Agurs v. United States Department of Justice Criminal Division ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ___________________________________
    )
    DAMON B. AGURS, SR.,                )
    )
    Plaintiff,        )
    )
    v.                            )                        Civil Action No. 14-0188 (RC)
    )
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., )
    )
    Defendants.       )
    ___________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.
    14]. 1 The motion is unopposed, and for the reasons stated below, it will be granted.
    Plaintiff submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    , to the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for “a copy of the Title III
    interception of electronic communication approval letters and all other documents that are part of
    the electronic surveillance for [five] telephone numbers” provided by plaintiff. Def.’s Statement
    of Facts As To Which There Are No Genuine Issues (“SOMF”) ¶ 1. The Criminal Division
    initially denied plaintiff’s request in full on the ground that the requested records were exempt
    from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3, 
    id. ¶ 3
    , and this determination was affirmed on
    administrative appeal to the DOJ’s Office of Information Policy, id ¶ 5.
    1
    Also before the Court is a Motion for Leave to Supplement Defendants’ Summary Judgment
    Motion [ECF No. 16]. The motion will be granted.
    1
    “[N]otwithstanding its categorical[] withholding under Exemption 3, the Criminal
    Division . . . search[ed] for records responsive to [p]laintiff’s FOIA request and processed them
    under the FOIA.” 
    Id. ¶ 7
    . Its searches of “the database used to track federal prosecutors’
    requests for permission to apply for court[] authorization to surreptitiously intercept
    conversations of person[s] allegedly involved in criminal activity . . . and . . . the database
    containing archived emails of Criminal Division employees” yielded responsive records. 
    Id.
     The
    Criminal Division withheld certain of these records or portions of records under FOIA
    Exemptions 5, 6 and 7(C), 
    id. ¶ 10
    ; see Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.s’ Mot. for Summ. J.,
    Decl. of Peter C. Sprung (“Sprung Decl.”), Ex. H (Vaughn Index). Among the responsive
    records were documents originating from other DOJ components. Pursuant to 
    28 C.F.R. § 16.4
    (c)(2), (d), the Criminal Division referred Title III applications to the Executive Office for
    United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”) and referred agent affidavits to the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (“FBI”). SOMF ¶ 11; see Sprung Decl. ¶ 39. The EOUSA and the FBI since
    “have consented to release of all the documents that were referred to them,” and on December 9,
    2014, the Criminal Division sent these documents (totaling 1,094 pages) to plaintiff at his current
    place of incarceration. Mot. for Leave to Supplement Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot. [ECF No. 16], Supp.
    Sprung Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. (Index of Released Documents). The declarant averred that all
    reasonably segregable information has been released. See Sprung Decl. ¶¶ 40-41; Supp. Sprung
    Decl. ¶ 3.
    On October 15, 2014, the Court issued an Order [ECF No. 15] advising plaintiff of his
    obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to
    respond to the motion. Specifically, the Court warned plaintiff that, if he failed to file an
    opposition to the motion by November 14, 2014, the motion would be treated as conceded. To
    2
    date, plaintiff has neither filed an opposition to the motion nor requested an extension of time.
    For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the above facts are deemed admitted. See LCvR
    7(h)(1) (“In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court may assume that facts
    identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is
    controverted in the statement of genuine issues.”).
    Although the Court may treat defendants’ unopposed motion as conceded, see LCvR
    7(b), summary judgment is warranted only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
    as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a); see Alexander v. FBI, 
    691 F. Supp. 2d 182
    , 193 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[E]ven where a summary
    judgment motion is unopposed, it is only properly granted when the movant has met its
    burden.”). Here, defendants have met their burden. The Criminal Division’s declarant
    adequately has explained: (1) the searches for records responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request, see
    Spring Decl. ¶¶ 14-23; (2) the withholding of records under FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C),
    see id. ¶¶ 30-38; the release of all reasonably segregable information, see id. ¶¶ 40-41; and the
    referral of records to the EOUSA and the FBI, see id. ¶ 39, and their subsequent release to
    plaintiff in full, see Supp. Sprung Decl. ¶ 3. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary
    judgment in defendants’ favor. An Order is issued separately.
    DATE: December 17, 2014                               /s/
    RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
    United States District Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2014-0188

Judges: Judge Rudolph Contreras

Filed Date: 12/17/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/17/2014