Haight v. O'Bannon ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MIESHA HAIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:14-cv-01211 (CRC)
SHAYNE O'BANNON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Miesha Haight was arrested for failing to follow a police officer’s verbal
commands during a late-night altercation between two of her neighbors. Haight claims that her
arrest was unjustified and that the arresting officer assaulted her in the process of carrying it out.
She has filed suit against the officer for false arrest, excessive force, and violation of her First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. She has also sued the District of Columbia and Police Chief
Cathy Lanier for vicarious liability and negligent supervision of the officer, as well as for
maintaining policies that Haight claims are deliberately indifferent to citizens’ constitutional rights.
The defendants move to dismiss Haight’s constitutional claims against the District and all of her
claims against Chief Lanier. Finding that Haight has failed to plead facts that could establish that
an official policy or custom motivated the officer’s alleged wrongdoing and that Chief Lanier had
no personal involvement in the incident, the Court will grant the partial motion to dismiss.
I. Background
The following facts are drawn from Ms. Haight’s complaint. The Court accepts them as true
for the purpose of resolving the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. Officer Shayne O’Bannon of
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) arrived at Haight’s apartment
complex during the early morning hours of July 20, 2013 and proceeded to separate two residents
who were arguing with one another. Compl. ¶¶ 11–14. According to Haight, O’Bannon informed
all present, including her, that the next person to speak would be arrested. Id. ¶ 14. When one of
the quarreling residents then began yelling obscenities, Haight says she urged her to be quiet. Id. ¶¶
15–16. O’Bannon allegedly responded by pushing Haight against a spiked metal fence, causing her
skirt to rise up above her waist. Id. ¶¶ 16–26. Haight claims that O’Bannon briefly released her,
but then followed her as she walked towards her apartment, punched her in the mouth, pulled her
hair, and slammed her head into concrete steps. Id. ¶¶ 27–34. O’Bannon and other MPD officers
then took Haight into custody and brought her to the emergency room, where Haight was treated for
lacerations and contusions and received 12 stitches in her mouth. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. She was later
booked for disorderly conduct and misdemeanor assault on a police officer, but prosecutors
declined to pursue these charges. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. Haight submitted a claim for damages to the
District’s Office of Risk Management, which determined after an investigation that Haight had
failed to comply with O’Bannon’s verbal commands and “[a]ll actions by Officer O’Bannon were
justified and within Metropolitan Police Department Policy.” Compl. Ex. A at 1. Haight then filed
this suit. Her complaint alleges five counts against Officer O’Bannon for false arrest in violation of
the Fourth Amendment and District of Columbia common law, excessive force in violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and common law
assault and battery. It further alleges three counts against the District of Columbia and MPD Chief
Lanier, in both her official and personal capacities, for maintaining policies and procedures
exhibiting deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, vicarious liability for O’Bannon’s alleged
common law torts, and negligent supervision and training. The defendants now move to dismiss
Haight’s constitutional claims against the District and all of her claims against Lanier. They have
not moved to dismiss Haight’s claims against Officer O’Bannon.
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II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be granted if the
allegations in the complaint do not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility entails “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. While the court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint
as true,” legal conclusions “couched as a factual allegation” do not warrant the same deference. Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. Analysis
A. Claims Against Chief Lanier in Her Official Capacity
Defendants move to dismiss the claims brought against Chief Lanier in her official capacity.
They argue that the complaint lacks allegations relating directly to Lanier’s official conduct and
thus these claims are redundant to Haight’s claims against the District of Columbia. Haight
responds that the Court is not required to dismiss individuals in their official capacities when the
city is also a party to the suit, though she acknowledges that “retaining Chief Lanier as a Defendant
in her official capacity does not provide any additional relief.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Partial Mot. to
Dismiss at 13. Haight is correct that the Court is not required to dismiss individuals in their official
capacities when the city is also party to the suit. See Owens v. District of Columbia, 631 F. Supp.
2d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2009). But she offers no persuasive reasons for the Court to exercise its
discretion to retain the official capacity claims here. Because dismissing redundant official capacity
claims is “‘the overwhelming approach that has been taken by members of this Court, as well as the
position taken by other courts,’” the Court will dismiss Haight’s official capacity claims against
Chief Lanier. Brown v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 603 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting
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Price v. District of Columbia, 545 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (D.D.C. 2008)); accord Hardy v. District of
Columbia, 601 F. Supp. 2d 182, 186-87 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Claims brought against government
employees in their official capacity are treated as claims against the employing government and
serve no independent purpose when the government is also sued.”).
B. Claims Against Chief Lanier in Her Individual Capacity
Defendants also move to dismiss the complaint against Chief Lanier in her individual
capacity. Because the complaint lacks any allegations that Lanier was personally involved in the
single incident at issue, the Court will dismiss the individual capacity claims as well. See Jones v.
Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against individual
where complaint did not allege personal conduct causing alleged constitutional violations); Lesesne
v. Doe, No. 10-CV-00602 (CRC), 2014 WL 4100008, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2014) (same);
Jefferies v. Dist. of Columbia, 917 F. Supp. 2d 10, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2013) (same); Way v. Johnson,
893 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2012) (same).
C. Constitutional Claims Against the District of Columbia and Lanier
Haight alleges that O’Bannon’s conduct reflected deliberately indifferent policies, practices,
customs, training, and supervision by the District of Columbia in violation of the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. 1 A municipality may be held liable for the constitutional
violations of its officers if they are caused by municipal policies, customs, or practices. See Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Courts engage in a two-part
inquiry to determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for municipal liability. Baker v. District
of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
1 Haight alleges constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but Section
1981 does not provide a private cause of action here independent from Section 1983. See Brown v.
Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Sledge v. District of Columbia, 869
F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D.D.C. 2012)).
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U.S. 115, 124 (1992)). First, the court evaluates “whether the complaint states a claim for a
predicate constitutional violation.” Id. At this step, “[a]ll that is being established . . . is that there
is some constitutional harm suffered by the plaintiff, not whether the municipality is liable for that
harm.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Second, the court determines “whether the complaint states a
claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694). To do so, the complaint must “allege[] an affirmative link” between the policy and the
incident “such that a municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.”
Id. (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985); City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
Haight’s allegations clearly satisfy the first part of the inquiry, as excessive force and false
arrest constitute predicate constitutional violations. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)
(holding that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in making an arrest “are
properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard”). Yet the
complaint falls short of the second step of the test, as Haight does not allege facts that could
establish that an MPD policy was the moving force behind O’Bannon’s alleged wrongdoing.
Haight argues that the city has admitted that the MPD has a policy or custom of deliberate
indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights that caused her injuries because the District’s Office of
Risk Management wrote in a letter to her lawyer that “[a]ll actions by Officer O’Bannon were
justified and within [MPD] Policy.” Compl. ¶¶ 87 – 88 & Ex. A at 1. But Haight reads far too
much into this one sentence. The letter refers to “[MPD] Policy” in the context of explaining that
officers are permitted to arrest citizens who refuse to obey lawful commands. Id. Ex A. at 1.
Haight provides no factual basis for the Court to infer that the “[MPD] Policy” the letter refers to
permits, encourages, or ignores the use of excessive force or the denial of First Amendment rights
by police officers. Far from it.
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Haight nonetheless contends that the Court should allow her to “proceed to discovery to
ascertain which, if any, policies permitted Defendant O’Bannon to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, and thus caused Plaintiff’s injuries.” Haight’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 7
(emphasis added). But this argument essentially concedes that Haight’s complaint merely
speculates that some unknown MPD policy or custom might have been the moving force behind her
injuries. Such conclusory allegations that merely recite the legal standard fall short of the
requirements for pleading municipal liability. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823 (noting that municipal
liability claims require specific factual connections between police policy and constitutional harms
because otherwise virtually any allegation of harm inflicted by a municipal official would qualify).
Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss Haight’s constitutional claims against the
District.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 9] is GRANTED. It is
further
ORDERED that Count IV is hereby DISMISSED. It is further
ORDERED that Counts VII and VIII are hereby DISMISSED as they relate to Defendant
Lanier.
SO ORDERED.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: April 22, 2015
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