United States v. Logan ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
v. )
) Crim. Nos. 12-59-17(EGS)
JONATHAN MCCOY LOGAN ) 13-248 (EGS)
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jonathan McCoy Logan pled guilty to drug and gun related
offenses in two criminal cases pursuant to a plea agreement, and
was sentenced to an agreed-upon 147 months of incarceration.
Several months after his sentencing, the government informed Mr.
Logan that an FBI agent who was indirectly involved with his
case had tampered with evidence in other cases. Mr. Logan later
moved to vacate his sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and
the Court denied the motions. Mr. Logan now moves for a
certificate of appealability so that he can appeal this Court’s
decision. Because Mr. Logan has failed to make a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2), Mr. Logan’s motion for a certificate of
appealability is DENIED.
I. Background
The Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion set forth the facts
in this case in detail. See United States v. Logan, No. CR 12-
59-17(EGS), 2018 WL 5297812, at *1–4 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2018).
What follows is a summary of the facts necessary to provide
context for Mr. Logan’s current motions.
A. Investigation and Arrest
Mr. Logan was charged in two separate criminal cases based
on evidence accumulated during an investigation of drug
trafficking activity in Maryland and the District of Columbia,
and evidence seized during Mr. Logan’s October 21, 2011 arrest.
Id. at *1. The investigation revealed that Mr. Logan sold
cocaine to another indicted individual, Kelvin Heyward. Id.
Wire-tapped calls between the two captured the details of
specific drug transactions, as well as how the transactions were
generally conducted. Id. The evidence obtained during Mr.
Logan’s October 21, 2011 arrest were a .32 semi-automatic
handgun, over $14,000 on his person, and $4,000 and several
plastic bags containing cocaine in his car. Id.
Based on the evidence obtained, an indictment was filed on
March 8, 2012, charging Mr. Logan with several drug offenses.
Id. The October 2011 arrest, and subsequent car search, resulted
in an August 2013 indictment in Maryland, later transferred to
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this district, charging Mr. Logan with several drug and gun
offenses. Id.
Mr. Logan was arrested at his job, the All-In-One Stop in
Clinton, Maryland, following the filing of the March 8, 2012
superseding indictment. Id. at *2. That same day, a team of FBI
agents executed a search warrant at the All-In-One Stop.
According to the United States Attorney’s Office for the
District of Columbia (“USAO-DC”), the investigation that
resulted in Mr. Logan’s indictment was conducted by the FBI’s
Safe Streets Task Force. Id.
The presence of one agent, Special Agent (“SA”) Matthew
Lowry, is particularly relevant to Mr. Logan’s pending motion.
SA Lowry was assigned to a different task force--the Cross-
Border Task Force (“CBTF”)--but he “provided some assistance to
the overall investigation at the time of the ‘take-down’ in
March 2012.” Id. Specifically, SA Lowry participated in the
execution of the search warrant at the All-In-One Stop which led
to the seizure of several items. Id. SA Lowry was not listed on
the chain-of-custody for any of the items seized from the All-
In-One Stop. Id.
On October 1, 2014 the FBI informed USAO-DC that “Special
Agent Lowry may have engaged in misconduct by tampering with
evidence . . . includ[ing] tampering with narcotics and firearm
evidence seized during investigations.” Notice, ECF No. 563 at
3
1–2. The FBI’s investigation into SA Lowry’s misconduct was
prompted by the discovery of SA Lowry under the influence of
drugs in an FBI vehicle on September 29, 2014. See Criminal
Action No. 13-248, Mem. Of Investigation, ECF No. 40-1 at 20. 1
The investigation revealed that SA Lowry had begun to remove FBI
drug evidence in “late 2013.” Id. SA Lowry admitted to using
drugs from “late 2013 when he began, through September 29, 2014,
when he was found [under the influence] in his FBI-issued
vehicle.” Id. SA Lowry was charged with, among other things,
possession of heroin. See Criminal Action No. 15-34, Judgment in
a Criminal Case (“Judgment”), ECF No. 30. He pled guilty to the
charges and was sentenced to 36 months of incarceration. Id.
In November 2014, the government disclosed to Mr. Logan the
information about SA Lowry’s alleged wrongdoing. Notice, ECF No.
563 at 1. 2 The Court then directed the government to file status
reports updating the Court on the status of the government’s
investigation into SA Lowry’s alleged misconduct. Minute Order
of November 13, 2014. The government explained SA Lowry’s role
in Mr. Logan’s case as follows:
[G]overnment counsel understands that Agent
Lowry’s involvement in the investigation . .
. involved assisting in a large-scale
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the
page number of the filed document.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, docket citations in this Memorandum
Opinion are to Criminal Action No. 12-59.
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"takedown" on March 12, 2012, specifically the
execution of one search warrant on March 12,
2012, in Clinton, Maryland. Agent Lowry
participated along with a team of other FBI
agents in executing a search warrant at
defendant Jonathan Logan's business location.
. . . Agent Lowry was not listed on the chain-
of-custody for any of the items seized from
this location.
Criminal Action No. 13-248, Gov’t. Response to Def. Ltr. to
Court, ECF No. 18 at 1–2. The government also made clear that
the only event in which SA Lowry participated in Mr. Logan’s
case--the execution of the search warrant on March 12, 2012--
occurred five months after October 21, 2011, which was the
ending date of the drug conspiracy with which Mr. Logan was
charged. Id. Similarly, the proffer of facts explained that the
gun seizure occurred during the October 21, 2011 arrest, several
months before SA Lowry’s involvement in the case. See Proffer,
ECF No. 461 at 6.
B. Guilty Plea and Sentence
On August 29, 2013, over a year before SA Lowry’s
misconduct came to light, Mr. Logan pled guilty before this
Court to two drug conspiracy offenses and to one gun-related
offense. One of the drug conspiracy offenses was in connection
with the narcotics he sold to Mr. Heyward and for which he was
indicted in Criminal Action No. 12-59, and the other was in
connection with the drugs recovered from his car during his
October 2011 arrest, which resulted in the indictment in
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Criminal Action No. 13-248. See Proffer, ECF No. 461. The third
offense was for using and carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking offense, also in connection with his October 2011
arrest. See Criminal Action No. 13-248, Proffer, ECF No. 3 at 6.
The parties agreed to a 147-month term of incarceration pursuant
to an 11(c)(1)(C) plea. See Addendum to Plea Agreement, ECF No.
527 at 1. On April 17, 2014, this Court sentenced Mr. Logan to a
concurrent sentence of 87 months on the two conspiracy drug
offenses, and a consecutive sentence of 60 months for the
firearm offense for a total of 147 months consistent with the
agreed-upon sentence. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 627 at
35.
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion
On September 18, 2015, Mr. Logan, pro se, filed motions to
vacate his convictions and sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 arguing that SA Lowry’s misconduct entitled him to relief
under the statute. See Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613. Mr. Logan made
two principal arguments: (1) that if he was aware of SA Lowry’s
misconduct, he would not have pled guilty; and (2) the
government violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), when it failed to disclose SA Lowry’s conduct
prior to his plea. Id.
On February 6, 2018, over two years after he filed his
motions, Mr. Logan filed a supplemental pleading, this time with
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the assistance of counsel, making an additional argument that
there was a technical error in the calculation of Mr. Logan’s
sentence, see Criminal Action No. 13-248, Pet’r’s Suppl. Mot.,
ECF No. 40 at 3. He argued that “the pre-sentence report
incorrectly stated Logan . . . was on probation at the time he
committed the instant offense . . . giving him an additional 2
points to his criminal history” under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. at 3–4. Mr. Logan argued that his Guidelines range for the
drug offenses should have been 78-97 months and did not take
issue with the 60-month consecutive sentence he received for the
gun-related offense. Id. Thus, Mr. Logan argued that his actual
sentencing range should have been 138-157 months and therefore
the 147-month sentence that he received was erroneous.
The Court denied Mr. Logan’s section 2255 motions and his
supplemental amendment to that pleading on October 25, 2018. See
Logan, 2018 WL 5297812 at *4-8. The Court found that Mr. Logan’s
claims related to his guilty plea were devoid of factual
support, that his Brady claim had no merit, and that his claims
related to his sentencing were procedurally barred. 3 Id. Mr.
Logan now asks this Court to grant a certificate of
3 The Court noted that even if his claim was timely it would have
failed because, even under his own calculation, Mr. Logan agreed
to a sentence that was within the Guideline range and therefore
there was no error in accepting the plea agreement which
governed the length of his sentence. See Logan, 2018 WL 5297812
at *7-8.
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appealability based on the denial of his section 2255 motions.
See Def.’s Mot., ECF No.695.
II. Legal Standard for Issuance of a Certificate of
Appealability
A certificate of appealability must be issued for an
appellate court to hear an appeal from a “final order in a
proceeding under section 2255.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The
federal district court judge who rendered the judgment for which
appellate review is sought must either issue the certificate of
appealability or explain why it should not be issued. Fed. R.
App. P. 22(b)(1). A certificate of appealability may issue “only
if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this
showing, the petitioner “need not show that he should prevail on
the merits.... Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are
debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve
the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” United
States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).
If the court issues the certificate of appealability, it
must specify which issues satisfy the substantial showing
requirement. Id. at 1130. If a district court judge denies a
request for a certificate of appealability, a petitioner may
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request one from the circuit court judge. Fed. R. App. P.
22(b)(1).
III. Analysis
The issues in Mr. Logan’s section 2255 motion can be
analyzed in two categories: (1) issues concerning his plea
agreement; and (2) issues concerning his sentence. The Court
first discusses whether it should issue a certificate for
appealability for Mr. Logan’s plea agreement claims, and then
for his claim of error at sentencing.
A. Mr. Logan Has Not Shown that the Court’s Decision on
Constitutional Issues related to his Guilty Plea was
Debatable
Mr. Logan’s section 2225 motion was based on a series of
claims in connection with the role of SA Lowry in his case. His
original petition, filed September 18, 2015, raised four issues
which he argues affected his decision to plead guilty: (1) SA
Lowry’s alleged admission that he tampered with evidence during
the search of Mr. Logan’s business address; (2) the lack of
procedural safeguards to protect the evidence recovered by the
CBTF during his October 2011 arrest; (3) the DEA test results in
connection with the search of his place of business which
allegedly show SA Lowry tampered with evidence during the
search; and (4) the government’s failure to disclose SA Lowry’s
illegal actions in violation of its Brady obligations. See
Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No. 613.
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Mr. Logan’s first three claims relate to alleged evidence
tampering in his case. In his motion for a certificate of
appealability, Mr. Logan highlights a portion of an exhibit that
he submitted with his supplement. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 1–2. This
portion is taken from a document regarding the investigation of
SA Lowry and states:
Although Lowry’s defense counsel
initially reported that Lowry took drug
evidence from cases that were already in
the prosecution phase and had already had
plea deals with the defendants, Lowry
stated that he was not concerned with the
status of the cases from which he was
using the drug evidence. Lowry said that
he took drug evidence from any case that
he was associated with and would have a
plausible reason for checking out the
drug evidence, he said he was just trying
to get through the day.
Id. Mr. Logan argues that the above statement, which was
attached to his original motion, shows that SA Lowry had access
to all evidence seized at the time Mr. Logan was arrested and at
the earlier stop when he was searched and therefore SA Lowry
tampered with the evidence. Id. at 2.
As the Court stated in its Memorandum Opinion, the
government’s several disclosures in this case indicated that SA
Lowry was not involved in the chain of custody for any evidence
seized from Mr. Logan’s place of business. Logan, 2018 WL
5297812 at *5 (citing Criminal Action No. 13-248, Gov't.
Response to Def. Ltr. to Court, ECF No. 18 at 1–2). The record
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is clear that the only event in which SA Lowry participated in
Mr. Logan’s case--the execution of the search warrant on March
12, 2012--occurred five months after October 21, 2011, the end
date of the drug conspiracy with which Mr. Logan was charged.
Id. That search is not relevant to any of the charges to which
he pled guilty since it was conducted several months after the
time frame of the drug conspiracy. Id. (citing Proffer, ECF No.
461.) Similarly, the proffer of facts shows that the gun seizure
occurred during the October 21, 2011 arrest, several months
before SA Lowry’s involvement in the case. Id. *3.
Once a defendant who pleads guilty has been sentenced,
permission to withdraw the plea will be granted only “in those
‘extraordinary cases’ when the court determines that a manifest
injustice would result from allowing the plea to stand.” United
States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Moreover, “[t]o have a plea set aside on a section 2255
petition, the petitioner must show that the plea proceeding was
tainted by a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v.
Weaver, 265 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s finding that Mr.
Logan’s claim that evidence was tampered with in his case was
not factually supported and therefore his plea proceeding not
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the result of a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure, is
not debatable. See Logan, 2018 WL 5297812 at *4-8.
Similarly, the Court’s ruling on Mr. Logan’s Brady claim is
not debatable. 4 The Court held that Mr. Logan’s Brady claim fails
because he cannot show that the government either willfully or
inadvertently suppressed evidence against him. Id. at *6–7. The
government, including law enforcement, was not aware of SA
Lowry’s conduct during Mr. Logan’s plea or sentencing. Id. The
government learned of SA Lowry’s conduct on September 29, 2014,
five months after Mr. Logan was sentenced. Id. at *6 (citing
Criminal Action No. 13-248, Mem. Of Investigation, ECF No. 40-1
at 20.). USAO-DC, which was recused from the investigation, was
informed two days later, on October 1, 2014, and alerted Mr.
Logan of the investigation into SA Lowry’s conduct on November
13, 2014 in response to this Court’s Order. Notice, ECF No. 563
at 1. The record shows that, under these circumstances, the
government provided the information to Mr. Logan within a
reasonable time after receiving notice of the investigation from
the FBI (i.e., 44 days), and provided the Court and parties with
4 Mr. Logan does not appear to challenge the Court’s ruling on
his Brady claim, but, in the abundance of caution, the Court
will analyze that claim nonetheless.
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regular updates about the investigation. See id. Accordingly,
there was no Brady violation in this case.
Because Mr. Logan has not made “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right,” the Court DENIES his
motion for a certificate of appealability on his claims related
to his guilty plea. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
B. Mr. Logan Has Not Shown that the Court’s Decision on
Constitutional Issues related to his Sentence was
Debatable
Mr. Logan supplemented his section 2255 motion to include a
claim related to an alleged sentencing calculation error. See
Criminal Action No. 13-248, Pet’r’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 40 at
3–5. Under section 2255, a defendant generally must file a
motion for relief under the statute within a year of “the date
on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4). Mr. Logan filed his original
petition on September 18, 2015, within one-year of November
2014, the date on which the government disclosed the
investigation into SA Lowry, and therefore his original petition
was timely filed. Logan, 2018 WL 5297812 at *7. However, Mr.
Logan supplemented the petition more than two years later, on
February 6, 2018, to add an additional issue based on an alleged
sentence calculation error. See Criminal Action No. 13-248,
Pet’r’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 40 at 3–5. That supplement states
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that “the pre-sentence report incorrectly stated Logan . . . was
on probation at the time he committed the instant offense . . .
giving him an additional 2 points to his criminal history” under
the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 3–4. Therefore, Mr. Logan
argues, he is entitled to new concurrent sentences consistent
with a Guidelines range of 78–97 months for the conspiracy drug
offenses followed by a 60-month consecutive sentence on the gun
offense. Id. at 5. The Court ruled that Mr. Logan’s sentencing
claim was procedurally barred because it was filed well after
the one-year time requirement and did not meet any exceptions to
that rule. Logan, 2018 WL 5297812 at *7.
The Court considered two exceptions that would allow Mr.
Logan’s sentencing claim to proceed. Id. First, an amendment to
a section 2255 motion is “permitted to relate back [to the
original filing] only when ‘the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading.’” See United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380,
388 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)). In this
Circuit, a proposed amendment does not relate back when it
“makes claims or is based on occurrences ‘totally separate and
distinct, in both time and type from those raised in [the]
original motion.” Id. (citations omitted). In his original 2255
motion, Mr. Logan argued that he is entitled to relief based on
14
the actions of SA Lowry and the CBTF. See Pet’r’s Mot., ECF No.
613. His claim of a sentencing calculation error is therefore
based on occurrences “totally separate and distinct, in both
time and type” from those raised in his original motion. See
Hicks, 283 F.3d at 388. Therefore, Mr. Logan’s supplemental
motion did not relate back to his original filing.
Second, the Court considered Mr. Logan’s argument that the
one-year deadline should be equitably tolled. Logan, 2018 WL
5297812 at *7 The Court found that equitable tolling did not
apply to this case because Mr. Logan failed to point to any
“extraordinary circumstance[s]” which would allow the Court to
do so. Id. (citing United States v. McDade, 699 F.3d 499, 506
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding deadline was equitably tolled when
defendant timely advised counsel he wanted to raise claim four
months in advance of deadline and counsel failed to file in
time)). This is partially because, notwithstanding the alleged
mistake, Mr. Logan was sentenced within the sentencing range
that he asks the Court to apply today. Because Mr. Logan agreed
to, and received, a sentence that was within the Guideline
Range, the Court held there was no error in accepting the plea
agreement. Id. Accordingly, the Court does not find that jurists
would find it debatable whether Mr. Logan’s petition states a
valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right, nor find it
debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural
15
ruling. See United States v. Saro, 252 F.3d 449, 453 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
Because Mr. Logan has not made “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right,” the Court DENIES his
motion for a certificate of appealability on his sentencing
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Logan’s motion for a
certificate of appealability is DENIED. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
December 17, 2019
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