Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. v. Airbus Helicopters ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 10-0789 (RLW)
AIRBUS HELICOPTERS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Airbus Helicopters’ Bill of Costs for
expenses related to the hearing on Airbus’ request for a permanent injunction, which took place
from October 20 through October 22, 2014. After reviewing the parties’ papers and relevant
legal authorities, the Court concludes that Airbus is not the prevailing party in this case, and that
even if it were, the Court would decline to award costs in light of the mixed nature of the
judgment. The Court therefore denies Airbus’ request for costs.
I. PREVAILING PARTY STATUS
“An award of costs . . . involves two separate inquires.” Shum v. Intel Corp., 629 F.3d
1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396,
1407 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “First, who is the ‘prevailing party’ within the meaning of Rule
54(d)(1).” Id. “Second, how much (if any) costs should be awarded to the prevailing party.”
Id.; accord SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The
decision of who is the prevailing party is controlled by Federal Circuit precedent. Manildra
Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
The Federal Circuit held in Shum that even if a judgment is mixed, there can be only one
prevailing party in a case. 629 F.3d at 1366-67. Thus, a court does not make a prevailing party
determination on a claim-by-claim basis, but rather with a view toward the entire case. The
prevailing party must have received some relief on the merits, and that relief must have
“materially alter[ed] the legal relationship between the parties by modifying one party’s behavior
in a way that directly benefits the opposing party.” Id. at 1367 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where both parties obtained relief, a court examines the relief received respectively by
each party. Id. at 1368.
There were several contested issues in this case: (i) whether the Modified Gear infringed
the patent; (ii) whether Airbus was entitled to damages for past infringement by the Modified
Gear, the Original Gear, or both; and (iii) whether Airbus was entitled to an injunction based on
any infringement. Bell Helicopters prevailed on the first and second issues, while Airbus
prevailed on the third. See Aug. 15, 2014 Opinion and Order (Dkt. Nos. 104, 105); Sept. 23,
2014 Tr. at 78:6–89:24 (Dkt. No. 159); Oct. 1, 2010 Order (Dkt. No. 169); Jan. 22, 2015 Opinion
and Order (Dkt. Nos. 209, 210). The Court’s rulings in this case therefore do not lend
themselves to a straightforward determination of prevailing party status.
After carefully considering the relief received by each party, the Court concludes that, to
the extent that a prevailing party determination can be made, Bell is entitled to that status as it
obtained greater benefit from the Court’s rulings on the contested issues in this case. Because
the Modified Gear is the gear currently used by Bell, the Court’s declaratory judgment with
respect to that gear significantly affected the parties’ legal relationship in Bell’s favor. While
Airbus did obtain a benefit flowing from the Court’s injunction against any future use of the
Original Gear by Bell, a balancing of these benefits tips towards Bell. Bell had previously
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ceased use of the Original Gear, so while the injunction marginally benefitted Airbus, it
nonetheless did not “modify [Bell’s] behavior.” Shum, 629 F.3d at 1367. In addition, it is
undisputed that Airbus did not prevail on the question of damages; to the contrary, the Court’s
rulings established that Bell was not obligated to compensate Airbus for any past infringement.
The Court therefore concludes that Airbus is not the prevailing party in this suit and cannot be
awarded costs.
II. DISCRETIONARY AWARD OF COSTS
In the alternative, even if Airbus could be considered the prevailing party, the Court finds
that it would be appropriate to deny costs in light of the highly mixed nature of the judgment. A
prevailing party is not automatically entitled to costs. SSL Servs., LLC, 769 F.3d at 1087.
“Depending on the extent and nature of the prevailing party’s victory, it may be proper for the
trial court to award only low costs or no costs at all.” Shum, 629 F.3d at 1367 n.8 (citing Farrar
v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992); Manildra Mill., 76 F.3d at 1183). The amount of the cost
award, if any, is controlled by D.C. Circuit precedent. See Manildra Mill., 76 F.3d at 1184.
Although Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a presumption in
favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party, Moore v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762
F.2d 1093, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the mixed nature of the judgment here provides grounds
for requiring each party to bear its own costs. See C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 601 F.
Supp. 2d 262, 280 (D.D.C. 2009) (declining to award costs in a mixed judgment case, without
deciding who was the prevailing party, on the ground that the parties were “nearly in
equipoise”). Indeed, although it appears that the D.C. Circuit has not considered the practice,
several circuits have approved of district courts declining to award costs when each side has
prevailed in nearly equal degree. See Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1234-35
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(10th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding no abuse
of discretion when a district court refuses to award costs because neither party prevailed overall
in the suit); Testa v. Village of Mundelein, 89 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring each party
to bear its own costs where plaintiff prevailed on one claim and defendant prevailed on another);
Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In the event of a mixed judgment, . . .
it is within the discretion of a district court to require each party to bear its own costs.”). Given
the near-parity of each party’s relative success in this case, the denial of a cost award to Airbus is
appropriate. 1
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Airbus Helicopters’ request for costs, Dkt. No. 213, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Digitally signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins
DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins, o=U.S.
District Court, ou=Chambers of Honorable
Robert L. Wilkins,
email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US
Date: March 25, 2015 Date: 2015.03.25 16:15:03 -04'00'
ROBERT L. WILKINS
United States Circuit Judge
(Sitting by designation in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia)
1
Bell opposed Airbus’ motion, but did not itself seek costs.
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