School for Arts in Learning Public Charter School v. Barrie ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
SCHOOL FOR ARTS IN LEARNING )
PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09-2357 (RWR)
)
FATMATA BARRIE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The School for Arts in Learning Public Charter School
(“SAIL”), a District of Columbia public charter school, has sued
attorney Fatmata Barrie and the Law Offices of Christopher N.
Anwah (the “Anwah Firm”), seeking $3,278.50 in attorney’s fees
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),
20 U.S.C. § 1415, claiming that it was a prevailing party at the
administrative level and that the defendants brought and
continued a due process complaint that was frivolous. Barrie
moves to dismiss, disputing that SAIL was a prevailing party and
arguing that her due process complaint was not without merit.
Because SAIL was not a prevailing party, Barrie’s motion to
dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, will be
granted.
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BACKGROUND
In March 2008, the Anwah firm filed an IDEA due process
complaint on behalf of Nakeisha Arrington, the parent and legal
guardian of K.A., a student eligible to receive special
education. The complaint alleged that SAIL, a local education
agency (“LEA”), and the District of Columbia Public Schools
(“DCPS”) had failed to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation
and Vineland assessment of K.A. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 11.) SAIL
convened a meeting to resolve the complaint and agreed to conduct
the requested evaluation and assessment. (Id. ¶ 12.) In April
2008, a due process hearing was held, and the parties settled all
remaining issues before a hearing officer. (Id. ¶ 13.) The
hearing officer issued an order, documenting SAIL’s agreement to
conduct the requested evaluations and stating that the parties
would convene a Multi-Disciplinary Team (“MDT”) meeting within 15
days after the evaluations were complete to review the
evaluations and discuss, in part, K.A.’s individualized education
program and compensatory education. (Id. ¶ 14.)
SAIL conducted the evaluations in May 2008, and an MDT
meeting was held in June 2008, during which Arrington raised the
possibility of K.A. receiving compensatory education. (Id.
¶¶ 15-16.) Although SAIL stated that it did not believe that
compensatory education was warranted, SAIL nevertheless proposed
as a compensatory education plan a program to be implemented at
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SAIL that summer. (Id. ¶ 16; Def. Barrie’s Mem. of P. & A. in
Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 3, 6.)
Arrington rejected the plan that was offered and asked
unsuccessfully that K.A. be provided with tutoring services at
Sylvan Learning Center. (Def.’s Mem. at 3, 5, 6.) SAIL sent a
letter on June 16, 2008 to Georgina Oladukun, Arrington’s
attorney at the Anwah firm, providing details about the summer
program SAIL had proposed, but neither Arrington nor Oladukun
replied. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.)
In August 2009, Barrie, then employed by the Anwah firm,
filed another due process complaint on behalf of Arrington,
alleging that DCPS and SAIL had failed to develop and implement a
compensatory education plan and seeking as relief the tutoring
services that SAIL had not agreed to in the June MDT meeting.
(Id. ¶¶ 5, 20; Def.’s Mem. at 6-7.) That same month, SAIL faxed
a letter to Barrie notifying her that it had offered Arrington a
compensatory education plan in a June 16, 2008 letter to
Oladukun, without response, and advising Barrie that if she
pursued the complaint and SAIL prevailed, SAIL would seek
attorney’s fees on the basis that the complaint was frivolous.
(Compl. ¶ 21.) The next day, SAIL moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that it had proposed to Arrington in June a
compensatory education plan but that Arrington had failed to
respond. (Id. ¶ 22.) On September 4, 2009, during a pre-hearing
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conference, Arrington’s counsel orally withdrew the due process
complaint. (Def.’s Mem. at 3, 6.) Thereafter, a hearing officer
dismissed as moot the August 2009 due process complaint, finding
that SAIL and DCPS had developed and offered to implement a
compensatory education plan for the student and Arrington had
failed to respond. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25.)1
SAIL filed this action seeking attorney’s fees, arguing that
it was a prevailing party at the August 2009 administrative
hearing and that Barrie’s August 2009 due process complaint was
frivolous. Barrie moves to dismiss, claiming that SAIL was not a
prevailing party and has not shown that the August 2009 due
process complaint was frivolous.
DISCUSSION
“A complaint can be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Winston v. Clough, Civil Action
No. 07-1411 (RWR), 2010 WL 1875626, at *3 (D.D.C. May 11, 2010)
(citing Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (D.D.C.
2009)). “In deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court does not consider matters outside the pleadings[.]” Id.However, if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
1
The complaint alleges that DCPS had also moved to dismiss on
the ground that it had offered a compensatory education plan that
Arrington “signed off on.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) It is unclear how
that squares with the Hearing Officer’s finding that Arrington
had not responded.
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not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When
the party opposing a motion that presents material outside the
pleadings has a reasonable opportunity to contest facts averred
outside the pleadings, “the court may convert the motion to a
motion for summary judgment without providing notice or the
opportunity for discovery to the parties.” Winston, 2010 WL
1875626, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d). Barrie’s motion and memorandum present facts
outside the complaint. (See Def.’s Mem. at 3, 5-7.) SAIL has
had a reasonable opportunity to contest them. Barrie’s motion,
then, will be treated as one for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66
(D.C. Cir. 2009). When a court “consider[s] a motion for summary
judgment, all justifiable inferences from the evidence are to be
drawn in favor of the nonmovant[,]” Cruz-Packer v. District of
Columbia, 539 F. Supp. 2d 181, 189 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted), and the court must determine whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists “such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party[.]” Moore,
571 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The IDEA permits a court, in its discretion, to award
attorney’s fees
to a prevailing party who is a State educational agency
or [LEA] against the attorney of a parent who files a
complaint or subsequent cause of action that is
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or
against the attorney of a parent who continued to
litigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation[.]
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). A prevailing party is one who
obtains a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship
of the parties.”2 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). “‘[A]
plaintiff is [not] a “prevailing party” if it achieves the
desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary
change in the defendant’s conduct[.]’” Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d
162, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-
02). Rather, “a plaintiff is a prevailing party only if he has
‘received a judgment on the merits[.]’” Id. (quoting Buckhannon,
532 U.S. at 605).
The D.C. Circuit has articulated a three-part test for
determining prevailing party status: “(1) there must be a ‘court-
ordered change in the legal relationship’ of the parties; (2) the
judgment must be in favor of the party seeking fees; and (3) the
judicial pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial relief.”
2
In the context of IDEA administrative proceedings, a hearing
officer’s relief serves as “judicially sanctioned” relief. See
T.S. ex rel. Skrine v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 05-
00861 (HHK), 2007 WL 915227, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2007).
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District of Columbia v. Straus, 590 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (quoting Thomas v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486, 492-93
(D.C. Cir. 2003)). Although the IDEA does not itself define
“prevailing party,” Straus applied the second and third factors
in order to determine whether DCPS as a defendant named in an
IDEA administrative complaint was a prevailing party entitled to
attorney’s fees. See id. (citing District of Columbia v.
Jeppsen, 514 F.3d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
In Straus, parents of a special needs student filed an
administrative complaint seeking from a hearing officer an order
requiring DCPS to pay for an independent psychiatric evaluation,
a declaration that DCPS’s delay in conducting the evaluation
denied the student a free, appropriate public education, and an
award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 899-900. The hearing officer,
however, dismissed the administrative complaint with prejudice as
moot because the only issue then before him was DCPS’ failure to
conduct the independent evaluation, and DCPS had voluntarily
agreed to conduct it. Id. at 900-02. DCPS sued for attorney’s
fees and, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that DCPS had easily
satisfied the second factor of the test to determine whether a
defendant is a prevailing party because the hearing officer’s
dismissal of the case was in favor of DCPS. Id. at 901.
However, as to the third factor, the court found that the
dismissal order provided DCPS with no judicial relief as it
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resolved nothing on the merits and provided DCPS with no res
judicata protection since DCPS had already agreed to do the one
thing at issue at the administrative level. Id. at 902. The
court stated that “[i]f the District were considered a prevailing
party under these circumstances, then DCPS could ignore its legal
obligations until parents sue, voluntarily comply quickly, file
for and receive a dismissal with prejudice for mootness, and then
recover attorney’s fees from the parents’ lawyers.” Id.; and see
District of Columbia v. Straus, 607 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184 (D.D.C.
2009) (same).
Here, Barrie contends in part that SAIL’s complaint should
be dismissed because SAIL has not shown that it is a prevailing
party. SAIL’s only argument in response to Barrie’s contention
is that “[t]he hearing officer below issued an order granting
[its] Motion to Dismiss the administrative action with
prejudice[.]” (Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Def. Barrie’s
Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) The hearing officer’s order denying as
moot Barrie’s due process complaint did favor SAIL. However, the
hearing officer’s order did not provide SAIL with any judicial
relief because Barrie orally withdrew her due process complaint
at the pre-hearing conference. (See Def.’s Mem. at 3, 6.) That
left no live case or controversy for the hearing officer to
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adjudicate.3 As in Straus, “the hearing officer resolved nothing
on the merits.” 590 F.3d at 902.
Because SAIL was not the prevailing party and is not
entitled to attorney’s fees under the IDEA, Barrie’s motion to
dismiss the complaint, treated as a motion for summary judgment,
will be granted.4 Further, because the complaint does not set
forth facts supporting any actionable claim, the plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed as to both defendants. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 03-2547 (RWR),
2005 WL 1241132, at *3 (D.D.C. May 24, 2005) (“Where, as here,
the basis for dismissal is applicable as to another defendant, it
is proper to make the holding applicable to the non-moving party
as well.”); Whitehead v. New Line Cinema, Civil Action No. 98-
1231 (PLF), 2000 WL 33351821, at *3 (D.D.C. June 14, 2000)
3
SAIL states that the hearing officer found that the
complaint was moot because SAIL had offered to Arrington by
letter a compensatory education plan to which Arrington failed to
respond. (See Compl. ¶ 22.) However, the plan SAIL offered by
letter was the same plan that Arrington rejected in the June
meeting after she demanded tutoring at Sylvan. While SAIL may
have developed and offered to implement a plan, that may or may
not have mooted the issue raised in the due process complaint
regarding SAIL’s failure to develop and implement the plan
involving tutoring that Arrington had asked for. Whether or not
the June letter from SAIL was properly regarded as mooting the
controversy, Barrie’s withdrawal of the complaint was sufficient
to moot the case.
4
Barrie also requests attorney’s fees and costs. (Def.’s
Mem. at 8.) Ordinarily, however, parties are required to bear
their own attorney’s fees absent explicit statutory authority.
See Straus, 590 F.3d at 900. Because Barrie points to no
statutory authority that would entitle her to relief, her request
for fees will be denied.
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(granting summary judgment motion filed by one defendant and
entering sua sponte judgment for all remaining defendants because
same deficiencies existed with respect to claims against non-
moving defendants); Bennett v. Stephens, Civil Action No. 88-2610
(RCL), 1989 WL 17751, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1989) (granting
defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissing sua sponte claims
against remaining non-moving defendants because same deficiencies
existed with regard to claims against non-moving defendants).
CONCLUSION
Because SAIL was not a prevailing party, Barrie’s motion to
dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, will be
granted as to both defendants. A final, appealable Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SIGNED this 20th day of July, 2010.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge