United States v. Jones ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
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v. ) Criminal No. 13-305-12 (ESH)
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VINCENT JONES, )
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Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Vincent Jones, along with twenty-two others, has been charged with
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin,
five hundred grams or more of cocaine, and twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, crimes punishable by a minimum of ten years imprisonment. See
21 U.S.C. § 841. The government requested a detention hearing which was held by Magistrate
Judge Kay on November 26, 2013. (See Detention Memorandum (“Det. Mem.”) at 1, Dec. 3,
2013 [ECF No. 72].) At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Judge Kay ruled that
defendant Jones should be held pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. (See id. at 6.) Jones
thereafter filed a motion to appeal Magistrate Judge Kay’s detention order under 18 U.S.C. §
3145(b), which the government opposed. (Def.’s Mot. to Vacate Det. Order and Order for Pre-
Trial Release, Dec. 11, 2013 [ECF No. 58]; Gov’t’s Omnibus Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Review
and Revocation of Det. Orders (“Opp.”), Dec. 13, 2013 [ECF No. 86].) This Court held a
hearing on the motion on December 17, 2013. For the reasons stated in open court, as well as the
reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny this motion.
DISCUSSION
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., a judicial officer “shall order” a
defendant’s detention before trial if, after a hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community.” Id. § 3142(e). The judicial officer
considering the propriety of pretrial detention must consider four factors:
(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
including whether the offense . . . involves . . . a controlled
substance, [or] firearm;
(2) the weight of evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . the
person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug
or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings; . . . and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release.
Id. § 3142(g). The government is required to demonstrate the appropriateness of pretrial
detention by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 3142(f). However, when “there is
probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committed an offense for which a maximum term
of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §
801 et seq.),” there is a rebuttable presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of the
community.” Id. § 3142(e). Considering each factor below, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that the government has met its burden and that defendant Jones has failed to
rebut the presumption against pretrial detention.
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First, the nature and circumstances of the offense favor Jones’ continued detention. The
indictment demonstrates probable cause that Jones participated in a large-scale narcotics
conspiracy. Moreover, according to the government’s proffer and the evidence presented at the
hearing, Jones regularly purchased between ten and one hundred grams of heroin for re-
distribution from co-defendant Juan Floyd. Jones, a childhood friend of co-defendant Floyd,
also alerted Floyd to the fact that he was being followed by law enforcement and participated in
one hundred “pertinent phone calls” often conducted in coded language regarding narcotics
transactions. On November 20, 2013, law enforcement searched Jones’ residence in
Washington, D.C. and found a fully-loaded, semi-automatic assault rifle along with ammunition
of several different calibers, as well as four cellular phones.
Second, the weight of the evidence favors continued detention. At the hearing, the
government proffered that Jones and Floyd completed thirty narcotics transactions during the
course of the investigation. Each transaction is believed to have been for between ten and one
hundred grams of heroin. Among these suspected transactions, on one occasion, defendant Jones
requested a “dollar bill” from co-defendant Juan Floyd. The government proffers, based on their
experts and confidential sources that in the drug trade a “dollar bill” refers to one hundred grams
of heroin. In addition, police recorded a call made by Jones to Floyd warning him that a law
enforcement vehicle might be surveilling Floyd. (Det. Mem. at 3; Gov’t’s Second Mem. in
Support of Pretrial Det., Nov. 26, 2013 [ECF No. 15], at 20-21.) Together these events
constitute sufficient evidence that Jones was likely a narcotics redistributor for Floyd and that he
has failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
Third, the history and characteristics of the defendant support his continued detention.
As defense counsel explained, Jones’ convictions are dated and he is gainfully employed by the
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D.C. Department of Public Works. However, the defendant’s history and characteristics still
support continued detention. Despite prior convictions of carrying a firearm and possession with
intent to distribute, the evidence strongly suggests that Jones continued to re-distribute narcotics
and kept illegal weapons and ammunition in his home where children live. (Det. Mem. at 3-4.)
Fourth, defendant’s potential danger to the community favors his continued detention.
As Magistrate Judge Kay explained, “the narcotics trade does serious and pervasive damage to
this community [and] Mr. Jones was in frequent contact with the head of the criminal conspiracy
charged here . . . .” (Det Mem. 6.) Moreover, defendant kept an illegal firearm and ammunition
in his home. The Court is therefore not satisfied that Jones would not present a danger to the
community if released pending further proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for reversal of the Magistrate Judge’s
order of detention is hereby DENIED, and in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), the Court
ORDERS that defendant remain in the custody of the Attorney General for confinement pending
trial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
DATE: December 19, 2013
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