Sack v. Department of Justice ( 2015 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    KATHRYN SACK,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                         Case No. 1:12-cv-01755 (CRC)
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Defendant.
    ORDER AND OPINION
    In its April 23, 2015 Order [ECF No. 43], this Court granted in part and denied in part
    Defendant Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, and
    directed the FBI to conduct additional searches for documents responsive to Plaintiff Kathryn
    Sack’s FOIA request for records related to the agency’s polygraph program. The Court also
    reserved ruling on the FBI’s invocation of FOIA Exemptions (b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(7)(E) to
    withhold documents from production to Plaintiff. Following that Order, DOJ submitted a
    supplemental memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on June 22, 2015,
    noting that it had conducted the searches and released to Plaintiff the documents they yielded.
    Not having received a response from Plaintiff after six weeks, the Court issued an Order on
    August 7, 2015, directing Plaintiff to show cause why the remaining claims against DOJ should
    not be dismissed. In Plaintiff’s response to that Order, she explained that she does not oppose
    DOJ’s arguments set forth in its supplemental memorandum and that she is “satisfied for the
    most part” with the FBI’s supplemental search and release of documents. However, she
    maintains her previous objections to the FBI’s reliance on the three exemptions. Because the
    FBI properly invoked those exemptions, and because Plaintiff sets forth no other objections, the
    Court will grant what remains of DOJ’s renewed motion for summary judgment.
    I.      FBI’s Invocation of FOIA Exemption (b)(2)
    FOIA Exemption (b)(2) provides that agencies responding to FOIA requests need not
    make available to the public information “related solely to the internal personnel rules and
    practices of an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). The FBI invoked this exemption to withhold
    documents “relating to the selection process for FBI Polygraph Examiners.” Def.’s Suppl. Mem.
    Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7. The agency contends that the information therein does not concern use
    of polygraphs, Def.’s Reply Supp. Suppl. Mem. 9, and instead “pertains to administrative matters
    of interest only to FBI employees,” Def.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7. Plaintiff
    counters that, in an earlier ruling, this Court concluded that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
    Firearms and Explosives could not invoke the same exemption to withhold documents
    concerning how it uses polygraph techniques to screen job applicants, and that by the same
    reasoning, the FBI cannot withhold “how it chooses the examiners responsible” for
    implementing such polygraph techniques. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. 6–7.
    But an agency’s hiring practices are distinct from its use of certain technologies, even if
    the hiring process at issue concerns potential operators of those technologies. “The key word” in
    Exemption (b)(2) “is ‘personnel.’” Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    562 U.S. 562
    , 569 (2011). The
    term “refers to human resources matters,” such as “the selection, placement, and training of
    employees.” 
    Id. (quoting Webster’s
    Third New International Dictionary 1687 (1966)) (internal
    quotation mark omitted). In Milner, the Supreme Court distinguished between use of techniques
    or implementation of agency policy by personnel on the one hand, and matters concerning hiring
    of and benefits for personnel on the other. The Court rejected an attempt to shield under this
    exemption documents of the Department of the Navy containing data that “assists Navy
    personnel in storing munitions.” 
    Id. at 578.
    The Court reasoned that the modifier “personnel”
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    limits the scope of the exemption to information not just “for personnel,” but “about
    personnel”—in other words, “that [which] relates to employee relations or human resources.” 
    Id. Under Milner’s
    logic, documents concerning the use of certain technologies, such as
    polygraph techniques, by personnel would not be covered by this exemption, as this Court
    concluded in its previous Order. But documents relating to “the selection” or “placement” of
    employees—even those whose job descriptions require that they use those technologies later
    on—would be covered by Exemption (b)(2). 
    Id. at 569.
    Accordingly, the Court will uphold the
    FBI’s use of this exemption for these documents concerning the agency’s selection processes.
    II.     FBI’s Invocation of FOIA Exemption (b)(5)
    FOIA Exemption (b)(5) protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
    which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
    agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). In other words, agencies may withhold, under this exemption,
    documents that “satisfy two conditions: [their] source [is] a Government agency, and [they] fall
    within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern
    litigation against the agency that holds [them].” Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users
    Protective Ass’n, 
    532 U.S. 1
    , 8 (2001). The FBI invoked this exemption to withhold a
    “paragraph containing the recommendation of employees in the FBI’s Security Division to the
    Director’s Office about the feasibility of hiring non-agent polygraph examiners” as protected by
    the “deliberative process” privilege. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 10.
    The deliberative process privilege “covers ‘documents reflecting advisory opinions,
    recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
    decisions and policies are formulated.’” Klamath Water 
    Users, 532 U.S. at 8
    (quoting NLRB v.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
    421 U.S. 132
    , 150 (1975)). Such documents must be “both ‘pre-
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    decisional’ and ‘deliberative.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
    796 F. Supp. 2d
    13, 25 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 
    449 F.3d 141
    , 151 (D.D.C.
    2006)). The protection rests on the recognition “that officials will not communicate candidly
    among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its
    object is to enhance ‘the quality of agency decisions,’ by protecting open and frank discussion
    among those who make them within the Government.” 
    Id. at 8–9
    (citation omitted) (quoting
    Sears, 
    Roebuck, 421 U.S. at 151
    ).
    The government argues that the recommendation “was not adopted or implemented by
    the FBI,” and thus that it was pre-decisional and deliberative, and its disclosure would
    “discourage candid discussion within the agency in the future.” Def.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot.
    Summ. J. 10. Ms. Sack counters that the withheld paragraph does not reflect mere deliberation
    as described by the FBI, but rather “states the official position of the entire FBI Polygraph
    Program,” which renders it “post-decisional” with respect to that Program. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s
    Suppl. Mem. 7.
    The FBI is correct. The “deliberative process privilege is intended to protect ‘the
    decision making processes of government agencies,’” not merely of agency departments
    generating recommendations for agency directors. Judicial Watch, 
    796 F. Supp. 2d
    at 25
    (emphasis added) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    365 F.3d 1108
    , 1113 (D.C.
    Cir. 2004)). A document is “pre-decisional if it was generated before agency policy was adopted
    and deliberative if it ‘reflects the give and take of the consultative process.’” 
    Id. (quoting Judicial
    Watch, 449 F.3d at 151
    ). Because the withheld paragraph was generated by an agency
    department “before agency policy was adopted” by the FBI Director, and because it reflects an
    exchange of ideas within the agency, in that its recommendation was not adopted, the FBI was
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    justified in withholding this paragraph under Exemption (b)(5).
    III.   FBI’s Invocation of FOIA Exemption (b)(7)(E)
    FOIA Exemption (b)(7)(E) protects
    records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
    extent that the production of such . . . records or information . . . would disclose
    techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or
    would disclose guidelines for [such actions] if such disclosure could reasonably be
    expected to risk circumvention of the law.
    5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The FBI invoked this exemption to withhold “information about
    procedures and techniques used by FBI agents to conduct polygraph examinations.” Def.’s
    Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 14. In support, the government contends that disclosing this
    information “could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law” under the
    exemption because it would have the potential to allow deduction of patterns or methods the FBI
    uses to implement polygraphs as law enforcement tools. In her response to DOJ’s supplemental
    memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, Sack objects to use of this
    exemption on the ground that the FBI’s definition of a reasonable risk of circumvention of the
    law is overbroad.
    As the government points out, “Exemption 7(E) sets a ‘low bar for the agency to justify
    withholding.’” Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    746 F.3d 1082
    , 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Blackwell v. FBI, 
    646 F.3d 37
    , 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The
    D.C. Circuit has upheld use of Exemption 7(E) to protect from disclosure the CIA’s security
    clearance procedures because it was “self-evident that information revealing [such] procedures
    could render those procedures vulnerable and weaken their effectiveness at uncovering
    background information on potential candidates.” Morley v. CIA, 
    508 F.3d 1108
    , 1129 (D.C.
    Cir. 2007). So too here. Disclosing the procedures and techniques the FBI uses to conduct
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    polygraph examinations would weaken their effectiveness at tracking and interpreting responses
    to questioning during such examinations, which would thereby weaken the effectiveness of
    polygraph examinations as a law enforcement tool. Accordingly, the FBI was justified in
    withholding these documents under Exemption (b)(7)(E).
    IV.    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
    ORDERED that what remains of Defendant’s renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
    is GRANTED.
    SO ORDERED.
    CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
    United States District Judge
    Date:    October 14, 2015
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