United States v. McCarey ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
v. ) Criminal Case No. 07-338 (EGS)
)
COLLEEN MCCAREY, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is defendant Colleen McCarey’s
(“Ms. McCarey”) pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“2255 motion” or
“motion”). Ms. McCarey argues that this Court denied her due
process by accepting her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and
enter a not guilty by reason of insanity defense without sua
sponte ordering a competency study pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
Ms. McCarey requests that the Court immediately and
unconditionally release her from confinement.
After careful consideration of Ms. McCarey’s motion, the
government’s response, Ms. McCarey’s replies and letters
thereto, the entire record herein, and the applicable law, the
Court DENIES Ms. McCarey’s motion.
I. Background
Ms. McCarey was arrested and charged with one count of
threats to inflict bodily harm upon a former President and/or a
1
member of a former President’s immediate family in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 879 on November 29, 2007. See Compl., ECF No. 1;
Information, ECF No. 4 (Dec. 6, 2007). On December 7, 2007, Ms.
McCarey pled guilty to the one-count information. See Plea, ECF
No. 9. This Court accepted her guilty plea on January 9, 2008.
See Order, ECF No. 13. On April 17, 2008, Ms. McCarey filed an
unopposed motion to withdraw her guilty plea, see ECF No. 16;
she filed a notice of her insanity defense the same day, see ECF
Nos. 17. The next day, the Court granted the government’s motion
to commit Ms. McCarey to undergo a psychological examination to
ascertain whether she was insane at the time of the offense
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4242(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). See
Order, ECF No. 19. Pursuant to that Order, physicians at Federal
Medical Center (“FMC”) Carswell conducted an evaluation. They
concluded, in a report issued on July 1, 2008, that Ms. McCarey
suffered from delusional disorder at the time of the offense
and, as such, she did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her
acts. See Stipulated Facts, ECF No. 23-2 at 2-3. 1
Accordingly, on September 9, 2008, 2 the Court held a
stipulated trial, at which the Court conducted a comprehensive
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
2 The government contends that the stipulated trial occurred on
July 28, 2008, but that hearing appears to have been a status
2
colloquy to ensure that Ms. McCarey was competent to withdraw
her guilty plea and plead not guilty by reason of insanity. See
generally Sept. 9, 2008 Tr., ECF No. 71. Concluding that Ms.
McCarey was competent, see id. at 34, the Court granted her
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, see Order, ECF No. 24, and
found her not guilty by reason of insanity, see Order, ECF No.
26. The Court also ordered a study pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4243(b) to determine whether Ms. McCarey presented a substantial
risk of bodily injury to herself or another person. See Order,
ECF No. 26. Upon learning that physicians believed Ms. McCarey
presented a reasonably low risk of harming others, the Court
ordered Ms. McCarey released to reside in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania pursuant to an appropriate conditional release plan
on May 1, 2009. Order, ECF No. 36. The Court held regular status
conferences and found Ms. McCarey in compliance with the terms
of her conditional release plan until May 2011. Bench Warrant,
ECF No. 51.
On June 6, 2011, Ms. McCarey was arrested in Hawaii. See
June 8, 2011 Minute Entry. The Court ordered her committed to
the custody of the U.S. Attorney General on June 10, 2011. See
Order, ECF No. 54. The Court also ordered another psychological
evaluation and directed the parties to submit a proposed
conference to schedule the stipulated trial. See July 28, 2008
Tr., ECF No. 70.
3
conditional discharge plan. See Order, ECF No. 55. Upon
reviewing the physicians’ report and finding that Ms. McCarey
was likely not a danger to herself or others on October 19,
2011, the Court ordered her conditionally released to Bensalem,
Pennsylvania under the supervision of the United States
Probation Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See
Order, ECF No. 56. On November 16, 2011, the Court once again
ordered Ms. McCarey committed pursuant to her own representation
that she could no longer comply with the terms of her treatment
plan. See Order, ECF No. 57. On March 9, 2012, she was again
conditionally released to Bensalem, Pennsylvania upon the
Court’s review of the physicians’ reports that she was likely
not dangerous. See Order, ECF No. 61. 3
On May 13, 2013, the United States Probation Office
recommended that the Court transfer jurisdiction of Ms.
McCarey’s case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania (“Eastern District”) because Ms.
McCarey resided in Philadelphia and supervision had been
provided by that Probation Office. See P.O. Petition, ECF No.
62. The Court concurred with the recommendation and transferred
3On April 20, 2012, Ms. McCarey was arrested in Bucks County,
Pennsylvania. See April 30, 2012 Minute Order. On November 21,
2012, she pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to one to two
years in state custody. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 72 at 4. The
Court was unable to locate additional information about the
case.
4
jurisdiction to the Eastern District on May 13, 2013. See Order,
ECF No. 63. Jurisdiction was accepted by the Eastern District a
month later. See Order, ECF No. 65.; see also Criminal Case
Number 2:13-259 (E.D. Pa.).
About a year later, Ms. McCarey was arrested in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. See April 21, 2014 Minute Entry (Case
No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D. Pa.)). On May 15, 2014, the Eastern
District Court ordered Ms. McCarey committed pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 4243. See Order, ECF No. 11 (Case No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D.
Pa.)). On February 22, 2018, the Eastern District Court found
that Ms. McCarey had recovered from her mental illness such that
her conditional release would not create a substantial risk of
injury to herself or another person. See Order, ECF No. 22 (Case
No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D. Pa.)). The Court conditionally released
her to Philadelphia and imposed certain release conditions. See
id. Based on the Court’s review of the docket, it appears that
Ms. McCarey has been complying with the terms of her conditional
release. See generally Docket (Case No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D. Pa.)).
II. Analysis
Ms. McCarey argues that this Court should order her
immediately and unconditionally released. See Def.’s Mot., ECF
No. 66 at 12. She contends that the Court violated her due
process rights when it accepted her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea agreement and found her not guilty by reason of
5
insanity without sua sponte ordering a competency study. Id. at
4. She argues that she was not competent and was “suffering from
a mental illness which prevented [her] from understanding the
nature of the court proceedings” and that she “was unable to
work with [her] attorney.” Id. The government responds that the
Court should deny Ms. McCarey’s motion because the record
establishes that she was competent at the stipulated trial
proceeding. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 72.
Before the Court can reach the merits of Ms. McCarey’s 2255
motion, however, the Court must ensure that it has jurisdiction.
The Court therefore first determines whether it has jurisdiction
before it evaluates the merits of Ms. McCarey’s claim.
A. The Court Will Construe the 2255 Motion as a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
The parties agree that Ms. McCarey is not eligible for
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and that her motion should
be construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 72 at 5-9; Def.’s
Reply, ECF No. 75 at 1 (“I agree with the government that the
petition is a 2241 [motion]”).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that a “prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court” may “move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence” if the
prisoner believes “that the sentence was imposed in violation of
6
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 4
It is unclear, however, whether Ms. McCarey is a “prisoner
under the sentence of a court” because she was found not guilty.
Neither the Court nor the government could locate a case in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(“D.C. Circuit”) addressed whether a person acquitted by reason
of insanity is entitled to 2255 relief. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF
No. 72 at 6. However, several federal courts have addressed this
issue and concluded that a defendant acquitted by reason of
insanity does not qualify as a “prisoner” under a sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). See, e.g., Crook v. United
States, No. 3:04-cr-58, 2008 WL 4933966, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov.
14, 2008)(“Petitioner was found not guilty by reason of insanity
. . . . Consequently, because Petitioner is neither
a prisoner nor serving a sentence, he may not move this Court
for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”)(citing United States
4 Ms. McCarey filed her 2255 motion more than eight years after
she was found not guilty by reason of insanity. There is a one-
year statute of limitations applicable to 2255 motions. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f). The government does not contend that her
motion is untimely. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 72. For that
reason, and because the Court agrees that her motion should be
construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it need not
evaluate whether her motion is time-barred.
7
v. Tucker, 153 Fed. App'x 173, 175 (4th Cir. 2005)(per curiam)
(dismissing appeal of denial of 2255 motion because individual
had been found not guilty by reason of insanity); Archuleta v.
Hedrick, 365 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2004)(petitioner “was found
not guilty by reason of insanity and therefore is not eligible
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”); United States v. Budell,
187 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999)(section 2255 is inapplicable
to a petitioner who was originally found not guilty by reason
of insanity “[b]ecause [he] was acquitted, [therefore] he is not
a prisoner in custody under sentence . . . .”); Knox v. United
States, 2008 WL 2168871 at * 4 (D.S.C. May 2, 2008)(slip copy)
(noting that petitioner could not file a 2255 motion because he
was not a “prisoner in custody under sentence”); United States
v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 1998)(“a defendant
temporarily committed pursuant to section 4241(d) is neither
a prisoner nor under sentence” and may not file a 2255 motion).
In this case, Ms. McCarey withdrew her guilty plea and was
found not guilty by reason of insanity. See Orders, ECF Nos. 24,
26. As such, rather than being sentenced, Ms. McCarey was
committed for mental health treatment by this Court and the
Eastern District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 4243. See, e.g.,
Order, ECF No. 54; Order, ECF No. 11 (Case No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D.
Pa.)). Ms. McCarey likely is not a “prisoner in custody under a
8
sentence of a court” and therefore, she is not eligible for
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Nonetheless, a defendant committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4243 may challenge the legality of her detention 5 via a petition
for writ of habeas corpus. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(g) (“Nothing
contained in section 4243 . . . precludes a person who is
committed under . . . such sections[] from establishing by writ
of habeas corpus the illegality of his detention.”). As such,
the Court will construe Ms. McCarey’s pro se 2255 motion as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
See United States v. Class, 38 F. Supp. 3d 19, 23 (D.D.C.
2014)(“The Court construes Defendant's [pro se] Motions
liberally for any possible relief to which he might be
entitled.”)(citing Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d
576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). However, construing Ms. McCarey’s
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 creates another set of
jurisdictional issues.
5 The Court’s review of the Eastern District docket suggests that
Ms. McCarey is no longer detained. See Docket, 2:13-cr-259 (E.D.
Pa.). However, neither party raises Ms. McCarey’s conditional
release as an impediment to resolving her motion. Moreover, Ms.
McCarey requests that the Court order her immediately released
with no further restrictions and, based on this Court’s review,
it appears that Ms. McCarey must still comply with conditions of
release. See id. As such, the Court will not evaluate whether
Ms. McCarey’s conditional release renders her habeas petition
moot.
9
B. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Habeas Petition
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over Ms. McCarey’s
habeas petition turns on what she is challenging. First, to the
extent that Ms. McCarey is attempting to relitigate the Court’s
initial finding that she was not guilty by reason of insanity,
Ms. McCarey may not collaterally attack her decision to assert a
successful insanity defense. See Curry v. Overholser, 287 F.2d
137, 139–40 (D.C. Cir. 1960)(“Having thus elected to make
himself a member of that ‘exceptional class' of persons who seek
verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, [the defendant]
cannot now be heard to complain of the statutory consequences of
his election . . . . no direct attack upon [the acquittal] is
possible”)(citations omitted); Archuleta, 365 F.3d at 648
(“Archuleta may not collaterally attack his decision to assert a
successful insanity defense”) (citing Curry); see also Tucker,
153 Fed. Appx. at 175 (citing Curry); Ruston v. Jett, No. 14-cv-
1891, 2015 WL 1223669 at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2015)(rejecting
defendant’s attempt to appeal his insanity defense as coerced
because a defendant “may not collaterally attack his decision to
assert a successful insanity defense”)(citing Archuleta and
Curry). That said, a defendant may still challenge his
confinement in a habeas proceeding. See Curry, 287 F.2d at 140
(finding that the defendant could not appeal his successful
10
acquittal by reason of insanity but could challenge his
confinement).
Assuming Ms. McCarey is attempting to challenge her
confinement, the Court must still determine whether it has
jurisdiction over that challenge. “Writs of habeas corpus may be
granted by . . . district courts . . . within their respective
jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). “Because ‘[a] writ of
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief,
but upon the person who holds him in . . . custody,’ a court may
issue the writ only if it has jurisdiction over that
person.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1237–38
(D.C. Cir. 2004)(quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494 (1973) and citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004)). Because “a district court may issue the
writ only to one who is within its district, . . . [in] habeas
cases involving ‘present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies
in only one district: the district of confinement.’” Id. at 1239
(quoting Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443). At the time Ms. McCarey
filed her habeas petition in October 2016, she was committed at
FMC Carswell in Texas for stabilization and treatment. See
Order, ECF No. 11 (Case No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D. Pa.)). Thus, this
District was not the district of confinement and the Court does
not have jurisdiction over Ms. McCarey’s custodian. See Stokes,
374 F.3d at 1239.
11
Nonetheless, the government argues and Ms. McCarey agrees,
that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition because a
court that committed a defendant after an acquittal by reason of
insanity has jurisdiction over a petition challenging that
order. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 72 at 9-10; Def.’s Reply, ECF
No. 75 at 1. Again, it does not appear that the D.C. Circuit has
addressed this question, but the government relies on other
Circuit precedent for the proposition. See id. at 9-12 (citing,
among other authority, Archuleta, 365 F.3d 644). In Archuleta,
the defendant—who had been acquitted by reason of insanity and
had been committed for medical treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4243—argued that his commitment was unlawful. See Archuleta, 365
F.3d at 644-648. The 8th Circuit remanded and transferred his
habeas petition from the district court in which he was confined
to the district court that issued his commitment order. It found
that the defendant was “in custody by reason of a commitment
order issued by the District of Utah. Only that court, not the
Warden of FMC Springfield, may grant the . . . relief [the
defendant] seeks, either conditional or unconditional release.”
Id. at 649 (citing and discussing United States v. Buddell, 187
F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 1999)). The 8th Circuit concluded that the
district court that issued the commitment order had jurisdiction
to decide the habeas petition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(g)
12
and (h). 6 Id.; see also Commey v. Grondolsky, 2 F. Supp. 3d 48,
49-50 (D. Mass. 2014)(“When a person is committed pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 4243 and challenges his continued confinement . . . he
‘may, at any time during [the] confinement, file with the court
that ordered the commitment’” a challenge to that
confinement)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h))(emphasis in original).
Assuming the committing court is indeed the appropriate
court to consider Ms. McCarey’s request for unconditional
release, the Court must next determine whether it was in fact
the court that issued the commitment order. See Archuleta, 365
F.3d at 649; Commey, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 49-50. The answer to this
question, however, is not entirely clear. Indeed, this Court did
issue the initial order confining Ms. McCarey after accepting
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and finding her not
guilty by reason of insanity. See Order, ECF No. 24 (granting
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea); Order, ECF No. 26.
However, this Court was not the court that ordered Ms. McCarey
committed at the time she filed her habeas petition. Indeed,
after jurisdiction was transferred to the Eastern District in
June 2013, the Eastern District court ordered Ms. McCarey
committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243 in May 2014. See ECF No.
6 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) states that a committed defendant, counsel,
or legal guardian may “file with the court that ordered the
commitment a motion for a hearing to determine whether the
person should be discharged from the facility.”
13
11 (Case No. 2:13-cr-259 (E.D. Pa.))(ordering Ms. McCarey
committed to the custody of the Attorney General). She was still
committed pursuant to that Court’s order when she filed her
petition in October 2016. See generally Docket, Case No. 2:13-
cr-259 (E.D. Pa.). Thus, to the extent Ms. McCarey is
challenging the order that committed her at the time she filed
her petition, jurisdiction would likely not lie in this Court.
However, because the Court must construe Ms. McCarey’s pro
se petition liberally, United States v. Henry, 20 F. Supp. 3d
278, 281 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, 609 Fed. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir.
2015), the Court will assume Ms. McCarey challenges only the
orders issued by this Court.
C. Ms. McCarey’s Petition Does Not Raise a Legal Basis for
Habeas Relief
Ms. McCarey contends that her due process rights were
violated when the Court granted her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea and accepted her not guilty by reason of insanity
defense. She claims that the Court should have sua sponte
ordered a competency study because there was clear and
convincing evidence that she could not make rational decisions
at the time. See Def.’s 2255 Mot., ECF No. 66 at 5-6. The
government opposes, arguing that there was no reasonable cause
to believe that Ms. McCarey was incompetent, and the Court
conducted an extensive colloquy to ensure that Ms. McCarey was
14
competent before accepting her insanity defense. See Gov’t’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 27 at 12-27.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the prosecution of a criminal defendant who
is not mentally competent to stand trial. See Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993). “Generally, a defendant is
considered to be incompetent if he is ‘unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense.’” United States v. Weissberger,
951 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)).
However, “[t]he entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity . . . presupposes that the defendant is competent to
stand trial and to enter a plea.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 449 (1992).
A criminal defendant is entitled to a hearing on mental
competency whenever there is “sufficient evidence of
incompetency.” O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44, 55 (D.D.C.
2004)(citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966)).
However, a Court need only order a competency evaluation “if the
court has ‘reasonable cause’ to believe that the individual may
be incompetent to stand trial.” Weissberger, 951 F.2d at 395
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). “There is no precise definition
of ‘reasonable cause’; however, the Supreme Court has held that
any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires
15
a competency evaluation.” Id. (citing, among other authority,
Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (when evidence raises a bona fide doubt as
to the defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held)).
“Where the evidence fails to raise a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to the
defendant's mental competency, a court will not order an
independent mental evaluation.” O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d at
57 (quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 385).
In this case, the Court had no basis to believe that Ms.
McCarey was not competent to withdraw her guilty plea and plead
not guilty by reason of insanity. Not only did neither party
raise any concern as to Ms. McCarey’s competency, but the Court
also undertook an extensive colloquy to ensure that Ms.
McCarey’s decision to plead not guilty by reason of insanity was
rational, knowing, and voluntary. For example, at the beginning
of Ms. McCarey’s stipulated trial, the Court asked her attorney
whether she was “of the opinion that” Ms. McCarey “ha[d] a
factual and rational understanding of the charges against her.”
Ms. McCarey’s counsel replied “yes.” Tr., ECF No. 71 at 7. The
Court also asked Ms. McCarey whether her medications confuse her
or could affect her ability to understand the proceedings. See
id. at 8-9. Ms. McCarey answered that the medicine she took did
not affect her ability to understand the proceedings. Id. She
clarified that she understood that she was before the Court “to
present evidence . . . for [her] plea of not guilty by reason of
16
insanity.” Id. at 9. The Court specifically noted and observed
that Ms. McCarey “sound[ed] to be clear of mind.” Id. at 8. When
asked whether she felt “clear of mind this morning,” id., Ms.
McCarey responded “yes, very much so.” Id. at 9.
The Court further ensured that Ms. McCarey understood the
charges that the government alleged she committed and the facts
to which she had stipulated. Id. at 10-17; see also id. at 28-31
(government proffer of the stipulated facts). The Court also
reviewed and discussed with Ms. McCarey the expert reports
submitted as joint exhibits regarding her mental state. Id. at
18-19. Ms. McCarey recalled undergoing the medical evaluations,
understood the physicians’ opinions regarding her mental health
at the time of the crime, and read their reports. Id. at 19-20.
She agreed that she was suffering from a mental illness at the
time she made the threats and attested that the reports were
accurate; she also voluntarily signed the physicians’ report
into the evidentiary record. Id. at 20-21 (COURT: “I’m not
ordering you to sign it. It’s your choice.” DEFENDANT: “I will
sign it, Your Honor.”). The Court also ensured that Ms. McCarey
understood her burden of proof in submitting an insanity
defense. Id. at 22-23. Ms. McCarey replied that she understood
the consequences of her decision and affirmed that she had a
sufficient opportunity to discuss the decision with her
17
attorney. Id. at 23. Ms. McCarey also stated that she was “very
much” satisfied with the services of her attorney. Id. at 26.
Finally, Ms. McCarey understood that, by finding her not
guilty by reason of insanity, the Court would be required to
commit her to determine whether she was a danger to herself or
others. Id. at 23-24. She also understood that “the amount of
time [she could] spend in custody receiving treatment may be
longer than the maximum time to which [the Court] could have
sentenced [her] for the offense had [she] pleaded guilty or been
found guilty.” Id. at 25 (COURT: “You could be in custody for
medical treatment for the rest of your life. Do you understand
that?” DEFENDANT: “Yes, Your Honor.”). Ms. McCarey affirmed that
it was her decision to raise the insanity defense and she
understood that “no one [could] force her to plead not guilty”
by reason of insanity. Id. at 26.
Ultimately, when asked whether there was anything she did
not understand about pleading not guilty by reason of insanity,
Ms. McCarey replied that she “underst[ood] everything.” Id. at
26. After the colloquy, the government stated that it
“believe[d] Ms. McCarey [was] competent.” Id. at 34. The Court
then made a finding that Ms. McCarey “appears to be competent,
she understands the nature of the proceedings, [and] the nature
of the charges against her.” Id. The Court further elaborated
that it had “no doubt that she’s able today to understand those
18
charges [and] to assist her attorney with respect to those
charges,” and “that she’s made an intelligent decision and a
knowing decision,” and “that she’s likewise made an intelligent,
competent decision to proceed to date by way of this nonjury
proceeding.” Id.
In light of the Court’s thorough discussion with Ms.
McCarey about the proceeding, the Court cannot find that there
was any basis to believe that Ms. McCarey was not competent to
withdraw her guilty plea and plead not guilty by reason of
insanity. See O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (holding that
the Court need not order a competency evaluation unless there is
a reasonable basis to conclude that the defendant was not
competent). The Court went to painstaking lengths to ensure that
Ms. McCarey understood the consequences of her decision,
including warning her that she could spend the rest of her life
committed. Ms. McCarey clearly, confidently, consistently, and
lucidly answered all the Court’s questions. Moreover, the Court
observed that Ms. McCarey appeared and sounded to be clear of
mind. See Tr., ECF No. 71 at 8-9, 34.
While the record establishes that there was no reasonable
basis to doubt that Ms. McCarey was competent at the time, the
medical evidence also corroborates the Court’s conclusion. See
United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Griffin v. Lockhart, 935 F.2d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1991)
19
(“Medical opinions are ‘usually persuasive evidence on the
question of whether a sufficient doubt exists’ as to the
defendant's competence.”). After evaluating Ms. McCarey, one of
her physicians concluded that she “remains competent to proceed
despite her significant mental illness” because “she [] know[s]
and understand[s] the nature and consequences of her current
legal situation and can work with counsel in preparing her
defense.” Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 72 at 26,
Nevertheless, Ms. McCarey contends that she did not have a
rational understanding of the proceedings because she was in a
“psychotic state and [was] unable to comprehend the
proceedings.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 75 at 1. While the Court
does not doubt Ms. McCarey’s sincerity or the extent of her
mental illness, the record simply does not corroborate Ms.
McCarey’s claims. Despite Ms. McCarey’s contention that she was
in a delusional state at the time, the record conclusively
establishes that the Court engaged in an extended colloquy with
her and concluded that she had a factual and rational
understanding of the proceedings and the consequences of her
decision to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The record
also establishes that she conferred intelligently with her
counsel. There was absolutely no reason for the Court to
question Ms. McCarey’s competency. As such, the Court must deny
her habeas petition.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Ms. McCarey’s
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255, construed as a habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to
CLOSE civil case number 16-cv-2024. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
January 2, 2019
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