Estate of Matthews v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Estate of MARY MATTHEWS AND
JAMES MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff Civil No. 07-301 (CKK)
v.
NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(November 26, 2014)
This suit alleging that Mary Matthews suffered injuries as a result of her treatment with
the drug Zometa marketed and distributed by Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, is before
this Court on remand from Multi-District Litigation proceedings in the Middle District of
Tennessee. Upon remand, the parties were directed to show cause why this case should not be
transferred to the United States District Court in the district where Plaintiff resides. The parties
agree that the case should be transferred out of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, but disagree on the Court to which the case should be transferred: Plaintiff argues for
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, while Defendant argues for the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Upon consideration of the
pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record for purposes of this Motion, the Court
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Plaintiff’s Response to Show Cause Order (“Pl.’s Resp.”), ECF No. [8]; Defendant’s
Response to Show Cause Order (“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. [9]; Defendant’s Motion to Transfer
Case (“Def.’s Mot”), ECF No. [14]; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Transfer Case (“Pl.’s
Opp’n”), ECF No. [15]; Defendant’s Reply (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. [16].
finds that private and public interest considerations outweigh the deference given to Plaintiff’s
chosen forum. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Transfer to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia and DENIES Plaintiff’s request to
transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following facts are not disputed by the parties. Mary Matthews began treatment with
Zometa while she was living in Florida, within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 3 (Dr. Schreiber Depo.), at 6-7. On July 3,
2002, in Florida, Dr. Fred Schreiber first prescribed Zometa to Ms. Mathews. Id. at 7. Dr.
Schreiber treated Ms. Matthews with Zometa through November 2003. Id. at 8. Approximately
a year after beginning treatment with Zometa, Ms. Matthews and her husband moved to Axson,
Georgia, within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia. Id., Ex. 1 (Pl.’s Fact Sheet), at 5. While in Georgia, Ms. Matthews was treated by Drs.
Marco Ayulo and Asit Jha with Zometa and a generic version of Aredia from November 2003
through May 2006. Id., Ex. 4 (Ayulo Depo.) at 7-10; id., Ex. 5 (Jha Depo.), at 7-10. Dr. Ayulo
discontinued Ms. Matthews’ use of Zometa in August 2005, but placed Ms. Matthews back on
the drug during his last visit with her in May 2006. Id. at 9.
In June 2006, while still living in Georgia, Ms. Mathews was diagnosed by Dr. Fernando
Alvarado with osteonecrosis of the jaw (“ONJ”), or “bone death resulting from poor blood
supply to an area of the bone.” Compl. ¶ 1; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (Alvarado Depo.), at 8-9. Dr.
Alvarado treated Ms. Matthews for her ONJ from June 2006 to July 2007. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6
(Alvarado Depo.), at 7-10. Ms. Matthews was also treated for her ONJ by Dr. Steve Wilkerson
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in Douglas, Georgia in June of 2006. Id., Ex. 7 (Wilkerson Depo.), at 10. In total, Ms.
Matthews was treated with the drugs at issue for over four years. For more than three of those
years, Ms. Matthews was receiving her treatment in Georgia. Ms. and Mr. Matthews, who lived
in Georgia at the time they filed this suit in 2007, have since passed away. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.
Plaintiffs’ daughter, April McMullins, is executor of the estates of Ms. and Mr. Mathews and has
been substituted as Plaintiff in this action. Id. Ms. McMullins lives in Minneola, Florida, which
is located in the Middle District of Florida. Id.
B. Procedural Background
In February 2007, Ms. and Mr. Matthews filed suit in the District of Columbia against
Defendant Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation for strict liability, negligent manufacture,
failure to warn, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and (for Mr. Matthews)
loss of consortium. Compl. ¶ 16-42. The Complaint alleges that Aredia and Zometa cause ONJ
and that Ms. Matthews’ ONJ was caused by her infusions of Zometa. Id. ¶ 1. Although the suit
was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the case was transferred in April
2007 to the Multi-District Litigation panel, which sent the case to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to be considered along with other Aredia/Zometa
cases. See Letter from MDL Panel, ECF No. [3].
In December 2013, the case was remanded to this Court. See Conditional Transfer Order,
ECF No. [5]. After this Court issued a Show Cause Order requiring the parties to show why the
case should not be transferred to the district where Plaintiff resides, the parties each responded
that the case should be transferred out of the District Court for the District of Columbia, but
disagreed as to the court to which the case should be transferred. Plaintiff advocates a transfer to
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the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, while Defendant advocates a
transfer to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.
The Court reviewed the parties’ responses to the Show Cause Order, but found that neither
party presented sufficiently supported facts for the Court to determine the appropriate district to
which this matter should be transferred. See Order (April 10, 2014), ECF No. [13], at 1-2. In its
Order, the Court noted that “when evaluating motions to transfer, courts should only consider
undisputed facts supported by affidavits, depositions, stipulations, or other relevant documents.”
Id. at 1-2 (citing Bederson v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 n. 6 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing
Midwest Precision Servs. Inc. v. PTM Indus. Corp., 574 F. Supp. 657, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1983))).
Consequently, the Court ordered Defendant to file a Motion to Transfer with fully supported
facts addressing, among other things, the location(s) where plaintiffs and their representatives
live(d) at all relevant times, including presently; the location(s) where Ms. Matthews was treated
with Aredia and Zometa and the length of time she received treatment at the location(s); the
location(s) where Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated for jaw osteonecrosis and the length of
time she received treatment at the location(s); the location and identity of witnesses in this case,
particularly treating doctors; and the location of relevant documents in this case. Order (April
10, 2014), at 2. This Court further ordered Plaintiff to file a Response to Defendant’s Motion,
responding to Defendant’s arguments and providing fully supported facts addressing, among
other things, the factors outlined above as they pertain to Plaintiff’s argument regarding the
proper court to which this case should be transferred. Id. Defendant was permitted to file a
Reply. Id. at 2-3. Having received all of the parties’ briefing, the issue now ripe and before the
Court is whether the “convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice” are in favor
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of transferring venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia or
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Both parties seek to have this Court transfer the venue of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court may transfer a case to any other district
where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests
of justice.” Determining whether transfer is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) calls for
a two-part inquiry. The Court must first ask whether the transferee forum is one where the action
“might have been brought” originally. Id. Venue is proper in a “judicial district where any
defendant resides . . . [or] in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred. . . [or] any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Second, the Court must consider whether private and public interest factors weigh in
favor of transfer. Lentz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 2006). In considering
whether a transfer would be proper, the court may consider the following “private interest”
factors:
(1) The plaintiff’s choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly
in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendants’ choice of forum; (3) whether the
claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of
the witnesses of the plaintiff and defendant, but only to the extent that the
witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease
of access to sources of proof.
Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court
must also weigh public interest considerations such as (1) the transferee court’s familiarity with
the governing laws and the pendency of related actions in the transferee’s forum; (2) the relative
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congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee courts; and (3) the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home. Id. at 128. Section 1404(a) vests discretion in the district
court to conduct an “individualized, case-by-case analysis.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). The “plaintiff’s choice of forum is ordinarily entitled to deference,”
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 675 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (D.D.C.
2009) (citation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that convenience and the interests of
justice weigh in favor of a transfer to that district. See Int’l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades
Union v. Best Painting and Sandblasting Co., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 906, 907 (D.D.C. 1985). As
both parties have effectively moved the Court to transfer this case out of the District Court for
the District of Columbia, each party bears the burden of establishing that the relevant factors
favor transfer to their chosen district.
III. DISCUSSION
In regards to the threshold inquiry under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the Court concludes—and
the parties do not dispute—that this action could have properly been brought in either the
Southern District of Georgia or the Middle District of Florida. See generally Def.’s Reply; see
Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Accordingly, the only question for the Court to analyze is whether the parties
have met their burden of showing that their private interests and the public interest favor transfer
of this action to the Middle District of Florida or the Southern District of Georgia. The Court
shall consider each private interest factor and public interest factor in turn.
A. Private Interest Factors
1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
“[P]laintiff’s choice of forum is a ‘paramount consideration in any determination of a
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transfer request.’ ” Sheffer v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 873 F. Supp. 2d 371, 375 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting Thayer/Patricof Educ. Funding, L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., 196 F. Supp. 2d 21, 31 (D.D.C.
2002). Plaintiff has selected the Middle District of Florida as her forum. While courts should
give deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum, “this deference is weakened if . . . another
‘jurisdiction has the stronger factual nexus.’ ” Scurlock v. Lappin, 870 F. Supp. 2d 116, 123
(D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Miller v. Insulatino Contractors, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d
97, 102 (D.D.C. 2009) (“When the events occur in more than one district, a court can consider
which jurisdiction has the stronger factual nexus to the claims.”). As explained in greater detail,
infra, Georgia has the stronger factual nexus to this case. Accordingly, this factor weighs only
slightly in favor of transfer to the Middle District of Florida.
2. Defendant’s Choice of Forum
The defendant’s choice of forum is a consideration when deciding a § 1404(a) motion,
however, it is not ordinarily entitled to deference. Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (citing
Mahoney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2008)). Moreover, Novartis, “a
multinational corporation, readily able to defend this lawsuit in either district, has no real stake in
having the case heard in either forum.” Id. at 376 (finding defendant Novartis’ choice of forum
to be a neutral factor in a Zometa/Aredia products liability case); see also Veney v. Starbucks
Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D.D.C.2008) (giving little weight to multinational corporation’s
choice of forum). Accordingly, the Court finds this factor to be neutral.
3. Where Claim Arose
The Court must next consider where this claim arose. Pharmaceutical product liability
cases arise wherever the plaintiff took the drug, purchased the drug, and was prescribed the drug.
Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (citing Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C.
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2007)). In this case, Ms. Matthews ingested, purchased, and was prescribed the drugs at issue in
both the Middle District of Florida and the Southern District of Georgia. Accordingly, the claim
at issue here could be said to have arisen in either the Middle District of Florida or the Southern
District of Georgia. However, the majority of the material events that constitute the factual basis
of Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Southern District of Georgia. Ms. Mathews received all of
her generic Aredia infusions and most of her Zometa infusions in Georgia. Although Ms.
Mathews was prescribed and took Zometa in each of the transferee districts, she was diagnosed
with and treated for the injuries allegedly caused by the drugs in Georgia. Accordingly, this
factor weighs in favor of transfer to the Southern District of Georgia. See Lagor v. Eli Lilly and
Co., No. 06-1967, 2007 WL 1748888, *3 (D.D.C. 2007) (transferring case to Rhode Island even
though plaintiff ingested DES in both Rhode Island and Massachusetts because “the clear
majority of the material events that constitute the factual basis of plaintiffs’ claims occurred in
Rhode Island.”).
4. Convenience of the Parties
Plaintiff next argues that transfer to the Middle District of Florida is most appropriate
because she resides in the Middle District of Florida making that location far more convenient
for her. Plaintiff contends that the two districts are equally convenient to Defendant and,
therefore, this factor weights in her favor. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. The Court does not find this factor
dispositive.
Plaintiff contends that litigating in the Middle District of Florida would be more
convenient because it would “reduce[ ] all costs on [Plaintiff] to appearing at trial.” Pl.’s Opp’n
at 3. However, Plaintiff makes no argument that the added cost of litigation would be unduly
burdensome in the Southern District of Georgia. See Gemological Inst. of Am., Inc., v. Thi-Dai
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Phan, 145 F. Supp. 2d 68, 74 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding transfer away from plaintiff’s preferred
forum appropriate where plaintiffs did not “offer[ ] any documentation to show that [the transfer]
would be unduly burdensome to its finances”). Moreover, the Court notes that the two proposed
transferee districts are adjacent to each other and, although the Southern District of Georgia is
not as convenient as the Middle District of Florida, Plaintiff could reach a Southern District of
Georgia district court by car without an unduly lengthy drive. See Lagor, 2007 WL 1748888, at
*11 (holding that the relatively close proximity of the parties’ desired forums minimized any
inconvenience to plaintiffs that could result from a transfer to Rhode Island as opposed to a
transfer to Massachusetts). Accordingly, this factor weighs only slightly in favor of transferring
this case to the Middle District of Florida.
5. Convenience of Witnesses
Defendant’s argument that this case should be transferred to the Southern District of
Georgia rests primarily on the fact that all of the treating physicians who might be called at trial,
except for one, reside in Georgia. See Def’s. Mot. at 4. Defendant notes that by transferring this
case to Georgia, four of Ms. Matthews’ treating physicians will be able to appear in person while
only the initial prescriber of the drugs in question, Dr. Schreiber, would potentially have to
appear by deposition. Id. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that this case should be transferred
to the Middle District of Florida because Ms. Matthews’ first prescribing physician resides there.
Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-4.
“The convenience of the witnesses has been described as ‘the most critical factor’ to
examine when deciding a motion to transfer.” Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 377(quoting Pyrocap
Int’l Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 259 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D.D.C. 2003)). Courts in this Circuit have
repeatedly recognized that when the vast majority of essential fact witnesses are within the
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subpoena power of a proposed district this factor favors transfer to that district because it will be
more convenient for fact witnesses to appear. See Dean, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 22-23 (“Because the
vast majority of essential fact witnesses are within the subpoena power of the District of
Massachusetts (but not the District of Columbia) and because it will be more convenient for fact
witnesses to appear in the District of Massachusetts, this factor favors transfer.”); Lagor, 2007
WL 1748888, at *4 (finding transfer appropriate to the district where it “will be the most
convenient for the greatest number of potential witnesses”); MacMunn v. Eli Lilly Co., 559
F. Supp. 2d 58, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2008) (“the fact that almost all of the nonparty, nonexpert
witnesses reside in Massachusetts clearly weighs in favor of transfer”).
The causes of action alleged in this case will require testimony from Ms. Matthews’
prescribing physicians and the physicians who treated her for the injuries Plaintiff alleges were
caused by Defendant’s drugs. While Ms. Mathews’ initial prescribing physician, Dr. Schreiber,
is located in Florida, four physicians located in Georgia also prescribed Ms. Mathews the drugs
at issue and/or diagnosed her and treated her for her eventual injuries. The testimony of all of
these physicians will likely be important to this case, but the greatest number of physicians reside
in Georgia. Moreover, Plaintiff has not indicated any reason to believe that Dr. Schreiber is an
unwilling witness who would not present himself at trial thus necessitating the subpoena power
of a district court. See Thayer/Patricof Educ. Funding, L.L.C., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (holding
that the movant must show that a witness would be unwilling to testify; absent any such showing
the Court assumes the witness would voluntarily appear). Accordingly, the convenience of the
witnesses weighs in favor of transferring this case to the Southern District of Georgia.
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6. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
Finally, although modern technology makes the location of documents less important
than it once was, this Court finds that the ease of access to sources of documentary proof weighs
in favor of transfer to the Southern District of Georgia, where a vast majority of the document
owners—i.e. the prescribing and treating physicians—can be reached with a subpoena if
necessary.
B. Public Interest Factors
1. Transferee’s Familiarity with Governing Laws & Pendency of Related Actions
Courts have long held that it is preferable to try a diversity case “in a forum that is at
home with the state law that must govern the case.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645
(1964). Defendant argues that transfer to the Southern District of Georgia is appropriate because
Georgia law will likely apply to issues of liability and compensatory damages given that Ms.
Mathews was a resident of Georgia, received most of her treatments with the drugs at issue in
Georgia, and was diagnosed and treated for her jaw injury in Georgia. Def.’s Mot. at 5. Plaintiff
argues that a transfer is favored to the Middle District of Florida because it is experienced with
Aredia/Zometa cases and has a number of other Aredia/Zometa cases that are presently pending.
Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff also argues that Florida law will likely govern this matter. Id. at 5.
The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of transfer to the Southern District of
Georgia because Georgia law will likely govern. When a case is transferred under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), the transferee court is “obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied if
there had been no change of venue.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. This principle requires
District of Columbia choice of law, as it pertains to the governing substantive law, to apply in
this case. See id. Under the District of Columbia’s choice of law analysis, the Court must
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analyze four factors in determining which state’s substantive law will apply: (1) where the injury
occurred; (2) where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) where the
relationship between the parties is centered. Herbert v. District of Columbia, 808 A.2d 776, 779
(D.C. 2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. d (1971)). Here, it
appears that Ms. Matthews’ alleged injury occurred in the Southern District of Georgia where
she was diagnosed with ONJ three years after leaving Florida to move to Georgia. Cf. Lagor,
2007 WL 1748888, at *5 (DES products liability case holding that the purported injury should
not be measured at ingestion, but instead, when the injured party was born prematurely). The
conduct that caused Ms. Matthews’ injury—her prescription, purchase, and ingestion of the
drugs—occurred in both Florida and Georgia, however, the majority of the conduct occurred in
Georgia where she was prescribed the drugs (and even taken off and put back on the drugs) and
ingested the drugs over three years as opposed to one year in Florida. As for the third factor,
Defendant is incorporated in neither of the proposed transferee districts and does business in
both, making this a neutral factor in the choice-of-law analysis. At the time they filed their
Complaint, Ms. and Mr. Mathews were domiciled in and residents of the Southern District of
Georgia. Lastly, the relationship between the parties is primarily centered in the Southern
District of Georgia since it is the site where Ms. Mathews received most of the treatment with the
drugs, and where her alleged injuries were diagnosed and treated. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Georgia law would likely govern this case.
Since Georgia products liability law will likely govern and products-liability law
“involves complex and continually evolving concepts,” Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (quoting
Godoy ex rel. Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 768 N.W.2d 674, 680 (2009)), the
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Southern District of Georgia’s experience interpreting Georgia products-liability law strongly
favors transfer. See id. (“Familiarity with the governing law is more significant when legal
issues presented are complex or unsettled.”). Even if the Middle District of Florida has extensive
experience with Aredia and Zometa cases, courts have held that this experience does not
counterbalance the interest in having the trial of a diversity case “in a forum that is at home with
the state law that must govern the case.” MacMunn, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)).
2. Relative Congestion of Potential Transferee Courts
As for the relative congestion of the proposed transferee courts, Defendant contends that
the Southern District of Georgia’s docket is less congested than the docket of the Middle District
of Florida. In support of this contention, Defendant cites to the United States Courts’ website
which shows that the Middle District of Florida has 7,392 cases pending, while the Southern
District of Georgia has only 546 pending cases. Def.’s Mot. at 5-6, n. 3. Moreover, the median
time from filing to disposition of a case in the Middle District of Florida is 9.2 months and 8
months in the Southern District of Georgia.2 Id. Plaintiff does not dispute this information.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of transfer to the Southern District of Georgia.
2
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C05Sep1
3.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). The Court has included the most recent statistics from 2013
in this Memorandum Opinion. In its Motion, Defendant cited to 2012 statistics which indicated
that the medium time from filing to disposition of a case in the Middle District of Florida was
38.4 months, but only 8.1 months in the Southern District of Georgia. In 2012, there were
12,884 cases pending in the Middle District of Florida and only 591 cases pending in the
Southern District of Georgia. See Def.’s Mot. at 5-6 (citing
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C05Sep12.pdf).
The Court finds that the more recent statistics still support the thrust of Defendant’s argument as
to this factor.
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3. Local Interest in Deciding Local Controversies at Home
Finally, the Court must consider the “interest [of each state] in redressing the harms of its
citizens.” MacMunn,559 F.Supp.2d at 63. Each party argues that their proposed transferee
district has an interest in deciding this case because the claim arose within that district. See Pl.’s
Opp’n at 5; Def.’s Mot. at 5. However, the Court found, supra, that Plaintiff’s claim is most
appropriately characterized as arising in Georgia. As Georgia has an interest in litigating
controversies that arise locally, this factor weighs in favor of transfer to the Southern District of
Georgia. See MacMunn, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (“The District, while its contacts with the case are
not ‘legally insignificant,’ . . . does not derive as great an interest from those contacts as
Massachusetts does from its interest in redressing the harms of its citizens.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that all of the private-interest and public-
interest factors either favor granting Defendant’s motion to transfer this case to the Southern
District of Georgia or are neutral, with the exception of Plaintiff’s choice of forum and
convenience of the parties. However, the significance of Plaintiff’s chosen forum and any
inconvenience to Plaintiff of litigating in Defendant’s chosen forum is diminished because
Defendant’s chosen forum has the stronger factual nexus to this case and Plaintiff has not
demonstrated she will be unduly burdened by litigating in Defendant’s chosen forum.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it would be in the interest of justice to transfer this case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia and, therefore, GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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