Davis v. U.S. Department of Justice ( 2015 )


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  •                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ___________________________________
    )
    RONALD L. DAVIS,                    )
    )
    Plaintiff,        )
    )
    v.                            )        Civil Action No. 14-0862 (RBW)
    )
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,         )
    )
    Defendant.        )
    ___________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
    No. 12]. The motion is unopposed, and for the reasons stated below, it will be granted.
    The plaintiff submitted to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) a document titled
    “Request for Production of Documents Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34.” See
    Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Summary Judgment
    Motion (“Def.’s Mem.”), Declaration of Paralegal Donna Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”), Exhibit
    (“Ex.”) A. He sought, among other records, a copy of his inmate central file. Id., Johnson Decl.
    ¶ 2. The BOP treated his request as one under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    , assigned it a tracking number (FOIA/PA Request Number 2014-04744), and sent
    the plaintiff a written acknowledgment of its receipt. 
    Id.,
     Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. B.
    When the plaintiff submitted his FOIA request, he was incarcerated at the Federal
    Correctional Institution in Elkton, Ohio (“FCI Elkton”). The plaintiff’s case manager at FCI
    Elkton located the central file and forwarded it to the BOP’s Northeast Regional Office
    (“NERO”) for processing. 
    Id.,
     Johnson Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C.
    1
    NERO staff estimated that fees for processing the plaintiff’s request, specifically for
    photocopies, totaled $16.20. 
    Id.,
     Johnson Decl. ¶ 5. The plaintiff was advised in writing of the
    estimated fees by letter dated July 7, 2014, and further was advised that the BOP would release
    the responsive records only after he paid the fees. See 
    id.,
     Johnson Decl., Ex. D. The plaintiff
    “was released from imprisonment from FCI Elkton on July 29, 2014,” however. 
    Id.,
     Johnson
    Decl. ¶ 5. Since then, the BOP neither has received correspondence from the plaintiff, nor
    payment of the assessed fees, nor a request for wavier of the fees. 
    Id.,
     Johnson Decl. ¶ 5.
    On October 9, 2014, the Court issued an Order [ECF No. 13] advising the plaintiff of his
    obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to
    respond to the defendant’s motion. Specifically, the Court warned the plaintiff that if he failed to
    file an opposition to the motion by November 10, 2014, the motion would be treated as
    conceded. To date, the plaintiff has neither filed an opposition to the motion nor requested an
    extension of time to do so. Therefore, for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the above
    facts are deemed admitted. See LCvR 7(h)(1) (“In determining a motion for summary judgment,
    the court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts
    are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues . . . .”).
    Although the Court may treat the defendant’s unopposed motion as conceded, see LCvR
    7(b), summary judgment is warranted only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
    as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a); see Alexander v. FBI, 
    691 F. Supp. 2d 182
    , 193 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[E]ven where a summary
    judgment motion is unopposed, it is only properly granted when the movant has met its
    burden.”). Here, the defendant has met its burden.
    2
    “Exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required before seeking judicial
    review” under FOIA, Wilbur v. CIA, 
    355 F.3d 675
    , 677 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam), and
    “[e]xhaustion does not occur until the required fees are paid or an appeal is taken from the
    refusal to waive fees,” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
    920 F.2d 57
    , 66 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
    Here, the defendant has demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to pay the assessed fees and thus
    failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. Based on this showing
    and absent any opposition from the plaintiff, the Court will grant summary judgment in the
    defendant’s favor. An Order is issued separately.
    /s/
    REGGIE B. WALTON
    United States District Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2014-0862

Judges: Judge Reggie B. Walton

Filed Date: 2/4/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/4/2015