Costello v. District of Columbia , 826 F. Supp. 2d 221 ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
DANNY COSTELLO, and )
GAI NGUYEN, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-389 (RBW)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiffs, Danny Costello and Gai Nguyen, bring this civil lawsuit against the
District of Columbia (the “District”), seeking redress for an alleged unlawful search of their
apartment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006). See Third Amended Complaint for Violation of
Civil and Constitutional Rights (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 4-23. Currently before the Court is the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint. Upon careful consideration of the
third amended complaint, the defendant’s motion, and all memoranda of law relating thereto, 1
the Court must grant the defendant’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The third amended complaint contains the following material allegations. The plaintiffs
are a married couple who reside at an apartment located in Washington, D.C. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2,
1
In addition to the documents already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its
decision: (1) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mem.”); (2) the Opposition to the Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss (“Pls.’
Opp’n”); and (3) the Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s
Reply”).
4. On April 1, 2010, a Judge of the Superior Court for the District of Columbia issued a warrant
authorizing a search of the plaintiffs’ apartment. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The search warrant was issued upon
a finding of probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs’ apartment contained “[m]oney derived
from the sale of illegal drugs, paperwork showing dominion control of narcotics, US currency,
scales, bank records, mailboxes, safes, similar storage cabinets, photographs, tally sheets, proof
of occupancy, receipts, packing, boxes, [and] indicia of sale of weapons.” Id. ¶ 5. On April 9,
2010, ten officers from the District’s Metropolitan Police Department executed the search
warrant. Id. ¶ 4. The officers forcibly entered the plaintiffs’ apartment without first knocking
and announcing their authority and purpose. Id. When Mr. Costello asked the officers “what
was going on,” one of the officers “put a gun to his head, told him to shut up, forcefully twisted
his arm, handcuffed him, and restricted him to [a] couch” in the apartment. Id. Ms. Nguyen then
entered the room and asked “what’s wrong,” to which another officer “rushed over to her and
told her to ‘shut up,’ pushed Ms. Nguyen against the wall, and forcibly pushed her outside of the
apartment.” Id. The officers restrained both plaintiffs while they conducted their search. Id.Ultimately, the officers uncovered none of the items listed in their search warrant, nor any other
contraband. Id.The plaintiffs instituted this action on February 16, 2011, and thereafter filed their third
amended complaint on April 14, 2011, asserting the following three claims against the District
based upon the officers’ search of the plaintiffs’ apartment: Count I (for violations of the
plaintiffs’ civil and constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), id. ¶¶ 8-13; Count II (for
violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment), id. ¶¶ 14-18; and
Count III (for violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3109), id. ¶¶ 19-
23. On April 28, 2011, the District moved for dismissal of the third amended complaint pursuant
2
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that the plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim of municipal liability against the District for the officers’ allegedly unconstitutional search.
Def.’s Mem. at 3-5.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the
complaint properly states a claim on which relief may be granted.” Davis v. Billington, 775 F.
Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2011). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only that it provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “‘detailed
factual allegations’” are not required, a plaintiff must provide “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007)), in order
to “give the defendant fair notice . . . of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Nor may a plaintiff offer mere “labels and
conclusions . . . [or] a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555.
Rather, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A complaint alleging facts which are merely consistent
with a defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must be liberally construed in the
3
plaintiff's favor and the Court must accept as true all of the well-pleaded factual allegations made
therein. Davis, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33. Nevertheless, while the Court must accept well-
pleaded factual allegations, any conclusory allegations are not entitled to an assumption of truth,
and even those allegations pleaded with factual support need only be accepted insofar as “they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Municipal Liability Under § 1983 for Alleged Constitutional Violations
Section 1983 creates a private cause of action against any person who, acting under color
of state or District of Columbia law, deprives another of a federal constitutional or statutory
right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “municipalities are liable for their agents’
constitutional torts only if the agents acted pursuant to municipal policy or custom . . . .
Respondeat superior liability does not apply.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). To state a § 1983 claim against the District,
then, a plaintiff “must allege not only a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal
law, but also that the [District’s] custom or policy caused the violation.” Id. (citing Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123-24 (1992)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of
pleading the existence of a municipal custom or practice that abridge[d] her federal constitutional
or statutory rights.” Trimble v. District of Columbia, 779 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2011). A
plaintiff may satisfy this burden by alleging that (1) “the municipality or one of its policymakers
explicitly adopted the policy that was ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation,’” Warren,
353 F.3d at 39 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); (2) “a policymaker ‘knowingly ignore[d] a
practice that was consistent enough to constitute custom,’” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 601
4
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Warren, 353 F.3d at 39); or (3) the municipality “failed to respond to a
need . . . in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the
need will result in constitutional violations,” id. (quoting Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d
1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
In attempting to identify a municipal custom or policy that caused the alleged violations
of their constitutional rights, the plaintiffs claim that the District’s officers executed the search
warrant on their apartment pursuant to the
District’s long standing policy, practice, and custom that allows police officers to
execute search warrants[] without training its officers how to properly execute a
search warrant to insure that [it is] not executed in violation of the requirements of
18 U.S.C. § 3109,[2] and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is the
execution of this long standing policy, practice, and/or custom that caused the
Plaintiff’s injuries, alleged in this complaint.
Am. Compl. ¶ 7. From these allegations it appears that the plaintiffs are seeking to predicate the
District’s liability on a failure to train theory. As this Court has recognized, “only in limited
circumstances can a municipality’s failure to train employees constitute a policy or practice, and
thus serve as the basis for municipal liability.” Davis v. District of Columbia, ___ F. Supp. 2d
___, ___, 2011 WL 3240439, at *5 (D.D.C. 2011) (Walton, J.) (citing Atchinson v. District of
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The Supreme Court recently expounded in detail
upon the standards governing municipal liability based on a failure to train theory:
2
18 U.S.C. § 3109 provides as follows:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house,
or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution
of the warrant.
The statute codifies the common law knock-and-announce requirement, a requirement which is also incorporated in
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Sutherland, 466 F.3d 1083, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Circuit found in
Sutherland that Ҥ 3109 and the Fourth Amendment have merged both in the standards governing entries into the
home and in the remedy for violations of those standards. There is now one uniform knock-and-announce rule.” Id.
at 1085-86.
5
A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train . . . . To satisfy [§ 1983], a municipality’s
failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to “deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come
into contact.” Canton [v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)]. Only then “can such
a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is
actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 389 . . . . “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a
stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his action.” [Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)]. Thus, when city policymakers are on actual
or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes
city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed
deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program. Id. at
407 . . . . A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
“ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of
failure to train. [Id. at 409]. Policymakers’ “continued adherence to an approach
that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by
employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their
action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.”
[Id. at 407]. Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular
respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training
program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.
Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359-60 (2011).
While the plaintiffs have alleged in conclusory terms that the District failed to train its
officers regarding the lawful execution of search warrants, Am. Compl. ¶ 7, they have pleaded
no facts indicating that the District’s decisionmakers knew or should have known of any
deficiencies in the training of its police officers concerning the execution of search warrants such
that the District could be deemed “deliberately indifferent” towards citizens’ constitutional
rights, Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. For instance, the plaintiffs have not alleged a “pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Id. They instead rely solely upon the
alleged unconstitutional search of their apartment as the basis for their claim against the District.
Without further factual enhancement, the plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to state a
plausible claim of municipal liability against the District based on its improper training of its
police officers. See, e.g., Davis, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 3240439, at *5 (dismissing §
6
1983 claims against the District where the plaintiff failed to plead facts showing that the District
acted with deliberate indifference in failing to train its officers); Robertson v. District of
Columbia, 2010 WL 3238996, at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (same); see also Trimble, 779 F.
Supp. 2d at 59 (“merely speculating that an unidentified policy and uncorroborated practice or
custom exists without providing any factual heft to support the allegation is insufficient to state a
claim under § 1983”).
The plaintiffs contend in their opposition brief that “Monell does not require that the
execution of the government’s policy or custom be unconstitutional.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Rather,
the plaintiffs assert that “Monell only requires that the acts represent official policy.” Id.
Because the “execution of a search warrant is pursuant to an official policy,” the plaintiffs claim
that the District may be held liable for the officers’ alleged unlawful execution of the search
warrant on their apartment. Id. The plaintiffs misconstrue the Monell municipal liability
standard. As the Court made clear in Monell, “the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a
government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights
protected by the Constitution.” 436 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). In other words, it is not
enough that a municipal official engaged in unconstitutional conduct while acting pursuant to a
wholly legitimate, official policy of his employer. If that were the case, then municipalities
would effectively be subject to respondeat superior liability for unconstitutional acts committed
by their employees in their official capacities. That is precisely the rule that the Monell Court
rejected when it adopted the “policy or custom” standard for municipal liability—a standard that
the plaintiffs’ allegations fail to satisfy.
Thus, because the plaintiffs have asserted only conclusory allegations of insufficient
training devoid of factual support, their § 1983 claims against the District must be dismissed.
7
B. Other Asserted Bases for Municipal Liability
The remaining counts in the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint merit only brief
discussion. Counts II and III seek damages for the District’s alleged violations of the plaintiffs’
rights under the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and are based on the same factual
allegations as the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-23. Regarding the Fourth
Amendment claim, the plaintiffs cannot evade the strictures of Monell by styling their claim as a
direct violation of the Constitution as opposed to a claim brought under § 1983. See Tarpley v.
Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 9-11 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying rationale of Monell and holding that
municipalities may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior for claims brought
directly under the Constitution). As for the plaintiffs’ claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, no
provision of that statute creates an express private cause of action for damages against a
municipality, nor do the plaintiffs cite any authority or offer any arguments supporting the
existence of an implied cause of action under the statute. Accordingly, both counts must be
dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the District’s motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), and dismiss the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint.
SO ORDERED this 1st day of December, 2011. 3
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge
3
The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
8