis to Title VII and DCHRA claims).
    10
    the [her] race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
    disability.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 
    550 F.3d 1191
    , 1196 (D.C.
    Cir. 2008); see also Douglas v. Donovan, 
    559 F.3d 549
    , 552 (D.C.
    Cir. 2009) (“An adverse employment action is a significant
    change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
    promote, reassignment with significantly different
    responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in
    benefits.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    “To prevail on a motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to
    establish a prima facie case.” Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
    of the D.C., 
    113 F. Supp. 3d 297
    , 310 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing
    Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 
    778 F.3d 158
    , 162 (D.C. Cir.
    2015)). Nonetheless, Ms. Dieng “must allege facts that, if true,
    would establish the elements of each claim.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    It is undisputed that Ms. Dieng asserts that AIR’s unlawful
    actions resulted in her termination on the basis of her race.
    See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2 ¶¶ 4, 6, 12. AIR argues that Ms.
    Dieng has “alleged nothing more than she is African American and
    was terminated[,]” Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 9-1 at 14, and that Ms.
    Dieng failed to address the arguments in its motion to dismiss
    as to Counts III and IV in which Ms. Dieng alleges that she was
    unlawfully terminated based on her race, see Def.’s Reply, ECF
    11
    No. 12 at 1-2. The Court disagrees.
    While the “Argument” section in Ms. Dieng’s opposition
    brief lacks a separate subheading for her discrimination claims
    and her arguments could have been provided in a more direct and
    clear manner to support those claims, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
    11 at 7-12, Ms. Dieng is asserting disparate treatment claims
    based on her allegations of racial discrimination in light of
    her arguments under the “Hostile Work Environment” subheading,
    see 
    id. at 7
    . Ms. Dieng explicitly references “numerous
    incidents” of “disparate treatment,” 
    id. at 9,
    including her
    supervisor yelling at her and ignoring her during staff
    meetings, 
    id. at 2
    . Ms. Dieng contends that her grievances at
    AIR escalated when she reported her “race claim” to the Human
    Resources department, 
    id. at 10,
    and that she was a “victim of
    racial discrimination,” 
    id. at 2
    . Because the Human Resources
    department told her to “handle the conflict alone,” Am. Compl.,
    ECF No. 8 at 3 ¶ 17, Ms. Dieng asserts that she reminded the
    department of AIR’s policy that the department must be
    “engage[d] in the diversity area to ensure that every employee
    is respected and feels valued[,]” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 2.
    According to Ms. Dieng, she continued to experience mistreatment
    after she met with the Human Resources department. See 
    id. at 2
    .
    Ms. Dieng, “as the only person of color” in a particular
    group at AIR, argues that she was treated differently than her
    12
    white co-workers, 
    id. at 8
    , because her supervisors required her
    to seek prior approval from management before telecommuting,
    whereas her white co-workers could telecommute without prior
    approval, 
    id. at 9.
    Ms. Dieng points out that her supervisors
    inserted falsehoods and mischaracterizations in her performance
    evaluations, whereas the evaluations of her white co-workers
    included true and accurate information about their performance.
    
    Id. at 4,
    8-10, 10 n.2. Ms. Dieng alleges that her supervisors
    falsely accused her of touching a production system without
    permission, but such permission was not required for her white
    co-workers. 
    Id. at 5
    (citing Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 7 ¶ 43).
    Indeed, she points out that she requested permission based on
    the same procedure she had followed for five years. 
    Id. And her
    co-workers touched the production system without permission, but
    she was the only employee to be reprimanded and fired. Am.
    Compl., ECF No. 8 at 8 ¶ 43. She asserts that a week after she
    met with the Human Resources department and her supervisors
    concerning the accusations that she impermissibly touched the
    production system, AIR terminated her. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11
    at 5; see also Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 7-8 ¶ 43.
    AIR’s next argument—that Ms. Dieng has alleged nothing more
    than she is African American and was terminated—is unavailing.
    See, e.g., Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 9-1 at 14; Def.’s Reply, ECF No.
    12 at 2. Construing the allegations in the light most favorable
    13
    to Ms. Dieng, the Court therefore finds that she has alleged
    enough facts to state a disparate treatment claim based on her
    race to survive the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jackson v.
    Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. CV 18-1978 (ABJ), 
    2019 WL 3502389
    , at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2019) (holding that plaintiff
    stated a disparate treatment claim on the basis of race, sex,
    and religious discrimination based on allegations that he was
    wrongfully terminated for raising his voice and “other non-
    Muslim, non-African-American, and female employees were treated
    more favorably because they were not fired despite engaging in
    similar conduct”); Winston v. Clough, 
    712 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 10
    (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for racial
    discrimination by alleging that he was subjected to discipline
    that “was motivated by [his] race and color” and “that other co-
    workers outside [his] protected class” engaged in the same
    behavior for which he was disciplined “yet none was suspended or
    disciplined for it”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES AIR’s motion
    to dismiss as to Ms. Dieng’s discrimination claims based on race
    (Counts III and IV).
    B. Retaliation Claims
    The Court next turns to Ms. Dieng’s retaliation claims.
    Title VII “both prohibits employers from engaging in employment
    practices that discriminate on the basis of race, see 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e–2(a), and bars them from retaliating against an employee
    14
    ‘because [she] has opposed any [such] practice,’ 
    id. § 2000e–
    3(a).” Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 
    791 F.3d 65
    , 68 (D.C.
    Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “In order to establish a prima
    facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) [she]
    engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) [she] suffered
    an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
    connection between the two.” Jackson, 
    2019 WL 3502389
    , at *5.
    “[A] plaintiff need not plead each element of his prima facie
    retaliation case to survive a motion to dismiss.” 
    Id. For the
    reasons explained below, Ms. Dieng has stated claims for
    retaliation.
    Here, it is undisputed that Ms. Dieng has sufficiently
    alleged facts for the first two elements because she engaged in
    protected activity when she complained to the Human Resources
    department about her mistreatment in September 2015,
    specifically about her Project Manager’s “disrespectful and
    abusive behavior.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2 ¶ 11. There is no
    dispute that Ms. Dieng’s termination in February 2018
    constitutes a materially adverse action. See 
    id. at 2
    ¶ 6, 8 ¶
    44. The remaining issue is whether Ms. Dieng has alleged
    sufficient facts for a causal connection between the protected
    activity in 2015 and the termination in 2018. AIR argues, and
    the Court disagrees, that “there are no allegations that Ms.
    Dieng complained to Human Resources or anyone in AIR
    15
    [management] about the alleged hostile actions” and that the
    Program Manager resolved her claims of mistreatment with an
    apology. Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 9-1 at 15. Indeed, Ms. Dieng
    alleges that she reported her claims of mistreatment to her
    Staff Manager. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 3 ¶ 14. And Ms. Dieng
    asserts that she reported her Technical Project Manager’s
    “abusive discriminatory behavior” and “abusive treatment” to her
    Staff Manager during her first year in 2013. 
    Id. at 6
    ¶ 38.
    Ms. Dieng alleges at least seven retaliatory actions that
    were taken by her supervisors after she complained about her
    mistreatment: (1) she was ignored at staff meetings, 
    id. at 4
    ¶
    19; (2) her managers constantly questioned her work and made
    irrelevant probes, 
    id. at 4
    ¶ 21; (3) she was required to seek
    prior approval from senior management before telecommuting while
    her team members telecommuted without such approval, 
    id. at 4
    ¶
    22; (4) the Staff Manager reprimanded her for telecommuting
    after verbally approving her request to do so, 
    id. at 5
    ¶ 26;
    (5) Ms. Dieng lost her telecommuting privileges, 
    id. at 5
    ¶ 30;
    (6) her supervisors ignored her repeated verbal and written
    requests to address her concerns with her evaluation, 
    id. at 6
    ¶
    35; (7) her supervisors rejected her initial request for a new
    laptop, 
    id. at 7
    ¶ 42; and (8) her supervisors revoked her
    access to the production system, 
    id. at 8
    ¶ 43.
    Next, AIR contends that Ms. Dieng does not allege that the
    16
    alleged incidents in 2017 and 2018 were connected to her 2015
    protected activity, and that “given the passage of time, there
    is no reasonable inference that can be made to suggest that what
    Ms. Dieng claims to have experienced in 2017 and 2018 was in any
    way related to her alleged protected activity in 2015.” Def.’s
    Mem., ECF No. 9-1 at 16. AIR correctly notes that “‘[t]emporal
    proximity can indeed support an inference of causation, . . .,
    but only where the two events are ‘very close’ in time.’” 
    Id. (quoting Woodruff
    v. Peters, 
    482 F.3d 521
    , 529 (D.C. Cir.
    2007)). AIR argues that the Senior Manager—who accused Ms. Dieng
    of impermissibly touching the production system that led to her
    termination—lacked any knowledge about Ms. Dieng’s protected
    activity in 2015. 
    Id. at 17.
    “[U]nder some circumstances, temporal proximity between an
    employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse
    personnel action may alone be sufficient to raise an inference
    of causation.” 
    Harris, 791 F.3d at 69
    (emphasis added); see also
    Townsend v. United States, 
    236 F. Supp. 3d 280
    , 316 (D.D.C.
    2017) (“If the causation element is predicated on temporal
    proximity alone, however, that proximity must be ‘very close.’”
    (citation omitted)). Here, Ms. Dieng asserts that she complained
    to the Human Resources department in September 2015 about her
    mistreatment and that she was terminated in February 2018. See
    Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2 ¶ 11, 3 ¶ 14. Ms. Dieng also reported
    17
    her mistreatment to her Staff Manager in 2013. 
    Id. at 6
    ¶ 38.
    Viewing Ms. Dieng’s allegations in the light most favorable to
    her, the allegations of her complaints in 2013 and 2015 were not
    “very close” in time to her termination. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.
    v. Breeden, 
    532 U.S. 268
    , 273-74 (2001) (noting that a three- or
    four-month period between an adverse action and protected
    activity is insufficient to show a causal connection, and a
    twenty-month period “suggests, by itself, no causality at all”);
    see also Mason v. Geithner, 
    811 F. Supp. 2d 128
    , 189 (D.D.C.
    2011) (finding that “approximately two years had elapsed since
    [the plaintiff] had last engaged in protected activity in
    connection with the [retaliatory act], precluding any potential
    inference of retaliation based on temporal proximity.”), aff’d,
    492 F. App’x 122 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
    Relevant here, however, is AIR’s denial of Ms. Dieng’s
    request to telecommute. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶¶ 26-30.
    Ms. Dieng met with the Human Resources department about the
    accusations of insubordination where she “explained herself,”
    
    id. at 5
    ¶ 27, and the meeting appears to have taken place
    around the time that Ms. Dieng received a “harsh reprimand about
    telecommuting” from her Staff Manager, 
    id. at 6
    at ¶ 28. An
    employee “can engage in ‘protected activity’ by verbally
    complaining to [her] employer about unlawful discrimination.”
    Jackson, 
    2019 WL 3502389
    at *6. The United States Court of
    18
    Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”)
    has made clear that a denial of a request to telecommute “could
    constitute an adverse employment action.” Kline v. Berry, 404 F.
    App’x 505, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Burlington N. & Santa
    Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
    548 U.S. 53
    , 68 (2006) (“[R]etaliation that
    produces an injury or harm” is actionable if “a reasonable
    employee would have found the challenged action materially
    adverse, which in this context means it well might have
    dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
    of discrimination.” (citation omitted)). Depending on the
    context, “[a] schedule change in an employee’s work schedule” or
    exclusion of an employee “from a weekly training lunch” could
    deter a reasonable employee from complaining and therefore might
    be actionable. 
    White, 548 U.S. at 69
    .
    Ms. Dieng alleges that the denial of her telecommuting
    privileges—privileges that were enjoyed by her team members—was
    disruptive. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶ 30. Ms. Dieng
    argues that the “denial of teleworking” impacted “her
    performance.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 10. The Amended
    Complaint does not provide the exact date for Ms. Dieng’s “loss
    of her telecommuting” privileges. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 5 ¶
    30. Assuming that the denial of Ms. Dieng’s telecommuting
    privileges were “very close” in time to her complaints to AIR’s
    management and the Human Resources department about her
    19
    mistreatment and reprimand for telecommuting, the Court may
    infer a causal relationship. See 
    Townsend, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 316
    .
    “At the motion to dismiss stage, the hurdle of alleging a
    causal link is not a high one.” Cavalier v. Catholic Univ. of
    Am., 
    306 F. Supp. 3d 9
    , 38 (D.D.C. 2018). “Temporal proximity,
    for example, may suffice . . . as may other factual allegations
    that, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
    would ‘plausibly’ establish this element of [the retaliation]
    claim.” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    The D.C. Circuit’s decision in
    Harris v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Authority, 
    791 F.3d 65
    , 68-71 (D.C. Cir. 2015) is instructive. There, the D.C.
    Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
    while declining to “decide whether a five-month time lag without
    more would be sufficient to render [the plaintiff’s] claim
    plausible because his complaint alleged more” in support of his
    retaliation claim. 
    Harris, 791 F.3d at 69
    . The D.C. Circuit
    considered other allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint,
    including that the plaintiff was “regularly commended for his
    work” and made “numerous contributions to the improvement of”
    the employer’s operations, as supporting the inference, at the
    motion to dismiss stage, that the employer terminated the
    plaintiff in retaliation. 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and
    citations omitted).
    20
    “The only question before [the Court] is whether [Ms. Dieng
    has] alleged facts that, taken as true, render [her] claim of
    retaliation plausible.” 
    Id. at 70;
    see also 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
    (“[A] complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
    survives a motion to dismiss.”). Ms. Dieng has done so. Ms.
    Dieng alleges that she “became the go-to person as an expert at
    fixing bugs, leading to her promotion as Lead Database
    Engineer.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2 ¶ 10. For the period of
    January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, Ms. Dieng received an
    overall performance rating of “Consistently Met Expectations” in
    her performance evaluation at AIR. 
    Id. at 6
    ¶ 31. In fact, her
    Manager stated that “[o]verall, the effort [Ms. Dieng] puts
    forth, particularly for night and weekend deployments is
    appreciated, and she is a key contributor on the team.” Def.’s
    Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-2 at 2. With the exception of the Technical
    Project Manager who exhibited “abusive discriminatory behavior”
    towards her, Ms. Dieng alleges that she got along with the whole
    team. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 6 ¶ 38. Ms. Dieng challenges the
    stated reasons for her termination—“performance issues” and
    “insubordination.” 
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 44.
    “If true, these facts would show that [Ms. Dieng’s]
    termination was not attributable to [one] of the ‘two most
    common legitimate reasons’ for termination: ‘performance below
    the employer’s legitimate expectations[.]’” 
    Harris, 791 F.3d at 21
    69 (quoting George v. Leavitt, 
    407 F.3d 405
    , 412 (D.C. Cir.
    2005)). In determining that the plaintiff’s complaint in Harris
    alleged facts that, if shown, would be sufficient to state a
    prime facie case of retaliation, the D.C. Circuit explained that
    a showing that the plaintiff’s termination was not attributable
    to the plaintiff’s performance below his employer’s legitimate
    expectations was “sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden of
    establishing a prima facie case at the summary judgment
    stage[.]” 
    Id. (citations omitted);
    see also Calhoun v.
    Johnson, 
    632 F.3d 1259
    , 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Usually,
    proffering ‘evidence from which a jury could find that [the
    employer’s] stated reasons . . . were pretextual . . . will be
    enough to get a plaintiff’s claim to a jury.’” (quoting 
    George, 407 F.3d at 413
    )). The Court therefore finds that Ms. Dieng’s
    factual allegations are sufficient at this stage to state a
    plausible claim for retaliation. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
    AIR’s motion to dismiss as to Counts V and VI.
    C. Hostile Work Environment Claims
    The Court next considers Ms. Dieng’s hostile work
    environment claims. “Hostile environment claims are different in
    kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated
    conduct.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    ,
    115 (2002) (citation omitted). To state a hostile work
    environment claim, Ms. Dieng must allege “that [her] employer
    22
    subjected [her] to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
    insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
    conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working
    environment.” 
    Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201
    (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted). “Although a plaintiff need not plead a
    prima facie case of hostile work environment in the complaint,
    the alleged facts must support such a claim.” McKeithan v.
    Boarman, 
    803 F. Supp. 2d 63
    , 69 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether Ms.
    Dieng has alleged facts to support her claim, the Court must
    evaluate “the totality of the circumstances, including the
    frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its
    offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work
    performance.” 
    Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201
    ; see also 
    Baird, 792 F.3d at 168
    (“A hostile environment consists of several individual
    acts that ‘may not be actionable on [their] own’ but become
    actionable due to their ‘cumulative effect.’” (quoting 
    Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115
    )). 6
    Here, Ms. Dieng asserts that she was subjected to a hostile
    6 Ms. Dieng relies on a Ninth Circuit decision to support her
    hostile work environment claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at
    8 (citing Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 
    349 F.3d 634
    , 642 (9th
    Cir. 2003)). The Court will not consider the out-of-Circuit
    opinion because it is not binding on this Court and Ms. Dieng
    provides no reasons for this Court to deviate from D.C. Circuit
    precedent.
    23
    work environment based on racial harassment because “she was not
    treated the same way that Whites were treated on the job.” Pl.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 8. Ms. Dieng points out that “her
    performance evaluation contained blatant mischaracterizations
    and downright falsehoods, whereas no Caucasian was treated that
    poorly[,]” 
    id. at 8
    -9, and that her white co-workers had the
    ability to telecommute without prior approval, but she could
    only telecommute with “upper level approval[,]” 
    id. at 9.
    Ms.
    Dieng contends that several incidents of disparate treatment—her
    supervisors yelling at her, ignoring her at staff meetings,
    fabricating her performance evaluations, and revoking her
    telecommuting privileges—all contributed to a hostile work
    environment. 
    Id. at 8
    -11. Acknowledging that “no racist comments
    or utterances” were made in her presence, Ms. Dieng argues that
    direct evidence is not necessary at the motion to dismiss stage.
    
    Id. at 9
    (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    ,
    802-05 (1973)). Finally, Ms. Dieng contends that AIR knew about
    her claims of “racial harassment from the very first meeting
    with [the Human Resources department]” and that she has
    “recounted a number of adverse workplace events which created
    for her a hostile work environment, including incidents
    occurring more than 300 days prior to the filing of her Charge
    with the [EECO].” 
    Id. at 11.
    AIR responds that Ms. Dieng’s allegations are insufficient
    24
    to “establish that the alleged hostile work environment was
    based on [her] race.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 3. AIR argues
    that “there are no allegations to connect the alleged racial
    discrimination by the Program Manager in 2015, to the alleged
    hostile behavior by the Staff Manager two years later in 2017”
    and that “there are no allegations that the alleged actions of
    the Staff Manager were racially motivated.” 
    Id. AIR contends
    that the performance evaluation, on its face, is racially
    neutral and does not support Ms. Dieng’s claims that it contains
    falsehoods or “negative feedback” from others. 
    Id. at 4.
    AIR
    argues that Ms. Dieng’s allegation—that her white co-workers had
    telecommuting privileges, but she did not have the same
    privileges—fails to establish that the “alleged harassment was
    due to her race.” 
    Id. AIR makes
    a timeliness argument with
    respect to Ms. Dieng’s 2015 allegations, contending that the
    allegations of yelling and ignoring her during staff meetings
    are untimely because Ms. Dieng filed her EEOC charge of
    discrimination in 2018. 
    Id. at 5
    . Finally, AIR argues that the
    2017 alleged misconduct is not sufficiently severe or pervasive
    to show a hostile work environment. 
    Id. at 6
    . Before addressing
    each argument, the Court first turns to the parties’ timeliness
    arguments.
    1.     Timeliness
    Title VII requires the “person aggrieved” to file a charge
    25
    with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful
    employment practice occurred,” but this period is extended to
    300 days if the person “has initially instituted proceedings
    with a State or local agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see
    also D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a) (DCHRA establishes a one-year
    limitations period). Because Ms. Dieng filed the EEOC charge in
    2018, Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 8 ¶¶ 46-47, and she does not
    allege that she filed a complaint with the District of
    Columbia’s Office of Human Rights, see 
    id. at 8
    ¶¶ 45-47, she
    had 180 days from the time of the alleged violation to file her
    EEOC charge. See Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of France in U.S., 
    878 F. Supp. 2d 164
    , 171 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Where Plaintiff has failed
    to pursue her grievances through the state’s administrative
    processes, as here, she cannot invoke the longer presentment
    [300-day] window and must file her claims within the 180–day
    window to be timely.”). The Court therefore finds that only the
    allegations of discriminatory acts that occurred within the 180-
    days window are timely for the purpose of determining Ms.
    Dieng’s hostile work environment claims.
    Ms. Dieng relies on National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
    Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    , 113 (2002) for the proposition that “an
    action against a defendant employer for a claim of hostile work
    environment can include events occurring before the charge-filing
    period, i.e., occurring more than 300 days before she filed her
    26
    claim with the EEOC.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 11-12 (emphasis in
    original). Ms. Dieng argues that “although the staff meeting
    hostility occurred more than 300 days prior to [the] filing [of]
    her EEOC Charge, if it is part of the same discriminatory hostile
    work environment claim, those acts are included.” 
    Id. at 12.
    In
    response, AIR neither cites nor addresses Morgan. See Def.’s Reply,
    ECF No. 12 at 5. As previously explained, the 300-day window does
    not apply to Ms. Dieng’s situation. See Ashraf-Hassan, 878 F.
    Supp. 2d at 171. Morgan, however, supports Ms. Dieng’s timeliness
    argument.
    In Morgan, the Supreme Court noted that hostile work
    environment claims by “[t]heir very nature involve[ ] repeated
    
    conduct.” 536 U.S. at 115
    . The Supreme Court made clear that an
    unlawful employment practice “cannot be said to occur on any
    particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years
    and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of
    harassment may not be actionable on its own.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The Supreme Court explained:
    A hostile work environment claim is composed
    of a series of separate acts that collectively
    constitute     one    “unlawful     employment
    practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). The
    timely filing provision only requires that a
    Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a
    certain number of days after the unlawful
    practice happened. It does not matter, for
    purposes of the statute, that some of the
    component acts of the hostile work environment
    fall outside the statutory time period.
    Provided that an act contributing to the claim
    27
    occurs within the filing period, the entire
    time period of the hostile environment may be
    considered by a court for the purposes of
    determining liability.
    
    Id. at 117.
    In other words, “a hostile work environment claim .
    . . may properly be viewed as a ‘continuing violation’ under
    both Title VII and the DCHRA.” Hammel v. Marsh USA Inc., 206 F.
    Supp. 3d 219, 233 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing 
    Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122
    ;
    Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 
    830 A.2d 874
    , 890 (D.C.
    2003)).
    Here, AIR does not dispute that Ms. Dieng’s 2017
    allegations in support of her hostile work environment claims
    are timely. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 6. Ms. Dieng asserts
    two specific acts of hostility that occurred in 2017: (1) “lies
    as to her performance, which occurred on several occasions”; and
    (2) the “denial of teleworking.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 10.
    Ms. Dieng’s hostile work environment theory is also based on
    AIR’s alleged misconduct in 2015. See 
    id. at 10.
    According to
    Ms. Dieng, “[t]he yelling at [her] in staff meetings was most
    humiliating. However, it became worse after she reported her
    race claim to [the Human Resources department]. Then she was
    totally ignored, unable to ask questions or contribute to work
    conversations in the meeting.” 
    Id. Ms. Dieng
    alleges other acts
    of hostility without providing the exact dates. See Am. Compl.,
    ECF No. 8 at 4 ¶¶ 20-21. Because Ms. Dieng only had to file an
    28
    EEOC charge within 180 days “of any act that is part of the
    hostile work environment,” see 
    Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118
    , the
    Court therefore finds that all of her allegations are timely.
    2.     Failure to State a Claim
    Having found that Ms. Dieng’s hostile work environment
    claims are timely, the Court turns to the merits of those
    claims. “[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can
    be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These
    may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
    severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
    or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
    interferes with an employee’s work performance.” 
    George, 407 F.3d at 416
    (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    ,
    23 (1993)). Here, Ms. Dieng alleges that certain incidents at
    AIR were humiliating. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 10;
    Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 3 ¶¶ 13-16, 4 ¶¶ 20-21, 5 ¶¶ 24-30. But
    the alleged incidents in Ms. Dieng’s Amended Complaint were not
    “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
    [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.”
    
    Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201
    (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also 
    Baird, 792 F.3d at 168
    -69 (explaining that
    “Title VII is aimed at preventing discrimination, not auditing
    the responsiveness of human resources departments”).
    Ms. Dieng argues that the “lies as to her performance,
    29
    which occurred on several occasions” constitute a hostile work
    environment. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 10. Because Ms. Dieng’s
    Amended Complaint incorporates by reference the 2016 performance
    evaluation, see Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 6 ¶ 31, the Court will
    consider that document for purposes of evaluating whether Ms.
    Dieng has stated a claim, see McManus v. Williams, 
    519 F. Supp. 2d
    1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007) (Sullivan, J.). 7 The Court agrees with
    AIR’s argument that the 2016 performance evaluation does not
    contain the phrase “negative feedback” and that the evaluation
    fails to support her allegations that she received negative
    feedback from others. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 4. The
    2016 performance evaluation states, in relevant part, that “[Ms.
    Dieng] pretty consistently gets feedback from others on bugs or
    issues in her code when code reviews are completed.” Def.’s Ex.
    1, ECF No. 9-2 at 2 (emphasis added). While AIR provided as an
    exhibit to its motion to dismiss the 2016 performance
    evaluation, AIR did not attach Ms. Dieng’s other evaluations to
    address her other allegations—she had a “perfect record” at AIR,
    Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 at 7 ¶ 40, she sought “other independent
    evaluations of her work[,]” 
    id. at 7
    ¶ 41, and she “received no
    7 When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider
    “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as
    exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and
    matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.”
    Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 
    226 F. Supp. 2d 191
    , 196 (D.D.C. 2002).
    30
    negative feedback from any of her co-worker reviewers[,]” 
    id. Nonetheless, such
    allegations are not sufficiently severe or
    pervasive to state a plausible hostile work environment claim.
    See Laughlin v. Holder, 
    923 F. Supp. 2d 204
    , 216-21 (D.D.C.
    2013) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a hostile work
    environment claim based on certain performance-based actions,
    such as alleged manipulation of performance evaluations).
    Ms. Dieng points to other incidents in support of her
    hostile work environment claims: (1) the “denial of
    teleworking,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 10; (2) yelling at her
    during staff meetings, id.; (3) ignoring her at those meetings,
    id.; and (4) “constant questioning of [her] work,” Am. Compl.,
    ECF No. 8 at 4 ¶ 21. This Court and other courts in this
    jurisdiction have found that similar allegations of misconduct
    are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a hostile work
    environment claim. See, e.g., Outlaw v. Johnson, 
    49 F. Supp. 3d 88
    , 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (Sullivan, J.) (dismissing hostile work
    environment claim where allegations of “promotion denials, a
    subjective performance review, and being hired at a lower grade
    than Caucasian employees” were not sufficiently severe or
    pervasive); Koch v. White, 
    134 F. Supp. 3d 158
    , 167-68 (D.D.C.
    2015) (finding that denials of certain accommodations, including
    request for “part-time telework arrangement,” did not create
    hostile work environment claim); Casey v. Mabus, 
    878 F. Supp. 2d 31
    175, 189 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that supervisor’s “loud and
    aggressive” statements and actions of “slamm[ing] his hands on
    the desk” during meeting failed to constitute hostile work
    environment). Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has held that
    workplace tribulations, such as “petty insults, vindictive
    behavior, and angry recriminations[,]” are not actionable under
    Title VII. Brooks v. Grundmann, 
    748 F.3d 1273
    , 1277-78 (D.C.
    Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The Court therefore finds that
    the factual allegations set forth in Ms. Dieng’s Amended
    Complaint fail to state a hostile work environment claim.
    Accordingly, the Court GRANTS AIR’s motion to dismiss as to
    Counts I and II.
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART
    and DENIES IN PART AIR’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES
    WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Dieng’s hostile work environment and
    gender discrimination claims. Ms. Dieng’s remaining claims are
    her discrimination and retaliation claims based on her race. A
    separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    SO ORDERED.
    Signed:    Emmet G. Sullivan
    United States District Judge
    September 26, 2019
    32