Davis v. Brittin ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
ANTHONY L. DAVIS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 19-cv-0092 (APM)
)
MICHAEL D. BRITTIN, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Anthony L. Davis asks “this Court to vacate, set-aside, or correct the [s]entence,”
Pet., ECF No. 1, at 5 (page numbers designated by ECF), imposed by the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia for his conviction in 1996 of first-degree murder while armed and related
firearms offenses, id. at 8. Petitioner is serving a term of 30 years to life imprisonment. Id.
According to Petitioner, his conviction is unlawful because the Assistant United States Attorney
who prosecuted his case committed misconduct. See generally id. at 10–12, 17–20. Petitioner
also challenges the constitutionality of D.C. Code § 22-2404, the statute pursuant to which the
Superior Court imposed a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence. See generally Pet. at 5, 74–77.
A federal district court may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
For purposes of § 2254, the local courts of the District of Columbia are treated like state courts.
See Milhouse v. Levi, 548 F.2d 357, 360 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Banks v. Smith, 377 F. Supp. 2d 92,
94 (D.D.C. 2005). A District of Columbia offender, however, faces a unique hurdle. See Byrd v.
Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because he has been convicted in and sentenced by
the D.C. Superior Court, a challenge to his conviction and sentence must be raised by motion under
D.C. Code § 23-110 in the D.C. Superior Court. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. United States, 661 F.3d 1141,
1142 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
In relevant part, D.C. Code § 23-110 provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
laws of the District of Columbia, (2) the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the sentence is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court to vacate, set aside,
or correct the sentence.
D.C. Code § 23-110(a). Such a motion “shall not be entertained . . . by any Federal . . . court if it
appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion for relief under this section or that the
Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” D.C. Code § 23-110(g); see Williams v.
Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Section 23-110(g)’s plain language makes clear
that it only divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who could
have raised viable claims pursuant to section 23-110(a).”). Hence, this federal district court has
jurisdiction only over “those claims that could [not] have been raised [under §] 23-110.” Williams,
586 F.3d at 999 (quoting Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see Ibrahim,
661 F.3d at 1142 (stating that “the availability of relief by motion under § 23-110 typically
precludes the challenger from seeking habeas relief in federal court”).
“[I]t is well established that claims predicated on prosecutorial misconduct . . . are
‘cognizable under § 23-110.’” Roberson v. United States, No. 18-cv-1469, 2018 WL 5777394, at
*2 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2018) (quoting Saunders v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 105, 109 (D.D.C.
2014)); see Richardson v. Stephens, No. 11-5004, 2011 WL 8363538, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 25,
2011) (per curiam). So, too, are claims arising from the imposition of an illegal sentence. See
Johnson v. Stansberry, No. 10-cv-0178, 2010 WL 358521, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2010). If, as
Petitioner represents, see Pet. at 3, he has raised these issues in the District of Columbia courts, he
has no recourse in federal court merely because his efforts were unsuccessful. See, e.g, Plummer
v. Fenty, 321 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Graham v. FCC Coleman USP II
Warden, No. 14-cv-1567, 2016 WL 2962190, at *3 (D.D.C. May 20, 2016); Pinkney v. United
States, No. 11-5239, 2012 WL 5995435, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012) (per curiam) (citing Garris
v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
The Court therefore denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. An Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: January 29, 2019 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge