Herrick v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PETER S. HERRICK, P.A., :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Civil Action No. 08-0035 (JR)
:
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER :
PROTECTION, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM
Peter Herrick sued to obtain the names and addresses of
individuals from whom the U.S. Customs and Border Protection had
seized currency in ten cases. Suzuki Decl. ¶¶ 6, 13. Customs
turned over names but not addresses of the individuals in eight
cases that had been closed, withholding information about the two
that were pending at the time of Herrick’s FOIA appeal. Customs
moves for summary judgment, arguing that its search was adequate,
that 19 C.F.R. § 103.32 permits limiting the disclosure in
seizure cases to names only, and that FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C)
are applicable. Dkt. #5. Herrick concedes the adequacy of the
search and the propriety of withholding information about pending
cases but cross-moves for summary judgment, arguing that the
addresses were improperly withheld under the FOIA exemptions.
Dkt. #7. Customs’ motion will be granted because, even if
§ 103.32 permits disclosures of the addresses, FOIA Exemption
7(C) was properly applied.
FOIA Exemption (7)(C)
The documents qualify as “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes,” and so the only question
is whether disclosure of the addresses could “reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see, Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d
1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Seized Property Recovery, Corp. v.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 502 F.Supp.2d 50, 56 (D.D.C.
2007); Suzuki Decl. ¶¶ 14, 24. Answering this question requires
“the reviewing court to weigh the public interest in the release
of information against the privacy interest in nondisclosure.”
Schrecker v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
The Supreme Court has held “as a categorical matter
that a third party's request for law enforcement records or
information about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to
invade that citizen's privacy, and that when the request seeks no
official information about a Government agency, but merely
records that the Government happens to be storing, the invasion
of privacy is unwarranted.” U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (Exemption
7(C) properly applied to prevent a news organization from
obtaining individuals’ rap sheets) (internal quotations omitted).
A panel of this Circuit has further held “categorically that,
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unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals
appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is
necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that
the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is
exempt from disclosure.” SafeCard Services, Inc. v. S.E.C., 926
F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Exemption 7(C) properly applied to
“the names and addresses of potential witnesses or litigants in
SEC stock manipulation investigations.”); see, Nation Magazine v.
United States Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(applying SafeCard).
Those decisions are controlling and dispositive. The
addresses plaintiff seeks reveal nothing about Customs or what it
is up to. Customs is not alleged to be connected to any possibly
illegal activity. When a court is required to balance privacy
interests against the public interest but is “shown no public
interest in [disclosure] . . . [it] need not linger . . . .”
National Ass'n of Retired Federal Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d
873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, Dkt. #5, will be granted, and the
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plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, Dkt. #7, will be
denied in an order that accompanies this memorandum.
JAMES ROBERTSON
United States District Judge
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